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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis to explore the theoretical similarities between 
Peirce and Vygotsky with respect to the process of concept formation. 
 
It is acknowledged that these two thinkers are seldom associated with each 
other in relation to the learning process. Peirce is seen as one of the 
founders of modern semiotics, but he is rarely linked with the activity of 
concept formation itself. Vygotsky, whilst associated with the latter, is not 
interpreted as a semiotician – even though he sometimes uses the 
terminology of signs. It will be argued in the course of this thesis, however, 
that their views are closer to each other than is commonly recognised and 
that this convergence derives from the influence of Hegel. 
 
In the case of Peirce, Hegel is often viewed in negative terms – as a 
philosophical legacy that Peirce is reacting against. It will be argued that 
this interpretation overlooks the deeper impact of Hegelian thought in terms 
of how Peirce constructs his semiotics. Indeed, an Hegelian interpretation 
of concept formation helps reframe Peirce’s account of the ‘mediating’ sign, 
the notion of the ‘determined’ sign, and the role of the ‘object’ in his triadic 
structure. Moreover, the reference point of Hegel creates an opportunity to 
re-evaluate Peirce’s icon, index and symbol. 
 
Hegel’s influence on Vygotsky is more frequently acknowledged, but 
seldom pursued in detail by commentators who often draw Vygotsky into a 
more social account of meaning construction. Full recognition of Hegel’s 
influence on Vygotsky, however, has the effect of reframing his notion of 
‘mediation’, and making his account of concept formation less focused on 
the social dimension than is commonly recognised. 
 
The overall effect of these arguments is to reposition Vygotsky’s ‘natural 
history of the sign’ in a framework that parallels Peirce’s own account of 
sign formation. There remain, of course, important differences in the 
approaches of Peirce and Vygotsky, and these will be highlighted in the 
course of the discussion. But the broader perspective outlined below 
suggests that there should be greater recognition of their philosophical 
similarities. 
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Impact Statement 
 
This thesis seeks, primarily, to re-evaluate the work Peirce and to provide a 
broader understanding of his contribution to semiotics. It is argued that 
greater recognition of the influence of Hegel on Peirce has the potential to 
bring new perspectives to his treatment of the sign, the role of the icon, 
index, and symbol, and the semiotic terminology that he employs. But this 
re-evaluation of Peirce can equally contribute to our understanding of 
Vygotsky because their positions emerge as closer to each other than is 
commonly understood. 
 
The similarities between Peirce and Vygotsky have the considerable benefit 
of bringing Peirce more into the mainstream of educational thinking. 
Vygotsky is, justifiably, held up as a key source in the philosophy of 
education. This status derives from his account of concept formation and 
the mental processes that this involves. This thesis suggests that Peirce 
should be considered in this same light, and that his semiotic thinking is 
designed to show how our concepts are formed. 
 
This revisionary account of Peirce can also be compared with the thinking 
of Vygotsky. Although the influence of Hegel on Vygotsky is often noted, its 
full extent is seldom fully acknowledged because commentators fail to 
recognise the underlying Hegelian template that he is adopting. This can 
lead to misunderstandings of Vygotsky’s concepts of dialecticism, and 
mediation, and often results in an overly ‘social’ account of meaning 
construction. This thesis outlines, in contrast, a more Hegelian account of 
Vygotsky which builds parallels with Peirce in a number of areas. 
 
Beyond the scope of Peircean and Vygotskian exegesis, this thesis 
necessarily involves an account of concept formation and how meaning, 
itself, is constructed. This inevitably has implications in many theoretical 
fields – including the philosophy of education and the broader spheres of 
philosophy and psychology. In particular, Peirce’s non-referential concept of 
meaning is explored, and the implications for his concept of truth are 
discussed in detail. This raises important questions for the social, and 
linguistic, accounts of meaning construction that have been dominant in 
twentieth century philosophy. 
 
This thesis builds upon papers that I have published in the International 
Journal of Market Research - looking at how meaning is created by brands 
using hierarchies (Barnham: 2009: 593-610), and how such meaning 
constructions can be explored using qualitative research (Barnham: 2015: 
837-854). These have been written for a very different audience – in market 
research and marketing - but they indicate how the thinking of this thesis 
can be utilised in other theoretical fields. 
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1) Introduction 
 
1.1) The Purpose and Scope of this Thesis 
Peirce and Vygotsky are infrequently associated with each other in relation 
to the learning process. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate some 
of the theoretical links that exist between them and to show how each can 
contribute to a better understanding of the other. 
 
At first sight, these two thinkers seem to be strange bedfellows. Vygotsky is 
viewed primarily as a child psychologist who is concerned with the 
processes involved in child development. He occasionally uses the 
terminology of signs, but he is hardly ever associated with semiotics per se. 
Moreover, in the secondary literature, he is frequently viewed by 
commentators as a ‘social constructionist’ who sees the social dimension 
as being critical in the formation of concepts. 
 
Peirce, on the other hand, is seen mainly as a philosopher and as a 
logician. He is recognised as one of the founding fathers of semiotics, and 
also of pragmatism, but he is neither associated with modern psychology, 
nor, specifically, with child development. His work seems more concerned 
with addressing epistemological problems of knowledge and he adopts a 
system of signs to tackle these issues. 
 
The bridge, however, that potentially exists between Vygotsky and Peirce is 
one based on their account of concept formation. Vygotsky is well known as 
a thinker on this particular issue, but Peirce is seldom viewed in this specific 
light. The reasons for this will be discussed in due course, but it will be 
argued that Vygotsky’s account of concept development shares important 
similarities with Peirce’s account of sign formation. We will explore, as a 
result of this, how Peirce’s account of signs parallels Vygotsky’s treatment 
of concepts. 
 
Is there an underlying theoretical framework that underpins these potential 
similarities between Vygotsky and Peirce? It will be argued that the 
underlying template that enables these connections to be made can be 
found in the writings of Hegel. This aspect of Vygotsky’s writings are often 
recognised in secondary texts (e.g. Derry: 2013; Van der Veer and Valsiner 
1991), but the Hegelian foundations of Peircean thought are seldom 
identified. Indeed, Peirce is often construed as being a critic of Hegel. One 
of the key themes of this thesis will be to evaluate the Hegelian roots of 
Peircean thought and to show that the latter is, in fact, developing Hegel’s 
thinking - rather than rejecting it. And, as we shall see, it is precisely within 
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the Hegelian aspects of Peirce’s semiotics that we will discover the links 
between Peirce and Vygotsky. 
 
In terms of the balance of this thesis, its main focus will be on Peirce. The 
reason for this is that the following exegesis of his thought has the most 
revisionary aspects to it. In contrast, the treatment, here, of Vygotsky is 
much closer to other commentators in the secondary literature. 
 
However, the following discussion of Vygotsky’s thought is still central to 
this thesis for a number of key reasons. Firstly, Vygotsky provides us with a 
highly influential account of concept formation that demonstrates the 
influence of Hegelian thinking on this issue. As such, he provides us with a 
useful template against which a more Hegelian interpretation of Peirce can 
be evaluated. Secondly, Vygotsky has achieved a very considerable status 
in the philosophy of education - based on his account of concept formation. 
The opportunity exists, therefore, to place Peirce on a similar footing 
amongst educationalists and in relation to the learning process. This has 
the potential benefit of positioning Peirce more in the educational 
mainstream. Peirce is often seen as being more on the periphery of the 
philosophy of learning - despite the progress made in Edusemiotics 
(Stables: 2005; Stables and Semetsky: 2015). One of the benefits of 
highlighting the theoretical proximity of Peirce and Vygotsky, is, therefore, 
to demonstrate how Peirce can be drawn into the philosophy of the learning 
process. This will have benefits for educationalists and semioticians alike. 
 
Overall, there are three main objectives of this thesis. 
 
 The first is to explore the influence of Hegel on the work of Peirce and 
Vygotsky, and to show that this results in revisionary exegeses of both 
writers and, in particular, of Peirce. In this discussion, the writings of 
Hegel will be placed in the broader context of German Philosophy. This 
will also involve a short discussion of the influence of Spinoza and 
Leibniz on Hegel. We will see that these two early modern philosophers 
had a more circuitous impact on Peirce and Vygotsky because they 
helped inform the philosophical position that Hegel expounds. 
 The second objective, derived from the Hegelian influence established 
above, is to identify the underlying similarities between Peirce and 
Vygotsky. As noted above, this area is largely unexplored in the 
secondary literature and it can provide useful learnings in relation to 
both thinkers. 
 The third objective relates to our understanding of the learning process. 
As highlighted, Vygotsky is already established in this respect, but the 
potential to construe Peirce as central thinker in this area will be 
discussed at the end of this thesis. 
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1.2) The Concept and the Sign 
 
The assertion that signs are involved in concept formation – a claim that is 
at the heart of this evaluation of Peirce - may strike the reader as a 
surprising one. It might be suggested, for example, that two separate, and 
quite distinct, dimensions are being conflated here. Signs are often seen as 
entities that we experience, whilst concepts are construed as being strictly 
formed by our minds. These two phenomena – signs and concepts - are 
thus categorised as being quite different kinds of things. The former are 
external and experiential, whilst the latter are internal and mental. It is 
important to begin this thesis by clarifying some of the issues that are at 
stake here and how Peirce, in particular, views these problems. 
 
At a simplistic level, of course, our experiences do contribute to the 
formation of our concepts. This is because these experiences provide the 
basic raw materials from which our empirical concepts are formed. This 
point is not at issue here; what needs to be debated is the much stronger 
claim that the ‘world’ has an active role in the construction of our concepts 
and that there is, as a result, a ‘bridge’ between the sensory and the 
intellectual in their formation. This claim is at the heart of Peirce’s semiotics 
and it is also central to this thesis. 
 
However, the basic argument that our sensory inputs provide the raw 
materials for our concepts can easily elide into the much stronger position 
that our senses can only have this very limited role in the formation of our 
concepts. In the next sub-section we will discuss how this slippage has 
taken place and how the quite simple claim (about mental ‘raw materials’) 
has evolved into a central feature of modern philosophy. We will see that 
what is a non-contentious claim about the status of our sense data has 
evolved into an implicit model of the mind. 
 
In addition, we will see that semioticians have, in some cases, adopted this 
model of the mind – insisting that signs (and their meanings) are separated 
from each other (along an experiential/meaning giving axis). Nöth, for 
example, explains the structure of the sign in the following terms: 
 
In this handbook, the concept of sign is generally used in its broadest sense of a 
natural or conventional semiotic entity consisting of a sign vehicle connected with 
meaning. 
(Nöth: 1990: 79) 
 
In this account, the sign is depicted as something that we first experience 
and its ‘meaning’ is what the mind then attaches to this ‘sign vehicle’ in an 
act of semiotic interpretation. The combination of these two elements forms 
a signifying act. This is an vision of the sign that is widespread in much of 
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semiotic literature. Saussure, to take just the most influential example, 
advocates a binary structure of the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’ (Saussure: 
2012) that reflects this account. 
 
Central to this thesis is the contention that Peirce rejects this underlying 
structure of the sign. He sees such a structure as being fraught with 
potential contradictions and, as a result, he proposes an account of the sign 
which is triadic, rather than binary, in nature. As we shall see, this Peircean 
model involves the notion of a mediating structure within the sign that 
intervenes between the initial, and experiential, dimension and the ultimate 
meaning created in the sign. It will be argued that this mediating structure is 
the ‘object’ of the sign. We will see that it is this ‘object’ in the sign that, for 
Peirce, transforms the raw material of perception (the ‘representamen’) and 
leads to the creation of meaning (the ‘interpretant’). This triadic account of 
the structure of the sign is also critical to establishing potential bridges to 
Vygotsky. This is because Vygotsky has his own version of the mediating 
‘object’ in the sign (which he calls ‘word meaning’) and, as a result, he 
proposes a triadic model of concept formation which has Hegelian roots. 
 
At this early stage of this thesis, it could be argued, of course, that there is a 
central flaw in the argument that is being proposed here. For Peirce hardly 
ever uses the term ‘concept’ in his writings. It seems very difficult, as a 
result, to position him as working to the same template of concept 
development as either Hegel, or Vygotsky. We need to address this 
potential criticism at this point in this thesis. 
 
Hegel is well known for his account of the nature of the concept (begriff). 
They are central to his argument that human knowledge is evolving towards 
‘The Absolute’. Hegel defines the concept, or what he calls the ‘Notion’, as 
follows: 
 
In the logic of understanding the notion is generally reckoned a mere form of 
thought, and treated as a general conception. It is to this inferior view of the notion 
that the assertion refers…that notions as such are something dead, empty and 
abstract. The case is really quite the reverse. The notion is, on the contrary, the 
principle of all life, and thus possesses at the same time a character of thorough 
concreteness….. the notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being 
and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in a 
unity of thought.  
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 187-8) 
 
We should note, at this point, that the Hegelian ‘Notion’ is more than a 
‘mere form of thought’. The latter would be simply a phenomenon that is 
present ‘in’ the mind. In contrast, a ‘Notion’ is viewed by Hegel almost as a 
technical term. It is a mental entity that fuses ‘two spheres’ – the 
experiential and the logical together. These are conjoined ‘in a unity of 
thought’ and this unity includes a concept’s relationships with other 
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concepts. Vygotsky, following Hegel, provides further definitions of a 
concept: 
 
A real concept is an image of an objective thing in its complexity. Only when we 
recognise the thing in all its connections and relations, only when this diversity is 
synthesised in a word, in an integral image through a multitude of determinations, 
do we develop a concept. 
(Vygotsky: 1998: 53) 
 
A concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the result of rational processing 
of our experience, and it is mediated knowledge of the object. To think of some 
object with the help of a concept means to include the given object in a complex 
system of mediating connections and relations disclosed in the determinations of 
the concept. 
(ibid: 55) 
 
Again, there are terms here that we will return to later. But it is clear that a 
concept, for both Hegel and Vygotsky, is, firstly, rooted in our experience of 
the world and, secondly, connected with other concepts. To take an 
example, the concept of a ‘table’ is more than the perception, or the idea, of 
a particular object – it is the set of properties that we associate with it; we 
can put things on it, it is something we find in dining rooms, and we are able 
to distinguish it from other objects of furniture, such as chairs and desks. 
Such a concept, so defined, becomes, for Hegel and Vygotsky, the basis of 
our empirical knowledge; it is embedded in a wider system of other 
concepts. 
 
The reader will notice, in the above discussion, that no mention has been 
made of Peirce. Does Peirce view the ‘concept’ in the same way? As noted, 
one of the interesting aspects of Peirce’s work is that he seldom uses the 
term ‘concept’ itself. But there is a very important reason for this. As we 
shall see, he is primarily concerned with showing how we establish 
empirical knowledge on the basis of signs. Signs are the very mechanisms 
that help us form concepts. As a result, he, in fact, uses the notion of the 
‘sign’ in much the same way as Hegel and Vygotsky use the term ‘concept’. 
Indeed, Peirce goes so far as to argue that ‘we think only in signs’ (CP2: 
397). 
 
This Peircean emphasis on signs as the mechanisms of concept formation 
creates a significant trap for the unwary. If we read his work, armed with 
assumptions regarding a binary distinction between signs (as experiential 
entities) and concepts (as mental entities), it becomes relatively easy to 
assume that signs, for Peirce, are simply experiential phenomena. It will be 
argued, however, that this is not the case. Signs, for Peirce, are the very 
point at which the empirical and the logical meet – as they do in the ‘Notion’ 
for Hegel. Peirce thus asserts that signs are his equivalent of the Hegelian 
concept - and he sees the action of signs, as a result, as an effective way to 
understand how concepts evolve. 
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There is, however, an additional, and historical, aspect to the apparent 
absence of the term ‘concept’ in Peirce’s writing. Widespread use of the 
term ‘concept’ is, in fact, a relatively modern phenomenon. This may be a 
reason why Peirce employs it so infrequently. Although the word had been 
in circulation for several centuries, it was only in the twentieth century that it 
becomes more prevalent. The Google dictionary, for example, shows that 
usage of the term accelerates sharply in the early decades of the last 
century. In this context, it is, perhaps, noteworthy that Peirce’s employment 
of the word occurs mostly in the later years of his career (and in specifically 
relation to his pragmatism). This may explain the relative lack of his use of 
the term in the early years of his career. 
 
This historical dimension is often disguised for the modern reader because 
we find Hegel’s apparent use of the term in modern translations of his work. 
In these editions of Hegel, the term ‘begriff’ is almost always construed as 
‘concept’, as is Kant’s usage of the same term in modern versions of the 
‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (Kant: 1781/2007). These translations have the 
effect of erroneously suggesting that the term ‘concept’ was in widespread 
circulation in the nineteenth century. But it is of some interest that older 
translations of Hegel (for example, Wallace’s translation of ‘The Science of 
Logic’ in 1892), use the alternative term ‘Notion’. 
 
The Hegelian ‘Notion’ should thus be treated as being the equivalent of the 
‘concept’. But if we simply translate the term ‘begriff’ as ‘concept’ then we 
run the risk of losing the Hegelian understanding of what it is to be a 
concept (as outlined in the quotation above). The Hegelian ‘Notion’ is 
equivalent to the Hegelian ‘concept’, but only if we recognise that the 
Hegelian ‘concept’ is very different from modern interpretations of the term. 
 
So there are two converging puzzles here. On the one hand, we have the 
question of why the potential links between Peirce and Hegel are not fully 
recognised in the literature. On the other hand, we have the question of why 
Peirce’s account of signs is not interpreted as relating to concept formation. 
 
The answers to both of these questions can be found in the fact that Peirce 
seeks to provide an account of concept formation that is similar to Hegel, 
but with one critical difference. Whilst sharing his conviction that concept 
formation is a central issue in philosophy, Peirce rejects Hegel’s dialectical 
approach to this problem and replaces it with a system based on sign 
development. For Peirce, concepts are formed, therefore, through the 
action of signs combining with each other, rather than through Hegelian 
dialectics. His insistence on the role of signs, and his parallel lack of usage 
of the term ‘concept’, has the effect of making him appear at some distance 
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from accounts of concept formation offered by Hegel and Vygotsky. But 
once we recognise that the Peircean sign includes both an empirical and a 
mental component, then it exhibits strong similarities with the Hegelian 
‘Notion’ and the Vygotskian ‘concept’. This view will underpin the account of 
Peircean sign put forward in this thesis. 
 
Is there any evidence for this claim? It is important to clarify that this claim 
is not simply an interpretation on my part – it is something that Peirce, 
himself, actually asserts in his writings. Hegel’s analysis of the stages of 
concept formation are outlined in ‘The Science of Logic’ (Hegel: 1892/2014) 
and they are defined as the ‘objective logic’ (footnote 1). Peirce states: 
 
But now we have to examine whether there be a doctrine of signs corresponding to 
Hegel’s objective logic; that is to say, whether there be a life in Signs, so that – the 
requisite vehicle being present - they will go through a certain order of 
development, and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that 
the same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be 
the matter of the thought, or whether, in addition to such a repetitive order, there 
be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes 
through, and what is the nature of it (my italics). 
(CP2: 111) 
 
This quotation both shows that Peirce endeavours to follow Hegel, and also 
that Peirce conceives signs as an alternative mechanism for concept 
formation. He asserts that a symbol needs to be ‘furnished with a vehicle of 
life’ – which is the concept that underlies it. Peirce certainly rejects Hegelian 
dialecticism, but it seems clear that Hegel’s ‘objective logic’ still provides 
him with an underlying template for concept formation. In the quotation 
above, Peirce calls this process ‘a life in Signs’. Interestingly, Vygotsky 
describes concept formation in a parallel manner – describing it as ‘the 
natural history of the sign’ (Vygotsky: 1978: 45). This, of course, raises the 
question of what sort of process is involved in this ‘life in Signs’, or ‘the 
natural history of the sign’? The answers to these questions are slightly 
different for Hegel and Peirce, on the one hand, and Vygotsky, on the other. 
 
Hegel and Peirce are working in a philosophical culture that is still 
dominated by the thinking of Kant and his attempts to show that empirical 
knowledge is achievable despite the problems of Cartesian Dualism 
(Descartes: 1985). They want to show, as Kant tried to do, that is possible 
to move from our sensory experience of the world to knowledge of it (e.g. 
from the ‘phenomenal’ to the ‘noumenal’). They adopt different strategies 
compared with Kant, but this does not disguise the fact that they are 
focused on this same philosophical project. As such, both Hegel and Peirce 
are dealing, fundamentally, with epistemology - and they view the process 
of concept formation as providing a potential solution to epistemological 
questions. They are trying to establish, in their different ways, an account of 
how the human mind moves from raw ‘sense data’ to the possession of 
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concepts involving a synthetic mixture of the empirical and the logical 
(footnote 2). 
 
 
In the case of Vygotsky the ‘natural history’ is a little different, because he is 
less concerned with purely epistemological issues. As a result, his remit is 
generally narrower. Nevertheless, he still seeks to demonstrate how the 
mind moves from its sensory inputs, which he calls ‘natural perceptions’, to 
the concepts present in the ‘higher psychological processes’ (Vygotsky: 
1978). In his own ‘natural history of the sign’ Vygotsky adopts an Hegelian 
template, but he uses it simply to understand the learning processes - 
rather than to demonstrate how a general account of how empirical 
knowledge can be established. 
 
From this brief discussion, it is already clear that the account of signs being 
proposed in this thesis extends beyond the usual scope of modern 
semiotics. It is important, therefore, to give some indication of its key 
themes, and to position these within a wider perspective. 
 
As noted above, the arguments, presented here, seek to place signs in an 
epistemological context. In the hands of Peirce, signs are not phenomena 
which require, or demand, ‘interpretation’ (as they would in the binary 
model). They are, instead, the very mechanisms through which the human 
mind develops the conceptual tools for knowledge of the world. This places 
Peircean signs in a context that moves them some distance away from 
semiotic discussions that tend to focus on culture, the philosophy of 
language, or questions of communication. 
 
Closely linked to this epistemological focus is the fact that Hegel’s, and 
Peirce’s, account of concept formation evolves, in important respects, from 
their philosophy of perception. Indeed, for Peirce, his semiotics should be 
viewed as a systematic attempt to address the consequences of his theory 
of perception. This, again, shifts the focus of Peircean thought away from 
the usual domains of semiotics. For many semioticians, issues raised by 
the philosophy of perception barely register in their thinking. They take the 
sensory world as they find it and they are more focused, instead, on how 
semiotics works at a ‘cultural’ level. This is not, however, how Peirce 
comprehends the activity of sign formation – he sees perception as being 
foundational in this process. 
 
This thesis will, therefore, consider signs, and signification, from a 
perspective that is infrequently adopted in semiotics. This is not to say that 
the issues of culture and language are not touched upon in the following 
discussion (and particularly with reference to Vygotsky). Rather, we will 
approach these specific topics from directions that do not place them centre 
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stage. And this will correspond with an account of Peircean sign action that 
seeks to draw out its Hegelian roots. 
 
 
 
In this respect, it is also important to explore how Peirce’s account of signs, 
and concept formation, differs from the ‘social’ accounts of meaning 
creation that have been dominant in the twentieth century. This is also 
important in relation to our later discussions of Vygotsky. The latter is often 
understood as giving a central role to the ‘social dimension’ in meaning 
creation. Indeed, he is frequently held up as being a pioneer in this area. 
But we will see that his account of meaning creation is not as avowedly 
‘social’ as is often claimed. We will see that its roots in Hegelian thought 
pull it back from a wholly social account of how meaning is created. And, 
again, we will see that it has more in common with Peirce than is commonly 
acknowledged. In this respect, a clear understanding of Vygotsky’s 
Hegelian influences are thus instructive because they temper the more 
‘social constructionist’ interpretations of Vygotsky which are encountered in 
the secondary literature. 
 
In the following sub-sections, therefore, we will explore two areas. Firstly, 
we will consider, in more detail, the model of meaning construction that 
underpins the binary account of the sign which is commonly found in 
modern semiotics. Secondly, we will look at how this model has also 
become central to the ‘social’ models of meaning creation that have been 
dominant in twentieth century. 
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1.3)  Dualism and the Sign 
 
1.3.1)  Dualism and ‘Mediation’ 
 
We have seen that if the sign is construed as a sensory input, combined 
with an ‘interpretation’ that gives it meaning, then it will possess a binary 
quality. In this section we will consider where this binary model of the sign 
comes from and the factors that have influenced its impact on semiotics. 
 
It is clear, from the outset, that there is an implicit dualism present in this 
model. The notion of ‘dualism’ is one that is well recognised in modern 
philosophy. Descartes’ form of dualism is widely acknowledged as dividing 
the world into two halves - the ‘internal’ mental world of ‘res cogitans’ and 
‘external’ world of ‘res extensa’ (Descartes: 1985). As many philosophers 
have shown (e.g. Hume: 1985), such dualism makes it very difficult to show 
how valid empirical knowledge might be achievable - because the dualism 
isolates the mind from reality. Whatever is in the mind, at a sensory level, 
cannot be known by the mind to exist in reality itself, if only because our 
sense data is construed as simply existing within the mind. Kant reinforced 
this view by dividing reality into the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘noumenal’. The 
former is what we experience directly, whilst the latter is thought to only 
exist behind a Kantian ‘veil of perception’ (Kant: 1781/ 2007). As Peirce 
observes, this kind of dualism leads to philosophy that ‘performs its 
analyses with an axe’ (EP2: 2). 
 
This thesis takes an anti-dualist stance. A full discussion of whether dualism 
is fundamentally flawed lies outside of the scope of this thesis. But we will 
see, in due course, that Hegel, Peirce, and Vygotsky share the view that 
dualism is a philosophical mistake. And when adopting this view, all three 
thinkers are also reflecting the legacy of Spinoza and Leibniz - who were 
the first to attack Descartes’ original position. The rejection of dualism, 
therefore, is a theme that runs throughout this thesis and it is one that we 
will return to in the course of our discussion. 
 
As noted earlier, Peirce follows Hegel in putting forward the view that the 
Cartesian Dualism can be overcome if the mind is able to bridge its 
apparent divide through a mediating entity. As we shall see, in the case of 
Hegel, this mediating entity is the ‘Essence’ that is first posited, and then 
formed into a ‘Notion’, through Hegel’s dialectics. In the case of Peirce the 
mediating entity is the ‘object’ in the triadic sign which evolves to eventually 
form a symbol. And, in the case of Vygotsky, he proposes the idea of ‘word 
meaning’ as a form of mediating entity which fuses the empirical and the 
intellectual. 
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Mediation is, therefore, how all three thinkers believe we can overcome the 
dangers of Cartesian Dualism. How such mediation works will be 
discussed, in detail, in this thesis; it will form a central theme of our 
discussions. Such analysis will include detailed discussion of how the 
mediating entity is initially formed and how it subsequently evolves. We will 
also consider how the idea of ‘mediation’ has been interpreted (and 
possibly misinterpreted) as a ‘social’ phenomenon, in Vygotskian literature. 
 
But at this stage, we should highlight that the idea of some kind of initial 
sensory input (which is fully accepted by Hegel, Peirce and Vygotsky) does 
not commit them to dualism. All three accept that we do, in fact, experience 
such sensory input. We could call this the ‘world’, for the sake of argument, 
but, if we use such term, we must be clear that we are not implying the 
existence of a Kantian ‘noumenal’ reality. In fact, Peirce deliberately uses 
the term ‘Phaneron’, on some occasions, to avoid such an implication. All 
three thinkers, therefore, simply accept that we do have some kind of 
sensory input - of whatever kind that may be. 
 
But even this position can easily be interpreted as a form of dualism. It can 
easily slip into a phenomenological claim that all we possess are our mental 
experiences – that ‘reality’ is no more than a collection of our sense data. 
Why is this alternative view intrinsically dualist? It is so because it still 
assumes that ‘one leg’ of the dualist position is, in fact, true – that there are 
such things as ‘sense data’ existing in a mental ‘space’. Such a position is 
certainly a denial of objective reality, but it is still, implicitly, an acceptance 
of a dualist division of reality. 
 
In contrast to this, as we shall see, Hegel and Peirce argue that we do not 
know the nature of our sense data. They are both non-committal on this key 
point and they assume that what we experience is only ‘vague’ or 
‘indeterminate’. Likewise, Vygotsky, whilst he is generally less concerned 
with these philosophical issues, still tends to view our perceptions as 
‘vague’. 
 
Where Vygotsky is certainly different from both Hegel and Peirce is in the 
role he gives to the social dimension. This is where the question of 
‘mediation’ is, once more, of importance. One of the issues that we will 
discuss, later in this thesis, is how mediation can be mis-interpreted in 
relation to the social aspects of meaning creation. Some commentators 
argue that social mediation between individuals within a society is how 
meaning is created. I would argue that this is a misrepresentation of 
Vygotsky’s views, and, also, that it re-introduces a form of dualism. For if 
meaning is created within a society, then this is necessarily separate from 
the mind of the individual. And the question then remains as to how such 
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socially created meaning can be transferred to the mind – an issue that 
Bruner has called the ‘problem of interiorisation’ (Bruner: 2001: 202). 
 
One of the arguments of this thesis, however, is that Vygotsky does not see 
the social dimension as being one in which meaning is first created, and 
transferred to the mind of the individual. Instead, he sees the social realm 
as simply providing another sensory input into the process of concept and 
meaning formation. The social dimension does this by providing a ‘word’ 
that the child can decide to use as a way of understanding his, or her, 
experience. The meaning that is created by the child is, therefore, entirely 
the product of the child’s own mind. It is in the child’s mind that meaning is 
made – rather than in the social realm. It is important to emphasis this point 
because this interpretation of Vygotsky brings him closer to Hegel, and to 
Peirce, and serves to distance him from the social constructionist positions 
of the twentieth century. And this conclusion is not, it turns out, a denial of 
‘mediation’ because the concept, formed in the mind, is still construed by 
Vygotsky as a mediating entity. 
 
So, to summarise, the three main thinkers in this thesis – Hegel, Peirce and 
Vygotsky – share the view that dualism is a philosophical mistake. They 
seek to overcome the problems that it causes by adopting a model of 
cognition that involves a ‘mediating’ entity. How they construe this entity 
varies from thinker to thinker, but this feature is critical to the assertion that 
they share a broadly similar perspective on concept formation. 
 
 
1.3.2)  ‘Secondary Dualism’ 
 
Besides the difficult questions raised by Cartesian Dualism, there is also 
another, more subtle, form of philosophical dualism that exists and which is 
central to our current understanding of the sign. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, let us call this ‘secondary dualism’. In this 
form of dualism we accept that our minds do not have access to a 
‘noumenal’ world ‘behind’ our perceptions, but we still claim that we have 
direct access to our sense data. This philosophical position, if adopted, has 
the effect of transforming the underlying status of our sensory experiences. 
In this new framework, our sense data now become entities that ‘exist’ only 
in the mind. These ‘sense impressions’ (Hume: 1985) are separated from 
reality, but they can, at least, be interrogated just as they appear to us – as 
sense data.  
 
In this model of ‘secondary dualism’, what has happened is that the location 
of dualism has been shifted to an internal division that takes place within 
the mind; it now exists between our sense data and the intellect. In many 
accounts, these ‘isolated’ sense data in the mind are deemed to be 
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‘representational’, or ‘foundational’, in nature, and they underpin the 
‘representational paradigm’ which is dominant in much of contemporary 
thought (Derry: 2013: 126-132). 
 
In this cognitive structure, our sense data are construed as providing 
experiential ‘content’. This content also seems to be ‘fixed’, if for no other 
reason than that it has been ‘given’ to us by reality. When confronted with 
this content, the mind considers the similarities, the differences, and the 
connections, which may exist between its individual elements. And, in 
particular, it is claimed that the mind is able to create ‘general terms’, or 
‘universals’, from these elements. It does this by identifying the similarities 
that it observes and by ‘abstracting’ them (Locke: 1690/1981: 297). Equally, 
it is asserted that the mind is able to identify causal connections between its 
sense data on the basis of the ‘constant conjunctions’ it observes (Hume: 
1985). Critically, this results in a framework in which the mind brings 
meaning and interpretation to the ‘content’ that is provided by the senses. 
 
This model also leads to the assertion that rational thought is ‘separated’ 
from reality and that, by itself, it cannot inform our understanding of the 
world. This, in turn, leads to a belief, in the empiricist tradition, that 
rationalism is ‘decontextualised’ (Wertsch: 1996: 30). It also has the effect 
of relativising our knowledge (Derry: 2013: 47). 
 
‘Secondary dualism’ is thus a more implicit, but very powerful, form of 
dualism. On one side, we have our ‘received’ sense data and, on the other, 
our acts of mental ‘interpretation’. Rorty describes this particular dualism in 
evocative terms – as the mind being like a ‘Mirror of Nature’ - with an ‘inner 
eye’ that stands back and considers its sense data (Rorty: 1980: 47). 
Semetsky calls this the ‘spectator theory of knowledge’ (Semetsky: 2010: 
54), and, likewise, McDowell calls it a ‘sideways on picture of the 
understanding’ (McDowell: 1994: 82). Davidson refers to it as the third 
‘dogma of empiricism’ (Davidson: 1973). Pikkarainen argues that it is a 
model of cognition that should be resisted: 
 
According to this model the form (or essence or feature as part of essence) is 
somehow copied from the original object to the mind of the subject in the event of 
perception. This model is an attractive analogy of a reflection of the image via a 
mirror or lens but it should be resisted. 
(Pikkarainen: 2016: 29-30) 
 
This model is highly relevant to our discussion of the sign because it is this 
precisely the structure of ‘secondary dualism’ which underpins the binary 
model of it. In this account, we have, on the one hand, the sensory input ‘in 
the mirror’ (often called the ‘signifier’ or ‘sign vehicle’); on the other, we 
have an ‘interpretation’ producing meaning (the ‘signified’). ‘Secondary 
dualism’, therefore, seems to inform this account of the sign. 
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If we consider this model, however, in any detail, it is evident that there is a 
fundamental contradiction at its very heart. For what it wishes to assert is 
that the mind has an interpretative role in relation to its sense data. But this 
conclusion, it turns out, is predicated on the tacit assumption that we must 
already ‘know’ the identity of that sense data. For if this premise is not 
implicitly accepted, then the ‘interpretations’ of our sense data could not 
possibly be construed as interpretations. It follows from this that the 
‘interpretative’ model of ‘secondary dualism’ is actually founded on an 
implicit assumption of prior knowledge. An interpretation, after all, has to be 
an interpretation of something. The ‘secondary dualist’, therefore, wants to 
claim that our knowledge of the world is only ‘interpretative’, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining that we do, in fact, know the initial identity of our 
sense data. This position is clearly fallacious; he, or she, cannot have it 
both ways. 
 
It would be acceptable, of course, if the ‘secondary dualist’ acknowledged 
that we do not know the initial identity of our sense data. But what he, or 
she, cannot maintain is that we only possess ‘interpretations’ of such data. 
In due course, we will see that Hegel and Peirce do not encounter these 
philosophical difficulties. This is because they reject the model of 
‘secondary dualism’ itself, and they also refute the view that we can ‘know’ 
the content of our sense impressions. Instead, they argue, more correctly, 
that we can only experience ‘indeterminate’ perceptions and that we 
cannot, as a result, make ‘interpretations’ of them. 
 
This model of ‘secondary dualism’ has many consequences. One of the 
main ones is the belief that our accounts of ‘reality’ are relativistic. If our 
knowledge of ‘the world’ is, necessarily, a result of ‘interpretation’, then it 
follows that different interpretations are always possible and that they are 
relative to each other. When taken to extremes, this position negates the 
possibility of any form of ‘valid’ empirical knowledge. Gergen, for example, 
suggests that: 
 
We must suppose that everything that we have learned about our world and 
ourselves – that gravity holds us to the earth, people cannot fly like birds, cancer 
kills, or that punishment deters bad behaviour – could be otherwise. There is 
nothing about ‘what there is’ that demands these particular accounts; we could use 
our language to construct alternative worlds in which there is no gravity or cancer, 
or in which persons and birds are equivalent, and punishment adored. 
(Gergen: 1999: 47) 
 
In this view, ‘secondary dualism’ prevents us from achieving any knowledge 
that is objectively rooted in the world. This is due, of course, to the fact that 
it implicitly accepts that our internal sense data are detached from any 
putative ‘reality’. And, as Gergen amply demonstrates, language then 
becomes the main mechanism through which we may ‘construct’ the world. 
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This conclusion is of significant relevance to this thesis. If semiotics 
implicitly adopts the underlying template of ‘secondary dualism’, then it 
follows that semiotics will always involve some kind of interpretation of 
reality. This means that the action of the sign will result in some kind of 
‘distortion’ of ‘reality’ because our interpretations will determine how our 
meanings are constructed. Eco clearly illustrates where this kind of thinking 
can lead: 
 
Semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in 
order to lie. 
(Eco: 1976: 7) 
 
And in the hands of writers, like Volosinov (1973: 10), it results in the 
assertion that semiotics is ‘ideological’ (see section 1.3). 
 
The semiotics of Peirce, however, rejects the implicit assumptions of 
‘secondary dualism’. Instead, Peirce proposes an alternative model of 
human experience that construes the human mind as being immersed in 
signs. As a result, there is no ‘mirror’, and no ‘inspecting eye’, in his account 
of cognition. This enables Peirce to adopt an entirely different sign structure 
and, critically, it is one that is not based on the notion of ‘interpretation’. As 
Greenlee remarks, Peircean semiotics seeks the ‘elimination of the 
‘psychological’ element’ (Greenlee: 1973: 42). 
 
The most effective way to explain the differences between the binary model 
of the sign and the Peircean model of the sign is to consider them 
diagrammatically. We have noted that the binary model involves the 
transformation of the signifier into a signified along lines suggested by 
secondary dualism. This can be depicted as follows: 
 
Fig 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, the identity of the signifier itself is a) known and b) its actual 
identity (in reality) does not change in the semiotic process. The 
transformatory effect of the sign is, as a result, provided by the action of a 
‘code’ that acts between them. And because the ‘code’ is an ‘interpretation’ 
(either individual, or cultural) it follows that the meaning of a sign (the 
 
Signifier 
 
Signified 
CODE 
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signified) involves a new meaning being given (or added) to the signifier by 
the mind. 
 
This model is entirely refuted by Peirce. Firstly, he rejects the claim that we 
can ‘know’ the initial identity of the signifier; for him the initial perception is a 
‘vague’. Secondly, and as a result of this, he proposes a different kind of 
transformation in the sign. In a process that we will discuss in due course, 
the initially ‘vague’ perception (or ‘representamen’) is transformed, through 
a process of determination, into a new identity (e.g. an interpretant). And 
critically, this new identity is construed by Peirce as also existing in the 
world: 
 
Fig 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model - of successive determinations - is key to understanding 
Peircean semiotics. It entails a never-ending activity of ‘semiosis’ (EP2: 
411) – a point that is highlighted by Stables in his view that Edusemiotics is 
‘process semiotics’ (Stables: 2016: 45; Stables: 2018: 31). In this process 
signs enable us to move from ‘indeterminate’ (and ‘vague’) perceptions to 
ones which are more ‘determinate’. And it is through this activity that the 
sign develops into an emergent concept - by becoming more ‘determined’. 
As Engel–Tiercelin argues: 
 
What Peirce has in mind when he talks about a ‘logic of vagueness’ is, in a 
broader sense, the formal study of signs, namely what he calls ‘significs’. 
(Engel-Tiercelin: 1992: 66) 
 
So signs, in this Peircean model, do not connect a known identity and an 
interpretative ‘meaning’ (‘a red light’ and ‘stop!’, for example). Instead, signs 
provide a mechanism that enables our perceptions to evolve into our 
concepts. And because these signs are thought to exist in the world (as 
‘interpretants’) they are also things that we can subsequently perceive. As 
noted, it is widely recognised that Peirce claims that all thought is ‘in signs’: 
 
The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized, is thought in signs. But 
thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must 
necessarily be in signs. 
(CP5: 251) 
 
This can easily be understood as a claim that we cannot think without some 
prior experiential input (an essentially Lockean interpretation (Locke: 
‘Vague’ 
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Determinate 
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Vague – creating 
a new Identity 
ETC…. 
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1690/19810), but it is now evident that, for Peirce, it represents the much 
stronger claim that signs are involved in the creation of our concepts. 
 
So, to summarise, Cartesian Dualism is able to exert its influence in ways 
that stretch well beyond a basic dualism of ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’. 
Of particular relevance to the discipline of semiotics is the way that a form 
of dualism – which we have called ‘secondary dualism’ –informs one of the 
dominant ways in which the sign is conventionally structured. 
 
At this stage in our discussion, I have simply highlighted that this binary 
model - of ‘known’ sense data, and an interpretative mind - is not one that 
Peirce subscribes to. He rejects the idea that we have knowledge of such 
‘foundational’ types of sense data and he seeks, instead, to understand 
how we move from ‘vague’ perceptions to empirical knowledge. 
 
The specific claim, however, that we ‘know’ the nature of our perceptions is 
an aspect of the model that we need to consider in more detail. And it is to 
this that we shall now turn. 
 
 
1.3.3) The ‘Myth of the Given’ 
 
When first encountered, the cognitive model of ‘secondary dualism’ seems 
to offer a potential solution to the epistemological ‘problem of knowledge’. 
For it suggests that, even if we cannot see ‘behind’ the Kantian ‘veil of 
perception’, we are able, at the very least, to ‘know’ the character of our 
‘sense impressions’. In otherwords, even if we do not know whether 
something is really ‘red’ (in some ‘noumenal’ reality), we can know, at least, 
that we have a sense datum of ‘red’ in our minds. 
 
This claim is, as noted, a key aspect of ‘secondary dualism’. For this model 
not only separates our sense data from our interpretations of them, but, as 
we saw above, it also asserts that we have direct access to our sense data 
and that we can, as a result, know their qualities. 
 
This position, however, is rejected by philosophers, such as Sellars (1956), 
who call this particular assertion the ‘Myth of the Given’. Sellars argues that 
we cannot possess this type of ‘direct’ experiential knowledge. He 
maintains that our knowledge of our sense perceptions necessarily involves 
some form of comparison between them. As a result of this, he argues, our 
sense data cannot be the source of direct, non-inferential, knowledge. 
 
This seminal attack on the ‘Myth of the Given’ is, of course, prefigured by 
Peirce (‘colour is not an impression, but an inference’ quoted in Murphey: 
1993: 415). As we have noted above, Peirce claims that we can only 
experience ‘indeterminate’ vagues. He does not, therefore, fall into the trap 
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of the ‘Myth of the Given’. He claims, instead, that we cannot know the 
identities and his model of the sign works, instead, on the very basis that 
we can never possess such knowledge. 
 
And, if we look at the historic roots of Sellars’ and Peirce’s position, we find 
that the Hegel agrees with them about the indeterminacy of our sense data. 
Indeed, Hegel goes further and he specifically rejects the underlying 
structure of ‘secondary dualism’ itself: 
 
It is a mistake to assume that, first of all, there are objects which form the content 
of our representations, and then our subjective activity comes in afterwards to form 
concepts of them, through the operation of abstracting that we spoke of earlier, 
and by summarising what the objects have in common. 
(Hegel:1830/1991: 241) 
 
Importantly, we can also identify how the ‘Myth of the Given’ is closely 
connected with our discussion of the sign. For the binary model of the sign, 
comprising sense data and mental interpretation, insists that we know the 
initial identity of the signifier. This is what leads the binary model to require 
a mechanism (e.g. a ‘code’) to explain the creation of meaning. In contrast 
to this, Peirce and Hegel, in rejecting the ‘Myth of the Given’, and in 
maintaining that our perceptions are ‘indeterminate’, have a requirement for 
a ‘code’. This is because our initial perceptions do not represent a form of 
‘direct’ knowledge. 
 
To summarise this sub-section, therefore, Peirce rejects both the model of 
‘secondary dualism’ and the ‘Myth of the Given’. Both of these positions 
underpin the binary model of the sign that posits a ‘sign vehicle’ and a 
meaning attached to it. This is the model that we find, most famously, in the 
Saussurian model of the sign (his ‘signifier’ and his ‘signified’). In contrast, 
Peirce, following Hegel, argues that we cannot know the identity of our 
perceptions - they are ‘vagues’. 
 
This philosophical position opens up the possibility of an alternative 
approach to the structure of the sign based on progressive determinations 
of our ‘indeterminate’ sense data. How this position is defended by Peirce 
will form a major theme of this thesis. In the next section, however, we must 
briefly consider how the binary structure of ‘secondary dualism’ also 
impacts extensively on the social accounts of meaning creation that have 
dominated the twentieth century. 
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1.4) The Social Creation of Meaning 
 
In this section we will evaluate the assertion, common in the twentieth 
century, that meaning is, and, indeed, can only be, created in the social 
domain. This discussion is, by its very nature, summary in scope, but it 
seeks to outline some of the themes that we will encounter later. In relation 
to these issues, we will consider the work of Wittgenstein (2009), Geertz 
(1973), Barthes (2009), and Volosinov (1973), some of the key arguments 
of Social Constructionism (Gergen: 1999; Burr: 1995), and also, briefly, the 
discipline of Social Semiotics (Hodge and Kress: 1988). This discussion 
also outlines how the positions of Peirce and Vygotsky compare with these 
social accounts of meaning creation. 
 
The basic starting point for the view that meaning is created socially is the 
tacit assumption that meaning cannot exist, as meaning, in the world. This 
view is implicit in much of modern culture, and, indeed, in much of semiotics 
itself. This leads to the assertion that meaning can only be created by the 
human mind. As we have just seen, in the model of ‘secondary dualism’, it 
is maintained, for example, that reality provides our raw empirical 
experiences, but that these are given meaning subsequently by our 
interpretative mind. 
 
One of the important questions that we will encounter in this thesis is 
whether, in this context, meaning can be created by the mind alone, or 
whether it is, necessarily, a social construct. In this respect, I will argue that 
both Hegel and Peirce, following a Kantian tradition, are constructionists, 
but not social constructionists. They believe that meaning can be created by 
the mind (in conjunction with its experiential input) and that, whilst a social 
dimension does become involved at later stages, it is not required to create 
meaning from the outset. This is contrast to modern social constructionists 
who generally believe that meaning can only be created at a social level. As 
we shall see, the position of Vygotsky is instructive here because he sits on 
the boundary between these two schools of thought. He certainly argues 
that a social input is required for concept formation, but his Hegelian roots 
prevent him from being a full social constructionist – despite the inclinations 
of some commentators to view him in this way (Phillips: 1995). 
 
The argument that meaning is wholly formed in the social dimension finds 
its most influential expression in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
(Wittgenstein: 2009). Interestingly, Wittgenstein actually shares a number of 
important views with Peirce. One of these is that meaning cannot be 
established on the basis of reference. For example, Wittgenstein argues 
that ‘The red that you imagine is surely not the same (not the same thing) 
as the red which you see in front of you; so how can you say that it is what 
you imagined?’ (Wittgenstein: 2009: 443). Wittgenstein concludes, as a 
 26 
result of this, that we must work within a framework of ‘family resemblances’ 
(ibid: 67). On this point, Peirce would entirely agree with Wittgenstein about 
the inherent ‘vagueness’ of our perceptions, but he would not conclude that 
meaning is, as a consequence, socially created. As we shall see, Peirce 
argues that our perceptions are experienced as ‘classes’, but he construes 
this as an indication of their ‘indeterminacy’, rather than as a need to invoke 
a social account of meaning creation. 
 
Wittgenstein also describes his ‘mind game’ of the beetles in different boxes 
- when discussing whether we can have access to the sensations of others. 
He argues that our sensations of pain, for example, are like a beetle in a 
box that only we can inspect. We do not know what is in other people’s 
boxes and they may have something quite different (which they call a 
‘beetle), or nothing at all, in their boxes. As a result of this, Wittgenstein 
argues that meaning cannot be determined ‘on the model of ‘object and 
name’ because ‘the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant’ (ibid: 
293). As such, a ‘private language’ is not possible because meaning can 
only be created at a social level. 
 
Again, Peirce would agree with Wittgenstein’s premiss, but not with his 
conclusion. He would accept that meanings are often not referenced on the 
objects that we experience. But, instead of taking this as an indication that 
meaning can be formed only in the social domain, Peirce argues that our 
minds adopt quite a different strategy. As we shall see, Peirce argues that 
our minds create ‘objects of thought’ (such as unicorns) which may not exist 
(as reference points) in the world, but which still possess meaning. Meaning 
is created through these ‘objects of thought’ and yet it is not dependent on 
the existence of reference points that exist in the world. 
 
Wittgenstein’s position is foreshadowed, in some respects, by Frege who 
makes a distinction between ‘reference’ and ‘sense’. The latter is viewed by 
Frege as being a mechanism that allows sentences to create meaning. He 
argues that ‘sense’ involves ‘expression’, and that this, again, creates 
meaning without need for reference: 
 
A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, 
stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense 
and designate its reference. 
(Frege: 1892/1997) 
 
When comparing this position with that of Peirce, we can discern, here, a 
fork in the road within nineteenth century philosophy. Frege adopts the 
notions of ‘sense’ and ‘expression’ as ways of explaining meaning without 
reference. But, in contrast, Peirce adopts the much older solution of an 
‘object of thought’ being present in the mind. 
 
 
 27 
 
Having concluded that words cannot achieve their meanings through an act 
of reference, Wittgenstein argues that meaning must be created through 
‘language games’ (ibid: 7), or through social ‘conventions’ (ibid: 355). He 
cites the example of builders using single words to communicate to each 
other what materials they need. He argues that when we look for the 
meaning of a word we should consider, not its reference, but how it is used: 
 
For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not 
all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language. 
(ibid: 43) 
 
Regard the sentence as an instrument, and its sense as its employment. 
(ibid: 421) 
 
For Wittgenstein, this linguistic perspective transforms the role of words. 
They become ‘tools’ in a ‘tool box’ (ibid: 11) and, rather than ‘representing’ 
something (referentially), words are now viewed as a ‘means of 
representation’ in our ‘language games’ (ibid: 50). The meanings of words 
thus derive from how they are used - not from what they ‘stand for’. 
 
This is not the place to evaluate whether Wittgenstein is correct in his 
analysis of meaning creation (footnote 3), but his views have certainly been 
highly influential. One of its key effects of such a position, however, is to 
render meaning relative. If meaning is created through our ‘language 
games’, then it follows that differing meanings will be created by different 
social groups. This introduces the concept of ‘culture’ into our discussion – 
and the allied belief that we must understand different cultures in their own 
terms. 
 
In focusing on this issue, Geertz, in his ‘The Interpretation of Cultures’ takes 
the view that anthropologists must enter into the world of their ‘subjects’ in 
order to understand their socially constructed meanings. This avoids any 
troubling questions with reference, and the possible ‘objectivity’ of those 
views:  
 
The whole point of a semiotic approach to culture is, as I have said, to aid us in 
gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in 
some extended sense of the term, converse with them. 
(Geertz: 1973: 24) 
 
Geertz suggests, therefore, that we can, through a ‘semiotic approach’, gain 
access to a cultural world and he stipulates, following Wittgenstein, that: 
 
Culture is public because meaning is. 
(ibid: 12) 
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And in the same chapter, quoting Weber, Geertz states that: 
 
The concept of culture that I espouse, and whose utility the essays below attempt 
to demonstrate, is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture 
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. 
(ibid: 5) 
 
In these comments, it is clear that Geertz is committed to the ‘interpretative’ 
stance outlined in our account of ‘secondary dualism’. And his borrowed 
metaphor of Man being ‘suspended in webs of significance’ indicates that 
he accepts that there must be a certain disconnection between reality and 
culture. When working with meaning, there is no ‘objectivity’ in what we 
observe, but only the reality that is interpreted by a particular culture. As 
Geertz aptly states, we only have ‘our own constructions of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to’ (ibid: 9). 
 
It is pertinent to this thesis that Geertz sees this approach as ‘semiotic’. He 
argues that such a stance should be adopted because we are dealing with 
the socially constructed meaning of signs. And, although he attacks the 
formalism in some approaches (e.g. Saussure), he argues that an 
understanding of symbols is central to cultural study: 
 
In the study of culture the signifiers are not symptoms or clusters of symptoms, but 
symbolic acts of clusters of symbolic acts, and the aim is not therapy, but the 
analysis of social discourse. 
(ibid: 26) 
 
Geertz thus sees cultural meaning as being socially constructed and as 
entailing a semiotic system of cultural symbols. The task of the 
ethnographer, he concludes, is to understand (or ‘de-code’) these symbols 
and these constructions. 
 
In the case of Barthes we can identify the same broad approach as Geertz, 
but it is now framed in semiotic terms. In his ‘Mythologies’, Barthes (2009) 
takes the Saussurian sign and develops his notion of the ‘myth’. Barthes 
still insists that the basic structure of the sign remains dyadic, and arbitrary, 
in character, but he now introduces a further layer of meaning creation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Fig 3 
 
 
‘LANGUAGE’ 
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‘MYTH’ 
 
 
 
 
3 Sign 
 
I SIGNIFIER 
 
 
 
 
II SIGNIFIED 
 
 III SIGN 
 
(ibid: 138) 
 
In this model, each arbitrarily formed sign (at ‘3’) forms the potential starting 
point of further signs (or ‘myths’) at a higher level (at III). 
 
For Barthes, the creation of ‘myths’ entails the creation of new identities 
within a specific culture. Barthes describes these as ‘essences’ or ‘forms’. 
He provides the examples of ‘Frenchness’ and ‘militariness’ (ibid: 139-40). 
However, because the originating sign is created arbitrarily, this means that 
any new identity, created at the level of a ‘myth’, is necessarily different 
from what may exist in ‘reality’ itself. Barthes, for example, discusses the 
‘basquity’ of a house in Paris based on its similarity to houses in northern 
Spain. He sees this essence, however, not as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon in the world, but one that is the creation of our culture. As a 
result, he depicts the ‘myth’ of ‘Basquity’ as a ‘distortion’, or a ‘deformation’ 
(ibid: 146), of reality. 
 
So, again, we find Barthes suggesting that, when we enter a semiotic 
framework, we are dealing with a form of cultural ‘reality’ that must be 
‘constructed’. The use of signs entails a ‘refraction’ of reality predicated on 
the assertion that they involve cultural interpretation. 
 
If we now turn to Volosinov, we find a similar insistence on the role of the 
social in meaning creation – but now expressed in even stronger terms. In 
line with Geertz, Volosinov asserts that once we enter the social domain we 
are working within a cultural framework. For Volosinov the social realm 
must be, as a result, ‘ideological’ because it involves ‘refractions’ of the 
world: 
 
Any ideological product is not only itself a part of a reality (natural or social), just as 
is any physical body, any instrument of production, or any other product for 
consumption. It also, in contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects and 
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refracts another reality outside itself. Everything ideological possesses meaning: it 
represents, depicts, or stands for something outside itself. In other words, it is a 
sign. Without signs there is no ideology. 
(ibid: 9) 
 
And Volosinov equates the ‘ideological’ with both the social, and the 
semiotic: 
 
This ideological chain stretches from individual consciousness to individual 
consciousness, connecting them together. Signs emerge, after all, only in the 
process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another. And the 
individual consciousness itself is filled with signs. Consciousness becomes 
consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, 
consequently, only in the process of social interaction. 
(ibid: 11) 
 
Volosinov argues here, concurring with Barthes, that what we understand is 
always ‘refracted’ in some manner. This means that we cannot have true 
access to putative reality – it is always framed through our interpretations. 
Secondly, Volosinov is also making the much stronger claim that our 
consciousness itself is ideological because it must involve signs. He 
suggests that we only possess consciousness when the mind ‘has been 
filled with ideological (semiotic) content’. And, on this basis, he claims that 
consciousness is only achievable through the social dimension. 
 
It is clear that Volosinov is moving from the widely accepted view that 
meaning is created in the mind to the much stronger claim that our 
consciousness itself is the product of meaning making. Indeed, Volosinov 
goes on to state that: 
 
If we deprive consciousness of semiotic, ideological content, it would have 
absolutely nothing left. 
(ibid: 13) 
 
This claim suggests that we cannot possess anything in our consciousness 
that has not already become meaningful (and ‘refracted’) in some way. In 
other words, the contents of our mind are, by their very nature, 
interpretative. Volosinov, however, only reaches this conclusion by 
assuming that perception is unable to provide us with ‘content’ untainted by 
‘interpretation’. And it is worth highlighting that Volosinov is not just saying 
that just our experience of the social dimension is interpretive – all of our 
perceptions (including those of the physical world) are the result of 
interpretation too. 
 
As we shall see, neither Peirce, nor Vygotsky, would accept Volosinov’s 
view. They both have a place, in their accounts of meaning-making, for 
some form of mental ‘content’ that does not possess intrinsic meaning. 
Peirce, as we shall see, has the ‘percept’ and Vygotsky maintains a role for 
his ‘natural perceptions’. And they both agree that meaning is constructed 
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upon the foundations of such mental content. Peirce views meaning as 
being created via ‘thirds’, whilst Vygotsky contends that meaning is 
achieved within the ‘higher psychological processes’. But neither of them go 
so far as to conclude that such meanings entirely exhaust the mental. As 
Bakhurst points out, quoting Bruner, ‘meaning must be made’ (Bakhurst: 
2011: 35); but this does not entail that everything in our minds must contain 
meaning. 
 
Social Constructionism accepts many of the arguments so far discussed, 
and it accepts the main tenets of what I have termed ‘secondary dualism’. It 
is acknowledged as a very broad theoretical church and one that has 
achieved a certain status in modern social theory. As Phillips also observes, 
it ‘has become something akin to a secular religion’ in educational theory 
(Phillips: 1995: 5). 
 
Social Constructionism insists that we do not have direct knowledge of 
empirical reality and it argues, too, that our knowledge of the world is 
always ‘refracted’. As such, it rejects the view that ‘knowledge is based 
upon objective, unbiased observation of the world’ (Burr: 1995: 3). Instead, 
it maintains that ‘the ways in which we commonly understand the world, the 
categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific’ 
(ibid). Social Constructionism, therefore, often views reality as being a 
‘discourse’, and that we make our own categorisations of the world. Either 
individually, or collectively, we create our meanings and reality has little say 
in the matter. Indeed, some social constructionists go so far as to argue that 
our constructions become ‘objectifications’ themselves (Berger and 
Luckmann: 1967). 
 
The role of language is clearly seen as critical in this process. Words are 
viewed as being the mechanisms which enable us to classify the world 
along culturally determined lines: 
 
Constructionists tend to maintain that classifications are not determined by how the 
world is, but are convenient ways in which to represent it. They maintain that the 
world does not come quietly wrapped up in facts. Facts are the consequences of 
ways in which we represent the world. The constructionist vision here is splendidly 
old-fashioned. It is a species of nominalism. 
(Hacking: 1999: 33) 
 
Again, some social constructionists, such as Berger and Luckmann, go still 
further and claim that the shared nature of language, in itself, results in a 
‘quasi-objective’ status for these linguistic constructions. And they also see 
these as having a semiotic component: 
 
The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic 
signification. 
 (Berger and Luckmann: 1967: 39-40) 
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The idea that language structures our world, and gives it meaning, clearly 
finds its origins in the model of ‘secondary dualism’ that we discussed 
earlier. If language plays the part of providing ‘form’ to the ‘content’ 
delivered by our senses, then language is construed as having the 
‘refracting’ effects noted earlier. As we shall see, this position would have 
been attacked by Peirce. He argues that, far from language determining 
meaning, the relationship is, in fact, the other way round – words simply 
capture (via symbols) the meanings that have already been formed in our 
minds (as concepts) through signs. 
 
Another common theme in Social Constructionism is the view that we not 
only construct the world, but that we also construct ourselves and each 
other. This leads to the rejection of what social constructionists sometimes 
call ‘essentialism’. They argue that, as ‘fragmented’ beings, we have no 
fixed identity which is able to explain our thoughts and our actions. Our 
identity is entirely dependent on context. As Burr explains: 
 
Instead, then, of people having single, unified and fixed selves, perhaps we are 
fragmented, having a multiplicity of potential selves which are not necessarily 
consistent with each other. The self is constantly on the move, changing from 
situation to situation, is contrasted with the traditional view of the stable, 
unchanging personality. 
(Burr: 1995: 29) 
 
And, corresponding to this view, some also argue that we construct our 
emotions, and even our ethics, on this relational basis: 
 
From the constructionist standpoint, it is through relationships that we construct 
worlds of good and evil, joy and sorrow, happiness and despair. 
(Gergen: 1999: 106-7) 
 
Once again, Peirce would have rejected this conclusion and would have 
argued for precisely the opposite position. When we discuss his 
pragmaticism, in chapter seven, we will see that what the social 
constructionist can only view as a contextual problem is, it turns out, the 
very basis of Peirce’s account of relational truth. 
 
When we compare Social Constructionism with Hegel, we find that he 
adopts the same position as Peirce. Whilst accepting that the mind plays a 
key role in meaning construction, Hegel is adamant that we cannot 
construct reality in isolation from it. Writing in the early nineteenth century, 
he is fully aware of where such arguments might take us. Reality, so 
construed, is in danger of becoming founded on the ‘fancy and discretion of 
the observer’, and, over a century ahead of the rise of twentieth century 
constructionism, Hegel even rejects the very term itself: 
 
 
 33 
 
The abuses which these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy 
and science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what is called 
‘Construction’. …..The name ‘Construction of notions’ has since been given to a 
sketch or statement of sensible attributes which were picked up from perception, 
quite guiltless of any influence of the notion, and to the additional formalism of 
classifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form on some 
presupposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and discretion of the 
observer. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 239) 
 
Lastly, the discipline of Social Semiotics agrees with many of the 
assumptions of Social Constructionism and, as its name implies, it is 
specifically concerned with the social creation of meaning. It maintains that 
meaning is constructed by sign users with the purpose of portraying reality 
in a particular (and usually advantageous) way. It rejects, however, the 
Saussurian view that signs are arbitrary and it maintains that signs are 
formed by users in both a motivated and conventional manner (Kress and 
Van Leeuwen: 1996: 8). The motivational element of the sign stems from 
the sign user’s agenda and the desire to convey a particular meaning. The 
element of conventionality derives from the fact that the user selects the 
culturally most effective signifying tools to achieve their goal. 
 
Social Semiotics, therefore, frames signs as social resources for meaning-
making. Van Leeuwen views these as follows: 
 
So in social semiotics resources are signifiers, observable actions and objects that 
have been drawn into the domain of social communication and that have a 
theoretical semiotic potential constituted by all their past uses and all their potential 
uses and an actual semiotic potential constituted by those past uses that are 
known to and considered relevant by the users of the resource and by such 
potential uses as might be uncovered by users on the basis of their specific needs 
and interests. 
(Van Leeuwen: 2005: 4) 
 
In Social Semiotics, these ‘resources’ are viewed as already endowed with 
the meanings that derive from their previous cultural manifestations. Van 
Leeuwen argues that: 
 
Studying the semiotic potential of a given semiotic resource is studying how that 
resource has been, is, and can be used for purposes of communication, it is 
drawing up an inventory of past and present and maybe also future resources and 
their uses. 
(ibid: 5) 
 
Social Semiotics also views signs, because they are socially motivated, as 
necessarily involving a ‘distortion’ of reality. Kress and Van Leeuwen, for 
example, state: 
 
 
 34 
 
From the point of view of social semiotics, truth is a construct of semiosis, and as 
such the truth of a particular social group arises from the values and beliefs of that 
group. 
(Kress and Van Leeuwen: 1996: 154-55) 
 
This is a theme that we have already encountered. It follows directly from 
the model of ‘secondary dualism’. For the conclusion that our interpretations 
of our sense data have a distorting effect can only be reached if we first 
assume that there is something fixed that can then be ‘distorted’ by our 
interpretative minds. And, of course, this essential part of the argument is 
supplied by the tacit belief that our sense impressions provide a form of 
‘direct’ knowledge. The Rortian ‘mirror’ is, it turns out, the very thing which 
provides a platform for the overt belief that our interpretations ‘distort’ 
experience. 
 
Finally, we should conclude this sub-section with a discussion of how 
Peirce and Vygotsky view the idea that meaning is socially created. We will 
discuss this issue in more detail in later chapters, but it is useful, at this 
point, to outline their respective positions. 
 
Peirce wrote in an age where the social dimension was yet to become a 
central feature of philosophical debate. As such, he sees it as having only a 
minimal role in the construction of meaning. Meaning is mainly created, for 
Peirce, at an individual level and this would take place even for an 
individual isolated on a desert island. This is not to say, however, that 
Peirce does not see a role for the social dimension once some level of 
meaning has been created by the individual. Peirce accepts that if we 
converse with others we may find that our own meanings do not correspond 
with theirs. In such scenarios, the social dimension is a sphere where we do 
qualify our meanings and adjust their ‘breadth and depth’ (EP2: 394). But 
this is certainly not the same as the claim, made by Barthes, Geertz and 
Volosinov, that the social is where meaning must originate. 
 
The question of the social is more complex in the case of Vygotsky. He is 
well known for asserting the role of the social in the development of 
meaning. But the key question is this: does he subscribe to the thorough-
going accounts of social meaning construction that we have just 
encountered in Social Constructionism? It will be argued that Vygotsky’s 
position is different from these other accounts. Vygotsky does, indeed, see 
the social dimension as playing a major role in the creation of meaning, but 
he does not assert that meaning is wholly created within the social domain. 
This is because he still envisages concept formation, like Peirce, as taking 
place largely within the mind of the individual. Vygotsky does believe that a 
social input is involved in this activity, but he does not see this element as 
wholly accounting for meaning creation. And it will be argued that it is his 
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Hegelian heritage which leads Vygotsky to this conclusion - and which 
distances him from thinkers such as Volosinov. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that Hegel and Peirce also differ from modern 
‘constructionist’ theories of meaning creation in another way too. They not 
only have a minimal role for the social dimension, but they also advocate an 
enhanced role for ‘reality’ in the meaning making process itself. Importantly, 
they are constructionists, but reality, for them, also has a role to play in 
concept formation. As such, they neither accept that the human mind is free 
to make meaning, nor do they agree that the social dimension is 
fundamental to the process. They both subscribe, instead, to the much 
older philosophical claim, inherited from Kant, that reality is constructed as 
a synthetic entity. 
 
To summarise, we can discern a relatively consistent position, across a 
spectrum of twentieth century thinkers, that maintains that meaning is, and 
must be, socially constructed. These writers tend to adopt a cognitive 
model, following the assumptions of ‘secondary dualism’, that construes the 
human mind as ‘interpreting’ its ‘known’ sense data. They often conclude 
that this must inevitably involve a degree of relativism and a ‘distortion’ of 
reality. The outcome of such interpretative activity is often construed in 
ideological, cultural, or semiotic terms. 
 
What is common to these accounts, however, is a vision of human 
knowledge that is different from the one proposed by Peirce. Central to this 
is the fact that Peirce construes signs as the mechanisms which enable us 
to form concepts, and, thereby, establish knowledge of a synthetically 
formed reality. Twentieth century thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Geertz, 
Barthes and Volosinov reject this Peircean position. They do not view it as a 
credible position to hold – because they assume, based on their implicit 
acceptance of ‘secondary dualism’, that such knowledge is unachievable. 
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1.5)  Thesis Structure 
 
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that this account of Peirce and 
Vygotsky seeks to establish parallels between them which are seldom 
discussed in the secondary literature. The main focus of this thesis will be 
the ways in which they understand concept formation - and the influence of 
Hegel in this respect. This involves a considerable reframing of Peirce and 
an approach which places epistemological issues at the heart of his 
semiotics. 
 
This thesis is intended to represent an exegesis of Peirce and Vygotsky – 
and one that interprets them both in an Hegelian light. At some points in the 
discussion, I will evaluate whether Peirce and Vygotsky are mistaken on 
certain points, but the focus will remain primarily on an explication of both 
thinkers. This apparently straightforward task will, however, result in a 
revisionary analysis that is potentially interesting for other commentators – if 
only because the Hegelian perspective that it adopts is seldom discussed. 
 
We begin with brief, and summary, account of Hegel’s description of 
concept formation. This is designed, at the outset of this thesis, to establish 
the underlying template, that is shared by Peirce and Vygotsky, and which 
they inherit from Hegel. We will also look, briefly, at the influence of Spinoza 
and Leibniz on this tradition of German Idealism. This analysis will be 
followed by a discussion of Hegel’s account of perception, and this will 
compared with similar treatments by Peirce and Vygotsky. 
 
The main sections of this thesis then consider Peirce’s treatment of the 
sign. In chapter three, we will consider how Peirce believes we experience 
the world through his categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. In 
chapter four, the structure of the Peircean sign will be explored. In 
particular, discussion will focus on the specific concepts that Peirce 
employs when describing sign action. These include a number which have 
Hegelian roots – for example, the ‘object’ and ‘determination’. These terms 
often cause confusion in the secondary literature on Peirce, but their 
meaning become clear once they are understood in Hegelian terms. 
 
Having outlined the underlying structure of the sign, we will then consider, 
in chapters five and six, Peirce’s account of concept formation itself. As 
noted earlier, this involves signs combining with each other in a manner that 
parallels Hegel’s dialectics. In chapter six, specifically, we look at how 
Peirce’s icon, index, and symbol, are enrolled into this semiotic activity. 
These sign types are ones for which Peirce is most well-known, but it is 
useful to consider them within their intended context - that of concept 
formation. 
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In chapter seven, Peirce’s view of the concept is discussed in relation to his 
accounts of truth and meaning. In particular, we will see how Peirce’s 
treatment of the ‘concept’ converges with his pragmatism. Peirce is well-
known for his original thinking in semiotics, and as being the founder of 
pragmatism, but we will see that, when the former is construed as an 
account of concept formation, it is possible to forge new, and important, 
links between these aspects of his thought. 
 
A greater understanding of the Hegelian context of Peirce also has benefits 
when, in chapter eight, we consider Vygotsky. Vygotsky is well known for 
maintaining that the social has a role in meaning creation, but we will see 
how recognition of his Hegelian influences position him at some distance 
from purely social accounts of this process. At the same time, now 
equipped with a revised interpretation of Peirce, we will evaluate Vygotsky’s 
thought and consider how the two thinkers are, in fact, much closer to each 
other than is commonly recognised. In particular, we will consider 
Vygotsky’s notion of the ZPD and identify potential parallels that may exist 
in relation to Peirce. 
 
The concluding chapter of this thesis will identify how Peirce and Vygotsky 
may be drawn closer together. This analysis has the potential benefit of 
bringing Peirce further into the educational mainstream. Such an outcome 
can only ameliorate our understanding of the learning process in an 
educational context. 
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2) Hegel’s Influence on Peirce and 
Vygotsky 
 
2.1)  The Hegelian Background 
 
This purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief introduction to Hegel’s 
thought. This is clearly an important requirement if we are, first, to establish 
the links that exist between Peirce and Hegel and, secondly, those that 
occur, at a deeper level, between Peirce and Vygotsky through their 
influence from Hegel. 
 
In this discussion we will look, to begin with, at some of the roots of Hegel’s 
own thinking. These can be found in the early modern writings of Spinoza 
and Leibniz. Indeed, in his ‘History of Philosophy’ Hegel states that ‘you are 
either a Spinozist, or not a philosopher at all’ (Hegel: 1995: 283). These two 
philosophers are important to this thesis because they also have a 
secondary impact on the work of Peirce and Vygotsky. The ways in which 
Vygotsky’s work is influenced by Spinoza is already relatively well 
established in the secondary literature. Commentators such as Derry (2013: 
110-111) have highlighted the Spinozist background to Vygotsky (e.g. 
Vygotsky: 1999: 219-20) and this influence is also referenced by Van der 
Veer (1984), and Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991). The way in which 
Leibniz also plays a role the development of the Peircean thought is, 
however, much less recognised – and it is one of the themes of this thesis. 
 
Secondly, this introductory section on Hegel will also consider, in summary 
detail, the underlying template that Hegel develops for his account of 
concept formation. This, as we shall see, is critical in understanding the way 
in which Peircean semiotics should be understood. It will be argued that this 
template has implications for how we should construe the Peircean sign. 
 
Overall, from the perspective of the early 21st century, it is quite difficult to 
grasp the full extent of Hegel’s impact on nineteenth century philosophy. 
His immense influence on European philosophy is well documented, but its 
effects were as strong in England and America as they were in Europe. 
Bernstein highlights the fact that under philosophers, such as the Hegelian 
Josiah Royce, ‘absolute idealism flourished in both the United States and 
Britain’ (Bernstein: 2013: 105) in the late nineteenth century. Likewise, 
Kaag argues that ‘Hegel’s followers invaded Harvard and MIT in the 1870’s 
and 1880’s’, resulting in their ‘total dominance of the philosophical field’ 
(Kaag: 2011: 557-75). However, Hegel’s reputation tended to peak in the 
Anglo-Saxon world at the end of the nineteenth century and it declined 
substantially in the course of the twentieth century. These changes took 
place for reasons that are outside the scope of this thesis, but, arguably, 
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they were impacted by the politics of the time - as the academic world 
reacted to two world wars and the rise of communism in 1918. Karl Popper, 
for example, illustrates the disrepute into which Hegel fell, and hints at the 
possible reasons for it: 
 
I have tried to show the identity of Hegelian historicism with the philosophy of 
modern totalitarianism. 
(Popper: 1945: 78) 
 
In the later twentieth century, however, there has been a revival of interest 
in Hegelian thought. Bernstein highlights two aspects of this (Bernstein: 
2013: 111-121) – the work of Sellars (1956), in the mid-century, and also 
that of McDowell (1994) and Brandom (2000). We will return to these 
philosophers in due course. 
 
The nineteenth century dominance, and subsequent decline, in Hegelian 
philosophy are important in the context of this thesis. With the decline of 
Hegel in the twentieth century it has become relatively easy to lose sight of 
his impact on Peirce and Vygotsky and, as a result, to overlook the 
Hegelian context in which they were writing. Peirce died in 1914 - before 
the assault on Hegelian thought really gathered pace - whilst Vygotsky, 
writing in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s and 1930’s, was still working in an 
environment dominated by ways of thinking influenced by Hegel. 
 
 
2.2) Spinoza and Leibniz 
 
There is little scope, within this thesis, to look in detail at the relationship 
between the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz and their relationship with 
Hegel. But both philosophers can be viewed as important, and highly 
influential, in the rise of German Idealism. When Hegel sought to reject the 
direction in which Kant had taken European philosophy it was to these two 
philosophers that he often turned. For they provided him with an effective 
basis to undermine the fundamentally dualist account that Kant was 
proposing. This was the case because both Spinoza and Leibniz suggest 
an account of reality that is non-dualistic, and relational, in character. These 
two aspects of their thought appealed to Hegel in his project to establish an 
account of human knowledge that is neither ‘synthetic’, nor based on a 
Kantian assumption of a priori knowledge. And, as we shall see, these are 
arguments which are endorsed, later in the nineteenth century, by Peirce in 
his own account of sign formation 
 
Spinoza is a ‘monist’ (Spinoza: 1677/1996: 71) and, as a result, he rejects 
Cartesian Dualism. This means that, when Spinoza talks about the ‘world’, 
he is not discussing an objective ‘reality’. What he is describing is a 
relational structure that is neither ‘objective’, nor ‘subjective’, in the modern 
sense. Indeed, it makes no sense to think about Spinoza’s concept of 
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‘reality’ in these terms – for they only came to have their current meanings 
in the centuries after his death. In contrast, Spinoza views ‘reality’ as a 
structure that is implicitly known by God, but which is also potentially 
knowable by the human mind. It is tempting, of course, to view this account 
of reality in quite ‘metaphysical’ terms, but this is an effect of our modern 
belief that an objective reality exists ‘behind’ our perceptions. Spinoza 
would not subscribe to such an interpretation because he is not a dualist to 
begin with. 
 
The relational view of the universe that Spinoza proposes, has clear 
implications for his treatment of human knowledge. For him, when we 
perceive something we only perceive what it is partially because we only 
experience some of the potentially infinite relational connections that it 
possesses with the rest of the universe. As a result, we do not immediately 
know what something is, because to do so would entail knowing all of these 
potential connections. Our knowledge begins, therefore, for Spinoza, as a 
collection of ‘confused ideas’ (Spinoza: 1677/1996: 51). This is in clear 
contrast to the model of ‘secondary dualism’ where it is readily assumed 
that we immediately know the identity of our ‘sense impressions’. 
 
In this epistemological context, Spinoza makes a useful distinction between 
‘inadequate’ and ‘adequate ideas’ (Spinoza: ibid: 69). An ‘adequate idea’ is 
one formed by the human mind when we understand enough of the intrinsic 
empirical connections of a thing to make sense of what it entails. An 
‘inadequate idea’, in contrast, is one that has not achieved this clarity in our 
thought. Understanding the nature of something is determined, as a result, 
by our grasping the relationships that are contained within the concept of a 
thing. When we have developed such a concept it has the potential to act 
as an ‘instrument’ of thought (Spinoza: 1955: 12) because our concept then 
contains some knowledge of how an object will behave in the future. 
 
As our knowledge of the world becomes more detailed, and more 
extensive, Spinoza argues that we establish linkages between our 
‘adequate ideas’ and they begin to form a whole. The growth of human 
knowledge is thus depicted as an evolutionary process in which our 
understanding builds incrementally upon itself. This is a theme that has 
parallels in the philosophy of both Hegel and Peirce. Human knowledge is 
viewed, by both, following Spinoza, as something that is initially ‘confused’, 
but which becomes progressively more ‘adequate’ as our concepts develop. 
The actual processes through which such ‘clarity’ is achieved are often 
different for these three philosophers, but the template of transition from 
‘confusion’ to ‘clarity’ is one that they all subscribe to. 
 
Turning to Leibniz, we find that his views on the nature of reality, and of 
human knowledge, strongly reflect those of Spinoza. Leibniz, like Spinoza, 
rejects Cartesian Dualism and he also construes the Universe as 
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fundamentally relational. Where Leibniz differs from Spinoza, however, is in 
his rejection of Spinoza’s underlying ‘monism’. In its place, Leibniz 
maintains that reality is a web of individual identities that he calls ‘monads’.  
These, as we shall see, have many similarities with Hegel’s ‘sublated’ 
Notions. Leibniz’s monads are relational in character and the properties of 
each individual monad is defined by its position within the web of the 
Universe (Leibniz: 1714/1951: 523). 
 
If we apply this way of thinking to the specific issue of identity, we find that 
identities are formed, according to Leibniz, by the relationships that define 
their unique perspective in the relational universe. As such, they have no 
separate identity of their own, but are, instead, defined by the sum of their 
relationships with everything else. This creates a web of existence involving 
everything defining everything else. Leibniz inherits this notion from 
Spinoza and for both of them God is involved in this web of being. 
 
For Hegel and Peirce, the question is more nuanced – they both need to 
account for how these perspectival points are formed without recourse to 
God. They do this in different ways – Hegel sees the mind as positing 
Essences (which then develop into ‘Notions’) to fulfill this role. Peirce takes 
a different route and sees icons as performing this task at the beginning of 
sign formation. In both their cases, however, they still borrow the Leibnizian 
idea that identities are relationally formed. Peirce can thus be seen to 
subscribe to a vision of identity that involves the creation of ‘placeholders’ 
by the mind – this is a Kripkean notion that we will return to later. 
 
To illustrate Hegel’s specific position on this important issue, he talks of 
‘existence’ in the following terms: 
 
Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another. It 
follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-
into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light upon one another, - 
which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of 
infinite interconnection between grounds and consequents. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 149) 
 
Leibniz also inherits Spinoza’s views on human knowledge and agrees that 
it admits of ‘degrees’. As we shall see later, this is relevant to our 
discussion of Peirce because parallels exist between Leibniz’s account of 
knowledge and Peirce’s vision of sign development. Leibniz, following 
Spinoza, begins with the assertion that we initially experience ‘confused 
ideas’ and he agrees that we develop ‘adequate ideas’. Leibniz, however, 
breaks this particular concept down into two types of idea - ‘clear’ and 
‘distinct’ ideas (footnote 4). He argues that when we apply our reason to 
‘confused’ ideas we first attain ‘clear ideas’: 
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I say, then, that an idea is clear when it enables one to recognise the thing and 
distinguish it from other things. 
(Leibniz: 1996: 254) 
 
What defines a ‘clear idea’, therefore, is the fact that we are able to 
‘distinguish’ it from others. This is achieved on the basis of recognition – we 
sense that something is similar to something else. The next stage in the 
development of knowledge is a ‘distinct idea’. When differentiating ‘clear’ 
from ‘distinct’ ideas, Leibniz argues that: 
 
They are clear, because we recognise them and easily tell them from one another; 
but they are not distinct, because we cannot distinguish their contents (my italics). 
(ibid: 255) 
 
What renders an idea ‘distinct’, therefore, is the fact that we can identify its 
‘contents’. By this, Leibniz means that we understand the nature of its 
connections with the world – what is contained within its idea and also what 
is not contained within it. 
 
Leibniz agrees with Spinoza that our ultimate goal is to have ‘perfect ideas’, 
but he accepts that this is only really achievable by God. One of the 
arguments of this thesis is that Peirce’s account of the evolution of the sign 
(from icon, to index, and to symbol) parallels this Leibnizian ‘hierarchy of 
ideas’. It should be noted, for example, that ‘clear ideas’ are established on 
the basis of similarity – echoing Peircean icons. 
 
Other aspects of Leibnizian thinking also emerge in Peirce’s work. Leibniz 
argues that, when we have a ‘working’ (but partial) knowledge of an object, 
we have a ‘nominal definition’ of it. When we know more about it, we come 
closer to its ‘real definition’. Of course, as with ‘perfect ideas’, we cannot 
achieve the full perspective possessed by God (and know the entirety of a 
‘real definition’), but we can, at least, strive to improve the quality of our 
‘nominal definitions’. As we shall see, in section 5.2.4, Peirce uses this 
Leibnizian template in relation to the ‘object’ in the sign – making a 
distinction between ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamic objects’ – which parallels 
Leibniz’s ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definitions. 
 
The model of the universe that is adopted by both Spinoza and Leibniz can 
be outlined in diagrammatical terms. In this model (Fig: 4) we have a 
relational structure of interrelated ‘monads’ (to use Leibniz’s term). The 
identities of these monads, because they are connected to every other 
monad, are defined by the sum of their relations with each other. 
 
Critically, they also form a type of ‘reality’ that is non-dualistic in nature. This 
is because the human soul itself is viewed by Leibniz as being simply one 
monad amongst the many. Of course, the soul has certain characteristics 
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that make it different from other monads – importantly it has consciousness 
– but this does not detract from the fact that it is also a monad. In such a 
model there is no place for a ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ stance in relation to 
the rest of the universe – the soul is immersed in it. This places human 
consciousness in a very different relationship to the world compared with 
that suggested by the model of ‘secondary dualism’ where it is construed as 
looking in a mirror. 
 
Fig 4: Spinoza and Leibniz: The Relational Model of Reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It will be argued in the course of this thesis that Peirce’s account of signs 
and how they relate to each other broadly follows this Leibnizian model. We 
have already noted that Peirce views the human mind as being immersed in 
signs – and this is what this model implies. Equally, the fact that monads 
are defined by their relationships with each other (and do not exist and then 
have relationships) is reflected in his view that signs are also relationally 
defined. As Stables highlights, this means that the distinction between 
denotation and connation is largely erased: 
 
It follows from this that, furthermore, there is no clear distinction between 
denotation and connotation: what the sign stands for is inextricably bound up with 
what it implies, and what it is in itself is determined by its relationality.  
(Stables: 2018: 26) 
 
In this model of the Universe, or sign relations, it is clear that this relational 
structure is the very basis for the conclusion, by both Spinoza and Leibniz, 
that everything is known partially. Every ‘monad’ (or sign) is ultimately 
connected with every other monad (or sign) in the universe and it is 
infinitely involved in the definition of everything we encounter. As such, we 
can only know it partially. However, ‘adequate’ knowledge can still be 
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achieved by the human mind without a higher (or divine) level of knowledge 
being established. We are able to grasp how the main characteristics of a 
monad (or sign) by understanding the most important relational 
characteristics which define it. Such ‘adequate’ knowledge is useful, but it is 
always open to further revision – it remains fundamentally dynamic in 
nature. 
 
We have seen that there is recognition, in the secondary literature, of the 
influence of Spinoza on Vygotsky. In terms of the influence of Leibniz on 
Vygotsky, the latter shows some signs of having read Leibniz (Vygotsky: 
1997a), but his comments are marginal in nature. Vygotsky, however, does 
mention Tarde (Vygotsky: 2012: 255) whose exploration of sociology, in 
‘Monadologie et Sociologie’ (1893), was informed by Leibniz. So the impact 
that Leibniz had on Vygotsky may have been via secondary sources. 
 
In terms of Leibniz’s influence on Peirce, however, there is surprisingly little 
recognition of the influence of Leibniz on either Peirce or Vygotsky. An 
exception is Fisch’s article entitled ‘Peirce and Leibniz’ (1986a), but even 
this is a discussion of Peirce’s views on Leibniz’s status as a philosopher 
and logician. Fabbrichesi (2011) has also written a short article on the 
relationship between Peirce and Leibniz’s theory of a universal language. 
The most fruitful discussion of Leibniz’s influence on Peirce, however, can 
be found in a paper by Belluci (2013: 195: 331-355). He recognises some of 
the parallels that has been drawn here between Leibniz and Peirce – noting 
some of the similarities in relation to ‘clear and distinct’ ideas and also to 
‘nominal’ and ‘real definitions’. Belluci does not, however, go on to establish 
any links in relation to Peircean signs and, in particular, to Peirce’s icons 
and indices. Nor does he explore Leibniz’s theory of perception and the 
critical role of ‘confused ideas’. Beyond these brief mentions of Leibniz in 
the Peircean exegesis, one can also find mentions of Peirce in works on 
Leibniz. The Leibnizian scholar, Loemker, for example, says of Peirce that 
he ‘knew Leibniz better than any other American of his time’ (1989: 57). 
 
It is also important to summarise, in this discussion, the extent to which the 
secondary literature discusses the influence of Hegel on Peirce and 
Vygotsky - a central theme of this thesis. Overall, again, there is much more 
recognition of the influence of Hegel on Vygotsky than is the case with 
Peirce. Writers such as Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991), for example, 
recognise that Vygotsky’s writings owe much to Hegelian dialectics, but, 
significantly, they see this process as operating primarily in the social space 
between the self and others (ibid: 265; 331). They also recognise (ibid: 278, 
358) the role of ‘sublation’ in Vygotsky, but they only mention it in passing. 
 
Derry (2013) also highlights the dialectical nature of Vygotsky’s model of 
concept formation (ibid: 119). Importantly, she rejects the view of Wertsch 
that Vygotsky is proposing a form of rationality that is ‘decontextualised’ 
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(Wertsch: 1996) and this draws her account of Vygotsky closer to the 
Hegelian model. Derry argues, for example, that Vygotsky’s sees rationality 
as ‘genetic’ or ‘historical’ (Derry: 2013: 113) and, therefore, rooted in reality. 
 
Elsewhere, Blunden (2017: 132-145) provides a detailed account of the 
similarities between Vygotsky and Hegel and includes a useful discussion 
of Hegel’s ‘The Science of Logic’; he also highlights the debt that Vygotsky 
owes to Hegel in terms of his units of analysis (‘word meanings’). Bakhurst 
(2007) also highlights the influence of Hegel on Vygotsky and notes that his 
notion of ‘mediation’ is inspired by him (ibid: 58), but, like Van der Veer and 
Valsiner, he still sees Vygotsky’s concept of mediation as being largely 
‘social’ in nature. Bakhurst, however, defends Vygotsky against critics who 
see him as a ‘rationalist’ (ibid: 74) and he argues that it would be wrong to 
dualistically ‘deploy a sharp distinction between abstract, general, universal 
forms of cognition, and concrete, specific situated ways of knowing’ (ibid: 
70). Elsewhere, Kozulin (1990) also discusses the ‘problem of mediation’ in 
Vygotsky (ibid: 118-121), and he links this back to Hegel. 
 
Derry is unusual in linking Vygotsky and Hegel at a deeper level – in terms 
of their shared influence from Spinoza, their mutual rejection of dualism, 
and their views on mediation. But even her account of Vygotsky leaves 
room for a more extensive analysis of how Vygotsky views the sign. This 
also reflects wider issues in the secondary literature. Commentators, such 
as Wertsch (1996), and Daniels (2016: 15) recognise that Vygotsky views 
signs as being important, but they generally construe them as external 
‘social’ forms of mediation (i.e. as ‘tools’ or symbols). 
 
The secondary literature on the potential links between Hegel and Peirce is 
much more limited. Discussion of the influence of Hegel on Peirce usually 
amounts to little more than a few paragraphs in most accounts. Moreover, 
even these mentions tend to focus on the differences between them. This, it 
is fair to say, is due to Peirce’s repeated attempts to distance himself from 
what he saw as Hegel’s ‘transcendental’ position (CP2: 35). Commentators 
have focused, accordingly, on these differences and there are several 
references to them in the literature (Stjernfelt: 2007; Stern: 2007; Stern: 
2009; Feibleman: 1970; Misak: 2013; Rockmore: 1999, Apel: 1981). 
 
But this focus serves, in fact, to hide the deeper connections which exist 
between the two philosophers. Again, Fisch makes a contribution here. He 
notes the underlying dialectical nature of Peirce’s thought and also the 
occasions on which Peirce refers to Hegel in his early career (Fisch: 
1986b). Likewise, Otto-Apel (1981) and Nagl (2014) also make 
comparisons between Peirce’s three categories and the three stages of 
Hegelian thought. However, Otto-Apel does not attempt to extend this to a 
discussion of Peircean signs, and Nagl only briefly touches upon such a 
relationship. Stables also considers some of the parallels between Peirce 
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and Hegel, in relation to Kant, and concludes that Peirce ‘owes many debts 
to rationalism and can be seen as its heir rather than its successor’ 
(Stables: 2014: 597). Bernstein provides a useful account of the relationship 
between Hegel and pragmatism (Bernstein: 2013), bringing Peirce into his 
discussion, but he does not mention any specific relationship between 
Hegel and Peirce in relation to signs. Kaag (2011: 557-75) highlights the 
similarities between Hegel and Peirce in relation to the concept of ‘Essence’ 
and he argues that this has potential links to Peirce’s idea of secondness. 
He does not, however, make any mention of Peircean signs. 
 
These more detailed discussions of the influence of Hegel on Peirce, 
however, are relatively isolated – a surprising fact given that Peirce 
sometimes references his similarities to Hegel (CP1: 42; CP4: 50; EP2: 
144). As a result, several contemporary works lack any substantial 
discussions of Hegel’s influence on Peirce. Short (2007) and Feibleman 
(1970) hardly mention Hegel, and Stjernfelt’s discussion of Hegel in his 
‘Diagrammatology’ (Stjernfelt: 2007) is very brief indeed. All three discuss 
the question of whether Peirce’s ‘Phaneroscopy’ owes anything to Hegel’s 
‘phenomenology’ – but this is a relatively minor point. Stjernfelt, in his later 
work, ‘Natural Propositions’ (2014) makes no mention of Hegel at all – 
which is remarkable given that the eponymous subject of this book has an 
Hegelian character. This criticism is also true of Murphey’s book on ‘The 
Development of Peirce’s Philosophy’ (1993) and Forster’s ‘Peirce and the 
Threat of Nominalism’ (Forster: 2011). What is more frequently found in the 
secondary literature is a discussion of the influence of Kant, and of pre-
modern philosophers (such as Duns Scotus), on Peirce (Boler: 1963; 
Feibleman 1970). 
 
As noted above, the issue most notably absent in the secondary literature is 
any detailed discussion of how Hegel influences Peirce’s account of sign 
formation. Even if Hegel is sometimes linked with Peirce, this seldom 
extends to Peircean semiotics and remains mainly focused on Peirce’s 
phenomenology and his three categories. 
 
The lack of recognition of these links between Hegel and Peirce often 
emerge in interesting ways. It becomes evident, for example, in semiotic 
discussions of Peircean terms - such as the ‘object’ and ‘determination’. 
These are commonplace in Hegel and are used by Peirce in an overtly 
Hegelian manner - but they are seldom interpreted by semioticians in this 
context. Equally, there is little recognition in the literature that Peircean sign 
formation involves an act of ‘sublation’ (EP2: 177). As we saw, this entails a 
change in the identity of the ‘object’ in the sign (EP1: 256) and it is one 
which informs Peirce’s concept of the ‘interpretant’. 
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2.3) The Hegelian Template 
 
The works of Hegel are renowned for their complexity. Indeed, one 
commentator has called ‘The Science of Logic’ (1892/2014) ‘the single 
densest book ever written’ (Carlson: 2007). A full account of his thought will 
not, therefore, be attempted in this section; but his specific views on 
concept formation will be outlined in brief detail. These will act as a 
reference point for our later discussions of Peirce and Vygotsky. 
 
Hegel begins his philosophy by rejecting Cartesian dualism, but he 
recognises that, at first, such dualism does appear to exist. As a result, 
Hegel, initially identifies both the inner world of the ‘Ego’ and outer world of 
‘Being’. For Hegel, however, our experience of ‘Being’ is of a very particular 
kind – it is what he describes as ‘indeterminate Being’. This provides us 
with sensory experiences that appear to have the makings of knowledge, 
but this ‘sense certainty’ is little more than illusion. Hegel argues, however, 
that we should not relapse, at this point, into scepticism. Instead, he 
proposes an account of knowledge which overcomes this apparent dualism. 
He believes that this involves the establishment of synthetic concepts which 
are rooted in our experience of the world. The process that creates such 
concepts he sees as dialectical in nature. 
 
It should be recognised that the idea that we can establish such synthetic 
knowledge has its roots in Kantian philosophy. But Kant’s solution resides 
in the notion of ‘a priori synthetic’ truth (Kant: 1781/2007) - which Hegel 
rejects. Hegel seeks an alternative way of establishing synthetic knowledge 
and he also criticises other elements of Kant’s approach. These include 
Kant’s assertion that we can know the contents of our perceptions, known 
as ‘intuitionism’ (Pinkard: 1990: 832), and also his dualistic distinction 
between the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘noumenal’ world (Kant: 1781/2007: 251-
69). There are, as a result, a number of differences between Kant’s and 
Hegel’s approach to knowledge – even though they both seek a ‘synthetic’ 
solution to the problem of how it can be established. 
 
To begin our discussion of Hegel, however, we should outline the broad 
structure of his dialectical model. As noted earlier, he describes this, in his 
‘The Science of Logic’, as his ‘objective logic’. There are a number of key 
stages in it: 
 
 Faced with the ‘indeterminacy of Being’, the Ego posits an ‘Essence’ 
as a means of grasping, or fixing, this perceptual indeterminacy. The 
posited ‘Essence’ always begins as an approximation to reality. 
 The ‘Essence’, as a result, acts as a working ‘hypothesis’. It contains 
the contents of ‘sense certainty’, but it also possesses inherent 
contradictions because of the way in which the ‘Essence’ has been 
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formed. It is, therefore, wholly inadequate for the task of 
understanding the world. It does, however, provide an initial form (or 
‘pathway’) around which conceptual development may take place. 
 In the next stage, the ‘Essence’ is refined through a dialectical 
process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hegel sees this as being 
a strictly logical activity and he borrows Kant’s concept of the 
‘Antimonies’ in this context (Hegel: 1892/2014: 62-3). Importantly, his 
dialecticism involves a reflexive interplay between ‘content’ and 
‘form’ that is only achievable because the contents of our initial 
perceptions are not ‘fixed’ in our experience of indeterminate Being. 
Hegel sometimes calls the dialectical process ‘Becoming’ because 
the ‘Essence’ becomes more like the object it ‘represents’. In this 
process the ‘Essence’ is progressively transformed into a more 
‘authenticated’ representation of reality (Hegel: 1830/1971: 225). At 
the same time, and through the same activity, the ‘Essence’ is 
adjusted by the mind to fit within a wider (and logical) system of other 
‘Essences’. 
 This dialectical process culminates in the creation of ‘Notions’ (or 
concepts) which we can then use to understand the world. These 
‘Notions’ are synthetic in nature because they have been formed 
from the combination of the empirical contents of ‘Being’ and the 
logical workings of the mind. They are also more than the sum of 
their empirical parts. Notions have now been sublated by the mind 
and they include new concepts, or new identities, which were not 
initially observable in our sensory experience. 
 In the Hegelian model, ‘Notions’ continue to interrelate with each 
other until they form the ‘Absolute Idea’. This is a rationally 
constructed representation of reality comprising all of our inter-
related Notions, or concepts. This structure, however, is one which is 
also founded in our experience of the world – because the original 
‘Essences’ are rooted in ‘Being’. This forms the basis for Hegel’s 
claim that ‘what is reasonable is actual; and what is actual is 
reasonable’ (Hegel: 1892/2014: 5). 
 
Hegelian dialecticism, itself, is rejected by Peirce. But this Hegelian model 
is still highly relevant to our understanding of Peirce because Hegel’s 
dialecticism has a triadic structure. Its three elements are Being (sein), 
Essence (wesen) and Notion (begriff). Peirce, as we shall see, uses entirely 
different terms when describing his sign structure (e.g. representamen, 
object, interpretant), but the underlying structure of his sign remains triadic 
in nature. In the secondary literature (e.g. Bernstein: 2013) there is some 
recognition that Hegel’s dialecticism informs Peirce’s three experiential 
categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. But there is almost no 
discussion as to whether this triadic model also influences Peirce’s 
structure of the sign, or, even more radically, the different types of sign that 
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Peirce proposes (e.g. icons, indices and symbols). We will explore these 
potential omissions in the secondary literature, in due course. 
 
As noted above, Hegel’s dialectical movement culminates in an act of 
‘sublation’ (‘aufgehoben’). This is an Hegelian mechanism that enables the 
mind to transform the dialectically evolving ‘Essence’ into a ‘Notion’. These 
‘sublated’ entities have three critical features which are important to our 
understanding of Peirce and Vygotsky. 
 
The first of these is Hegel’s contention that these sublated entities are 
‘mediated’. They have been synthetically created by the mind as a result of 
the application of our logic to our sensory data. As such, our concepts are 
not created by our minds in isolation (as in the model ‘secondary dualism’). 
Instead, they are formed in a manner in which reality has played a role. As 
a result of this, our concepts are a synthetic mixture of the empirical and the 
mental. In this context, Peirce describes the outcome of such a synthesis as 
‘concrete reasonableness’ (CP5: 3); Vygotsky talks of an ‘amalgam’ 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 225). Hegel reaches for the metaphors of ‘welding’ (Hegel: 
1830/1971: 211) and ‘fusion’ (ibid: 212). 
 
Secondly, sublated Notions have a reflexive role in perceptual activity. 
Dialectically created concepts are believed, by Hegel, to inform our 
subsequent perceptions of the world. We, therefore, experience reality 
through our sublated concepts. This Hegelian position is one that both 
Peirce and Vygotsky subscribe to - and it contrasts with the strictly linear 
model of sign reception (in ‘secondary dualism’) that assumes that we, first, 
receive sensory input and, second, attach meaning to it. In the model of 
perception espoused by Hegel, Peirce, and Vygotsky, this order can be 
reversed; our concepts can sometimes reflexively inform our perceptions. 
Vygotsky, for example, talks of ‘verbalised perceptions’ (Vygotsky: 1994: 
125). 
 
The third key aspect of the Hegelian ‘Notion’ is that acts of ‘sublation’ 
produce new identities. As a result of this, the Hegelian concept is much 
more than what is created in a nominalist ‘naming’ process. When the mind 
creates a concept, in the final stage of dialecticism, it produces an identity 
that is deemed, at least contingently, to exist in the world. As a result, our 
concept of a ‘chair’ is not simply a name that we give to a collection of wood 
and fabric. It is something that exists, itself, as a synthetic and mediating 
concept. Hegelian concepts, therefore, are not ‘detached’ from the world as 
simple nominalistic ‘interpretations’ of the mind. Later, we will see how the 
sublated Hegelian ‘Notion’ has important parallels with the Peircean 
‘interpretant’ in the sign. 
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Hegel’s model of concept formation also has other parallels with Peircean 
thought. In a discussion of Hegel’s concepts of ‘mediation’ and ‘immediacy’, 
Inwood states (referring to ‘sublation’ at point three): 
 
Thus mediation and immediacy form not a dyadic opposition, but a triad: 
 
1) Bare (but still relative immediacy) 
2) Mediation 
3) Mediated Immediacy, in which an entity’s mediation is taken up into it 
 
This pattern is repeated. The mediated immediacy that concludes one triad is the bare 
immediacy that opens the next. 
(Inwood: 1992: 185) 
 
In this triadic structure, ‘bare immediacy’ is the perceptual state that we 
encounter when we experience ‘Being’. The second stage, that of 
‘mediation’, occurs when the posited ‘Essence’ is dialectically refined. The 
third stage, as we noted, is that of ‘mediated immediacy’ where we 
reflexively experience reality through our concepts. Importantly, this 
process is also described by Inwood as repeating itself – each new concept 
that is dialectically created is utilised in subsequent perceptual experience 
and we may, on occasions, be forced to revise it. 
 
As we shall see, this Hegelian cognitive model has parallels with Peirce’s 
two categories of ‘firstness’ (‘bare immediacy’) and ‘thirdness’ (‘mediated 
immediacy’). 
 
But there seems to be an important difference between Hegel and Peirce 
when we consider the second level of ‘mediation’. This is where Peirce 
interjects his alternative concept of ‘secondness’ – the disruptive role of 
reality itself. We will see later that this marks a significant difference 
between Hegel and Peirce (and one that Peirce is always keen to highlight). 
Hegel sees the intermediate stage as being purely logical in nature and one 
that the mind is able to conduct by itself. In contrast, Peirce views this stage 
as involving the ‘brute’ intervention of reality. It is where the world has a say 
in determining the meaning (the ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’) of our concepts. 
Peirce claims that this intervention by reality marks a significant difference 
between himself and Hegel, and we will discuss whether he is correct in 
making this claim in due course. But what we must also recognise, 
however, is that Peirce’s rejection of Hegelian dialecticism does not also 
entail a rejection of the logical nature of the second stage. Peirce retains 
the Hegelian belief that the process of ‘mediation’ has a logical character. 
From Peirce’s point of view, we do not have the luxury of dividing up the 
world as a matter of choice – the way in which we form concepts is 
determined by reality itself. 
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In summary, this sub-section has sought to outline the main facets of 
Hegel’s account of concept formation. Hegel sees this issue as critical to 
any solution to the problem of how empirical knowledge is formed. The 
synthetic concepts that emerge from his dialectical process enable us to 
understand the world. 
 
What is less well recognised is the extent to which Peirce utilises this same 
Hegelian template. Once this is acknowledged, we will be able to 
understand Peirce more fully, and see Peirce and Vygotsky in the same 
theoretical light – with benefits for a philosophy of the learning process. 
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3) Perception and ‘Indeterminacy’ 
 
3.1) Hegel on Perception 
 
Hegel’s treatment of perception forms the starting point for his account of 
how knowledge is achieved. Central to Hegel’s discussion of perception is 
his rejection of Kantian ‘intuitionism’ – the belief that we are able grasp the 
immediate content of our perceptions. We have already encountered this 
rejection of ‘intuitionism’, in modern form, in Sellars’s ‘Myth of the Given’. 
Over a century earlier, Hegel notes: 
 
Sense-certainty appears to be the truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted 
anything from the object, but it has the object before it in its perfect entirety. But, in 
the event, this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth. 
(Hegel: 1977: 58)  
 
In the place of ‘intuitionism’ Hegel invokes a much older model of 
perception which states that our perceptions, whilst being immediate, do not 
constitute a form of immediate knowledge. Spinoza and Leibniz describe 
such perceptions as ‘confused ideas’ and Hegel advocates this position 
with his account of ‘indeterminate Being’. 
 
Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on the one hand pure thought, and 
on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the first beginning 
cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 101) 
 
Hegel thus construes human experience as comprising something that is 
both ‘immediate’ (i.e. not behind a Lockean ‘veil of perception’ (Locke: 
1690/1981)) and also ‘indeterminate’. This notion of ‘indeterminacy’ is key 
to an understanding of how Hegel understands concept formation. We 
initially experience the world in this form and the dialectical workings of the 
mind then render it more ‘determinate’. The concepts that emerge from this 
process are ‘mediated’ and they allow us to establish knowledge of the 
world. Hegel rejects the views of philosophers, such as Locke and Hume, 
who claim that we enjoy immediate knowledge of our sense impressions: 
 
In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual 
world and present to sensation. 
(ibid: 49) 
 
The theory asserts that immediate knowledge is a fact. It has to be shown to be 
untrue in fact to say that there is immediate knowledge, a knowledge without 
mediation either by means of something else or in itself. 
(ibid: 87) 
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The form of ‘mediated’ knowledge that is achieved through the dialectical 
process is sometimes framed by Hegel in terms of ‘thought-forms’ or 
‘thought-types’: 
 
And in order to prevent misconception, thought-form or thought-type should be 
substituted for the ambiguous term thought. From what has been said the 
principles of logic are to be sought in a system of thought-types or fundamental 
categories, in which the opposition between subjective and objective, in its usual 
sense, vanishes. 
(ibid: 27-28) 
 
These ‘thought-forms’ or ‘thought-types’ are quite unlike the ‘interpretations’ 
that we encountered in ‘secondary dualism’. The latter, we noted, are 
isolated from reality because they are based upon our sense impressions. 
This is not the case with Hegelian ‘thought forms’, or ‘thought types’, 
because these are dialectically created as an ‘amalgam’ of the mental and 
the empirical. In the course of this thesis we will see that both Peirce and 
Vygotsky possess equivalents of these Hegelian entities. In the case of 
Peirce, their equivalent is the ‘object’ in the triadic sign. In the case of 
Vygotsky, they are ‘word meanings’. 
 
Finally, as already noted above, Hegel’s dialecticism results in the formation 
of concepts that can be used, reflexively, to inform perception itself. Our 
concepts, once established, impact on how we experience the world. As 
Inwood observes, ‘everything, then, including all human awareness, is both 
mediated and immediate’ (Inwood: 1983: 211). This reverses the model of 
‘secondary dualism’ that positions perception as prior to interpretation. It 
follows, as a result, that we experience things as things. We will also 
encounter this approach in Peirce and Vygotsky. Hegel states: 
 
Man, therefore, is always thinking, even in his perceptions: if he observes 
anything, he always observes it as a universal, fixes on a single point which he 
places in relief, thus withdrawing his attention from other points, and takes it as 
abstract and universal, even if the universality be only in form. 
(Hegel: 1892/2104: 29) 
 
It follows from this that we, in fact, experience ‘meaningful perception’. We 
experience (rather than infer) meaning because we use our concepts in 
perception. 
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3.2) Peirce and the ‘Daughters of Nominalism’  
 
Having discussed Hegel’s account of perception, we will now consider 
Peirce’s view of the same process. In this discussion we will also place 
Peirce’s thinking in a wider philosophical context. We have already 
encountered some of these issues - in our discussions of ‘secondary 
dualism’ and the ‘Myth of the Given’. 
 
To begin with, however, it is worth noting that a telling feature of Peircean 
exegesis is the relative lack of discussion of his views on perception 
(Almeder: 1980: 137). From the perspective of semiotics, this reluctance to 
engage with Peirce’s foundational thinking has many consequences. 
Importantly, if we assume that Peirce’s philosophical starting points are 
similar to those of Saussure, then we will misunderstand the entire basis of 
his semiotics. 
 
Peirce is well known for being a critic of nominalism (Forster: 2011) and his 
views on perception are informed by this. The nominalist stance, he argues, 
largely determines the way in which we view the world: 
 
But it is not modern philosophers only who are nominalists. The nominalist 
Weltanschauung has become incorporated into what I will venture to call the very 
flesh and blood of the average modern mind. 
(EP2: 157) 
 
Nominalism is closely related to ‘secondary dualism’ because it adopts 
much the same stance in relation to meaning construction. It maintains that 
we have sense data that are ‘given’, in our perception, and which we then 
interpret. Indeed, nominalism maintains that the very way in which meaning 
is created is through the giving of ‘names’, or identities, to our sense 
impressions – which is why it is called ‘nominalism’. Peirce rejects this 
philosophical position, and its consequences, which, on one occasion, he 
calls: 
 
….those daughters of nominalism, - sensationalism, phenomenalism, 
individualism, and materialism. 
(EP1: 104). 
 
We will now consider what Peirce means by these ‘daughters of 
nominalism’ and how they relate to his views on perception. Nominalism 
divides reality along the Cartesian lines that we have already encountered 
(Descartes: 1985). One of its many consequences is the assumption that 
the mind (and the mind alone) can perform acts of perception. This 
conclusion is reached because objects are viewed as intrinsically passive in 
the perceptual process; objects are perceived – they do not have an active 
role in the perceptual act itself. 
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Peirce’s account of perception rejects this view. He understands perception, 
instead, in terms of a relationship between the perceiver and the perceived 
object. For example, Peirce discusses the example of a chair; the 
perception of it forces itself upon him: 
 
I am forced to confess that it appears. Not only does it appear, but it disturbs me, 
more or less. I cannot think the appearance is not there, nor dismiss it as I would a 
fancy. I can only get rid of it by an exertion of physical force. It is a forceful thing. 
Yet it offers no reason, defence, nor excuse for its presence. It does not pretend to 
any right to be there. It silently forces itself upon me. 
(CP: 7.620-1) 
 
The chair is thus an active force in the perceptual process – ‘it is a forceful 
thing’. 
 
A further, and damaging, consequence of the belief that we perform 
‘perceptual acts’ is the fact that they necessarily separate our perceptions 
from each another. Each act of perception is particular and cannot, by 
definition, be the same as any other act of perception. This results in a 
pattern of fragmented sense data that is familiar to any student of Humean 
philosophy. Peirce is referring to this when, above, he mentions 
‘individualism’. Our sense data, in the nominalist model, are ‘atomised’ by 
our acts of perception. It follows from this that we are unable to perceive 
any potential connections that might exist between our perceptions; there 
can be no sense impressions of these and we can only infer them. This 
conclusion is reached, of course, by definition - because if we could ‘see’ 
the potential connection between any two perceptions then this linkage, 
itself, would become another atomised perception. And we would then need 
to find a connection between the perceived ‘linkage’ and one of our original 
perceptions. This way of construing perception thus leads to the scepticism 
espoused by Hume (1985) (footnote five). 
 
Again, Peirce rejects this position and argues that we experience the world 
as a continuum. Perceptions are, as a result, picked out from this 
continuum and they come laden with their linkages to other perceptions. 
This way of understanding experience Peirce calls ‘synechism’: 
 
In like manner, I have proposed to make synechism mean the tendency to regard 
everything as continuous. For many years I have been endeavouring to develop 
this idea… I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the 
whole domain of experience in every element of it. 
(EP2: 1) 
 
Peirce also highlights ‘sensationalism’ in the quotation above. 
‘Sensationalism’ maintains that, although we cannot see between our 
perceptions, we do have true knowledge of them, however. Peirce’s 
‘sensationalist’ asserts that when we see something ‘red’ we cannot doubt 
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that this is the case – it simply looks ‘red’ to us (Forster: 2011: 110). This is 
the ‘Myth of the Given’ as criticised by Sellars. Peirce, concurring with his 
criticism of it, argues that we cannot possess this kind of knowledge and he 
rejects the ‘intuitionism’ of Kant (EP1: 12-27, CP5: 213). As Davis states: 
 
Knowing is a process, which cannot be immediate and intuitive. 
(Davis: 1972: 10) 
 
We must be very careful, however, to avoid the mistaken conclusion that 
Peirce rejects the view that we directly experience sense data. Indeed, 
Peirce insists that we do enjoy direct experience of the world (via the 
categories) and that there is, as a result, no ‘veil of perception’. So Peirce 
maintains, following Hegel, that we have direct (but still ‘vague’) experience 
of our sense data, and that this does not constitute a form of ‘true’ 
knowledge. 
 
Another consequence of the nominalist model is the belief that our 
perceptions are exhausted by their individual qualities. We can see 
something that is ‘red’ or something that is ‘blue’, but if we see something 
that is ‘blue and red’ then we must accept, by definition, that we have two 
separate sense perceptions. Once again, Peirce rejects this argument. He 
asserts that we can have single perceptions that include multiple qualities – 
and which can be subsequently separated by the mind. Talking about the 
chair, he argues (I will discuss ‘percepts’ shortly): 
 
The percept is, besides, whole and undivided. It has parts, in the sense that in 
thought it can be separated; but it does not represent itself to have parts. In its 
mode of being as a percept it is one single and undivided whole. 
(CP: 7.625) 
 
This account, when linked to the idea of a perceptual ‘continuum’, gives 
Peirce the opportunity to think about experience in a new way. Crucially, it 
allows him to sustain the view that we perceive connections and 
relationships in the world. 
 
We have, so far, discussed two of the ‘daughters of nominalism’ - 
‘sensationalism’ and ‘individualism’. This leaves the other two ‘daughters’ – 
‘materialism’ and ‘phenomenalism’. These are closely allied to Peirce’s 
rejection of dualism. He consistently argued against this Cartesian position. 
He states, for example: 
 
The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two 
radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting 
this, we are driven to some kind of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. 
(EP1: 292) 
 
Peirce, however, rejects both of these daughters of nominalism - 
‘materialism’ and ‘phenomenalism’; in other words, he argues against both 
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poles of the dualist model. In its place he asserts a form of ‘monism’, 
mentioned above, and which we have also noted in Spinoza (see appendix 
5). Peirce, therefore, disputes that reality can be divided into two categories 
- mind and matter. And, in particular, he rejects the idea that reality is 
exhausted by matter which is why he mentions ‘materialism’ above. 
 
Simultaneously, however, Peirce also rejects what he sees as the 
‘phenomenalist’ position of Hegel. Why does he do this? He claims that his 
account of experience is not the same as Hegel’s phenomenalism because 
he believes that we have direct experience of reality – and particularly 
through ‘secondness’. This is why he labels ‘phenomenalism’ as one of the 
four ‘daughters of nominalism’. This leads him to adopt a position that he 
describes as ‘objective idealism’ (EP1: 293). He positions this between the 
two dualistic views that he observes in the cases of ‘phenomenalism’ and 
‘materialism’. 
 
Peirce’s efforts to distance himself from Hegel (footnote 6) are also 
reflected in his decision to call his study of experience ‘Phaneroscopy’. For 
Peirce, the ‘Phaneron’ comprises all that is in our mind, including the three 
categories of direct experience: 
 
I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content 
of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the sum of all 
we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value. 
(EP2: 362) 
 
The Phaneron is, therefore, one entity and it is experienced as a continuous 
whole which reflects Peirce’s underlying ‘synechism’ (EP2: 2). He sees the 
mind as being ‘immersed’ in the Phaneron. He believes that ‘all that exists 
is continuous’ (CP 1.172) and that ‘continuity is given in perception’ (EP2: 
238). Because we are part of this continuity ourselves, it follows that we 
cannot view reality from the ‘outside’ in the role of a ‘spectator’. Indeed, 
Peirce insists that ‘we ought to say that we are in signs and not that signs 
are in us’ (CP5: 289). The position he rejects is, of course, the model of 
‘secondary dualism’, and the ‘mirror’, and the inspecting ‘eye’, that inform it. 
 
The ‘objective idealism’ of Peirce thus positions his philosophy in a way that 
transcends dualism. He places himself squarely between the opposing 
views that reality is either ‘objective, but unknowable’ (the dualist position), 
or that it is ‘knowable, but not objective’ (the ‘idealist’ position). Indeed, 
Peirce even construes the mental as being in matter itself – as ‘effete mind’ 
– illustrating his rejection of both ‘materialism’ and ‘phenomenalism’: 
 
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter 
is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. 
(EP1: 293) 
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3.3) Peirce on Perception 
 
3.3.1) The ‘Percept’ 
 
At the basis of Peirce’s account of perception is his notion of the ‘percept’. 
This is very different from the concept of ‘sensation’ in the nominalist model. 
Peirce describes it as follows: 
 
Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of my table, a yellow 
chair with a green cushion. That will be what psychologists term a ‘percept’ (res 
percepta). They also frequently call it an image. With this term I shall pick no 
quarrel. Only one must be on one’s guard against a false impression that it might 
insinuate. Namely, an ‘image’ usually means something intended to represent, - 
virtually professing to represent – something else, real or ideal. So understood, the 
word image would be a misnomer for a percept. The chair I appear to see makes 
no professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does 
not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for 
anything else, not ‘as’ anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and 
stands there in the doorway.  
(CP7: 619) 
 
A number of points emerge here. Firstly, the percept does not ‘stand for’ 
anything. It is not a representation of anything that is putatively ‘behind’ it. 
Secondly, the percept is acting on the perceiver. It ‘obtrudes itself upon’ his 
gaze. This, as noted earlier, reverses the model that interprets the perceiver 
as the active force in the perceptual act. In the same section, Peirce goes 
on to describe what the percept does: 
 
1st, it contributes something positive ……. 
2nd, it compels the perceiver to acknowledge it. 
3rd, it neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any 
pretension to reasonableness…..The percept, on the contrary is absolutely dumb. 
It acts upon us, it forces itself upon us; but it does not address the reason, nor 
appeal to anything for support. 
(CP7: 622) 
 
Peirce, once again, insists here on the active force of the percept. But what 
is also clear is that it provides no information about the world. It is 
‘absolutely dumb’. The percept does not contribute direct knowledge 
(contrary to the ‘Myth of the Given’). 
 
There are other aspects of the percept, however, that are also important. 
The first of these is that percepts are always connected to each other. As 
such, Peirce rejects the ‘atomism’ of nominalism: 
 
The psychologists very reasonably argue that the first impressions made upon 
sense must have been feelings of sense qualities – say colours, sounds, etc – 
disconnected from one another, and not appearing to stand over against a self as 
objects….. But this is quite inferential. We are, of course, directly aware of positive 
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sense qualities in the percept (although in the percept itself they are in no wise 
separate from the whole object); but as for their being at first disconnected and not 
objectified; that is psychological theory. 
(CP7: 624) 
 
And, linked to this, Peirce maintains that perceptions are not exhausted by 
one quality. When we see a chair we perceive the different elements of it in 
relation to each other. Leaving aside Peirce’s references to ‘firstness’ for 
the time being: 
 
In the percept, these elements of Firstness are perceived to be connected in 
definite ways. A visual percept of a chair has a definite shape. If it is yellow, with a 
green cushion, that is quite different from being green with a yellow cushion. These 
connectives are directly perceived, and the perception of each of them is a 
perception at once of two opposed objects – a double awareness. In respect to 
each of these connections, one part of the percept appears as it does relatively to 
a second part.  
(CP7: 625) 
 
We thus see the chair in its entirety (and as a chair) and we also perceive 
the relations between its elements. This is not an option that is available to 
the nominalist who can only link atomised perceptions via acts of 
interpretation. Nominalists might argue, in response, that Peirce is 
overcoming the problems of scepticism by sleight of hand. They could 
argue that Peirce is simply defining what a ‘percept’ is in such a way that 
allows us to see the connections and relationships between perceptions. 
 
The Peircean response would that the nominalist needs to justify his own 
account of perception. Why is it that he believes that perceptions are 
fragmented when, in fact, our day-to-day perceptual experience is quite to 
the contrary? It is clear that we do not actually experience ‘atomised’ 
perceptions. Instead, perception flows over us as a continuous whole. It is 
only because the nominalist position insists upon the ‘active’ perceiver that 
we conclude that our perceptions are fragmented. And this, in turn, is 
rooted in the dualism that Peirce rejects. So Peirce is not circumventing the 
issues posed by nominalism – he is asking serious questions about its own 
foundations. 
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3.3.2) The ‘Perceptual Judgment’ 
 
The ‘perceptual judgment’ is central to Peirce’s account of perception. It 
enables us to move from perceiving a ‘dumb’ percept to experiencing 
something that has the beginnings of ‘knowledge’. The type of knowledge 
contained within a perceptual judgment will be discussed shortly, but, 
critically, with the perceptual judgment, we begin to understand what sort of 
things we experience in the world. Peirce describes the ‘perceptual 
judgment’ as follows: 
 
We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual 
judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we 
see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality, - excepting also, of 
course, what the psychologists are able to make out inferentially. But the moment 
we fix our minds upon it and think the least thing about the percept, it is the 
perceptual judgment that tells us what we so ‘perceive’. 
(CP7: 643) 
 
The perceptual judgment is, therefore, the mechanism through which we 
‘understand’ what we have encountered in the percept. We have to be very 
careful, however, that we couch this in the correct Peircean terms. Even 
using the word ‘understand’ brings with it overtones of nominalist thinking. It 
suggests that there is some ‘factual’ element in the percept (the image in 
Rorty’s mirror) which is then ‘interpreted’ by the mind (the ‘inner eye’). This 
is, again, something that Peirce refutes – the perceptual judgment does not 
view the percept and then give it meaning (Misak, for example, suggests 
this – perceptual judgments are ‘matters of interpretation’ (Misak: 1994: 
742). Instead, the perceptual judgment is exactly what the mind perceives; 
it is forced upon it. Rosenthal puts this very clearly: 
 
The percept is that sensory element which is presented in perceptual 
awareness…… Peirce is not here asserting that we first perceive the percept and 
then proceed to interpret it in a judgment. Nor is he asserting that the percept and 
the content of the perceptual judgment are physically, metaphysically, or 
numerically distinct. He does not hold that what we are aware of is sense data of 
some sort rather than a physical object. Rather, the percept as interpreted is what 
we immediately perceive and is the reality. 
(Rosenthal: 2004: 194) 
 
What does a perceptual judgment do? The perceptual judgment takes a 
percept and tells the perceiver ‘what sort of thing’ it is. It does this in a way 
that leaves the percept untouched, but which fundamentally changes its 
epistemological status. Whereas Locke and Hume argue that our ideas are 
‘copies’ of sense impressions (the ‘representationalist’ paradigm), Peirce 
argues that the percept and the perceptual judgment are categorically 
different: 
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By a perceptual judgment, I mean a judgment asserting in propositional form what 
a character of a percept directly present to the mind is. The percept of course is 
not itself a judgment, nor can a judgment in any degree resemble a percept. It is as 
unlike it as the printed letters in a book where a Madonna of Murillo is described 
are unlike the picture itself.  
(EP2: 155) 
 
This means that we do not perceive ‘sensations’ as such - we only 
experience the world as it is mediated through our perceptual judgments. 
As a result, we do not perceive reality as such; we perceive reality as 
something. Gallie states: 
 
He (Peirce) rejects the claim that we have direct intuitive knowledge of such 
elementary data on the ground that whenever we know something we know it as 
something – as being of such and such a character, or as standing in such and 
such relations. In otherwords, to know something, we must classify it or relate it. 
(Gallie: 1952: 67) 
 
Perceptual judgments, therefore, provide us with a tentative form of 
knowledge; they tell the perceiver ‘what sort of thing’ the percept might be. 
This is done in a manner that is outside of the control of the perceiver - and 
so is not an interpretation. As Peirce puts it, the perceptual judgment 
‘compels assent’ (CP: 7.627). It contrasts with the ‘inner eye’ model where 
the mind has the time, seemingly, to ‘inspect’ its sense data. Perceptual 
judgments, in contrast, are not something we can stand back from. 
Importantly, the process through which the perceptual judgment classifies 
the percept is through comparison and relation: 
 
But the perceptual judgment ‘This chair appears yellow’ has vaguely in mind a 
whole lot of yellow things, of which some have been seen, and no end of others 
may be or might be seen; and what it means to say is, ‘Take any yellow thing you 
like, and you will find, on comparing it with this chair, that they agree pretty well in 
colour’. 
(CP7: 632) 
 
This notion of resemblance is important for Peirce and we will return to it 
later (in relation to iconicity) . It is sufficient, at this stage, to highlight that it 
plays a role, even at this basic level of perception. It is on the basis of 
resemblance that our perceptual judgments are formed. 
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3.3.3) What is the Status of a Perceptual Judgment? 
 
If we consider the words Peirce uses in the phrase ‘perceptual judgment’ - 
we can discern his underlying strategy. In ‘secondary dualism’, perception 
and judgement are held apart; Peirce now deliberately conjoins them. In the 
nominalist model, sense data are viewed as ‘representations’ of the world, 
but what is the status of the perceptual judgment? Radically, as we saw in 
the ‘Madonna of Murillo’ quotation, Peirce claims that the perceptual 
judgment has the formal status of being a proposition (Sternfelt: 2014: 120). 
The perceptual judgment has this structure because of how it is formed. It 
makes an assertion that: 
 
Percept Y is the member of class X. 
 
We, therefore, experience percepts as members of classes. Peirce accepts 
that any perceptual judgment may, in fact, be incorrect in its classification, 
but this does not change its underlying logical structure. As Forster argues, 
on Peirce’s definition, ‘a perceptual judgment qualifies as a judgment 
because it involves assent to a proposition’ (Forster: 2011: 121). The 
perceptual judgment, therefore, not only combines perception and judgment 
– it also enjoys propositional status. And, concurring with McDowell, Peirce 
sees the conceptual as being necessarily involved in the perceptual 
(McDowell: 1994). 
 
Peirce readily accepts that any individual perceptual judgment may be 
mistaken. Indeed, this is what his doctrine of ‘fallibilism’ entails (Short: 
2007: 317-323). The perceiver classifies the percept in a way that is always 
open to revision. If I see a blue stain out of the corner of my eye then this is 
what I have seen. If, however, I turn my head and realise that what I 
thought was a blue stain is, in fact, some blue paper then this perceptual 
judgment does not falsify the original perceptual judgment – it simply 
replaces it. It does this because, for Peirce, no two perceptual judgments 
can have the same subject – they always succeed each other. And this may 
also mean that, on some occasions, an existing perceptual judgement is 
replaced by an inferior one; no comparison ever takes place between our 
perceptual judgements because this would entail the model of ‘secondary 
dualism’ again. 
 
This is a radical suggestion, on the part of Peirce, because ‘secondary 
dualism’ always wants to separate our perceptions into two camps - ones 
that are ‘correct’ and ones that are ‘incorrect’. This insistence stems from its 
belief that our perceptions are either ‘true’ or ‘false’ representations of some 
noumenal reality. Peirce, however, is freed from this constraint. He 
believes, instead, in a continuous process of making new perceptual 
judgments (CP: 7.639). 
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Another aspect of the perceptual judgment is that it is ‘vague’. Therefore, 
when I perceive what I think is a ‘blue stain’, I am thinking that it is the sort 
of thing that looks like a blue stain. Peirce is adamant that I do not know 
whether the percept is of a specific blue stain (i.e. a singular fact about 
reality). All I know is that the stain looks like it belongs to the class of things 
that look like blue stains. It is, as a result, a category that is open to further 
determination. There may be lots of different types of blue stains in reality. 
This is what Peirce means by a perceptual judgment being ‘vague’ – it is 
never absolutely true, or false; it is simply never absolutely determined. 
 
So, what a perceptual judgment does is to place a percept into a putative 
class. Indeed, we can only experience ‘things’ as members of classes: 
 
I look again at the colour before me. The idea of yesterday and that of today are 
two ideas; they have nothing in common, unless it be that the mind naturally 
throws them together. Some beginner may object that they both have a blueness 
in them; but I reply that blueness is nothing but the idea of these sensations and of 
others I have had, thrown together and indistinctly thought at once. Blueness is the 
idea of the class. 
(CP7: 392) 
 
The fact that perceptual judgments do not deliver specific knowledge about 
individuals in the world, but forms classes of percepts, is critical. Bernstein 
(1964) argues, erroneously, that a perceptual judgment cannot be a 
‘judgment’ if it cannot be true or false. But this is to assume that perceptual 
judgments provide specific ‘facts’ about the world. They are, in fact, doing 
no such thing - they are merely providing us with classificatory hypotheses 
upon which we can build our knowledge: 
 
This brings us to Peirce’s own, at first sight, paradoxical suggestion that every 
piece of apparently direct intuitive knowledge – including our knowledge of the 
most elementary ‘data of consciousness’ – is in fact of the nature of a hypothesis; 
since every claim to knowledge involves the assumption that a certain method of 
classification or systematization will in fact apply to a particular object or set of 
objects in a particular way. 
(Gallie: 1952: 68-9) 
 
This has implications for the Peircean account of signs. As we discussed 
earlier, we should not approach Peirce’s semiotics assuming that we know 
the identity of a ‘sign vehicle’. Instead, any perception that forms the 
content of a Peircean sign starts as a ‘vague’. Indeed, signs are the very 
way in which we come to understand (or ‘determine’) the identity of such 
perceptions. 
 
Importantly, moreover, because the perceptual judgment transforms the 
percept into a member of a class it also creates a putative universal (or 
‘general’ as Peirce calls it): 
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But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate, generals 
must have a real existence. Now this scholastic realism is usually set down as a 
belief in metaphysical fictions. 
(CP5: 312) 
 
The nominalist asserts, in contrast, that we only perceive atomised 
particulars - and that it is the interpretative mind that creates universals. 
Peirce, however, believes that we experience universals (albeit indistinctly) 
in perceptual judgments. Peirce states: 
 
Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgement, or 
proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a present 
percept, or sense image, that judgment must involve generality in its predicate. 
(EP2: 208) 
 
This has the effect of changing the ‘direction’ in which our perceptions 
‘operate’. The nominalist argues that the mind moves from particulars to 
universals and that perceptions simply provide us with raw data. For Peirce, 
in contrast, perceptions are transformed by the perceptual judgment and 
are experienced as manifestations of universals. As Peirce notes, 
nominalists would dismiss this as a relapse into metaphysics. They would 
argue that such a position involves unfounded beliefs in a noumenal reality. 
But Boler summarises Peirce’s position: 
 
In its strictly logical sense the universal is a creation of the mind and cannot exist 
apart from the mind. But it is not necessarily a fiction, for it can be based on a real 
commonness which is the nature in itself. 
(Boler: 1963: 52) 
 
Because the perceptual judgment creates a class, this means that it 
contains a potentially infinite number of individual manifestations within it. 
For example, when I have a perceptual judgment of ‘blueness’, the class to 
which it belongs contains an infinite number of shades of blue. 
 
It follows from this that any perceptual judgment also includes the idea of 
‘possibility’. When we think of something as ‘blue’ it contains a potentially 
infinite number of ‘blues’ which could be further ‘determined’. Whilst the 
nominalist insists that we start with individual perceptions and construct 
‘generals’ from them, Peirce advocates the opposite trajectory: 
 
But Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then 
thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes 
every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented which in itself 
has no parts, but which is nevertheless analysed by the mind, that is to say, its 
having parts consists in this that the mind afterward recognises those parts in it. 
(W6: 449) 
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This is not to say that Peirce rejects the notion of individuality. Early in his 
philosophical life he did adopt this position (‘The absolute individual can not 
only not be realised in sense or thought, but cannot exist properly speaking’ 
(CP3:93), but in the later parts of his career (Murphey: 1993: 131), Peirce 
comes to believe that we experience individuality through the action of what 
he calls ‘haecceity’. What Peirce consistently rejects, however, is the 
suggestion that intellection begins with ‘atomised’ sense data. 
 
To summarise, it is clear that Peirce’s arguments for perceptual judgements 
run strongly against the current of nominalism. He believes that we enjoy 
direct experience of the world, but only in a manner that combines the 
experiential and the judgmental. The perceptual judgments that we form in 
perception are putative universals and, critically, they are ‘real’ (rather than 
‘constructed’). But, importantly, they still do not possess the status of ‘true’ 
knowledge - and so Peirce rejects the ‘Myth of the Given’. Perceptual 
judgments, therefore, always remain indeterminate ‘vagues’ in need of 
further determination. 
 
As a philosophical position, this leaves Peirce with a fundamental need to 
‘fix belief’ (EP1: 109-124). In the case of Hegel, this indeterminacy of Being 
is addressed through dialectical logic. For Peirce, the same task is achieved 
through the combinatory action of signs. 
 
 
3.4) Vygotsky on Perception 
 
So far, we have identified some of the parallels between Hegel and Peirce 
in their accounts of perception. We have noted that they both reject dualism 
and that whilst our perceptions are ‘immediate’, they do not constitute the 
kind of non-inferential knowledge suggested by the ‘Myth of the Given’. In 
contrast, they both maintain that we experience the world in a manner that 
is ‘indeterminate’ and which requires further determination. 
 
In his account of perception, Vygotsky also argues, in line with Hegel, that 
our initial experiences of the world are ‘confused’. He describes them, for 
example, as ‘a wild dance of uncoordinated sensations’ (Vygotsky: 1987: 
291). And when describing a scenario in which a child is confronted with an 
intellectual puzzle, Vygotsky and Luria talk of the ‘jumbled’ nature of the 
child’s responses: 
 
The small child, placed in a situation where the direct attainment of his purpose 
seems impossible, displays a very complex activity which can only be described as 
a jumbled mixture of direct attempts to obtain the desired end…. 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994:117) 
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Although Vygotsky does not emphasise the indeterminacy of our 
perceptions as much Hegel and Peirce do, this starting point still echoes 
their accounts of ‘indeterminate’ Being and perceptual ‘vagues’. Elsewhere, 
Vygotsky describes our experience of the world as a ‘syncretism in 
perception’ (Vygotsky: 1978: 29) and he believes that a ‘child’s thought 
emerges first in a fused, unpartitioned whole’ (Vygotsky: 1987: 251). 
 
This ‘unpartitioned whole’ means that our perceptions do not enter the mind 
in the atomised form of the nominalist model. Vygotsky states: 
 
Structural psychology has shown that the small child does not perceive separate 
objects. Daily observation supports this perspective. Whether the situation is that 
of play or feeding, the child perceives the whole situation. 
(Vygotsky: 1987: 298) 
And: 
 
In processes of so-called ‘immediate perception’ and the transmission of perceived 
forms uninfluenced by speech, the child grasps and fixes an impression of the 
whole (spots of colour, the basic features of form, etc) 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 127) 
 
It is important to note, however, that Vygotsky is simply claiming here that 
our perceptual experience should be taken as a ‘whole’. He is not making 
the bigger claim, as Hegel and Peirce do, that reality itself is syncretic. 
Vygotsky’s work is devoted to outlining how a child develops concepts; he 
is not trying to make a broader epistemological statement about the world. 
Vygotsky and Luria immediately go on to state that: 
 
Yet no matter how correctly and skillfully the child does it, at the very first stages of 
speech its perception ceases to be bound by the immediate impression of the 
whole; in its field of vision there arise new centres, fixed by words, and ties appear 
between these centres and different parts of the situation being perceived; 
perception ceases to be a ‘slave’ of the field of vision and, independently of the 
degree of correctness and perfection of solution, the child transmits impressions 
transformed by words. 
(ibid) 
 
This is an important passage for a number of reasons. Firstly, it outlines the 
key role that Vygotsky highlights for speech in transforming our perception. 
Secondly, he states that this allows the mind to create ‘new centres’ (e.g. 
new potential concepts). Thirdly, he specifically maintains that this is 
achieved when things are ‘fixed by words’. This verb is one that we have 
just encountered in Peirce – and it reflects the requirement for both thinkers 
to explain how we establish fixed points within the indeterminate continuum 
of our perception. 
 
This approach is also reflected in Vygotsky’s treatment of ‘attention’ in a 
child. When the effects of speech on our perception are taken into account, 
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the child is able to focus on particular aspects of the ‘visual field’ in a way 
that is more structured: 
 
From the first steps of the child’s development, the word intrudes into the child’s 
perception, singling out separate elements overcoming the natural structure of the 
sensory field and, as it were, forming new (artificially introduced and mobile) 
structural centres. Speech does not merely accompany the child’s perception, from 
the very first it begins to take an active part in it: the child begins to perceive the 
world not only through its eyes, but also through its speech, and it is in this process 
that we find an essential point in the development of the child’s perception. 
(ibid: 125) 
And: 
In the case of the child, the field of perception is organised by the verbalized 
function of attention…… The ape must first see the stick in order to pay attention 
to it; the child may pay attention in order to see. 
(ibid: 133) 
 
Vygotsky thus envisages a progression from what he calls ‘natural 
perception’ (as enjoyed by apes) to the ‘higher forms of perception’ that are 
specifically human. Speech is critical to this process and it enables the child 
to ‘single out’ particular perceptions and to render them distinct from other 
perceptions. It enables the child to employ what Vygotsky calls ‘verbalised 
perception’: 
 
Behind the phase of ‘object perception’ actually lay a living and integral perception, 
quite adequate to the picture while destroying the supposition of the ‘elementary’ 
character attributed to perception at this phase. What was usually regarded as a 
property of the child’s natural perception, proved to be really a peculiarity of its 
speech, or, in other words, a peculiarity of its verbalised perception. 
(ibid: 125) 
 
The natural laws of perception, most clearly observed in the receptive processes of 
the higher animals, undergo basic changes due to the inclusion of speech in 
human perception, and human perception thus acquires an entirely new character 
(my italics). 
(ibid: 126) 
 
‘Verbalised perceptions’ do not entirely supplant, or replace, ‘natural 
perceptions’, but they establish a further level of experience that builds, in 
an Hegelian manner, upon a child’s ‘lower’ levels of ‘natural perception’ 
(ibid: 123). They restructure the way in which the child experiences the 
world: 
 
At the moment when, thanks to the planning assistance of speech, a view of the 
future is included as an active agent, the child’s whole operational psychological 
field changes radically and its behaviour is fundamentally reconstructed. The 
child’s perception begins to develop according to new laws that differ from those of 
the natural optic field. 
(ibid: 122) 
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It is clear, in these passages, that Vygotsky is proposing a model that 
parallels that of Hegel (and of Peirce). As we saw, they both maintain that 
our concepts reflexively inform our perceptions. With Peirce, the ‘perceptual 
judgement’ allows prior knowledge to become involved in the perceptual 
process. He sees this as a purely mental capacity of the mind – we are able 
to see things as things. Vygotsky, in contrast, by invoking the notion of 
‘verbalised perception’, brings an external factor into the perceptual 
process. Without speech, he argues, the child would not be able to go 
beyond the bounds of ‘natural perception’. Later, we will discuss this 
difference between Peirce and Vygotsky and whether this means that 
Vygotsky is committed to a social account of meaning. But Vygotsky does 
agree with Peirce that ‘verbalised perceptions’ involve categorisation: 
 
A special feature of human perception – which arises at a very young age – is the 
perception of real objects. This is something for which there is no analogy in 
animal perception. By this term I mean that I do not see the world simply in colour 
and shape but also as a world with sense and meaning. I do not merely see 
something round and black with two hands; I see a clock and I can distinguish one 
hand from the other.….. These observations suggest that all human perception 
consists of categorised rather than isolated perceptions (my italics). 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 33) 
 
This position, as we saw before, entails the view that we experience the 
world in a way that is intrinsically meaningful. We do not first experience the 
world and then add meaning to it – our perceptions inherently contain 
meaning: 
 
Another [issue] is the meaningful nature of our perception. It has been shown 
experimentally that we cannot create conditions that will functionally separate our 
perception from meaningful interpretation of the perceived object…The 
understanding of the thing, the name of the object, is given together with its 
perception…… I see the object. I immediately perceive the object as such, with all 
of its meaning and sense. I see a lamp, a table, a person, or a door. In Buhler’s 
words my perception is an inseparable part of my concrete thinking. 
(Vygotsky: 1987: 295-6) 
 
One point of difference between Vygotsky and Peirce is that the latter 
insists on the provisional nature of ‘perceptual judgments’. This is not an 
epistemological position that Vygotsky seems to hold. But, for Vygotsky, the 
development of our concepts is still construed as a continuous process and 
one that is constantly re-structuring perception. As such, our ‘higher 
perceptions’ are always open to revision and so ‘verbalised perceptions’ do, 
in fact, have an effective provisional status. 
 
Vygotsky’s view that our perception is holistic, and that we ‘single out’ our 
perceptions from a syncretic whole, also has important consequences for 
his views on the psychology of his time. His rejection of ‘atomism’, as with 
Peirce, leads him to attack what he calls the ‘associationist’ template in 
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psychology. ‘Associationism’ maintains that we re-assemble our ‘atomised’ 
perceptions (and create meaning) by finding the ‘links’ between them. It 
forms an essentially quantitative account of how the mind develops. 
Vygotsky views this as follows: 
 
(In the Associationist view] The child’s mental development consists of the 
constant accumulation of this material, resulting in new, more extended, and richer 
associative connections among separate objects. The child’s perception is 
constructed and grows with this development of associative connections. 
(Vygotsky: 1987: 291) 
 
In contrast, Vygotsky construes the development of the mind as being a 
qualitative development that involves the creation of new mental structures. 
Critically, he argues that concepts themselves are part of this development. 
They are not formed by the accumulation of associations within the mind; 
rather they evolve from perception: 
 
A concept is not just an enriched and internally joined associative group. It 
represents a qualitatively new phenomenon which cannot be reduced to more 
elementary processes which are characteristic of the early stages of development 
in the intellect. Concept thinking is a new form of intellectual activity, a new mode 
of conduct, a new intellectual mechanism. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 259) 
 
This rejection of ‘associationism’ can also be found in Hegel and it is implicit 
in Peirce’s earlier rejection of nominalism. For example, Hegel argues that: 
 
The so called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest, 
especially during the outburst of empirical psychology which was 
contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. 
(Hegel: 1830/1971: 206) 
 
For Vygotsky, the ability of the mind to create concepts is critical in the 
liberation of humans from the more mechanistic thought processes of 
animals. By creating concepts, and evolving our ‘higher psychological 
processes’, we are able to free ourselves from the constraints of ‘natural 
perception’: 
 
However, the difference between the practical intelligence of children and animals 
is that children are capable of reconstructing their perception and thus freeing 
themselves from the given structure of the field. With the help of the indicative 
function of words, the child begins to master attention, creating new structural 
centers in the perceived situation. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 35) 
 
The perceptual process in humans enables us, as a result, to rise above 
our experience of ‘dyadic’ reactions. It means that we are not ‘slaves’ to our 
vision (Vygotsky: 1987: 127), and we have choice in the world: 
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The child constructs with words much greater possibilities than the ape can realize 
through action. 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 110) 
 
Vygotsky’s rejection of associationism, however, also has implications for 
the way in which psychology conducts its experiments. For a rejection of 
associationism also means that the workings of the human mind cannot be 
understood in terms of ‘stimulus and response’: 
 
Despite great diversity in procedural details, virtually all psychological experiments 
rely on what we shall term a stimulus-response framework. By this we mean that 
no matter what psychological process is under discussion, the psychologist seeks 
to confront the subject with some kind of stimulus situation designed to influence 
him in a particular way, and then the psychologist examines and analyses the 
response(s) elicited by that stimulating situation. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 58) 
 
Because humans are operating at a ‘higher’ level, Vygotsky argues that this 
stimulus/ response approach will always fail: 
 
When we examine the experimental procedures used in complex reactions, we 
find that all are restricted to meaningless connections between stimuli and 
responses. 
(ibid: 69) 
 
Vygotsky also argues that psychology has fallen into the dualistic trap of 
assuming that the mind and the body are in separate realms. When 
discussing the differences between biological and psychological 
development Vygotsky argues that: 
 
So a great chasm continues to gape between these two concepts. The historical 
and the biological aspect of the child’s development end up separated from one 
another and it is impossible to build a bridge of any sort between them, which 
might help us unite facts and data pertaining to the dynamics of form in the 
thinking process with the facts or data about the dynamics of the content which fills 
this form. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 197) 
 
In addition, he also sees psychology’s tendency to separate thought from 
speech as being founded on a dualistic mindset. He argues that speech is 
often treated by psychologists as a mere external manifestation of internal 
thought. As such, speech is interpreted as an accompaniment of thought, 
rather than something that actually forms it: 
 
Speech, at the most, was looked on as an element accompanying operations just 
as harmony assists the main melody. 
(ibid: 107) 
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And this results, in turn, in yet another dualism being created – that arising 
between sound and meaning. If speech is treated merely as the outward 
expression of thought, then the sounds that comprise it are also separated 
from meaning and are simply conjoined to it - by association. This is 
another assumption that Vygotsky also attacks: 
 
In accordance with dominant trend, psychology has until recently depicted the 
matter in an oversimplified way. It was assumed that the means of communication 
was a sign (the word or sound); that through simultaneous occurrence a sound 
could become associated with the content of any experience and then serve to 
convey the same content to other human beings. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 7-8) 
 
In this sub-section, we have noted that Vygotsky approaches perception 
from a similar standpoint as Hegel and Peirce – indeed, he accepts many of 
the tenets of Hegel’s position. Their shared position on perception, 
however, means that all three thinkers must now account for the way in 
which our knowledge of the world is created. Confronted with 
‘indeterminacy’ in our perceptions, they need to demonstrate how we ‘fix’ 
our knowledge. In the following chapters we will see that Peirce’s answer to 
this problem is through the action of signs. In the case of Vygotsky, he also 
moves some distance from Hegel’s original model of concept formation. He 
does this by giving ‘speech’ a critical role in the process. 
 
 
  
 72 
 
4) Peirce’s Three Categories 
 
Immersed in the Phaneron, Peirce argues that we experience reality 
through three categories – which are monadic, dyadic, or triadic. It on this 
basis that Peirce establishes his three categories of firstness (footnote 
seven), secondness, and thirdness. 
 
The notion of experiential ‘categories’ emerges with Kant (1781/2007). He 
argues that they are four in number (quantity, quality, relation and modality). 
The idea of categories is then adopted by Hegel, but in a different form. 
Hegel asserts, instead, that there are three stages (or ‘moments’) in our 
experience – Being, Essence and Notion. And Peirce openly acknowledges 
that he is following Hegel with his own three categories:  
 
They agree substantially with Hegel’s three moments. 
(CP2: 87) 
 
Incidentally, Peirce also believes there can be no such thing as ‘fourths’ – 
because these (if they existed) could be re-analysed as triadic relationships 
(CP: 7.537). 
 
Before discussing the Peircean categories, we should make some general 
observations. Firstly, the three categories seem, occasionally, to map onto 
the more familiar terminologies of the ‘nominalist’ position. Instances of 
firstness, for example, seem to be equivalent to ‘qualities’. ‘Firsts’ appear to 
be like our experiences of ‘warmth’, or ‘blueness’ etc, but, as we shall see, 
they have a number of characteristics that distinguish them from Locke’s 
‘secondary qualities’ (Locke: 1690/1981). Equally, secondness seems to be 
equivalent to the concept of ‘objectivity’ and it is often associated with it. 
But, as we shall also see, secondness is not the same as externally existing 
reality. As a category, it has other properties that impact on us, and play an 
active role in experience. 
 
More alarming, for the nominalist, is Peirce’s concept of ‘thirds’. These are 
perceptions of relationships that exist in reality. In the nominalist account 
these can only exist as inferences. Peirce argues, however, that we do 
experience relationships in the world. Our understanding of the world is 
entailed in our perceptual acts. 
 
Importantly, Peirce’s categories are how we perceive the world. They are 
not ‘things’ that we perceive. We experience the world through firstness, 
through secondness and through thirdness – they are experiential 
dimensions. 
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The three Peircean categories are also fundamentally different to signs – 
which we use to understand experience. Later, we will explore how these 
two dimensions interact with each other within Peirce’s classification of 
signs. Concept formation takes place as a result of this synthesis; but it is 
important to recognise that categories and signs are initially different from 
each other. 
 
 
4.1) Firstness 
 
The first1 of Peirce’s categories is monadic and it transcends the 
distinctions that are normally applied to our notions of ‘sense impressions’ 
and ‘qualities’. As we shall see, ‘firsts’ share some of the properties of these 
more familiar concepts, but, at the same time, they re-orientate our 
understanding of them. Most importantly, in this respect, Peirce 
understands them as ‘qualities’ that are ‘real’. They cannot be treated as 
mental entities in the same way that Locke conceives ‘secondary qualities’. 
This means that firstness is a category that is perceived directly: 
 
Imagine if you please, a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no 
relation, no recognised multiplicity (since parts would be other than the whole), no 
change, no imagination of any modification of what is positively there, no reflexion, 
- nothing but a simple positive character. Such a consciousness might be just an 
odor, say a smell of attar; or it might be one infinite dead ache; it might be the 
hearing of [a] piercing eternal whistle. In short, any simple and positive quality of 
feeling would be something which our description fits, - that it is such as it is quite 
regardless of anything else.… The first category, then, is Quality of Feeling, or 
whatever is such as it is positively and regardless of aught else. 
(EP2: 150) 
 
Firstness also enjoys a ‘freshness’ and ‘originality’ that differentiates it. It is 
‘fresh’ because it has yet to be determined by the mind: 
 
It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be 
initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining 
cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object 
of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation: it has no unity 
and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its 
characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. 
Stop to think of it, and it has flown! 
(EP1: 248) 
 
A ‘first’, therefore, is a quality of experience, but as soon as we begin to 
think about it, reify it, or compare it with other ‘firsts’, it has lost its character. 
It is a quality in its own right, but as soon as we try to specify what it might 
be, we find that we have actually differentiated it from something else and 
created a description of it. As Boler notes, a ‘first’ is a ‘bare thisness’ (Boler: 
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1963: 122). In many respects, it has the same status as a ‘percept’ before it 
becomes a perceptual judgement. 
 
Importantly, a ‘first’ is never perceived as a ‘atomised’ sense datum. It is 
only experienced as embodied in something else. In this respect, it is 
always experienced as being conjoined with other perceptions. Because of 
this, it only achieves the status of being a ‘first’ (and it can only be a first 
(Short: 2007: 75)) if the mind prescinds it from the embodied state in which 
we experience it. 
 
When Peirce gives instances of ‘firsts’ he often gives examples that we 
would view as ‘qualities’ - such as sensations of colour and warmth. But 
Peirce also includes examples such as the ‘emotional’ reaction one feels 
upon watching a performance of King Lear (CP1: 531), or when listening to 
a piece of music (CP5: 475). This confirms his description of ‘firsts’ as types 
of ‘consciousness’; they are much more than atomised sense impressions. 
 
Indeed, if we look at the precise words Peirce uses to describe ‘firsts’, he 
talks about them as ‘qualities of feeling’ – terminology that deliberately 
conflates two aspects of experience that are usually separated in the 
nominalist model. ‘Qualities’ are what we experience, whilst ‘feelings’ are 
their effect upon us. Peirce deliberately runs the two together in an overtly 
anti-dualist move. In doing so, however, he is following in Hegel’s footsteps: 
 
All our representations, thoughts, and notions of the external world, of right, of 
morality, and of the content of religion develop from our feeling intelligence…(my 
italics) 
(Hegel: 1830/1971: 194) 
 
Peirce, therefore, refuses to limit our experience of the world to the narrow 
experiences permitted by our five senses. Experience now includes, as for 
Hegel, how we feel in the world, and how we do so over a period of time. 
Critically, however, Peirce also emphasises the fact that the ‘first’ is a 
simple (but confused) feeling - even though the phenomena experienced 
(i.e. a performance of King Lear) can be complex. 
 
As noted, Peirce also maintains that ‘firsts’ are real. In a section entitled the 
‘Reality of Firstness’, he argues they are different to the ‘sense impressions’ 
of empiricism: 
 
But as for Qualities, they are supposed to be in consciousness merely, with 
nothing in the real thing to correspond to them except mere degrees of more or 
less….But when one considers the matter from a logical point of view the notion 
that qualities are illusions and play no part in the real universe shows itself to be a 
peculiarly unfounded opinion. 
(EP2: 187-8) 
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Another difference between Peirce’s ‘firsts’ and nominalism’s ‘sense 
impressions’ is that they are not foundational; they are not the building 
blocks upon which our knowledge of the world can be established. Although 
they are the simplest things that we perceive, they are never perceived in 
atomised, (or indeed un-embodied) states. 
 
To this extent, the term ‘first’ is somewhat misleading for the uninitiated 
reader. They are, in an important sense, not primary (an assumption that 
can be easily made). Instead, they are always prescinded retrospectively 
from embodied experiences. Some commentators do not emphasise this 
point enough and give an impression of their primary status (e.g. Murphey: 
1993). Peirce often does this as well, but, on occasion (e.g. EP2: 268), he 
does make it clear that our experience of ‘seconds’ actually precedes that 
of ‘firsts’ and he discusses them in that order. Boler makes the same point, 
and argues: 
 
For the purposes of exposition, the order of the categories can be slightly 
transposed; secondness seems the best one to begin with. 
(Boler: 1963: 121) 
 
We should also briefly compare Peirce’s ‘firsts’ with conventional abstract 
ideas. There seem to be initial parallels here, but, once more, it is easy to 
be misled. Because a ‘first’ is a quality like ‘greenness’ or ‘blueness’ we 
could assume (nominalistically) that it is has been abstracted by the mind. 
 
Peirce, however, insists that we should distinguish between abstraction and 
‘prescision’. For nominalists, an abstract idea is created when we identify 
shared qualities amongst our perceptions. We have an idea of blueness 
because we identify the similarities amongst a number of blue things. For 
Peirce, however, ‘prescision’ is quite different – it is the action of taking a 
quality from its embodied state. It thereby creates a new mental entity, but 
this is not created by grouping atomised perceptions. As such, Peirce 
insists that a ‘first’ implicitly retains its underlying relationships and cannot 
be fully detached from the context in which it was initially experienced. The 
reason for this, of course, is that a ‘first’ such as blueness only exists within 
the context that created it. It is not, therefore, a free-standing quality (as in 
the ‘Myth of the Given’) – it is always dependent upon its relational context. 
Peirce gives the example of a diamond and its ‘hardness’: 
 
Remember that this diamond’s condition is not an isolated fact. There is no such 
thing; and an isolated fact could hardly be real. It is an unsevered, though presciss, 
part of the unitary fact of nature. 
(EP2: 356) 
 
The ‘hardness’ of the diamond is thus not a ‘property’ in any absolute 
sense; it does not exist separately from the contexts in which we 
experience it. Therefore, when we experience this particular quality, we 
 76 
must include all of its relational context (Gallie: 1952: 191). The hardness of 
the diamond is not, as a result, a ‘fact’. It is simply a possibility that exists 
within the diamond itself and which is actualized, or not, in the relationships 
in which we encounter it. 
 
Importantly, this also means that we do not know all of the properties that a 
diamond possesses because we have not experienced it in all possible 
circumstances. It may contain properties that will arise in new contexts and 
which exist within the diamond ‘in potentia’. It could, for example, turn green 
if taken to Pluto. This insight has implications for Peirce’s account of signs. 
The elements of signs exist in the world, awaiting a relational context to 
reveal them. 
 
To summarise, Peirce’s ‘firsts’, seem, at first, to be a category of experience 
that has similarities with nominalist ‘atomised’ sense data, or with Lockean 
‘secondary qualities’. But these similarities are misleading. ‘Firsts’, in 
themselves, combine both the experiential and the mental because they are 
prescinded qualities that are experienced in an embodied form. Equally, 
they are perceived directly - which means that they are real. They are not 
simply the ‘effects’ of the world in our mind. ‘Firsts’ are, additionally, 
relational in nature because we encounter them in embodied states. As 
such, they are quite unlike the abstract ideas of nominalism. Finally, 
although they are the most elementary of Peirce’s three categories, they 
are not foundational in relation to human knowledge. 
 
 
4.2) Secondness 
 
The category of secondness, as the name suggests, is fundamentally 
dyadic; it involves the interaction of two entities. It works in two ways; either 
between two ‘objects’ in the world, or between the world and the self. Peirce 
gives an example of the latter - the pressing of one’s shoulder against a half 
open door (EP2: 150); it involves effort on one’s own part, but also the 
resistance of the door itself. Another example is the experience of being hit 
on the head by a man carrying a ladder (ibid). On both occasions there is a 
sense of effort and of resistance; it involves an acknowledgement of 
something ‘other’ than oneself: 
 
We find secondness in occurrence, because an occurrence is something whose 
existence consists in our knocking up against it. A hard fact is of the same sort; 
that it to say, it is something which is there, and which I cannot think away, but am 
forced to acknowledge as an object or second beside myself, the subject or 
number one, and which forms material for the exercise of my will. 
(EP1: 249) 
 
Secondness is also experienced when we observe two objects interacting 
with each other in the world; our diamond being scratched would be an 
 77 
example. It is important to stress, in such cases, that these are just ‘raw’ 
experiences – they do not lead us to any conclusions about causal laws - 
as these would then become ‘thirds’ (Stearns: 1952: 201): 
 
We not only thus experience Secondness, but we attribute it to outward things; 
which we regard as so many individual objects, or quasi-selves, reacting on one 
another. Secondness is only while it actually is. The same thing can never happen 
twice. 
(EP2: 268) 
 
Secondness, therefore, is a dyadic experience which is perceived 
momentarily (footnote eight). Peirce is, therefore, careful to point out that 
secondness does not involve two entities having a relationship, because 
this would last through time. As Boler states: ‘Although secondness can be 
experienced, it is non-conceptual’ (Boler: 1963: 122) This, however, still 
leaves open the possibility that secondness is little more than a single 
experience of a dyadic event. As such, it might possibly collapse into 
firstness. Peirce, however, rejects this objection because a ‘second’ must 
involve a limitation of a sense experience. It must involve interaction and 
resistance. Murphey thus rightly describes secondness as ‘upagainstness’ 
(Murphey: 1993: 373). It is how we discover limits in the world. 
 
Secondness amounts to the experience of something ‘other’. We must be 
careful, however, not to conclude that this amounts to an assertion of 
objectivity. As noted, Peirce is anti-dualist and his notion of secondness 
does not equate to our experience of an ‘objective world’. This is 
occasionally misunderstood by commentators. Olteanu, for example, 
argues that ‘objectivity is the definition of secondness’ (Olteanu: 2015: 267), 
Semetsky states that ‘seconds’ are ‘matter’, or ‘the mechanical aspect’, of 
the natural world (Semetsky: 2010: 64; 66), and Stearns suggests that 
secondness is the ‘category of existence’ (Stearns: 1952: 201). Elsewhere, 
Smith even goes so far as to suggest that secondness represents 
‘causality’ (Smith: 2010: 39). 
 
Secondness, however, should be viewed in the context of Peirce’s analysis 
of perception. There we saw that Peirce construes our perceptions as 
fundamentally indeterminate (e.g. they are ‘vagues’). The key role of 
secondness, as a result, is to set limits on the indeterminacy of our 
perceptions. This is why Peirce describes secondness in the first quotation 
in this section as being ‘a hard fact’ (EP1: 249) and why Peirce tends to use 
two specific verbs when discussing secondness – those of ‘struggle’ and 
‘surprise’: 
 
The next simplest feature that is common to all that comes before the mind, and 
consequently, the second category, is the element of Struggle. 
(EP2: 150) 
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But precisely how does this action of experience take place? It takes place by a 
series of surprises. 
(EP2: 154) 
 
Secondness, therefore, involves the discovery that the world is not how we 
expect it to be. This is pivotal to an understanding how Peirce views the 
formation of concepts. He maintains that reality has a role in this process 
through the action of secondness. In the Introduction of this thesis we saw, 
in diagrammatic terms (i.e. Fig 2), how perceptual ‘vagues’ become 
progressively more determined. We can now frame the action of 
secondness in this context – for it is this action that causes ‘determination’ 
to take place: 
 
Fig 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is how reality, for Peirce, plays a role in determining the meaning of 
our concepts. If follows that our resulting concepts can only contain the 
meanings that reality permits them to have – our concepts begin to acquire 
a logical character that is dictated by reality itself. In contrast, a semiotician, 
such as Saussure, would argue that our culture has a ‘free hand’ in creating 
the meanings of our words. 
 
As an example, Saussure might argue that our culture has arbitrarily 
separated ‘tigers’ from domestic ‘cats’ – by using the two terms to denote 
them. He might argue that we could have easily named them both, using 
just one term, as ‘cats’ (see Gergen’s quote, for example, in sub-section 
1:2). Peirce would point out, however, that this would be quite foolish. If we 
attempted to feed the large stripy ‘cat’, it might eat us instead. Reality – in 
the form of ‘secondness’ would thus has a role in demonstrating that cats 
and tigers should be denoted by different terms. We are not, it turns out, 
free to ‘divide up’ the world in an arbitrary manner. For Peirce, in ‘A Guess 
at the Riddle’, this is what secondness involves; it limits us:  
 
It [secondness] is very familiar, too; it is forced upon us daily: it is the main lesson 
of life. In youth the world is fresh and we seem free; but limitation, conflict, 
constraint and secondness generally, make up the teaching of experience. 
(EP1: 249) 
‘Vague’ 
 
A More 
Determinate 
Vague 
An even more 
Determinate 
Vague – creating 
a new Identity 
ETC…. 
Secondness 
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And Peirce uses the analogy of the sail on a ship returning from a storm: 
 
With what secondness: ‘doth she return with overweathered ribs and ragged sails’ 
(ibid) 
 
Secondness is, therefore, the action of reality upon us. It thwarts our plans, 
it limits the ‘breadth’ of our concepts, and makes us revise the scope, and, 
therefore, the meaning, of our words. Very importantly, however, 
secondness is not representing anything behind our perceptions – Peirce’s 
advocacy of secondness does not amount to him revising his rejection of 
dualism. 
 
Importantly, Peirce’s efforts to distance himself from Hegel come to a head 
with his concept of secondness. Peirce criticises Hegel for giving too much 
emphasis to what Peirce calls ‘thirdness’ (CP5: 79). This, he claims, does 
not allow reality (via secondness) to play a sufficient role in the 
development of knowledge. It entails a neglect of what Peirce calls the 
‘Outward Clash’ (EP1: 233). Let us consider Peirce’s arguments on this 
point, and then evaluate whether Peirce is justified in his claims. 
 
In Peirce’s view, Hegel adopts a triadic model that describes the 
development of human knowledge, but it removes reality from the 
dialectical process. Hegel claims that this process is carried out as a matter 
of logic - by simply considering the contradictions that an Essence may 
contain. Peirce views this as fundamentally mistaken. Logic alone, he 
believes, cannot perform this task - only secondness can provide us with 
the ‘surprises’ required to constantly revise our thinking. He argues that: 
 
The capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is 
that he almost altogether ignores the ‘Outward Clash’. Besides the lower 
consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of nutrition, this direct 
consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to 
make it mean something real. 
(EP1: 233) 
 
When Hegel tells me that thought has three stages, that of naïve acceptance, that 
of reaction and criticism, and that of rational conviction; in a general sense, I agree 
to it….. But be that as it may, the idea that the mere reaction of assent and doubt, 
the mere play of thought, the heat-lightening of the brain, is going to settle anything 
in this real world to which we appertain, - such an idea only shows again how the 
Hegelians overlook the facts of volitional action and reaction in the development of 
thought. I find myself in a world of forces which act upon me, and it is they and not 
the logical transformations of my thought which determine what I shall ultimately 
believe. 
(EP1: 237) 
 
The question, however, is whether Peirce is justified in this criticism. The 
generally metaphysical tone of Hegel would suggest, initially, that Peirce is 
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quite correct. But Peirce is overlooking important aspects of Hegel’s 
position. Firstly, there is the fact that the Hegelian Notion evolves from an 
‘Essence’ which is, itself, derived from reality. As such, the Essence 
potentially contains everything that is required for an ‘Outward Clash’ to 
take place. In ‘The Science of Logic’, Hegel states: 
 
And yet, as it was before remarked, the notion is a true concrete; for the reason 
that it involves Being and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with 
them, merged in the unity of thought. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 187-8) 
 
Secondly, for Hegel, the on-going nature of experience constantly brings 
new ‘Essences’ to the dialectical process. These will always demand 
integration with other Essences. This means that reality is always providing 
new inputs into the overall formation of our concepts. And, thirdly, Peirce 
overlooks the fact that Hegel sees concepts as informing our perceptions. 
This means that each time that we use an evolving concept we are re-
evaluating its utility in the world. As such, it is clear that Hegel does, in fact, 
allow reality to play an on-going role in concept formation. And Hegel even 
goes on, in the same passage, to reject the very position that Peirce 
accuses him of: 
 
The Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science of form only, and 
understood to deal with the form of notion, judgment, and syllogism as form, 
without in the least touching the question of whether anything is true. The answer 
to that question is supposed to depend on the content only. If the logical forms of 
the notion really were dead and inert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, 
careless of what they contained, knowledge about them would be an idle curiosity 
which the truth might dispense with. On the contrary they really are, as forms of 
the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. 
(ibid: 189-90) 
 
This passage shows that Hegel is, indeed, alert to the charge that his 
notions are detached from reality and that they have no input from the 
world. Hegel’s ‘Logic of the Notion’ means, therefore, that we cannot make 
meanings by ourselves, or as a matter of our will (‘a science of form only’). 
And this is also, of course, a refutation of the future Saussurian view that 
concepts are formed arbitrarily. Such a position is dismissed by Hegel 
because it implies that our concepts can be formed in a way that is 
‘careless of what they contained’. 
 
The interpretation of Hegel, put forward here, is also supported by Kaag, 
who points out that Hegel’s concept of ‘Essence’, in the German, is ‘Wesen’ 
and that this ‘stems from ‘Gewesen’ (been), the past participle of Sein’ (e.g. 
‘Being’) (Kaag: 2011). Kaag argues, as a result of this, that an Hegelian 
‘Essence’ will include all previous empirical experience. 
 
It seems, therefore, that Peirce, in his eagerness to distance himself from 
Hegel, may have overlooked these key aspects of his thought and, like 
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many subsequent philosophers, tended to see Hegel in more metaphysical 
terms. As a result, Peirce overstates the difference between himself and 
Hegel. And, in line with this conclusion, Shapiro highlights that Peirce’s 
criticism of Hegel on these points ‘is an exaggeration which needs to be 
corrected’ (Shapiro: 1981: 270). 
 
 
4.3) Thirdness 
 
Having defined secondness as involving resistance, Peirce completes his 
account of the categories with ‘thirdness’. This is the most important 
category for Peirce because it is the one category that provides us with 
knowledge of the law-like nature of reality. As we saw, secondness 
provides a sense of ‘something else’ that we react against, and which can 
‘surprise’ us, but this limiting category only operates momentarily. It 
provides no understanding of the way in which reality operates at the level 
of cause and effect, or in terms of regularity. As we saw earlier, the 
nominalist equivalent of thirdness is the conviction that our mental 
interpretations of ‘constant conjunctions’ provide our understanding of the 
world. Peirce argues, in contrast, that reality itself exhibits the category of 
thirdness, that we can directly perceive it, and that ‘thirds’ are not 
interpretations. 
 
‘Thirds’ are, by definition, triadic. This term needs careful explanation. 
Peirce sees thirdness as an additional level of experience which allows us 
to perceive relationships. A dyadic relationship is one that exists between 
two phenomena. A triadic relationship, on the other hand, is the experience 
of a dyadic relationship from a third perspective. In a synechistic model this 
can occur from any point in the web of relationships that make up the 
Universe. It is always possible, in this account, to view a dyadic relationship 
from a third perspective because it is inherently linked to the other two 
within the continuum. If the Universe is a web of such relationships (as in 
Leibniz’s formulation), then ‘thirds’ are always present in reality - either 
explicitly or implicitly. 
 
This has consequences in two important areas – in the social domain and in 
the physical world. Let us look at the social dimension first because many of 
Peirce’s examples of thirdness are social ones. In a discussion of the act of 
‘giving’, Peirce talks as follows:  
 
A presents C to B by any aggregate of dual relations between A and B, B and C, 
and C and A. A may enrich B, B may receive C, and A may part with C, and yet A 
need not necessarily give C to B. For that, it would be necessary that these three 
dual relations should not only coexist, but be welded into one fact. 
(EP1: 252) 
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Another example that Peirce gives is the action of a stone being 
haphazardly thrown out of a window by a merchant. This stone kills his son. 
This action can be broken down into the first action of the stone being 
thrown and the second action of the son being killed. It is only if we assert 
that the ‘merchant killed his son’ that we have a single fact of a relationship: 
 
Had it been aimed at him, the case would have been different; for then there would 
have been a relation of aiming which would have connected together the aimer, 
the thing aimed, and the object aimed at, in one fact (my italics). 
(EP1: 254) 
 
Thirdness, therefore, is the bringing together of two actions under one 
heading and perceiving them as one relationship. This enables us to think 
about two events as being linked by cause and effect because we now 
construe them as one event, or as one identity. Peirce, therefore, believes 
we experience thirdness at a perceptual level, enabling him to circumvent 
the problems of atomism. Hume argued that such connections can only be 
established via inference. Peirce, in contrast, not only suggests that these 
connections are justified, but also that they can be perceived (Peirce, for 
example, talks of the ‘firstness of thirdness’ (CP5: 113)). We experience 
thirdness as a category of being. 
 
A ‘third’, because it involves identifying two phenomena as something else, 
always results in the creation of a new identity and, therefore, a new 
meaning. Peirce states that it is only through this action that meaning is 
created; meaning cannot derive from either ‘firsts’ or ‘seconds’ alone: 
 
I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of quality [firsts] 
or reaction [seconds]. It depends on two main premises. The first is that every 
genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic 
relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic 
relations alone. 
(CP1: 345) 
 
Meaning is, therefore, dependent on our ability to see things as other 
things. As we saw, for Saussure, this signifying (or meaning-making) effect 
is achieved via a ‘code’ operating between two known identities (Fig:1). But, 
for Peirce, it involves a completely different process - a change in the 
identity in what is perceived (see Fig 2). This action creates a new identity 
in reality – rather than an existing identity, re-interpreted in the mind, via a 
‘code’. 
 
The question, of course, is whether a Peircean ‘third’ is, after all, just an act 
of ‘interpretation’. Peirce argues that the mind picks out ‘thirds’ from the 
synechistic continuum because it sees them as being different from other 
dyadic actions. This is not an act of interpretation, but rather an act of 
perception. This, corresponds to his account of perceptual judgments where 
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we see things as something. This is how he construes the basic action of 
perception, but with ‘thirds’ we now have a new, and important, twist. 
‘Thirds’ (which, ultimately, are signs) are not construed as seeing 
something as something (i.e. a perceptual judgment), but, rather, signs 
involve seeing something as something else. 
 
This means, of course, that ‘giving’ and ‘murder’ are not viewed by Peirce 
as arbitrary social constructions, or ‘interpretations’, but rather as real 
phenomena in the world. As ‘thirds’, they exist as synthetic entities that 
involve both the experiential and the mental. The mental is clearly involved 
because ‘thirds’ entail a relational perspective, but this does not mean that 
‘thirds’ are created through interpretation. 
 
The question may arise, of course, as to where the experience of social 
phenomena originates. Surely, there might still have been some initial 
agreement, or convention, about a phenomenon such as ‘giving’? But this 
need not be the case - because such phenomena may have originated in a 
manner explained by Peirce’s model of perception. Individual members of a 
society may have seen the similarities between particular acts of ‘passing a 
thing’ from one person to another and may have perceptually classified 
these (via their ‘perceptual judgments’) in ways that made them distinct 
from other acts. This would have created a perceptual class of acts which 
developed into a distinct identity within each individual mind. 
 
The social constructionist might object by saying that the combined effect of 
these individual ‘perceptual judgments’ would amount to the creation of 
‘giving’ as a cultural convention. But this claim should also be rejected. Just 
because individual ‘perceptual judgements’ are found to be alike does not 
mean that they are ‘socially constructed’. This would amount to saying that 
trees are ‘socially constructed’ because we all know what a tree looks like. 
The social constructionist needs to show that either the act of ‘giving’ is 
picked out at a social level, or that some (even tacit) social agreement 
exists as to what constitutes the act. Peirce, however, has no requirement 
to invoke either of these premises. 
 
Ultimately, the social constructionist may agree with Peirce that the concept 
of ‘giving’ is derived from experience (rather than convention), but then 
decide to take the argument one stage further. For he, or she, might argue 
that we can possess the new concept of ‘giving at a wedding’ (where the 
bride and groom make a long list of what they would like) without ever going 
to a wedding. Surely, the constructionist would argue, this is an example of 
the social construction of a concept which has nothing to do with our 
experience of ‘thirds’. 
 
Peirce, however, would reject this argument. The idea of ‘giving at a 
wedding’ certainly ‘qualifies’ our notion of ‘giving’ and it does form a new 
 84 
concept. However, Peirce would assert that this is actually the combination 
of two symbols – ‘giving’ and ‘wedding’ – to create a new one – ‘giving at a 
wedding’. This, he would claim, is not an instance of the social construction 
of meaning – but rather just an example of how symbols can be conjoined 
together. Philosophers have recognised this kind of mental activity ever 
since Locke distinguished ‘simple’ from ‘complex’ ideas (Locke: 1690/1981: 
132). It is not enough for the social constructionist to demonstrate that ideas 
can be combined – he, or she, has to show that meaning is created ab initio 
- and this is not achieved with the example of the ‘wedding gift’. 
 
Peircean ‘thirds’ also play a vital role in our understanding of the physical 
world. When we see two actions in a formation of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, a 
‘third’ means that we do not see these two actions separately, but rather 
one event:  
 
He is now in a third state of mind: he is Thinking. That is, he is aware of learning or 
of going through a process by which a phenomenon is found to be governed by a 
rule, or has a general knowable way of behaving. He finds that one action is the 
means, or middle, for bringing about another result. This third state of mind is 
entirely different from the other two [firstness and secondness]. In the second there 
was only a sense of brute force; now there is a sense of government by a general 
rule. In Reaction [secondness] only two things are involved; but in government 
there is a third thing which is a means to an end. The very word means signifies 
something which is the middle between two others. 
(EP2: 5) 
 
In our experience of the physical world, therefore, these ‘mediating’ ‘thirds’ 
establish our knowledge of regularities and laws. They are, however, also 
directly observed and form what Peirce calls ‘habits’ (CP1: 327-9). In a 
letter to Lady Welby, he states that: 
 
The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its nature necessitant, 
that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a universal proposition. 
(EP2: 479) 
 
Likewise, in a paper called ‘The Reality of Thirdness’, Peirce argues that: 
 
….general principles are really operative in nature. That is the doctrine of 
scholastic realism. 
(EP2: 183) 
In this he, again, follows Hegel: 
 
Laws are determinations of the intellectual consciousness inherent in the world 
itself; therefore, the intellectual consciousness finds in them its own nature and 
thus becomes objective to itself. 
(Hegel: 1830/1971:163) 
 
For Peirce, ‘habits’ belong to things in themselves (rather than just to 
people) and they are also ‘general principles’ operative in nature. As such, 
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they are not mental ‘associations’, as Meyers suggests (Meyers: 1992: 
518). Peirce, therefore, talks about objects themselves having ‘habits’: 
 
Moreover, all things have a tendency to take habits. For atoms and their parts, 
molecules and groups of molecules, and in short every conceivable real object, 
there is a greater probability of acting as on a former like occasion than otherwise. 
(EP1: 277) 
 
If we now revert to the psychological assumption originally made, we shall see that 
it is already largely eliminated by the consideration that habit is by no means 
exclusively a mental fact. Empirically, we find that some plants take habits. The 
stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit. Every ditcher thinks 
so. 
(EP2: 418) 
 
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind essentially 
enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and like other habits, it 
is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its dissolution) perfectly satisfied. 
Doubt is of an altogether contrary genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a 
habit. 
(EP2: 336-7) 
 
In the third quotation, doubt is seen to arise in the mind when an 
expectation of reality (based on a ‘third’) is surprised (by secondness). A 
habit is then upset and a doubt created. When this occurs, we want to 
address the doubt and adjust our knowledge accordingly; Peirce thus talks 
of the ‘irritation of doubt’ (CP1: 114). 
 
In the philosophy of Hegel, mediated entities evolve dialectically and share 
many of the characteristics of Peircean ‘thirds’. When they become 
‘Notions’, new ‘sublated’ identities are created that also exist in reality. We 
saw earlier that ‘sublation’ is the critical step that allows a new identity to be 
formed at the end of the dialectical process. And this is, of course, exactly 
what happens with a Peircean ‘third’. It forms a new identity from previously 
perceived phenomena in a way that parallels Hegel: 
 
Apropos of this, we should note the double meaning of the German word aufheben 
(to put by, or set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a 
law or regulation is set aside: (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it 
when we say: something is well put by. This double usage of language, which 
gives to the same word a positive and a negative meaning, is not an accident, and 
gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 116) 
 
With ‘sublation’, elements that existed in previously observed phenomena 
are both ‘preserved’ and transformed into the new identity. In our example 
of ‘giving’, the particular ‘movements’ of the gift from one person to another 
still exist in reality (and as two separate acts), but they are now ‘sublated’ 
into a ‘third’ (e.g. ‘giving’). And importantly, this new identity then becomes 
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‘immediate’ in our perception – because we are able to reflexively 
experience it as a ‘third’. 
 
To summarise this section, Peirce understands both social phenomena and 
the physical laws of nature through his category of ‘thirds’. It is through 
‘thirds’ that new identities, and their meanings, are created. Once formed, 
‘thirds’ subsequently enable us to understand the way in which the physical 
world operates, and they allow us to experience social phenomena at both 
a cultural and a symbolic level. Meaning is not created for Hegel, or for 
Peirce, at a social level, or through social convention. 
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5) The Structure of the Peircean Sign 
 
So far, we have focused on how Peirce construes our experience of the 
world – either in our perceptual judgments, or through his three categories. 
We have not attempted to show how Peirce believes we comprehend the 
world. Earlier, we highlighted a need to establish a bridge between 
empirical experience and human knowledge - across the dualistic divide - 
and it is this that Peirce tries to address through his account of signs. In the 
last section we started to see how ‘thirds’ form the basis of more coherent 
thought. But we must now consider how signs enable us to move from 
experience to knowledge itself and how they do this specifically through 
concept formation. As we shall see in due course, the precise mechanism 
that enables concepts to be formed is the interaction of signs with the three 
categories of experience – in a Peircean equivalent of dialectics. 
 
Peirce’s account of perception raises a number of questions. In assuming 
that our experience is intrinsically ‘vague’, he needs, firstly, to establish how 
we ‘pick out’ (or ‘fix’) identities within the continuum. Secondly, he is 
required to show how we transform such identities into concepts; and 
thirdly, he must establish how they evolve into complex forms of knowledge. 
In the next two chapters, the ways in which Peirce tackles these issues will 
be analysed in detail. 
 
In this chapter, however, we begin with a detailed discussion of the key 
elements, and structure, of the Peircean sign. These are important for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, Peirce is famous for his view that signs are 
‘triadic’ in nature - a point of difference from the binary sign of Saussure. 
Secondly, it is important to understand his sign structure in the way that 
Peirce intended – and this means understanding it in more of an Hegelian 
context. For example, the terms that he uses - such as ‘object’, and 
‘determine’ - are sometimes passed over by modern commentators as if 
their meanings were entirely obvious. But we need to grasp their underlying 
Hegelian meaning in order to make full sense of them. 
 
This chapter, therefore, conducts a detailed discussion of the three 
elements of the Peircean sign (the ‘representamen’, the ‘object’ and the 
‘interpretant’), their relationships with each other, and also the order in 
which they act upon each other. These discussions will also be related to 
our previous analysis of perception in Hegel and Peirce. 
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5.1) The ‘Representamen’ 
 
The representamen is generally agreed to be the first element in the sign. 
But what does this mean? Peirce makes it clear that not all perceptions are 
necessarily representamens. If a perception is not caught up in the process 
of semiosis (and thereby results in an interpretant) it is not a 
representamen. At one level, it seems, therefore, that Peirce sees the 
representamen a ‘special’ kind of perception, but he is not suggesting 
anything like the distinction that Saussure makes between ordinary 
perceptions and ‘sign vehicles’. For Peirce, perceptions do become 
involved in a process of semiosis, but until that point they are only 
potentially representamens: 
 
While no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an 
Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable doing 
this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever 
actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object. 
(EP2: 273) 
 
The factor that changes a simple perception into a representamen is the 
recognition, on our part, that it is something we have seen before. The role 
of repetition is important here: 
 
The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition….. A 
representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, 
would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. This 
repetitory character of the representamen involves as a consequence that it is 
essential to a representamen that it should contribute to the determination of 
another representamen distinct from itself. 
(EP2: 203) 
 
These characteristics of recognition and repetition illustrate the fact that, at 
the beginning of the semiotic process, an act of classification takes place. 
The perceiver, however sub-consciously, asserts that one perception is 
similar to another. We saw, before, that this is precisely what happens 
when a ‘perceptual judgment’ classifies a percept. A representamen is 
essentially, therefore, a perceptual judgment that enters into a sign and 
eventually determines an interpretant. This firmly roots Peircean semiotics 
in his theory of perception. 
 
Over his career, Peirce is quite inconsistent in his use of the term 
‘representamen’ (footnote nine), but we should establish why Peirce does 
adopt the term on some occasions. It suggests the idea of ‘representation’, 
but it is not the sort of ‘representation’ that we find in the mirror of 
‘secondary dualism’. In the latter, a sense perception is deemed to be a 
‘copy’ of an object ‘behind’ it. But we have already seen that ‘perceptual 
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judgments’ are not like this – they are not representations of the ‘noumenal’ 
world. 
 
This is important in terms of how we understand the creation of a Peircean 
sign. For if the representamen is ‘vague’, then the central task of the 
signification process is to transform this status into something more clearly 
defined. And this observation begins to explain why Peirce describes the 
sign as being determined by its object. He uses this term because the 
representamen is, by its very nature, something that is indeterminate. And 
this assumption is founded in his account of perception. Indeed, Peirce 
even goes so far as to claim ‘the universe is a vast representamen’ (CP5: 
119). 
 
To fail to understand this characteristic of the representamen is to make a 
fundamental mistake about the nature of Peircean semiosis. His semiotics 
diverges from that of Saussure in very many respects, but one critical 
difference is that the Peircean sign involves the development of a ‘vague’ 
representamen to a more ‘determinate’ sign. It follows from this that Peirce 
is not concerned, as Saussure is, with establishing a link between a known 
perception and a culturally defined meaning for it (Fig:1). He is pursuing an 
entirely different account of how meaning is created and it is one that 
follows Hegel’s transition from ‘Being’ to ‘Notion’. 
 
There are commentators who neither fully recognise these specific 
characteristics of the Peircean representamen, nor its Hegelian influences. 
Short, for example, insists that the sign amounts to a triadic relationship of 
three elements – the sign, the object and the interpretant (Short: 2007: 30). 
In such a construal, the representamen amounts to a ‘sign vehicle’: 
 
The ‘sign vehicle’ is the sign, as Peirce conceived of signs, and the object and the 
interpretant are other things, distinct from the sign. 
(ibid: 19) 
 
Jappy also maintains that the representamen is actually the sign, or sign 
vehicle: 
 
To conclude, then, a sign is a representamen, that is the first element in the triadic 
relation, but owing to the fact that that it has an animate interpreter and therefore a 
mental interpretant, it is but one of many different species of representamens. 
Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind that Peirce adopts the term 
‘representamen’ in many of the quotations to come and should substitute the term 
‘sign’ for the sake of simplicity. 
(Jappy: 2013: 13) 
 
Hookway, noting that Peirce’s use of the term representamen is 
inconsistent, also suggests that we drop the term and talk, instead, simply 
of ‘signs’ (Hookway: 1985: 121). And Greenlee, likewise, argues that we 
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‘dismiss the distinction between ‘sign’ and ‘representamen’ and speak only 
of signs’ (Greenlee: 1973: 46). 
 
Such interpretations will result in a number of important misunderstandings. 
Not only does the representamen itself become the sign itself (because it is 
now being treated as a ‘sign vehicle’), but the subtleties of Peirce’s thoughts 
on the ‘vagueness’ of the representamen are entirely lost. Moreover, for 
Peirce, the sign, itself, is more than the representamen – it is the whole 
triadic relationship created between the representamen, object and 
interpretant. To reduce the ‘sign’ to one element of this relationship (a ‘sign 
vehicle’) is thus misconceived. 
 
Problems then proceed to multiply, however, when commentators consider 
what Peirce might mean by the ‘object’ ‘determining’ the sign. Firstly, they 
tend to miss the Hegelian meaning of the verb ‘determine’. Secondly, if they 
have already decided that the representamen is the ‘sign vehicle’, then it is 
relatively easy to conclude (and mistakenly so) that the ‘object’ initiates it. 
This, however, results in a complete inversion of the Peircean trajectory of 
the sign – as we shall see in the next section. 
 
 
5.2) The ‘Object’ 
 
There is, perhaps, no other term in Peircean thought that causes more 
confusion than the ‘object’ in the sign. Given his strong rejection of dualism, 
the fact that Peirce uses this term when describing sign structure, seems 
something of a paradox. Is he now abandoning his anti-dualistic stance? Or 
is he actually using the term in a manner that incorporates his rejection of 
dualism? 
 
To begin our discussion, two accounts of sign structure will be briefly 
considered which seem prima facie to have some correspondence with 
Peirce’s position. These are included in our discussion simply as points of 
comparison. They serve to illustrate the problems that can arise in reading 
Peirce. Both accounts work, ostensibly, within his ‘triadic’ model and they 
appear to follow his sign structure. 
 
The first of these models is in a book which had a major effect on how 
Peirce has been interpreted by semioticians. This is Ogden and Richards’s 
work, ‘The Meaning of Meaning’ (1989). Written in 1923, Fisch sees this 
work as ‘the first book in any language from which it was possible to get a 
grasp of Peirce’s semeiotic at first hand, in his own terms’ (Fisch: 1986: 
345). The second work specifically discusses Peircean semiotics and has 
been mentioned before - Jappy’s ‘Introduction to Peircean Visual Semiotics’ 
(2013). 
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5.2.1) Interpretations of Sign Structure and the Peircean Model 
 
A key issue, when interpreting the Peircean sign, is to understand how the 
three elements of the structure relate to each other. It might be assumed 
that this would be a settled issue in the secondary literature, but this is far 
from the case. 
 
Writing in the early twentieth century, the Ogden and Richards’s approach 
to the triadic sign is important because it was, arguably, at this point that the 
Peircean ‘object’ became associated with being a referent in the outside 
world. In a footnote, they state, probably referring to Peirce (and possibly 
also in reaction to Hegel?): 
 
It has seemed desirable, therefore, to introduce a technical term to stand for 
whatever we may be thinking of or referring to. ‘Object’ though this is its original 
use, has had an unfortunate history. The word ‘referent’, therefore, has been 
adopted, though its etymological form is open to question when considered in 
relation to other participial derivatives such as agent or reagent. 
(Ogden and Richards: 1989: 9n) 
 
Ogden and Richards recognise that there is confusion over the ‘object’, or 
that it has become a contentious term to use. Hoping to simplify matters, 
they introduce the term ‘referent’ in its place. Armed with this re-
interpretation of the ‘object’, they introduce a triadic structure as follows: 
 
Fig 6: Ogden and Richards’s Triadic Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ibid: 11)  
 
In this model, ‘thought’ is placed in a central role. It ‘mediates’ between the 
symbol and the referent, creating a ‘bridge’ between them. Thought 
effectively ‘translates’ one into the other. This mediating role is, as a result, 
interpretative in nature. It either translates an object into a symbol (or 
meaning) or, conversely, it encounters a symbol and interprets it by 
connecting it with a referent. The mind, therefore, actively ‘encodes’ and 
Symbol 
Thought or 
Reference 
Referent 
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‘decodes’ signs in a way that closely parallels the model of ‘secondary 
dualism’ (and Saussurian semiotics). 
 
Our second example is Jappy’s account of the Peircean sign. This is 
another triadic model and it is one, indeed, that even claims to follow Peirce 
himself. It differs from the model of Ogden and Richards in that the sign is 
now positioned between the object and the interpretant - as something that 
translates an object into the latter - a ‘meaning’: 
 
Fig 7: Jappy’s Version of the Peircean Sign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Jappy: 2013: 6) 
 
Here, again, we have a triadic structure. We have already seen that Jappy 
conflates the notion of the representamen with that of the sign – hence the 
absence of this term in his diagram. Critically, Jappy views the order of sign 
action as being: 
 
   From Object ……….to Sign ……….. to Interpretant 
 
However, like Ogden and Richards, Jappy’s model places the object at the 
beginning of the chain – it starts the semiotic process and it acts as a 
source of ‘transmission’. But, in this model, the sign is now positioned 
between the object and interpretant: 
 
…the arrows indicate the direction of the semiotic ‘determination flow’, so to speak 
– from the object to the interpretant via the sign. 
(ibid: 6) 
 
This is also a structure that Short thinks is present in Peirce: 
 
The basic scheme, of object determining sign determining interpretant, clearly 
goes back to his 1868-9 papers in The Journal for Speculative Philosophy….. On 
the one hand, Peirce wants to say that signs are produced by their objects and 
produce interpretants: varieties of causal language are employed, apparently 
efficient not final in meaning…. 
(Short: 2007: 165-6). 
 
Object 
Sign 
Interpretant 
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And Smith sees the representamen/object/interpretant relationship along 
the same lines (Smith: 2010: 38-9). In these models, the sign now acts as if 
it were a communication vehicle between the object and the mind. The sign 
is thus construed as being caused by the object, and as ‘carrying’ meaning. 
 
Elsewhere, there are still other interpretations of Peircean sign structure. 
Ma, for example, suggests that the interpretant should be placed in the 
middle of the sign (rather than as the concluding element) and this echoes 
the model of Ogden and Richards: 
 
The mediatory effect of the interpretant in the sign-object relation is predicated on 
the meaning of a sign being tied to the cultural, historical milieu within which the 
sign is understood. 
(Ma: 2014: 379) 
 
And Semetsky follows a similar line of argument in suggesting that the 
interpretant should be placed between the representamen and the object 
(Stables and Semetsky: 2015: 17). 
 
It is clear, therefore, that there is considerable debate on even the basic 
issue of Peirce’s triadic sign structure. Some commentators adopt 
intrinsically dualistic models, but it would, indeed, be paradoxical for Peirce 
to adopt these. He would also be unlikely to adopt the notion of ‘referents’. 
We need to explore, therefore, other ways of understanding the Peircean 
‘object’. 
 
Reading Peirce, there does, however, seem to be ample evidence for the 
Jappy/ Short interpretation. For example, Peirce states: 
 
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates 
between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object 
relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the 
object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object 
through the mediation of this ‘sign’. 
(EP2: 410) 
 
But if we look further, we find Peirce also says that:  
 
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its 
Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its 
Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My 
insertion of ‘upon a person’ is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my 
own broader conception understood (my italics). 
(EP2: 478) 
 
In this passage Peirce seems to state, initially, that the object determines 
the sign, but he then goes on to say that the interpretant is ‘mediately’ 
determined by the object. This suggests that the object is in the middle of 
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the sign between the representamen and the interpretant. So why does he 
begin by saying that the ‘sign’ is determined by the object? The solution lies 
in the fact that the overall sign, for Peirce, is more than the representamen 
– the sign is all three of its elements in combination with each other. As 
such, the sign comprises the whole triadic structure, including the ‘object’, 
and so it is the object within the sign that determines its meaning. In this 
account, therefore, the sign creates a triadic relationship that places the 
‘object’ in a mediating role. 
 
One of the key arguments of this thesis is that the ‘object’, in the Peircean 
sign, is not a source of the sign’s transmission – rather the ‘object’ is one of 
the correlates within the sign – and it is from this mediating position that it 
then determines the interpretant. This claim will now be discussed in detail 
because it forms one of the main bridges between Peircean and Hegelian 
thought. Peirce states that: 
 
But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must ‘represent’, as we say, 
something else called its Object. 
(CP2: 230) 
 
This quotation seems, again, to endorse the view that a sign should be 
understood in terms of dualism – the sign seems to ‘stand for’, or 
‘represent’, the object ‘behind it’. But in the same paper, Peirce also argues 
that: 
 
The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the 
ground of the representamen. 
(CP2: 228) 
 
So it is clear that matters are more complicated than they first seemed. We 
have already noted that the representamen is a ‘vague’. What Peirce is 
suggesting here is that the sign takes the representamen and makes it 
‘represent’ the ‘object’ in some, but ‘not in all respects’. One, or more, 
elements of the representamen are, therefore, ‘picked out’ in the sign – and 
this forms its ‘ground’. This process of ‘picking out’ occurs on the basis of 
similarity and will become an important aspect of our discussion of iconicity. 
But at this stage, we should simply note that, on the one hand, the 
representamen is not taken at face value, and never in toto, and that, on the 
other, the ‘object’ constitutes a selection from the representamen. As such, 
the ‘object’ is, in fact, a partial creation of the mind. 
 
We can now begin to identify elements of the Peircean sign in our earlier 
discussion of Hegel. For Hegel, the mind, when confronted with 
indeterminacy of ‘Being’ (i.e. the representamen), posits an ‘Essence’ which 
is a partial approximation of reality. The ‘Essence’ is an imperfect 
representation of this reality, but it is one that is improved dialectically over 
time. As this happens the ‘Essence’ comes closer to representing reality 
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more accurately. I would contend that the ‘object’ in the Peircean sign is 
operating in a similar manner. Selected elements of the representamen 
‘stand for’ the object (in a partial and imperfect manner) and, as such, act 
as a working hypothesis of what the ‘object’ actually may be. 
 
On this basis, the relationships within the Peircean sign structure begin to 
look very different. We perceive the representamen, and the ‘object’ (within 
the sign) is our posited response to it. A sign begins to form and, through 
sign action, this leads to the creation of an interpretant which completes the 
formation of a triadic relationship. The ‘order’ between the elements of the 
Peircean sign should thus be as follows: 
 
Representamen… (the mind’s creation of the) Object… Interpretant 
 
In this interpretation of the Peircean sign, the interpretant is still 
‘determined’ by the object. But, crucially, this now takes place through the 
mediating action of the object in the sign. 
 
On the basis of these arguments, it is proposed that it is far more useful to 
think about the ‘object’ in the Peircean sign as being ‘an object of thought’. 
It does not act as an initiating source of signification, but as a mediating 
entity within the sign. As a result, Peirce is not referring to an object that 
‘exists’ in the world; he is not contradicting himself and now re-committing 
himself to dualism. As a result of this, for the sake of clarity, and when 
appropriate, the ‘object’ in the sign will be described in the rest of this thesis 
as an ‘object of thought’. 
 
To summarise, some commentators position the elements of the Peircean 
sign in an order that views the ‘object’ as the sign’s initiator. In so doing so, 
these models either suggest that the mind acts as a ‘bridge’ between an 
object and a symbol, or that the whole sign acts as a mediating entity 
between an object and the mind. These assumptions, however, tend to 
echo nominalist models of perception. They do not reflect what Peirce is 
proposing; and neither do they recognise his rejection of dualism. In 
contrast, Peirce views the ‘object’ as being ‘posited’ by the mind when it is 
confronted with the ‘indeterminacy’ of the representamen. In this approach, 
Peirce is, in fact, paralleling the Hegelian relationship between ‘Being’ and 
‘Essence’. 
 
We shall now consider the philosophical context surrounding Peirce’s use 
of the term ‘object’. Is there an historical foundation for the interpretation of 
the ‘object’, as a mediating entity, that is proposed here? 
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5.2.2) The ‘Object’: Kantian, Medieval, and Hegelian Models 
 
In order to understand Peirce’s usage of the word ‘object’, we need to 
recognise that he is a nineteenth century writer immersed in Kantian and 
Hegelian philosophy. Both of these philosophers use this term in a specific 
manner, and in a way which is embedded in German Idealism. The origins 
of the term, however, also go back much further than this. The concept has 
medieval roots, and Peirce is also influenced by Duns Scotus (Boler: 1963) 
in this respect. There are, consequently, several philosophical pathways 
leading to Peirce’s use of the term ‘object’ - and which are generally 
unfamiliar to modern readers. 
 
The most useful way to understand Peirce’s concept of the ‘object’ is to 
begin with a quotation from Kant. This is a well-known passage at the start 
of the section in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ entitled ‘The Idea of a 
Transcendental Logic’. Kant states: 
 
We are so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, 
it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the 
contrary, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the 
understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without 
sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would 
be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind. 
(Kant: 1781/2007: 85-6) 
 
Here Kant talks of ‘the object of the sensible intuition’ and he states that 
‘without understanding no object would be thought’. Kant is clearly using the 
term ‘object’ in a different way to modern parlance; it is, for him, a mental 
entity employed by the mind in an act of comprehension. Kant also claims 
that human knowledge is made from the fusion of sensibility (which 
provides sense data) and our understanding - and that these are combined 
in mediating entities. As Kant famously concludes in this passage, 
‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’. 
Synthetic knowledge cannot exist, he argues, without both elements of this 
epistemological equation in place and the existence of an entity (e.g. an 
‘object of thought’) where they are synthesised. 
 
The implications of this for our understanding of Peirce are clear. It both 
confirms that the ‘object’ should be viewed as operating in a mediating role, 
and also that it is neither exclusively extra-mental, nor intra-mental. Instead, 
the ‘object of thought’ combines, for Kant, experiential and mental 
components and, because it mediates, it is able to transcend dualism. And 
it corresponds, as a result, with other aspects of Peirce’s philosophy. 
 
Peirce, in his own writings, often uses the word ‘object’ in this Kantian 
fashion. Examples can be found at CP1: 115, CP1:132, CP2: 230, CP8: 15, 
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CP3:93, EP1: 7, EP1: 43, EP1:46, and EP1:91. This use of the term is 
sometimes noted by commentators (e.g. Murphey: 1993: 40), but, on the 
whole, it is infrequently referenced in the secondary literature. On 
occasions, however, Peirce could not make his meaning clearer: 
 
Indeed, what Kant called his Copernican step was precisely the passage from the 
nominalistic to the realistic view of reality. It was the essence of his philosophy to 
regard the real object as determined by the mind. That was nothing else than to 
consider every conception and intuition which enters necessarily into the 
experience of an object, and which is not transitory and accidental, as having 
objective validity. In short, it was to regard the reality as the normal product of 
mental action, and not as the incognizable cause of it (my italics). 
(EP1: 90-91) 
 
This Kantian approach is also present in German Idealism. Hegel uses the 
term ‘object’ in the same manner; again, it is created by the mind: 
 
The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true 
that this exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the real nature is a product of 
my mind, in its character of thinking subject…. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 26) 
And: 
 
Now by concreteness of contents it is meant that we must know the objects of 
consciousness as intrinsically determinate and as the unity of distinct 
characteristics (my italics). 
(ibid: 48) 
 
This usage is clearly important in relation to Peirce’s use of the term. 
Inwood, an Hegelian scholar, helps to clarify the potential confusion that 
surrounds it. He highlights that Hegel, in fact, uses two words in German 
which are both translated as ‘object’: 
 
He [Hegel] stresses the etymology of Gegenstand more than that of Objekt, so that 
a Gegenstand is essentially and immediately an object of knowledge etc, whilst an 
Objekt is at least initially independent. A Gegenstand is an intentional object whilst 
an Objekt is a real object.…. A Gegenstand, by contrast, may be the object of a 
simple form of consciousness, such as sense certainty, which is not yet a fully-
fledged subject. 
(Inwood: 1992: 204) 
 
It is clear, as a result, that whilst Peirce often speaks of conventional 
‘objects’, he also uses the term ‘object’ in the same manner as Hegel uses 
‘Gegenstand’. The fact that the latter can be an ‘object of a simple form of 
consciousness’ parallels Peircean use of the term in the sign. 
 
As such, Hegel also views the ‘object of thought’ as something that 
develops over time - a position that we will also encounter in Peirce. In the 
‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, Hegel argues that when consciousness is 
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confronted with reality, in an unexpected form, it is the ‘object’ 
(Gegenstand) that changes: 
 
If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one 
another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it 
conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object 
alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of 
the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially 
belonged to this knowledge (my italics). 
(Hegel: 1977: 54) 
 
This distinction between two kinds of ‘object’ can also be found elsewhere. 
When Deely discusses the sign, he makes a similar distinction between 
‘objects’ and ‘things’. He argues: 
 
Now there is a great difference between an object and a thing, however confusedly 
the two notions are made to play in popular culture. For while the notion of thing is 
the notion of what is what it is regardless of whether it be known or not, the notion 
of object is hardly that. An object, to be an object, requires a relation to a knower, 
in and through which relation the object as apprehended exist as terminus. A sign 
warning of ‘bridge out’ may be a lie, but the thing in question, even in such a case, 
is no less objective than in the case where the sign warns of a ‘true situation’. 
(Deely: 2002: 136) 
 
And again: 
 
Objects as such exist only in relation to a knower, a being that is aware or virtually 
aware of them; whereas ‘things’ by definition are what they are regardless of 
whether anyone is aware of them or not. 
(Deely: 2008: 26-7) 
 
If we go further back in Western philosophy, we find this usage of the term 
‘object’ is also found in more ancient sources. In the Duns Scotus’s view, 
individual sense data are the ‘objects’ of the senses (e.g. colour is an 
‘object’ of sight) (Lagerlund: 2007). Thus, in order to understand an ‘object’, 
as it exists in reality, it is necessary to have an additional, and mediating, 
‘object’, which forms within the mind. As Pasnau explains, it is this second 
‘object’ that renders something cognizable: 
 
He [Scotus] gladly allows that the external object is present – that it has real 
presence – and that it is the efficient cause of the cognitive act. Still Scotus insists 
that this is not enough to account for cognition. Another kind of presence is 
needed, the presence of the object-as-cognized. 
(Pasnau: 2003: 289) 
 
This insistence on the ‘object-as-cognized’ also explains how we can have 
concepts of things that we have not encountered in experience. And this 
parallels the Peircean view that signs can have ‘objects’ which are fictitious: 
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Of course the object in itself can be present and can make an impression on our 
cognitive faculties. But that does not explain cognition: that sort of relationship 
obtains throughout the natural world, between the sun and a rock, or waves and a 
beach. To account for the special sort of relationship at work in cognition, Scotus 
appeals to a further kind of presence….. It is this sort of presence, here said to be 
brought about through species, that is required for the intentional relationships 
found in cognition. The need for this special kind of presence is more clear in 
cases in which the object of thought is not itself present. Even here, thought has a 
kind of relationship to an object: one must be thinking about something. But since 
the object has no real presence, and so exerts no causal influence, the relationship 
is entirely conceptual. 
(ibid: 289-90) 
 
This passage is interesting because Pasnau differentiates between physical 
relationships, such as the ‘waves and a beach’ (Peirce’s ‘dyadic’ 
relationships), and the relationships that are involved in perception. As we 
saw, an act of cognition must involve the perception of something as 
something and this requires a conceptual component (an ‘object of 
thought’) provided by the perceiver. 
 
Elsewhere, Jacques Maritain also describes how the early modern 
philosopher, Poinsot, employs the term ‘object’: 
 
The concept is a mediator; by and in it the object is brought into the womb of the 
mind in the state of ultimate intellectual actuation. Thus, our intellect attains things 
only according as its concepts render them present to it. The manner of our 
understanding corresponds to the more-or-less complete, or the more-or-less 
defective way in which the thing is objectified in the concept. 
(Maritain: 1995: 416) 
 
And Tweedale confirms this view (in a book with a sub-title which explicitly 
mentions ‘objects of thought’ in medieval philosophy): 
 
Toward the end of the thirteenth century a distinction between esse subjectivum 
and esse objectivum comes into common usage among the scholastics. Perhaps 
the first thinker to make heavy use of it is John Duns Scotus. The idea here is that 
something might have two ways of existing: (1) a real existence in no way 
dependent on being the object of any mental act or state; (2) existence as an 
object of some mental act or state. The former is esse subjectivum; the latter, esse 
objectivum. Something can have either of these without the other, or both at once. 
(Tweedale: 2007: 73) 
 
It is of note, of course, that it is the ‘esse objectivum’ (and not the ‘esse 
subjectivum’) that involves the action of the mind here (footnote ten). 
 
Returning to Peirce, there are, a number of places where he explicitly 
confirms the interpretation of the ‘object’ that is being proposed here. In a 
letter to Lady Welby, he explains what he means by the term: 
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I use the term ‘object’ in the sense in which obiectum was first made a substantive 
early in the XIIIth century; and when I use the word without adding ‘of’ what I am 
speaking of the object, I mean anything that comes before thought or the mind in 
any usual sense. 
(SS: 69) 
 
And elsewhere, he argues that: 
 
By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i.e. anything we can talk about. 
(MS [R] 966: Quoted in Olteanu: 2015: 261) 
 
And even more compellingly, Peirce writes about potential manifestations of 
the ‘object’: 
 
The Objects – for a Sign may have any number of them – may each be a single 
known existing thing or thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to 
exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which 
single Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other 
mode of being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent its 
negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, 
required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances. 
(CP2: 232) 
 
It is clear in this passage that the ‘object’ is created by the mind - it is an 
‘object of thought’. As Ransdell points out, Peirce’s semiotic is ‘about 
objects of thought as such’ (Ransdell: 1976: 98). 
 
The view of the ‘object’ being put forward here may have its critics. They 
will point out, quite correctly, that there are numerous occasions where 
Peirce talks about ‘objects’ as if they are objects in a dualistic sense. But, 
as noted above, Peirce is not reverting to a form of dualism in his use of the 
term ‘object’. What he doing, instead, is using the word ‘object’ in the pre-
modern sense of being an ‘object of thought’. Such ‘objects of thought’ are 
neither ‘objective’, nor ‘subjective’, in nature, because they are synthetic. 
 
Additionally, and as noted earlier, there are always two stages in the ‘life of 
the sign’ – the phase where it begins to form a concept, and the second 
stage where it is reflexively observed in the world. We can accept that 
Peirce often fails to distinguish these two usages clearly enough, and that 
there are many occasions when he appears to be talking about a 
conventional ‘object’. But these instances should not be seen as evidence 
that he is adopting a dualistic stance. They are merely examples of 
occasions when we experience objects in the real world through signs. 
 
This account, however, still leaves an unanswered question; what precisely 
is the relationship between the representamen and the ‘object of thought’? 
This brings us to the contentious (and, again, misconstrued) issue of what 
Peirce means by the verb ‘determine’. We have already seen that Peirce 
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does not mean ‘initiate’ or ‘cause’. So what, precisely, does Peirce mean by 
this term? 
 
 
5.2.3) ‘Determination’ 
 
The concept of ‘determination’ also creates much confusion in the 
secondary literature. Like the word ‘object’ these mis-interpretations relate 
to Peirce’s usage of a term that is commonplace in Hegel. Peirce often 
employs the word in his definitions of the sign and we have already 
observed several instances of this. Here is further example - with an 
indication (and significantly in German this time) of what the term 
‘determination’ may mean: 
 
A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e. specialized, 
bestimmt) by something other than itself, called its Object….. while, on the other 
hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I 
term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein 
determined mediately by the Object. 
(EP2: 492) 
 
This quotation, again, unequivocally places the object in a mediating role – 
the ‘Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object’. 
However, such passages can still be read as suggesting that ‘determined’ 
means ‘caused’. We have already discussed Jappy’s account of sign 
structure, and there are other examples of this interpretation. De Waal, for 
example, claims that the object ‘compels the sign’ (De Waal: 2013: 87). 
Likewise, Hookway, seeking to explain the Peircean ‘object’, uses the 
example of some ‘stripped bark’ that acts as a sign: 
 
The stripped bark, here, is the sign; as its object we can take the deer or the fact 
that there have been deer nearby; and the interpretant is our thought that there are 
deer nearby. 
(Hookway: 1985: 122) 
 
Hookway here sees the deer as the ‘object’ and as the cause that leads to 
the bark being stripped. ‘Determination’, in these accounts, suggests that 
we must look for a ‘cause’ of the sign. 
 
Short, however, is more nuanced in his discussion of ‘determination’. He 
fully recognises the importance of the term to Peirce and devotes several 
pages to its meaning. He correctly identifies that ‘there is considerable 
trouble over how the relation of object to sign and of sign to interpretant is 
to be conceived’ (Short: 2007: 165). Crucially, he recognises, in line with 
the quotation above, that the word that Peirce often uses is the German 
term ‘bestimmen’ and that its meaning is ‘to limit as in ‘The water’s edge 
determines where your property ends’ (ibid: 167). Short concludes, as a 
result, that ‘each object limits, or determines, what may be a sign of it, and 
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each sign similarly determines what may be an interpretant of it’ (ibid) and 
that ‘objects determine their signs and signs determine their interpretants’ 
(ibid: 168). Whilst setting aside the mistaken order that Short suggests here 
in the sign itself, his account is, in fact, much closer to a true understanding 
of the term ‘determine’. But Short still does not take the critical step of 
making any connection with the indeterminateness of our perceptions. 
 
Given our discussion of Peircean perception, however, we are in a much 
better position to explicate precisely what Peirce means. Because he 
believes that our perceptions are intrinsically indeterminate’, it follows that 
the ‘object’ now has a clear role to play – to encapsulate a more 
‘determinate’ identity compared with the ‘vague’ representamen. In other 
words, the ‘object of thought’ limits the representamen. This procedure is 
never entirely accurate, or exhaustive, enough to make the ‘object of 
thought’ completely ‘determined’ (i.e. an absolute representation of reality 
itself), but this process renders it more ‘determinate’ than the initial 
representamen. This is the beginning of concept formation; as Peirce 
clearly puts it: ‘…thoughts are determinations of the mind’ (CP4: 582). 
 
It is important to understand how this process takes place. Usefully, one of 
Peirce’s editors entered into correspondence with him on this subject. 
Peirce clarified his position in a letter entitled ‘What is Meant by 
Determined’. Peirce states, referencing Hegel: 
 
Perhaps, therefore, I shall do well to state more fully than I did before, the manner 
in which I understand Hegel (in common with all other logicians) to use them. 
Possibly, the original signification of bestimmt was ‘settled by vote’; or it may have 
been ‘pitched to a key’. Thus its origin was quite different from that of ‘determined’, 
yet I believe that as philosophical terms their equivalence is exact. In general, they 
mean ‘fixed to be this (or thus), in contradistinction to being this, that, or the other 
(or in some way or other). 
(Writings of C.S. Peirce: 1867-71 (Vol. 2) 1982: 155-6) 
 
The meaning of ‘determined’ is, therefore, linked to the idea of ‘fixing’. 
When the representamen is ‘determined’ by the ‘object’, the latter specifies 
the former (at least provisionally). In other words, it determines (or ‘fixes’) 
the representamen as one thing, and not another. In an unpublished 
manuscript Peirce says: 
 
Potentiality is the absence of Determination (in the usual broad sense) not of a 
mere negative kind but a positive capacity to be Yea and to be a Nay. 
(MS 277:1) 
 
This clearly corresponds with the idea of ‘limiting’ which Short highlights. 
Elsewhere, Peirce also describes ‘determination’ as the adding of ‘depth’ 
because it involves specification. As Liszka notes:  
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Reasoning processes that are focused primarily on the increase or decrease in 
depth, respectively, are called determination and depletion. Determination is the 
process of reasoning by which we add greater and greater depth, more and more 
predicates to a particular subject (CP2: 422). A complete determination would 
involve a display of all the predicates that apply to some subject. 
(Liszka: 1996: 70) 
 
If we consider the pre-modern roots of this Peircean account, the ‘Isagoge’ 
of Porphyry is clearly an influence here. This major text in medieval 
universities argued that ‘species’ are contained within their ‘genera’. As we 
move down the ‘Porphyrian Tree’, we move from higher ‘genera’ towards 
manifestations, or ‘species’, that are more ‘determined’ (Barnes: 2003). At 
each lower level the ‘indeterminate’ genus becomes more specified (hence 
‘species’) and, as a result, comes closer to identifying an individual. In this 
manner specific identities are created through a process of determination. 
 
It is very easy for the modern mind to interpret the tree of Porphyry, in 
nominalistic terms, as a ‘catalogue’, or as a ‘classificatory system’ 
(Semetsky: 2015: 48). In the hands of Peirce, however, it is a mechanism 
that demonstrates how secondness forces us to distinguish discrete 
identities within the Phaneron: 
 
A genus characterised by Reaction will, by determination of its essential character, 
split into two species, one a species where secondness is strong, the other a 
species where the secondness is weak, and the strong species will subdivide into 
two that will be similarly related, without any corresponding subdivision of the weak 
species. 
(CP5: 69) 
 
This pre-modern model reflects Peirce’s use of the word ‘determine’ and the 
vital action of secondness. When we initially encounter a representamen, 
we encounter it is a ‘vague’ which can be given greater ‘determinateness’: 
 
Suppose, for example, two Englishmen to meet in a continental railway 
carriage….. If one mentions Charles the Second, the other need not consider what 
possible Charles the Second is meant. It is no doubt the English Charles the 
Second. Charles the Second of England was quite a different man on different 
days; and it might be said that without further specification the subject is not 
identified. But the two Englishmen have no purpose in splitting hairs in their talk; 
and the latitude of interpretation which constitutes the indeterminacy of a sign must 
be understood as a latitude which might affect the achievement of a purpose. 
(CP5: 448n) 
 
We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate, may be 
more determinate still, but not that it can be absolutely determinate. Such a term 
as ‘the second Philip of Macedon’ is still capable of logical division - into Philip the 
drunk and Philip the sober, for example…. 
(CP3: 93) 
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Peirce believes, therefore, that greater ‘determination’ can be given to our 
concepts as they become more ‘limited’ in their scope. This creates a vision 
of the concept that involves what Peirce calls ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’. He 
argues that every concept develops, over time, a combination of these two 
dimensions which determine its overall meaning – or its ‘information’ (EP2: 
305). The more predicates a concept possesses the more ‘specified’, or 
determined, it will become. 
 
The belief that the action of the mind (in combination with experience) leads 
to greater determinations in a concept was widespread in the late 
eighteenth century. Kant also uses the verb ‘determine’ in the Critique of 
Pure Reason (Kant: 1781/2007: 487-94) and a contemporary of Kant’s, 
Salomon Maimon (footnote eleven) even proposed a ‘Principle of 
Determinability’ (Bergman: 1967: 97). In this historical context, it is not at all 
surprising to find Hegel using the same term. In the ‘Encyclopaedia Logic’ 
he says: 
 
What are called concepts, and indeed determinate concepts, e.g. man, house, 
animal etc, are simple determinations and abstracted representations. 
 
 (Hegel: 1830/1991: 242) 
 
And Hegel highlights the process of ‘determination’, or ‘separation’, when 
specifically distinguishing them from the activity of taking intuitions at their 
face value (e.g. the ‘Myth of the Given’): 
 
Since the understanding behaves toward its objects in a way that separates and 
abstracts them, it is thereby the opposite of immediate intuition and feeling, which 
as such, deal entirely with the concrete and stick to that. 
(ibid: 126) 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the idea of ‘determination’ is also present in 
Hegelian thought. This usage is frequently misunderstood in accounts of 
Peircean semiotics and, as such, this serves to further confuse 
interpretations of the term ‘object’. 
 
The sign, therefore, contains a mediating ‘object of thought’ that determines 
the representamen. Peirce believes that this process of determination 
occurs through the action of secondness: 
 
Experience is that determination of belief and cognition generally which the course 
of life has forced on man. One may lie about it; but one cannot escape the fact that 
some things are forced upon his cognition. There is the element of brute force, 
existing whether you opine it exists or not.  
(CP2: 138) 
 
So reality refines our experience by determining, or limiting, our ‘objects of 
thought’. An ‘object of thought’ emerges (in a sign) when we initially select 
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certain aspects of the representamen. This act of selection, as with Hegel’s 
‘Essences’, is always provisional. But reality nearly always forces us to 
revise our initial hypothesis. In so doing, any previous determinations 
(contained in the ‘object of thought’) can be reinforced, further limited in 
their scope, or new ones formed. Reality thus has a critical say in concept 
formation. We have no choice, it turns out, in the process of deciding what 
is actually contained within our concepts. 
 
In contrast, one of the key tenets of Saussurian semiotics is that we have 
the freedom to choose (at a cultural level, at least) how signifiers are linked 
to their signifieds. Peirce, we can now see, rejects this view because our 
concepts are determined by reality. At one level, he does agree that we can 
‘arbitrarily’ decide, in a game of chess, for example, to use an old bottle top 
to ‘stand for’ a rook. But this is a special case of sign action – and one that 
Peirce indeed recognises (see section 6.2). It is not, however, how signs 
operate in general, or in relation to our empirical experience of the world. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the development of a mediating ‘object of thought’ 
is connected with the creation of meaning within the sign. We have already 
encountered the activity of meaning-making in our discussion of ‘thirds’. 
These begin to emerge as ‘objects of thought’ slowly develop within the 
sign. Peirce argues that: 
 
This third state of mind is entirely different from the other two [firstness and 
secondness]. In the second there was only a sense of brute force; now there is a 
sense of government by a general rule. In Reaction [secondness] only two things 
are involved; but in government there is a third thing which is a means to an end. 
The very word means signifies something which is the middle between two others. 
(EP2: 5) 
 
The mediating ‘object of thought’ thus creates meaning in the sign by 
determining what it represents. It is in ‘the middle between two others’ and, 
as we shall see, it goes on to form an interpretant. The ‘object’ is not, 
therefore, the initiator of the sign. 
 
 
5.2.4) Immediate and Dynamic Objects 
 
With the evolving ‘object of thought’, our grasp of reality becomes 
progressively more determined. As such, Peirce is not rejecting the 
existence of reality as such. This impasse would only occur if we assumed 
that reality is, in some sense, ‘behind’ our perceptions. Peirce, in contrast, 
sees the semiotic task as one which involves the development of 
conceptual structures within our experience of the Phaneron. And reality 
has a central role to play in this activity - as it helps us establish what is 
contained, or not contained, within our concepts. This is why that Peirce 
calls himself an ‘objective idealist’ (EP1: 293), rather than an ‘idealist’. 
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As we build our ‘objects of thought’, some become more developed than 
others. In the latter part of Peirce’s career, he begins to make a distinction 
between two types of ‘object of thought’ on this very basis. These he 
describes as the ‘immediate’ and the ‘dynamic’ objects in the sign. 
 
So how are these distinguished? In the relational world of Peirce’s 
Phaneroscopy, like Leibniz’s Universe, it is possible to view a particular 
phenomenon from many different perspectives. This means that we will 
have degrees of understanding of a particular ‘object of thought’ depending 
on our relational acquaintance with it. 
 
To take an example, a large piece of metal with four rubber wheels at each 
corner, can be classified as a ‘means of getting to work’, a reflection of ‘my 
status in life’ or, if I am standing in the outside lane of the M1, a ‘source of 
my imminent death’. These are all possible ways classifying the same 
‘object’; they are revealed in different contexts and also in different levels of 
completeness (e.g. the car can still be a potential source of my death even 
if I am sitting at home). What matters is the context, or the level of 
determination, in which an object is encountered. 
 
For Leibniz, we have only a limited understanding of reality – and only God 
knows the entire relational network of the Universe. In these circumstances, 
he argues that we must accept that we have only partial levels of 
comprehension - which he calls ‘nominal definitions’ - and which he 
contrasts with the ‘real definitions’ that are known by God. These ‘nominal 
definitions’ are, of course, provisional and can always be revised. In his 
‘New Essays Concerning Human Understanding’ Leibniz states: 
 
So there is a kind of redundancy in our perceptions of sensible qualities as well as 
of sensible portions of matter: it consists in the fact that we have more than one 
notion of a single subject. Gold can be nominally defined in various ways – it can 
be the heaviest body we have, the most malleable, a fusible body which resists 
cupellation and aquafortis, etc. Each of these marks is sound, and suffices for the 
recognition of gold: provisionally, at least, and in the present state of the bodies 
around us. So we can say that in matters where we have only the empiric’s kind of 
knowledge our definitions are all merely provisional. 
(Leibniz: 1996: 299-300) 
 
This is the same distinction that Peirce is making between ‘immediate’ and 
‘dynamic’ objects. What Leibniz is distinguishing is an ‘object of thought’ as 
it is immediately, or partially, known (e.g. in particular circumstances) and 
an ‘object of thought’ as it could potentially be construed, and if we had 
many perspectives on it. If we apply this way of thinking to our car, Peirce’s 
‘dynamic object’ includes all of the potential perspectives as to what the car 
could be - on different occasions, and in different contexts. 
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Curiously, there seems to be a form of dualism here, but this is very 
different from the metaphysical dualism of the nominalist. The latter 
distinguishes between what we actually experience and what we think 
might exist behind reality. Peirce’s (and Leibniz’s) distinction, in contrast, 
differentiates between actual (and partial) understandings and more 
complete (but potential) understandings. And the difference resides in the 
fact that Leibniz, and Peirce, both assume that we are immersed in a 
relational Universe. 
 
At the heart of this distinction is the question of what type of reality we are 
working with. The Kantian position suggests a world that is still separate 
from the spectator. A commentator, such as Apel, tends to see Peirce’s 
semiotics as an attempt to cross this dualistic divide (Apel: 1995: 366-397). 
He calls this ‘meaning critical realism’ (footnote twelve) (Apel: 1981: 28). 
But an alternative model of reality exists, and this views our consciousness 
as immersed in a web of relations. This model places Peirce much closer to 
Leibniz than to Kant. Peirce rejects Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’ (CP2: 113) 
and he adopts the Leibnizian model that seeks to establish the ‘real 
definitions’ of things. 
 
This Leibnizian template also explains why Peirce views signs as being 
potentially interpretable, even when they are not actually being interpreted 
(EP2: 404). In a system in which entities are defined by their relationships 
with each other it must follow that each entity is potentially interpretable 
from every other point of view in the system. 
 
In this context, Peirce defines the object that we initially encounter as the 
‘immediate’ object and he argues that it provides us with just a ‘hint’ of what 
the ‘dynamic’ object might be. In a letter to Lady Welby in 1908 he states: 
 
It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate without, and 
the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: 
acquaintance with its object must be gained by collateral experience. The Mediate 
Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. The Sign 
must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object. 
(EP2: 480) 
 
Peirce is also keen to insist that the dynamic object is not some noumenal 
reality that exists ‘behind’ the immediate object and, in another letter, to 
William James in 1909, he explains that he has deliberately not called the 
dynamic object the ‘real’ object: 
 
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, - i.e., the Object as 
represented in the Sign, - and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say rather the 
Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, 
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which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral 
experience. 
(EP2: 498) 
 
The ‘dynamical object’ is thus the ‘object of thought’ in all of its relational 
richness. It is what we would know if we were omniscient, or had the time 
and energy to consider an object from all of its relational perspectives (via 
‘collateral experience’). This would give us an understanding of how reality 
is formed by relationally defined entities (Raposa: 1984: 154). 
 
It is significant that Peirce initially wants to use the term ‘real’ to describe 
the dynamic object, but he deliberately chooses to avoid this term because 
he knows that such a description will be interpreted in a dualistic manner. 
Many commentators, however, do not appreciate Peirce’s desire to avoid 
this trap, and falling into it themselves, assume that Peirce admits of some 
kind of ‘objective’ reality. Short, for instance, whilst giving an excellent 
analysis of the dynamic object still concludes that: 
 
The dynamic object is exactly that about which more can be learned. Therefore, it 
must be independent of our experience of it. 
(Short: 2007: 199) 
 
Here he slips from the correct idea that we have incomplete experience of 
the dynamic object to the erroneous conclusion that it is ‘independent’ of us. 
He, therefore, ignores Peirce’s synechistic (and Leibnizian) view that we are 
immersed in reality and have only a partial grasp of objects. Short 
concludes that Peirce’s position must take him back to idealism: 
 
We are back to idealism again, semiotic idealism specifically. 
(ibid: 191) 
 
This reluctance to accept Peirce’s rejection of dualism also emerges with 
other commentators. Liszka (1996), for example, explains the ‘immediate’ 
object, but, picking up on the idea of ‘dynamism’, focuses on the idea 
compulsion when he defines the ‘dynamic object’. This then reinforces the 
‘transmission’ interpretation of the Peircean sign that we have seen before: 
 
The dynamic object can be considered as the dynamism, the machine that drives 
the semiotic process; it is what compels the sign. 
(ibid: 21) 
 
Indeed, Liszka goes on to illustrate his version of sign action with a diagram 
(ibid: 32) that places the dynamic object at the beginning of the signification 
process. This is a long way from the model of partial and complete ‘objects 
of thought’ that Peirce actually is proposing. Elsewhere, Nöth suggests that 
Peirce’s dynamic object ‘seem(s) to have committed him to an ontological 
realism’ (Nöth: 1990: 43) and Hausman, likewise, argues that: 
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It is clear that Peirce regarded the dynamical object as having a pre-interpreted, 
pre-triadic, and yet constraining function with regard to interpretation. 
(Hausman: 2012: 82) 
 
Deledalle also seems to misunderstand Peirce on this point. He rightly 
accepts that knowledge of the dynamic object is gained by ‘collateral 
experience’, but argues that such knowledge cannot be ‘direct knowledge of 
the dynamical object’ itself. He concludes, in dualistic fashion, that: 
 
We must therefore, unless we fall back into idealism, admit the existence of an 
‘external’ object: the dynamical object, which is ‘as it is regardless of any particular 
aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it 
to be’ (CP: 8.183). What is known is thus the relations of an existing object 
independent of ourselves in the course of the semioses in which we are, it and 
ourselves, engaged. 
(Deledalle: 2000: 46) 
 
Like Short, Deledalle has taken the fact that we have no direct knowledge 
of the dynamic object to mean that it is ‘independent of ourselves’. The only 
alternative, he concludes, is idealism – adopting an inherently dualistic and 
binary position. Proni likewise asserts that the dynamical object is 
equivalent to Kant’s noumenal reality: 
 
The Dynamical Object is that which puts the whole process in motion, standing 
behind the scenes, unreachable in its completeness (as in Ding an Sich in Kant), 
but effective in its empirical existence. 
(Proni: 2015: 19) 
 
And, finally, Greenlee reaches the same conclusion with the dynamical 
object viewed as having ‘noumenal’ characteristics: 
 
The dynamical object is the represented thing, as it is in itself, apart from relation 
to thought, while that same thing, brought into relation to thought, is the 
‘immediate’ object (my italics). 
(Greenlee: 1973: 66) 
 
Instead, Greenlee should recognise that the dynamical object, within the 
web of the Universe, is simply the end point towards which our ‘object of 
thought’ is evolving – it is not something ‘apart from relation to thought’. 
 
In summary, each of these Peircean commentators fail to reflect his 
rejection of dualism. Peirce’s view, in contrast, is that the evolving ‘object of 
thought’ is how we encapsulate our growing understanding - as it comes 
closer and closer to the ‘dynamical object’ (footnote thirteen). In doing so, it 
becomes both richer in content and more rooted in reality. As Deely points 
out, ‘before there are signs, there are signs virtually…’ (Deely: 1994: 381) 
and it is this semiotic fact that drives the evolving nature of the ‘object of 
thought’. Peirce’s notion of the ‘dynamical object’, therefore, stands in 
complete opposition to the nominalist model which asserts a vision of reality 
without such relations. 
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5.3) The Interpretant 
 
The interpretant is the third element of the Peircean sign and it is, again, a 
subject of much debate in the literature – and not only because of the word 
that Peirce has chosen for it. He uses the word ‘interpretant’ - not because 
it is an ‘interpretation’, but because the interpretant itself acts as an 
‘interpreter’. We need to explore, therefore, why Peirce insists that an 
interpreter is not the same as an interpretation. 
 
We have already seen that the representamen has an ‘indeterminate’ 
nature and that the role of the ‘object of thought’ is to determine greater 
specification of it. The outcome of this determining process is the 
interpretant – a transformation of the ‘object of thought’ into something that 
is also deemed to exist in the world (and not just in the mind). This is the 
semiotic action that transforms objects made of wood into ‘tables’ and a 
rings of metal into ‘signs of love’. Peirce thus defines the interpretant as a 
‘proper significate outcome’: 
 
For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the interpretant 
of the sign. The example of the imperative command shows that it need not be of a 
mental mode of being. 
(CP5: 473) 
 
Why should Peirce be so concerned that the interpretant is not an 
interpretation? What is important to him is that the outcome of the sign is 
not simply a ‘psychological’ ‘interpretation’ of a perceived phenomenon. If 
this were the case, then he would be letting nominalism re-assert itself. He 
wants to avoid this and to show, in contrast, that sign action changes the 
identity of the representamen (in the world). This transforms the 
representamen by giving it a new identity – which Peirce calls the 
interpretant. Interpretants (which can be either natural or cultural) exist all 
around us; they are how we experience world (as tables and chairs); they 
are not merely our ‘interpretations’ of it. 
 
This is why Peirce stresses the role of the ‘interpreter’ because an 
interpreter is the someone that says that one thing is equivalent to another 
(i.e. that two different identities are the same): 
 
Such a mediating representation may be termed an interpretant, because it fulfils 
the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he 
himself says. 
(EP1: 5) 
 
Earlier, it was noted that concepts are created when thirdness becomes 
involved in our understanding. And we saw that Peirce sees ‘thirds’ as 
undergoing Hegelian ‘sublation’. We can now link together these two 
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aspects of Peirce’s thought to see how thirdness is involved in the creation 
of new ‘mediated’ identities, or interpretants. 
 
If we observe an indentation in the snow we see this as a dyadic 
relationship – the shape in the snow is caused by something impacting on 
it. But we may also understand it as a ‘footprint’. When we do this, we 
create a ‘third’ because we now see the indentation as something that is 
more than just an impact of one substance upon another. We are 
experiencing it as a sign of human presence; in other words the mark in the 
snow is now a new identity (a footprint) that exists in reality. We saw the 
same process at work when Peirce described the merchant hitting his son. 
This could be viewed as a dyadic relationship; but, if it is construed as an 
‘act of murder’, we have created a new identity from the two events of the 
brick being thrown and it hitting the son. This is, of course, exactly what 
signs do and the outcomes that are created in this process are called 
‘interpretants’ – they are new realities existing in the world for which 
merchants, in this particular example, can be imprisoned. 
 
The interpretant, framed as a new identity, is critical for Peirce. But 
commentators sometimes misunderstand this essential aspect of his 
semiotics; instead, they reach for different verbs to describe what is 
happening – and ones that sometimes refer to ‘sending’ messages, or to 
‘communication’. The example of the footprint is, in fact, borrowed from 
Liszka (1996: 90). Instead of recognising that the footprint creates a new 
identity, Liszka sees it as an instance of ‘transmission’: 
 
Consequently, there is, in a sense, a transmission of form or character to the 
hunter by means of the footprint in the snow, but no communication, strictly 
speaking. 
(ibid) 
 
But an interpretant has nothing to do with ‘transmission’; it is, instead, an 
example of Hegelian sublation. The interpretant takes our previously 
experienced sense data and translates them into a ‘third’. This new identity 
can then be used by the mind to understand the world more effectively. 
 
Later in his career, Peirce makes distinctions between different types of 
interpretant in the same way as he distinguishes types of ‘object’. Because 
he maintains that the interpretant is a new form of reality (a new identity), 
rather than simply an ‘interpretation’, he creates three types of interpretant 
that correspond to his three experiential categories. This means that the 
interpretant, itself, can be experienced, either as a ‘first’ (an ‘emotional 
interpretant’), as a ‘second’ (an ‘energetic interpretant’) or as a ‘third’ (a 
‘logical interpretant’): 
 
The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is 
almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we 
comprehend the proper effect of a sign, although the foundation of truth in this is 
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frequently very slight. This ‘emotional interpretant’, as I may call it, may amount to 
much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper 
significate effect that the sign produces….. If a sign produces any further proper 
significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, 
and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic 
interpretant…….It can never be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a 
single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. But what further effect can 
there be? 
 
In advance of ascertaining the nature of this effect, it will be convenient to adopt a 
designation for it, and I will call it the logical interpretant, without as yet determining 
whether this term shall extend to anything beside the meaning of a general 
concept, though certainly closely related to that, or not. 
(CP5: 475-6) 
 
Peirce is here making the same distinctions that we encountered earlier – 
the ‘first’ is concerned with feelings, the ‘second’ is concerned with reaction 
and effort, whilst the ‘third’ is focused on the understanding. These three 
interpretants build upon each other in the same way as do the three 
categories of experience. This occurs because interpretants (as ‘thirds’) are 
directly experienced in the world – and this parallels the Vygotskian notion 
that we possess ‘verbalised perceptions’. 
 
To summarise, we have seen that the interpretant is the final element of the 
sign as it moves from experiential ‘vagues’ to the creation of synthetic 
concepts. These are formed as potential new identities that may exist in the 
world. It follows from this that if semioticians come to Peirce with a 
Saussurian frame of mind they will fail to recognise the project that he is 
embarked upon. If they assume (e.g. Jappy: 2013: 6), that we already know 
the identity of the representamen (or ‘signifier’), then it is inevitable that 
Peirce’s analysis of the evolving ‘object of thought’ will be misunderstood. 
And in doing so, commentators will fail to grasp that the interpretant is, in 
fact, a new identity. Instead, they will simply construe it as a ‘meaning’, or 
an ‘interpretation’. And this entails a failure to understand the Hegelian 
framework within which Peirce is working. 
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6) Icons, Indices, Symbols and Concept 
Formation 
 
We have now evaluated Peirce’s account of perception and his three 
experiential categories. We have also discussed the elements of the triadic 
sign and how these relate to each other. These elements do not, however, 
provide us with knowledge of the world. 
 
If we assume, incorrectly, that what Peirce means by ‘objects’ are everyday 
objects, then we will never understand how ‘objects of thought’ are formed. 
But if we acknowledge that ‘objects of thought’ are a primary concern of 
Peirce, and that they are working hypotheses (like Hegel’s ‘Essences’), 
then what we must understand is how they are developed within the sign. 
What sort of process is this? How is an ‘object of thought’ initially formed 
and how does it evolve? These are the semiotic questions that will be 
addressed in this chapter – in a detailed account of Peirce’s icons, indices 
and symbols. The focus of these discussions will be the way these three 
sign types allow us to semiotically initiate, and build, the ‘object of thought’ 
in the sign. Crucially, the signs that are involved in this process should not 
be construed as different types of signs that we perceive; rather, they 
should be interpreted as different staging posts in the development of fully-
fledged concepts. Each of the sign types that we consider in this chapter 
are, as a result, formed at particular points as the three Peircean categories 
intersect with the three different elements of the sign. 
 
When we considered the philosophy of Leibniz, these questions relating to 
the formation and development of mental ‘objects’ did not need to be 
addressed. Given that Leibniz gives a central role to God in his system, his 
‘objects of thought’ (or rather his ‘monads’) already exist in the ‘mind of 
God’. They simply await discovery by the human mind. This option is not 
available to Peirce; he needs to provide an account of how we develop 
‘objects of thought’ from our perceptions. 
 
To begin with, however, we must evaluate how Peirce classifies his 
different sign types, how they interact with his three categories, and, in 
particular, how Peirce views the roles of the three central sign types of the 
‘second trichotomy’ – icons, indices and symbols. These three signs are 
frequently considered to be a major part of his contribution to semiotics, but, 
as we shall see, the ‘received’ view often misrepresents them. 
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6.1) Peirce’s Classification of Signs 
 
Peirce’s classification of signs is notorious for its complexity and, in the 
words of Short (1986) can become a ‘journey into darkest semiotica’. 
Hookway, likewise, calls the classification ‘bewildering’ (Hookway: 1985: 
125). Muller (1994: 135-153) also explores the ways in which various 
commentators have tried to elucidate it. The underlying problem, however, 
is that these commentators often fail to recognise what Peirce is trying to 
achieve with this classification. Unable to acknowledge that the main 
purpose of Peircean signs is to form concepts, they approach his 
classification mistakenly armed with known perceptions (instead of 
‘vagues’), on one hand, and with fully-fledged concepts, on the other, and 
then try to establish semiotic links between the two. For Peirce, however, 
the whole purpose of his classification is to demonstrate how concepts are 
derived from vagues. This serves to entirely reposition his classification. 
Instead of being an obscure diversion into ‘darkest semiotica’ it forms the 
Peircean equivalent of Hegelian dialectics. As such, I will discuss Peirce’s 
classification in terms of how it parallels the thinking of Hegel and the 
workings of his ‘objective logic’. 
 
To begin with, it is essential to recognise that the sign is triadic in two 
senses. It involves three categories combining with the three elements of 
the sign (Savan: 1994: 184). This leads to a delineation of the nine basic 
signs types. On the one hand, we have three experiential categories of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness. On the other, three elements of the 
sign which, together, facilitate greater knowledge of the world – the 
representamen, the object and the interpretant. 
 
We must now understand how these two sets of triads interrelate in a way 
that is cumulative in nature. This is how, in Peirce’s view, we form mediated 
concepts. Peirce’s classification of sign types is found in many secondary 
sources (e.g. Nöth: 1995: 45, Olteanu: 2015: 73), and is as follows: 
 
Fig 8: 
 
 Element of the 
Sign: 
Representamen 
Element of the 
Sign: 
Object 
Element of the Sign: 
 
Interpretant 
Category of 
Firstness (Monadic) 
Qualisign Icon Rheme/Term 
Category of 
Secondness (Dyadic) 
Sinsign Index Dicent Sign 
/Dicisign/ 
Proposition 
Category of 
Thirdness (Triadic) 
Legisign Symbol Argument 
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The above table has deliberately not included, on the horizontal axis, any 
verb that specifies the relationships between the representamen, object and 
interpretant and the three categories - because we need to discuss these 
specific relationships. 
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that some commentators do not agree 
with even this basic classification (Sheriff: 1994: 41, Olteanu: 2015: 73; 
Feibleman: 1970: 93). Feibleman, for example, places three other terms 
along the horizontal axis – Sign, Ground and Object – thereby limiting the 
scope of the term ‘sign’ and confusing matters by placing ‘object’ in the 
column that should be occupied by the term ‘interpretant’. Meanwhile, 
Sheriff and Olteanu place the categories of firstness, secondness and 
thirdness along the horizontal axis as well as the vertical one. This latter 
strategy creates both its problems and its benefits. A disadvantage is that 
they lose the opportunity to show how each of the elements of the sign 
interact with the categories (although Olteanu does discuss this in his text). 
And, secondly, they make it harder to follow the transition from ‘vagues’, in 
the first column, to more specific statements about the world in the third 
(where we find rhemes, dicents and arguments). But one advantage of 
placing the categories along the horizontal axis is that this shows how the 
elements of the sign are experienced (e.g. monadically, dyadically, 
triadically etc). As such, a potential revision of Peirce’s classification would 
be: 
 
Fig 9: 
 
 Representamen Object Interpretant 
Category of 
Firstness 
(Monadic) 
Qualisign 
A monadic form of 
firstness 
Icon 
A monadic form 
of Secondness 
Rheme 
A monadic form of 
Thirdness 
Category of 
Secondness 
(Dyadic) 
Sinsign 
A dyadic form of 
firstness 
Index 
A dyadic form of 
Secondness 
Dicent/Dicisign 
A dyadic form of 
Thirdness 
Category of 
Thirdness 
(Triadic) 
Legisign 
A triadic form of 
firstness 
Symbol 
A triadic form of 
Secondness 
Argument 
A triadic form of 
Thirdness 
 
This way of thinking still seems very abstract, but it reflects occasions when 
Peirce does, indeed, talk about a ‘first of a first’ (e.g. CP1: 543). However, if 
we now apply our learnings from previous sections, including our 
observations on the ‘object’ as an ‘object of thought’, we can propose the 
following tabulation: 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
Fig 10: 
 
 Representamen ‘Object of 
Thought’ 
Interpretant 
Category of 
Firstness 
(Monadic) 
A vague, or 
indeterminate, 
quality 
A vague, or 
indeterminate, 
object (of thought)  
The possibility of a 
relationship  
Category of 
Secondness 
(Dyadic) 
The actuality of a 
quality 
 
The actuality, or 
actualities, of an 
object (of thought)  
The actuality of a 
relationship 
Category of 
Thirdness 
(Triadic) 
A quality as part of a 
‘system’, or ‘law’ 
An object (of 
thought) as part of 
a ‘system’, or law 
A relationship as part 
of a wider system, or 
law 
 
It must be admitted, however, that this formulation still remains rather 
difficult to comprehend. But it can be given concrete manifestation with the 
provision of an example. At this point, commentators (e.g. Liszka: 1996: 48-
52) often give disconnected examples of the different sign types. But if we 
are going to understand how a single concept is progressively formed within 
the sign, then we must show how its systematic growth takes place: 
 
Fig 11: 
 
 Representamen ‘Object of Thought’ Interpretant 
Category of 
Firstness 
(Monadic) 
Feeling a vague 
sensation (which 
turns out later to be 
wetness). 
An ‘hypothesis’ that I am 
experiencing ‘rain’  
‘Rain’ as a 
possible concept 
in a proposition 
Category of 
Secondness 
(Dyadic) 
 
Feeling the actual 
(but vague) 
sensation on my skin 
(a dyadic 
relationship) 
Whilst hypothesising 
that this might be rain, I 
also know that I am 
getting wet (an indexical 
link) 
A proposition 
about rain 
Category of 
Thirdness 
(Triadic) 
Feeling that this 
(vague) sensation of 
is one that I have felt 
before 
Knowing that this is 
‘rain’ (it is now an 
identity), and being able 
to tell someone else 
about it (via a symbol) 
An argument 
about the 
consequences of 
getting wet in the 
rain 
 
This revision of Peirce’s classification follows the evolving trajectory of a 
particular sign, or concept, from its experience as a ‘vague’ through to its 
emergence in a system of other concepts. Fundamentally, this way of 
considering Peirce’s classification emphasises that this process is dynamic. 
Peirce is not interested in classifying signs as static entities; Stjernfelt, 
indeed, highlights that Peirce is often interpreted as a ‘taxonomist of signs’ 
(Stjernfelt: 2007: 118). Short is a case in point here (Short: 2007: 207-231). 
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But this is the wrong way to view his classification. Rather, Peirce wants to 
show how sign action operates as a developmental force. Muller shares this 
view, recommending that we move from a ‘statics of classification’ to a 
‘dynamics of semiosis’ (Muller: 1994: 145). 
 
In day to day experience, we encounter a spectrum of ‘signs’ at many 
different stages of this developmental process - from qualisigns, to signs 
with developing ‘objects of thought’, through to fully evolved symbols. We 
always encounter, as a result, a range of signs and these include various 
evolving ‘objects of thought’ in the second trichotomy. These ‘objects of 
thought’ can be experienced as just emerging; or they may be ones that we 
recognise as existing in the world; or perhaps they are ones that have 
evolved to achieve symbolic status. The development of the sign is thus, to 
borrow the phrase from Vygotsky, a ‘natural history’. Peircean signs should, 
as a result, be seen as ‘staging posts’ on a continuum of concept 
development. To take an example, the Eiffel Tower can be understood as a 
simple physical object, or as a symbol of France. The overlap between 
these two positions is determined by how well the ‘object of thought’ is 
developed in the minds of different individuals. 
 
Peirce’s classification also provides a solution to the problem that Saussure 
and Barthes encountered with regard to the initiation of the ‘associative 
axis’. We saw earlier that their way of identifying how meaning is formed is 
circular. But we now have an alternative solution to this problem. In Peirce’s 
view, we are often confronted by experiences which are on the verge of 
becoming ‘objects of thought’. If they develop in this way they enter into the 
realm of semiotics. When they do this they become potential centres of 
meaning. In contrast, for Saussure and Barthes, an associative axis is only 
recognised when a meaning is already established, and can be seen to 
change. For Saussure and Barthes, paradigmatic identification, therefore, 
requires meaning to exist already, whilst, for Peirce, his ‘objects of thought’ 
emerge organically within a dynamic process of meaning creation. 
 
Linked to this argument is the way Peirce uses the term ‘sign’. We have 
seen that he views signs as being essentially triadic in nature and that they 
necessarily involve thirdness. It is, therefore, surprising to find him 
discussing ‘qualisigns’ that have yet to achieve this level of semiotic 
complexity. We must recognise, however, that Peirce wants to identify how 
the elements of the sign all contribute to signification. At the early stages of 
development they are not ‘genuine’ signs (and he designates these as 
‘degenerate’ (EP2: 306)). Peirce is, therefore, using the term ‘sign’ to show 
that different signs combine with each other in concept formation. What can 
easily look like terminological confusion is, in fact, evidence of Peirce’s 
theoretical perspective. 
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Although there is some risk of over-simplification here, a dynamic 
‘movement’ takes place through Peirce’s classification system. It acts 
‘downwards’ in first column and then moves on, in similar fashion, in the 
second and third columns. It concludes, in the bottom right hand corner, 
with the ‘argument’. There is, as a result, a ‘spiral’ action as signs build 
upon each other to form concepts. Paradoxically, this results in ten sign 
types as outlined in the appendix (footnote fourteen). Andacht comments on 
this cumulative action - and the dangers of assuming it is a static 
framework: 
 
If we do not act with theoretical caution, the Peircean sign classification may be 
misunderstood, and that would lead us to a static, non-triadic, reductionistic 
conception of the real functioning of signs in the world, as if each kind of sign 
worked in isolation from each other, or even worse, according to a nominalistic and 
dualistic mechanism. 
(Andacht: 2013: 519) 
 
 
6.2) Qualisigns, Sinsigns and Legisigns 
 
Before embarking on a detailed discussion of Peirce’s icon we should look 
briefly at the three ‘signs’, in the first trichotomy of the representamen. This 
is important - if only to show what is not included in these concepts and 
what is subsequently added in the second trichotomy. 
 
Peirce describes the ‘qualisign’ in his essay entitled ‘Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined’ as follows: 
 
A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as sign until it is 
embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. 
(EP2: 291) 
 
The qualisign, therefore, is not a quality as such – but only the possibility of 
a quality. It is not a sign in its own right and it can only be observed as part 
of a sinsign. Effectively, it must be embodied in something in order to be 
experienced – as we saw in our earlier discussion of ‘firsts’. An example of 
a qualisign is the perceptual experience of a shade of red. But we cannot 
say that it is a shade of ‘red’ at this point – it simply fulfills the possibility of 
being such. Critically, we can only say that it is ‘red’ once we have classified 
it in the column where an ‘object of thought’ is formed. At this point, in 
contrast, it has no actualised identity. 
 
Two points are important here. Firstly, we should recognise that the 
qualisign, because it is a representamen, is still a ‘vague’. It might be shade 
of red, but it also might be shade of ‘crimson’, or ‘magenta’. Secondly, this 
account parallels precisely the discussion of percepts and perceptual 
judgments that we encountered earlier. The percept is a ‘vague’ that is 
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subsequently classified by the perceptual judgment. This is exactly what a 
qualisign is too. It is a ‘possibility’ because it could turn out to be any one of 
several colours, or even another quality altogether. And, as we noted, 
perceptual judgments are always open to revision. The only difference, in 
the case of the qualisign, is that the ‘vague’ has now become enrolled in a 
sign. 
 
Peirce, in the same work, defines a sinsign as follows: 
 
A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning ‘being only once’ as in 
single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. 
It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, 
several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign 
through being actually embodied.  
(EP2: 291) 
 
It is easy to mistake what Peirce is saying here. There is much agreement 
as to what he intends by the qualisign, but when we come to the sinsign we 
encounter a range of interpretations. The correct one relies upon a clear 
understanding of what is included, and what is not included, in this sign type 
– and this depends on an understanding of what the columns and rows in 
his classification relate to. At this point we have a dyadic (but once only) 
relationship; and, critically, no ‘object of thought’ is yet involved - so we are 
still dealing with a possibility. In the above quotation Peirce stresses that 
the sinsign involves the embodiment of a qualisign (or several qualisigns). 
But we are still not sure what that embodied quality actually is. A sinsign, 
therefore, is simply a ‘vague’ quality that is embodied. Jappy claims, quite 
incorrectly, that a ‘sketch’ or a ‘photograph’ are sinsigns (Jappy: 2013: 13). 
In doing so, he commits the error of giving the embodiment an identity - and 
this is to run far ahead of ourselves. 
 
Likewise, Liszka (1996) when discussing sinsigns, talks about a ‘red buzzer’ 
(ibid: 36), thereby, rather precipitously, giving the ‘red experience’ an 
identity. At this point in the classification, the sinsign is still a ‘vague’; but it 
has, at least, become actualised in ‘something’. In other words, we have not 
reached a level where we have an identifiable ‘object of thought’ – although 
we have identified something that is embodied (and hence Peirce’s 
emphasis on singularity in the name). 
 
The last of the three signs in this column (the legisign), Peirce describes as 
follows: 
 
A Legisign is a law that is a sign. This law is usually established by men. Every 
conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it 
has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance 
of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word, ‘the’ will 
usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these 
occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it 
is a replica. The replica is a sinsign. Thus every legisign requires sinsigns. But 
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these are not ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are 
regarded as significant. Nor would the replica be significant if it were not for the law 
which renders it so. 
(EP2: 291) 
 
Legisigns, therefore, rely on a conventional ‘law’ or ‘rule’ to give them a 
significant value. But, again, we must be careful here. A hieroglyph on a 
page is an example of a sinsign, and it could also be what Peirce calls a 
‘replica’ in a system of legisigns (Jappy: 2013: 33-4). However, a legisign 
does not tell us anything about the world. The legisign is ‘a general type 
which, it has been agreed, shall be significant’. It does not yet relate to an 
‘object of thought’ that is rooted in reality. Peirce thus maintains that no 
specific ‘object of thought’ is involved in a qualisign, a sinsign or a legisign. 
 
The legisign, therefore, includes conventional signs, but excludes reference 
to the real world. This is misunderstood by some commentators, such as 
Short. He believes that the notion of ‘laws’ extends to the natural realm, and 
so he looks for ‘conventionality’ within this sphere. As a result, he sees 
legisigns as including conventional natural signs and he suggests that the 
signs created by mating grouse are legisigns because they have a purpose 
(Short: 20078: 211-12). But if we avoid the mistake of associating ‘laws’ 
with the natural world, we can see that legisigns are systems of signs 
created exclusively by the human mind. As such, we are now in a 
conceptual space that, in fact, allows arbitrary signs to be created. We can, 
for example, ‘decide’, as in our earlier example, that a bottle cap ‘stands for’ 
a rook in a game of chess. We can simply agree this amongst ourselves 
without reference to any empirical meanings in the world. This is why Peirce 
argues that ‘this law is usually established by men’. In otherwords, the 
whole of Saussurian semiotics can be found, arguably, in this part of 
Peirce’s classification (of legisigns and sinsigns). This is the area where 
arbitrariness does, in fact, hold sway. 
 
The full implications of this analysis only become clear, however, when we 
reach the next stage of the sign’s development - that of the icon. The role of 
this pivotal sign type is to begin the process of giving the emerging sign (or 
concept) an empirical foundation in the world. The icon is able to achieve 
this because it is the first sign type which introduces an ‘object of thought’. 
As such, we will now see how the icon forms the lynchpin of Peirce’s 
account of signification – the ‘bridge’ that allows our transition from 
perceptual experiences to empirical knowledge. 
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6.3) Peirce on Icons 
 
We have already discussed several misconstrued aspects of Peirce’s 
thought. But a further, and major, area of misunderstanding emerges with 
our next subject - that of the icon. The irony is that this aspect of his thought 
is often viewed as one of Peirce’s main contributions to semiotics. 
 
The following analysis of the Peircean icon will form three broad parts; we 
will begin with the ‘received’ view of the icon. Umberto Eco’s analysis of 
Peirce’s position in his influential ‘A Theory of Semiotics’ (1976) will be 
considered as an example of this perspective. Secondly, we will also look at 
how Eco changes his views on the icon in ‘Kant and the Platypus’ (Eco: 
1999) and consider more recent discussions of the icon as contributed by 
Stjernfelt in what he has called the ‘iconic turn’ (Stjernfelt: 2007). 
 
The third section will outline a revised account of the Peircean icon. This 
will place it within a context that relates it to the philosophy of Hegel – a 
task that is seldom attempted in the secondary literature. 
 
 
6.3.1) The Icon: The ‘Received’ View 
 
The ‘received’ view of the icon asserts that it involves a relationship of 
‘similarity’ or ‘resemblance’ between two things - the sign (in our minds) and 
its object (in the world). As such, the icon is contrasted with the index, and 
with the symbol. The different relationships between these three sign types 
and their ‘objects’ is how they are usually differentiated from each other. 
There are numerous examples of this interpretation: 
 
In an icon the sign resembles its object in some way; it looks or sounds like it. In 
an index there is a direct link between a sign and its object; the two are actually 
connected. In a symbol there is no connection or resemblance between sign and 
object: a symbol communicates only because people agree that it shall stand for 
what it does. 
(Fiske: 1990: 46) 
 
We call something an icon, then, when it is related to its object by similarity. 
(Fitzgerald: 1966: 50) 
 
Icons are those signs which represent their objects in virtue of a qualitative 
resemblance to them (paintings, maps); indices represent their objects in virtue of 
some dyadic existential relation, such as causality or indication (weather vanes, 
directional arrows); symbols represent their objects only in terms of some general 
conventions or rules (nautical flags, Morse code). 
(Delaney: 1993: 136) 
 
and even Stjernfelt, a more ‘revisionist’ commentator, concurs with this 
basic view: 
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Icons function by means of a similarity between the sign and the object, or, as 
Peirce may also say, by shared characteristics between the sign and its object. 
Indices function by means of an actual connection between the sign and the 
object, either of a causal character (the footprint on the beach) or of a purposive 
character (pointing gestures, deictics, pronomina or proper names in language). 
Symbols, finally, function by means of a habit, in mind or in nature, of connecting 
two otherwise unconnected entities to a sign. 
(Stjernfelt: 2014: 206) 
 
Icons, indices and symbols, therefore, are construed in terms of the 
different relationships that they have with the ‘object’. The icon has a 
relationship with the object based on ‘resemblance’; the index one based on 
‘connection’, or ‘contiguity’, and the symbol has a relationship founded on 
‘convention’ or ‘habit’. However, given our previous discussion of what 
Peirce means by the term ‘object’, we can see that there is considerable 
potential for revision here. For if the ‘object’ is actually an ‘object of thought’, 
within the sign, then a substantial re-casting of these relationships is 
demanded. 
 
Dualism clearly plays a part in the misunderstandings of some 
commentators. Focusing on the idea of ‘similarity’, they often frame their 
analysis along dualistic lines. The ‘object’ is construed as being ‘in the 
world’ and the icon, for its part, is ‘in the mind’. This reflects a misleading 
adherence to ‘secondary dualism’. In addition to the positions of Fiske and 
Stjernfelt, quoted above, we find many other examples of this view; for 
instance Morris talks about the similarities between the sign (as a mental 
entity) and its ‘denotata’ (Morris: 1946: 349) and, likewise, Sebeok 
discusses the similarity between the signifier and its ‘denotata’ (Sebeok: 
1994: 28). 
 
More problems arise, however, because some critics do not notice the 
important distinction Peirce also makes between the ‘immediate’ and 
‘dynamic’ object. In many places (but certainly not all), Peirce argues that, 
when he talks about the object in relation to the different signs in the 
second trichotomy, he is speaking of the ‘dynamic object’ and not the 
‘immediate object’. In the ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ he 
states: 
 
Thus the division into Icons, Indices, and Symbols depends upon the different 
possible relations of a sign to its Dynamical Object. 
(CP4: 536) 
 
We have already seen that these two ‘objects’ are very different from each 
other. The ‘dynamic object’ is best construed as the object as it would be 
understood if we knew all of its relationships with the world, whilst the 
‘immediate object’ is the object as it is directly presented to us in 
experience. 
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This also has implications for our understanding of the icon. It means that 
Peirce is defining the icon, not on the basis of some relationship with a 
known (immediate) ‘object’, but rather on the basis of the representamen’s 
potential relationships with the ‘dynamic object’. The effect of this is to re-
interpret the ‘direction’ in which the icon is operating. In the received view, 
the signifying action of the icon is usually viewed as operating from a known 
object to the icon. But if the icon has a relationship with the ‘dynamic 
object’, then the ‘direction’ of this relationship is reversed. The icon is now 
positioned as a sign that helps us understand what the dynamic ‘object of 
thought’ might possibly be. 
 
As such, the icon becomes one of the mechanisms through which we are 
able to establish knowledge of the ‘object of thought’ in the sign - rather 
than something that exists in the mind in a relation to a known object in the 
world. The icon, far from being a sign which (rather uninterestingly) has 
some relationship of ‘similarity’ with an object, becomes fundamental to the 
process of learning about that object. 
 
 
6.3.2) Distinguishing Icons from Hypoicons 
 
If these layers of potential confusion are already not enough, there is one 
further layer of terminology that Peirce introduces which also needs 
clarification. He often makes a distinction between icons and ‘hypoicons’ 
and he does this, paradoxically, in an attempt to clarify what he is saying 
about iconicity. 
 
Icons clearly involve the notion of similarity, but Peirce also recognises that 
some things that we experience in the world are substantial assertions of 
similarity which we (or other people) have created. For Peirce, these types 
of phenomena operate differently from iconicity itself. He distinguishes them 
with another term – ‘hypoicons’: 
 
But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, 
no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic 
Representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is 
largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or 
label, it may be called a hypoicon. Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according 
to the mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple 
qualities, or First Firstness, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly 
dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own 
parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a 
representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. 
(EP2: 273-4)  
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The distinction that Peirce is making here is that an icon ‘may represent its 
object, ‘no matter what its mode of being’, whilst the hypoicon, in contrast, 
is an ‘iconic representamen’ - a ‘substantive’ representation of asserted 
similarity. It can be, for example, a ‘material image’, such as a painting, or a 
diagram, or it can be created through a metaphor. All of these are 
assertions of similarity – a distinction that is overlooked by commentators if 
they assume that all icons are ‘images’, or pictures, which have similarity to 
something else. 
 
It is a mistake to either ignore this distinction, or to assume that icons and 
hypoicons can be conflated. Petrilli, for example, fails to make this 
distinction and wrongly asserts that images, diagrams, and metaphors are 
‘icons’ rather than hypoicons (Petrilli: 2010b: 264). Elsewhere, Ayer (1968: 
150), argues, in contrast, that if an icon is actually operating as a sign (i.e. 
as something ‘representing its object’), then it must be a hypoicon. As a 
result, he effectively removes iconicity from his discussion because it 
becomes usurped by the hypoicon. Short, similarly, confuses icons with 
hypoicons when arguing that ‘a red fire engine is a hypoicon of its red 
colour’ (Short: 2007: 217) when this is an embodiment of red – not an 
assertion of it. Andacht, however, correctly recognises the differences here, 
saying that there is a ‘distinction between the purely qualitative possibility 
(the icon proper) and its material embodiment (the hypoicon)’ (Andacht: 
2013 :509). 
 
Peirce’s quotation above, however, is an example of how unclear he often 
is when discussing icons. As in many other parts of his philosophy, Peirce 
is not altogether consistent in his use of his terms. Even when he is trying to 
distinguish between icons and hypoicons he sometimes muddies the water. 
For example, having used a painting as an instance of a ‘hypoicon’ he can 
also be found, elsewhere, talking about a photograph as an ‘icon’: 
 
Most icons, if not all, are likenesses of their objects. A photograph is an icon, 
usually conveying a flood of information. A piece of mimicry may be an auditory 
icon 
(EP2: 13) 
 
These inconsistencies make clear explication of his views on iconicity very 
difficult. But leaving aside these issues, we can now begin to explore what 
an icon is. Eco’s rejection of icons in his ‘A Theory of Semiotics’ (1976) 
exemplifies many of the criticisms that Peirce’s sign has been subjected to. 
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6.3.3) Attacks on the Icon: Early Eco 
 
As Sternfelt (2007) highlights, there was a considerable attack, in the late 
twentieth century, on the status of the icon and a concerted attempt to show 
that it is a conventional sign (like the symbol). This attack was led by Eco, 
but a clear way to exemplify it is through Petrilli’s summary of the icon. This 
is useful because it captures several misconceptions: 
 
Icon: One of three types of signs identified by Charles S. Peirce, the other two 
being index and symbol. The icon is characterised by a relation of similarity 
between the sign and its object. However, similarity alone will not suffice to 
determine an iconic sign. Twins look similar but are not signs of each other. My 
reflection in the mirror looks like me but is not an iconic sign. For iconic signs to 
obtain the effect of convention or habit social practices or special functions must 
be added to similarity. Iconic similarity is a special kind of similarity: it is an 
abstraction on the basis of convention, for it privileges given traits of similarity and 
not others. 
(Petrilli: 2010: 242) 
 
There are a number of key points here – some of which we have already 
noted. Firstly, a relation ‘between a sign and its object’ forms the icon. 
Secondly, this relation is deemed to be one of ‘similarity’. Thirdly, Petrilli 
suggests that this Peircean sign must be misconceived because many 
things (which are similar to other things) are not icons of each other; so 
‘similarity’ is an illegitimate basis on which to establish iconicity. Fourthly, 
she concludes that this means that there must be a conventional aspect to 
the icon because only through ‘convention’ could some similarities be 
privileged over others. This leads to a conclusion that icons are 
conventional signs – leaving only indices as ‘motivated’ by reality. Chandler 
reaches the same conclusion: 
 
Semioticians generally maintain that there are no ‘pure’ icons – there is always an 
element of cultural convention involved. 
(Chandler: 2002: 40) 
 
In his ‘A Theory of Semiotics’ (1976), Eco takes a similar view. Many 
commentators cite this influential work (e.g. Sebeok: 1976). Eco considers 
the various ways in which the icon could possibly resemble its object – in 
terms of its having the ‘same properties as its object’, being ‘similar to its 
object’, being ‘analogous’ to its object, or being ‘motivated’ by its object 
(Eco: 1976: 191) and he rejects them all as untenable methods of 
establishing a sense of ‘similarity’: 
 
Thus even the continuous line tracing the profile of the horse may be considered 
as the institution of a relation of similitude by a transformed correspondence point 
to point between the abstract visual content model of a horse and an image drawn 
on a given surface. The image is motivated by the abstract representation of the 
horse, but it is nevertheless the effect of a cultural decision and as such requires a 
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trained eye in order to be detected as a horse’s profile. Similitude is produced and 
must be learned. 
(ibid: 200) 
 
And Eco concludes his discussion with a provocative sub-section entitled 
‘Getting Rid of Iconic Signs’ (ibid: 216-20). The main thrust of his argument, 
as with Petrilli and Chandler, is that icons are ‘coded’ on the basis of 
convention and that some of these similarities are easily recognised (‘ratio 
facilis’) whilst others are less obviously ‘coded’ (‘ratio difficilis’). But 
convention, he insists, remains at the heart of iconicity. 
 
The Peircean icon, for Eco, is too loosely defined to have real utility - a 
point reiterated by Sebeok:  
 
An infant daughter can be said to be an iconic design for her mother if there is a 
topological similarity between her, as signifier, and her mother, its denotatum; 
however, the little girl can likewise, though doubtless to a lesser degree, stand as 
an iconic sign for her father, every one of her siblings, all of her kinfolk, and, further 
still, all mammals, all vertebrates, and so forth, and so on, in unending 
retrogression to ever more generalized denotata. 
(Sebeok: 1994: 30) 
 
Sebeok (1976: 130), like Petrilli, also points out that icons do not work 
reflexively and that this further undermines the notion of iconicity. A 
photograph of the Pope can be described as an ‘icon’ of the Pope, but it 
makes no sense to describe the Pope as an ‘icon’ of his photograph. Such 
criticisms by Sebeok, however, betray the tacit assumption, that a dualistic 
relationship must exist between an icon (in the mind) and an object (in the 
world). 
 
 
6.3.4) Eco: His Revised Account of the Icon 
 
Later in his career, Eco published, in ‘Kant and the Platypus’ (1999) - a 
remarkably honest revision of his previous thinking on the icon. In this 
reworking of his thinking he accepts that he previously misunderstood the 
Peircean sign. In this work he comes much closer to the position that we 
will propose in due course – although there still remain very significant 
differences. 
 
Crucially, Eco now makes a distinction between the icon and the hypoicon. 
He identifies, as a result, what he calls the ‘problem of perceptual iconism’ 
(i.e. iconicity itself) (ibid: 340), and he distinguishes this from the hypoicon. 
Without going into lengthy detail, he correctly argues that ‘primary iconism’ 
has parallels with Kant’s notion of ‘schema’ (ibid: 80), where perceptions 
are classified by the mind. He also notes that the schema is a ‘product of 
the imagination’, but he goes a little far in suggesting that this involves the 
immediate development of concepts (ibid: 81, 86). This is because 
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concepts (for Peirce) are ‘thirds’ and are created at a much later stage of 
the semiotic process. But Eco is certainly justified in suggesting that 
‘primary iconism’ is at the basis of empirical knowledge. 
 
Eco recognises that ‘primary iconism’ can exist at a basic perceptual level 
without using any objective criteria for establishing that any similarity exists. 
But he still argues that ‘adequate’ criteria must exist for the mind to do this: 
 
I think that for Peirce primary iconism lies in the correspondence whereby the 
stimulus is adequately ‘represented’ by that sensation and not by another. This 
correspondence is not to be explained, but only recognised (his italics). 
(ibid: 106) 
 
Eco thus uses the notion of ‘recognition’ as a basis for similarity. However, 
his recourse to ‘adequacy’ does not mark a very significant revision in his 
thought. We find that Eco is still construing the icon as involving two 
(dyadic) entities. As a result, he tries (rather tortuously) to see iconicity as 
operating through two elements ‘corresponding’ with each other on the 
basis of some criterion, or other: 
 
The fact remains that, in the situation cited, two somethings meet because they 
correspond to each other, as a screw corresponds to the female thread. (his italics) 
(ibid: 108) 
And he suggests: 
 
Therefore, in talking of primary iconism as a cast, we are talking not of actuated 
correspondence, but of a predisposition to correspond, of ‘likeness’ through the 
complementary nature of one element with respect to another to come. 
(ibid: 110) 
 
This takes him into an unsatisfactory discussion of whether ‘primary 
iconism’ must involve being ‘like a hole’ (ibid: 110). It is thus clear that Eco, 
even in this revised interpretation, is still working within a dualistic 
framework which he assumes is fundamental to the concept of the icon 
itself. Whilst he is right in grasping that the icon is a source of knowledge 
that echoes the Kantian ‘schema’, he neither fully understands how Peirce 
utilises the notion of ‘resemblance’ in the icon, nor does he recognise that 
the icon is fundamentally monadic (see Fig. 8). 
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6.3.5) Stjernfelt’s Account of the Icon 
 
Another contribution to our understanding of iconicity has been that of 
Stjernfelt – in his ‘Diagrammatology’ (2007), and his ‘Natural Propositions’ 
(2014). These works also mark a substantial move away from the ‘received’ 
view of the icon. 
 
Stjernfelt correctly critiques Eco’s early analysis of the icon, making a 
number of points that concur with the above discussion, and he rightly 
views Eco’s shift away from a ‘cultural’ position on iconicity as being only 
partial (Stjernfelt: 2007: 73). However, the direction in which Stjernfelt takes 
his analysis of the icon is not without its own problems. In the 
‘Diagrammatology’, Stjernfelt states that: 
 
This treatise deals with the sign types of icons and diagrams. Icons understood as 
those signs whose function as signs is due to some sort of similarity between them 
and their objects – and diagrams as that special sort of icons which represent the 
internal structure of those objects in terms of interrelate parts, facilitating reasoning 
possibilities (my italics). 
(ibid; ix) 
 
Here, Stjernfelt asserts a very specific relationship between icons and 
hypoicons. The latter are described as a ‘special sort of icons’. Later he 
writes: 
 
The diagram is an icon. In the taxonomy of signs, thus, the diagram forms the 
second subcategory among the three types of hypoicons – images, diagrams and 
metaphors, respectively – even if Peirce elsewhere notes that sharp distinctions 
among icons are not possible due to the inherent vagueness of the concept. 
(ibid: 90) 
 
It thus becomes clear that hypoicons are not viewed, by Stjernfelt, as 
something that Peirce wishes to separate from icons; rather, hypoicons, in 
the form of diagrams, are seen as examples of icons. This view is 
confirmed when Stjernfelt defines the icon in strictly diagrammatic terms: 
‘Thus when the operational criterion is adopted, icons become everything 
that can be manipulated in order to reveal more information about its 
object…’ (ibid: 92). This effectively inverts the relationship between the two 
– diagrams (e.g. hypoicons) become, for Stjernfelt, the dominant expression 
of iconicity. 
 
In addition, in the first passage quoted above, Stjernfelt still seems attached 
to a dualistic account of icons. He states that they have ‘some sort of 
similarity’ with their objects. This approach is confirmed, again, when he 
talks of icons in terms of reference: 
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As it appears from the definition, the icon refers to its object solely by means of its 
own properties. This implies that an icon potentially refers to an indefinite class of 
objects, namely all those objects which have, in some respect, a relation of 
similarity to it. 
(ibid: 28) 
 
It is clear, from these passages, that Stjernfelt does not recognise Peirce’s 
deeper philosophy; the ‘object’ is being treated as something in the ‘real 
world’ and the role of the diagram is simply to capture its qualities. On other 
occasions, Stjernfelt also thinks dualistically when describing the icon as 
mirroring: 
 
So, as soon as the icon consists of parts whose relations mirror the relations 
between the corresponding parts of the object, and the sign is used to gain 
information about those parts and their interrelations, a diagram is at stake. 
(Stjernfelt: 2014: 207) 
 
In this context, Stjernfelt also maintains that one of the defining 
characteristics of the icon is the way it enables us to ‘learn more’: 
 
It is not only the only type of sign involving a direct presentation of the qualities of 
its object, it is also a sign through the contemplation of which one can learn more 
than lies in the directions for its construction. 
(Stjernfelt: 2007: 78) 
 
The icon is thus conceived by Stjernfelt as being a key mechanism through 
which we can gain knowledge about the world. As such, he places 
considerable emphasis on the icon (or rather the diagram) in its role in 
meaning creation: 
 
Hypoicons are signs which to a large extent make use of iconical means as 
meaning-givers: images, paintings, photos, diagrams etc. But the iconic meaning 
realized in hypoicons have an immensely fundamental role in Peirce’s semiotics. 
As icons are the only signs that look-like, then they are at the same time the only 
signs realizing meaning. 
(ibid: 29) 
 
And this point is reinforced by Stjernfelt’s claim that: 
 
To Peirce, it was an ideal to use signs representing these phenomena [subjects 
and qualities and relations] as iconically as possible. 
(ibid: 22) 
 
Stjernfelt, however, reaches this conclusion by viewing the icon as 
providing a ‘mirroring’ effect, and also by conflating the icon and the 
diagram. He thus claims that diagrams are able to inform us about the world 
because they elucidate the ‘hidden informations’ (ibid: 85) that they contain. 
As such, icons (or is it actually diagrams?) ‘play the central role in Peirce’s 
evolutionary epistemology’ (ibid: 79). This is contrast to Peirce, who sees 
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the creation of meaning as a much more complicated process involving a 
progressive combination of signs (of which only one is an icon). And there 
is certainly no appeal to ‘mirroring’ in Peirce’s account of how knowledge is 
created. 
 
Overall, Stjernfelt’s approach seems to be informed by an Husserlian 
influence in his writing and he often tends to see Peirce through this 
particular lens. Husserl, for example, places very significant emphasis on 
human ‘intuition’ in the development of knowledge. This aspect, as we have 
seen, is rejected by Peirce, but Stjernfelt highlights it as being central to an 
account of Peirce’s diagrams. Stjernfelt’s focus on intuition may also explain 
why he so often conflates the icon and the diagram. Indeed, he openly 
states that we should view Peirce from a Husserlian perspective (and note 
the running together of the icon and the diagram): 
 
Just like Peirce develops his notion of diagram-icons to understand the 
observation aspect of the access to ideal and universal objects, Husserl 
undertakes a daring extrapolation of the concept of intuition to involve the grasping 
of grammar and linguistics syntax, of essences and states of affairs etc. 
(ibid: 146) 
 
In placing this emphasis of intuition, Husserl also claims that we can grasp 
‘wholes’ and that we can understand the relationship of their parts 
(‘mereology’ (ibid: 161-174). But even if this Husserlian interpretation of 
Peirce is justified in relation to diagrams, Stjernfelt is mistaken in the 
assumption that it is also applicable to his account of icons. 
 
We now turn to consider a revised account of the Peircean icon. We will 
define what it is, what it does, and how it forms a cornerstone of his 
semiotics. In so doing, we will set the icon apart from the hypoicon (and 
Stjernfelt’s diagrams) and place it in the context of Peirce’s broader, and 
Hegelian, account of perception and concept formation. 
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6.3.6) Revising the Peircean Icon 
 
This section outlines a critical revision of the Peircean icon. This will take 
account of our previous analysis of the ‘object’, and also the influence of 
Hegel upon Peirce. The argument put forward here is central to the account 
of concept formation in this thesis. It will be argued that the icon is viewed 
by Peirce as ‘posited’ by the mind and that it acts as the initiating stage in 
the development of a ‘mediating’ concept - in the same way as the 
‘Essence’ is posited in Hegel’s system. We saw that the Peircean ‘object of 
thought’ is created by selecting specific elements of the representamen. It 
will be argued that this is achieved through the icon in the form of an 
hypothesis. As such, the icon represents the first glimmerings of empirical 
knowledge. 
 
To begin, we should consider the manner in which Peirce describes the 
process of ‘forming’ a sign. In the Introduction section of Volume I of the 
‘Essential Peirce’, Houser states (quoting CP1: 444): 
 
Speculative grammar studies what is requisite for representation of any kind; it is 
the study of the ‘general conditions of signs being signs’ 
(EP1: xxxi) 
 
Elsewhere, Peirce states that there are: 
 
..three essential branches of semeiotics, of which the first, called speculative 
grammar by Duns Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a sign…. 
(EP2: 327) 
 
This approach will strike a Saussurian semiotician as strange. What makes 
a sign, in their model, is a simple act of interpretation on the part of the 
perceiver. Peirce, in contrast, wants to uncover the ‘general conditions’ that 
need to be satisfied for something to become a sign - and he calls this 
subject ‘speculative grammar’. Peirce asserts that this particular branch of 
semiotics is concerned with how ‘objects of thought’ become the mediating 
elements within signs (footnote fifteen). And it is of some significance that 
Peirce calls this ‘speculative grammar’. For the icon’s role in sign formation 
is fundamentally speculative in nature. 
 
We also need to look again at Peirce’s classification. We noted that, in the 
first trichotomy (column), we have not reached a point in the sign’s 
development where an ‘object of thought’ has become involved. With the 
icon, however, we reach this critical stage in the sign’s development; it is 
where firstness (in the first horizontal row) intersects with an ‘object of 
thought’ (in the second column). 
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If we consider the characteristic of being a ‘first’, we have already seen that 
this means that the icon should be viewed as a ‘possibility’ (Savan: 1995: 
325). But its position in the classification also means, critically, that the icon 
entails something else – ‘firsts’ are always monadic in nature. This suggests 
that iconicity should not be construed as a relationship existing between two 
entities that would render it dyadic. Instead, it should be interpreted as a 
single entity. However, the notion that the icon involves ‘two things’ is 
precisely what most of Peirce’s critics assume. But this leads to an 
interesting question – how is Peirce able to combine the notion of ‘similarity’ 
with the icon’s ‘monadic’ status? This problem is central to understanding 
the nature of the icon. 
 
Fundamentally, the icon provides the mind with the first imaginings of an 
‘object of thought’. It is at this ‘iconic’ stage in the sign’s development that 
we begin to move from our perceptual ‘vagues’, as we ‘posit’ an ‘object of 
thought’. Critically, however, at this stage in the sign’s development, we still 
do not know what the ‘object of thought’ is; it is merely a likeness. 
 
This last point is immensely important – Peirce is using the term ‘likeness’ 
in a very particular way. He is not asserting that a specific, and verifiable, 
similarity exists between two known entities (e.g. exactly what his critics 
accuse him of). Instead, he is making another point - that all we have, at 
this stage, is a recognition that two of our perceptions might be similar in 
some respect or other. The icon thus represents the most minimal level of 
knowledge we can have; at the very most it is an hypothesis that an ‘object 
of thought’ might exist: 
 
A pure icon can convey no positive or factual information; for it affords no 
assurance that there is any such thing in nature. 
(CP4: 447) 
 
In identifying such a similarity, we ‘pick out’ a putative resemblance in the 
Phaneron. It might be objected, at this point, that Peirce is now 
contradicting himself. We have seen, in his account of perceptual 
judgments, that we are not able to compare them – they simply replace 
each other. How is it possible for us, as a result, to identify a resemblance 
between two of them? Peirce would argue, however, that what is actually 
taking place is that the perceptual judgment, itself, draws two experienced 
percepts together. The icon can be thought of, as a result, as a perceptual 
judgment that has been drawn into a signifying relationship. 
 
It is clear, however, that an important Rubicon has now been crossed in 
terms of the development of the sign. We have established that a potential 
‘object of thought’ may exist on the basis of resemblance (and recognition) 
in much the same way as Leibniz defines his ‘clear ideas’. With the icon we 
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have now ‘picked out’ an emergent identity - even though this identity 
remains, at this stage, only an hypothesis. 
 
However, we still need to account for the icon being found in the part of 
Peirce’s sign classification that specifies its monadic nature. Let us look at 
another quotation from Peirce: 
 
Each Icon partakes of some more or less overt character of its Object. 
(CP4: 531) 
 
The verb Peirce uses - ‘partakes’ - is an interesting one. If ‘A’ ‘partakes’ of 
‘B’ then ‘A’ shares something with ‘B’. This is not a dyadic relationship 
between two separate entities – but rather a coming together under one 
identity. To take an example, if I see John today, and then see John again 
tomorrow, I do not establish a dyadic relationship between two ‘Johns’ – I 
am asserting that they are the same John; they share the same identity. 
When discussing the concept of similarity, Peirce states that resemblance 
forms precisely this type of relationship: 
 
Suggestion by resemblance is easily enough understood, as soon as the 
conception is once grasped that the similitude of two ideas consists in the fact that 
the mind naturally joins them together in thought in a certain way. 
(CP7: 392) 
 
And Peirce talks about two ‘experiences’ of blue: 
 
Some beginner may object that they have both a blueness in them; but I reply that 
blueness is nothing but the idea of these sensations and of others I have had, 
thrown together and indistinctly thought of at once. Blueness is the idea of a class. 
(CP7: 392) 
Elsewhere, he also claims that: 
 
Identity is essentially a dual relation. 
(CP1: 446) 
 
What Peirce is proposing here is that, in perceiving an iconic ‘resemblance’, 
we see two phenomena as one thing; we see them as the members of a 
class. We do not perceive two separate things, but, instead, we have a 
monadic experience of two things. Again, we have already seen this 
approach in Peirce’s account of ‘perceptual judgments’ where two 
experiences are members of a single class. Elsewhere, Peirce describes 
the ‘dyad’ as follows: 
 
A dyad consist of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have their 
modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of being, as first 
and second, etc, in connection with each other. They are two, if not really, at least 
in aspect. There is also some sort of union of them. The dyad is not the subjects; it 
has the subjects as one element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal 
character; and it has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad. 
(CP1: 326) 
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So Peirce is claiming that it is possible for an icon to be both monadic 
(‘monoidal’) and to assert a relationship between two things. The icon 
thereby effectively creates a monadic ‘object of thought’ from two separate 
experiences. It becomes a class awaiting further determination. Elsewhere, 
Peirce supports this view: 
 
This sort of association by virtue of which certain kinds of ideas become naturally 
allied, as crimson and scarlet, is called association by resemblance. The name is 
not a good one, since it implies that the resemblance causes the association, while 
in point of fact it is the association which constitutes the resemblance. 
(CP7: 498) 
 
And, elsewhere, Peirce goes further to define exactly what he means by 
‘resemblance’ – the combining of different experiences into one identity: 
 
Resemblance is an identity of characters; and this is the same as to say that the 
mind gathers the resembling ideas together into one conception. (my italics) 
(EP1: 254) 
 
A resemblance, therefore, consists solely in the property of the mind by which it 
naturally imposes one mental sign upon the resembling things. 
(CP8: 20) 
 
So Peirce’s critics utterly miss their target. They have debated whether 
similarity can be established between two identities (and reach the 
conclusion that this is not possible without convention), whilst Peirce is, in 
fact, embarked on an entirely different enterprise. He is asserting the view 
that similarity forms the basis of identity, rather than debating the point of 
whether any two identities can be the same. 
 
The reader will also recognise the nominalist perspective of Peirce’s critics 
here. Nominalists maintain that it is we who give identities to things and that 
identity precedes any assessment of similarity. In contrast, Peirce asserts 
that similarity is the very factor that creates identity. Iconicity, therefore, 
reinforces his rejection of nominalism. 
 
Of all his commentators, Murphey grasps Peirce’s position most accurately 
- referring to the same passage on ‘blueness’: 
 
The class concept of blue is a general idea which forms a connection among 
sensations, but the general idea does not produce those associations – rather it is 
an idea of the sensations which the mind groups together. It is the fact that the 
mind connects these ideas which makes them similar – not their similarity which 
leads the mind to connect them. (my italics) 
 (Murphey: 1993: 340) 
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Olteanu (2015) picks up on the notion of ‘recognition’ in the icon in his 
analysis of Peirce. He sees the action of the sign as being an essential 
feature of ‘how the unknown becomes known, of how that which is taught is 
integrated in what is already mastered’ (ibid: 201). However, he does not 
analyse the act of recognition in the sphere of perception, as discussed 
above, and nor does he see recognition as creating our ‘objects of thought’. 
Instead, he focuses, following Stjernfelt, on the potential ‘resemblance 
between taught and learned’: 
 
The compatibility between what is taught and the learner’s already existing 
signification is the diagrammatic character of learning, that is, the resemblance 
between taught and learned. The student has to re-cognize what is taught by using 
what she already knows and the teacher has to re-cognize what is taught into what 
starts being learned.  
(ibid) 
 
This treatment places the action of ‘recognition’ at an altogether different 
level in Peircean thought – and Olteanu suggests that ‘resemblances’ 
operate across the Cartesian divide between the teacher and the student. 
This is contrast to the argument, outlined here, that the resemblances are 
themselves created in the formation of icons. 
 
The fact that the icon creates a putative identity means that it is inevitably 
provisional and that it has an abductive character (footnote sixteen). This is 
precisely why Peirce asserts that the grounds for establishing signs should 
be called ‘speculative grammar’. In creating an icon, an ‘object of thought’ is 
tentatively established and it will not, therefore, represent anything like a 
complete similarity. As Peirce stated above, the icon only ‘partakes of some 
more or less overt character’ of the perception. This highlights, of course, 
another way in which critics of Peirce have misconstrued him. They argue it 
is not possible to know all of the similarities between the icon and its object 
(so we have to rely on ‘convention’ to privilege some for them). But we can 
now see that one of the defining characteristics of the Peircean icon is that 
it cannot provide similarity at all levels. This is precisely why it remains an 
hypothesis. 
 
The roots of the Peircean icon, in this interpretation, can also be found in 
Hegel. As we saw, the Hegelian ‘Ego’ grasps what is present in the 
indeterminacy of ‘Being’ by positing an ‘Essence’. In the ‘Phenomenology of 
Spirit’, Hegel explicitly links this act of ‘positing’ to the creation of the ‘object’ 
in opposition to the ‘I’ of consciousness: 
 
One of the terms is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate 
being, or as the essence, the object…. 
(Hegel: 1977: 59) 
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For Hegel, ‘Essences’ represent our initial attempts to ‘fix’ reality. In the 
passage above he views them as being ‘posited’, and he equates them with 
the ‘object’. The ‘Essence’ is, therefore, positioned by Hegel as a 
hypothetical entity (or ‘object of thought’) between our experience of the 
world (Being) and our knowledge (Notion). 
 
Significantly, there is one place in his writings where Peirce openly 
discusses Hegel’s model of positing of ‘identity’ - in the form of ‘possibility’: 
 
In the ‘Encyclopadie’ the development is somewhat as follows: Wirklichkeit 
[actuality] is that whose mode of being consists in self manifestation. As identity in 
general (the identity of Sein and Existenz) it [Essence] is, in the first place 
possibility. That is to say, apparently, bare possibility, any fancy projected and 
regarded in the aspect of a fact. 
(CP2: 386) 
 
Here Peirce is describing Hegel’s ‘positing’ of ‘Essences’ in terms similar to 
the icon – they are ‘identities’, they form ‘bare possibility’, and they are 
‘projected’. 
 
There is one critical difference, however, between the concept of the 
Peircean icon and the Hegelian ‘Essence’. And it is one that explains their 
disagreement with regard to secondness. For Peirce, the icon is a nascent 
‘identity’ that has no content. It is simply a ‘posited’ similarity. This is in 
contrast to Hegel’s ‘Essences’ that, as we noted, are full of content and 
implicitly contain the empirical contradictions that need to be dialectically 
resolved. This is why Hegel has no need ‘secondness’ – reality is already 
encapsulated, for him, in ‘Essence’. For Peirce, in contrast, the icon still 
needs to be ‘filled out’ at an empirical level. This, as we shall see (in section 
6.4), takes place through the action of indices. Hegel, in contrast, asserts 
that ‘Essence’, is the ‘real ground of everything’ (Hegel: 1892/2014: 31). 
 
Further back in the history of philosophy, we can also find the concept of 
the ‘icon’ (in the form proposed above) being discussed in the early modern 
period - but this time using quite different terminology. Deely (footnote 
seventeen) highlights the fact that Fonseca advocates two types of signs – 
the ‘formal’ and the ‘instrumental’. The first of these arguably equates to the 
icon, whilst the second corresponds to the index. Fonseca states (and note 
also his use of the term ‘object’): 
 
Formal signs are similitudes or certain forms (species) of things signified inscribed 
within the cognitive powers, by means of which the things signified are 
perceived…. These signs are called ‘formal’ because they form and as it were 
structure the knowing power. Instrumental signs are those which, having become 
objects for knowing powers, lead to the cognition of something else. Of this sort is 
the track of an animal left in the ground, smoke, a statue, and the like. 
(Fonseca: 1564: I.I. cap. VIII. Quoted in Deely: 2009: 183-4)) 
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In this formulation, we encounter here a potentially new way of thinking 
about the icon – as a ‘formal sign’ (footnote eighteen) which ‘structures the 
knowing power’ (footnote nineteen). In contrast to the icon, the ‘instrumental 
sign’ (or index), however, leads ‘to the cognition of something else’. This 
line of argument suggests that, when we first posit an icon, we create what 
early modern philosophers might describe as a ‘form’. This ‘form’, however, 
has no empirical content; it is what Kripke might call a ‘placeholder’ (Kripke: 
1980: see section 7.2). It establishes, however, a tentative ‘object of 
thought’ around which we can predicate further indexical relations. 
 
 
6.3.7) The ‘Purity’ of the Icon 
 
The notion of ‘form’, introduced above, highlights another aspect of the 
icon; the idea that it can be ‘pure’. A ‘pure’ icon, for Peirce, is one that 
captures a ‘suchness’. In this construal, the icon has no extraneous 
empirical baggage; it is simply the beginning of an identity, or an ‘object of 
thought’: 
 
For a pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It 
represents whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an 
affair of suchness only. 
(EP2: 163) 
 
‘Pure’ icons thus correspond to the notion of ‘form’ that we have just 
encountered. They are ‘forms’ before any empirical content has been 
added: 
 
No pure Icons represent anything but Forms; no pure Forms are represented by 
anything but Icons. 
(CP4: 544) 
 
and Murphey concurs with this interpretation: 
 
What Peirce calls an icon then is a sign which expresses the form of its object, and 
hence it may stand for any object which has a given form. 
(Murphey: 1993: 233-4) 
 
Peirce describes moments of experiencing such ‘pure’ icons, or forms, in 
very specific terms – they have an almost ‘dream-like’ quality: 
 
So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the 
consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy 
disappears, and it is for that moment a pure dream – not in any particular 
existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon. 
(CP3: 362) 
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Pure icons, as forms, are not, therefore, entities that exist ‘behind’ reality (in 
a model that McDowell rightly calls ‘rampant Platonism’ (McDowell: 1994: 
78)); rather they are the first imaginings of potential ‘objects of thought’. 
 
It is helpful, at this point, to consider the influence of Kant in relation to 
Peirce’s icons. In the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (and note the title refers to 
‘Pure Reason’), Kant states that: 
 
We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general is the mere result of the faculty of 
the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we 
should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever 
conscious. To bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that belongs to the 
understanding, and it is through this function that the understanding first supplies 
us with knowledge properly so called. Pure synthesis, considered in general, 
gives us the pure concept of the understanding. By this pure synthesis I mean that 
synthesis which rests on the basis of synthetic a priori unity. 
(Kant: 1781/2007: 104) 
 
The imagination is thus seen by Kant as the activity that initiates a process 
of synthesis. It enables us to create a ‘pure concept of the understanding’. 
Freydberg argues that this mental faculty has a central role in the initial 
creation of knowledge. He sees the Kantian imagination as follows: 
 
In theoretical reasoning, our fragmented intuitions are brought to the unity of pure 
concepts of the understanding by means of the synthesis of imagination. 
(Freydberg: 2005: 95) 
 
Kant’s position on this point has clear parallels with our account of the 
Peircean icon. The imagination, in hypothesising an ‘object of thought’, 
initiates the beginnings of knowledge in the form of a ‘pure’ concept. And 
such a concept is distinguished by Kant on the basis that it has no empirical 
elements: 
 
A priori knowledge is called pure if nothing empirical is mixed in with it. 
(Kant: 1781/2007: 38) 
 
And in the opening pages of the ‘Critique’, Kant explains that it is possible 
to think of substances without their empirical baggage. It this claim that 
arguably underpins the basis of the Peircean icon: 
 
Remove from your empirical concept of a body everything that stems from 
experience, one by one: the colour, the hardness or softness, the weight and even 
impenetrability, and there still remains the space which the body (now entirely 
vanished) occupied, and this you cannot remove. And in the same manner, if you 
remove from your empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all 
properties which experience has taught you, yet you cannot take away from it that 
property by which you think the object as a substance or attached to a 
substance….. Persuaded, therefore, by the necessity with which that concept of 
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substance forces itself upon you, you will have to admit that it has its seat in your 
faculty of knowledge a priori. 
(ibid: 40) 
 
The ‘pure concept’, as a ‘form’, thus establishes the beginnings of a 
concept. The difference between Kant and Peirce, however, is that Kant 
believes that these ‘pure intuitions’ represent ‘a priori’ knowledge, whilst, for 
Peirce, they simply retain the status of being ‘hypotheses’. But it is still 
evident that Peirce is working within a largely Kantian template. 
 
Not surprisingly, we find that Hegel also concurs with this view. In 
‘Philosophy of Mind’ he describes the process that begins with the 
‘Essence’ and which ends with the ‘Notion’. He describes how the mind 
strips ‘contingency’ from our experience when creating an ‘Essence’ and 
how this creates a sense of ‘objective’ rationality (i.e. an ‘object of thought’): 
 
But intelligence, far from confining itself to merely accepting this immediately 
presented content of the object, purges the latter of its purely external, contingent, 
and worthless elements.….Thus intelligence strips the object of the form of 
contingency, grasps its rational nature and posits it as subjective; and conversely, 
it at the same time develops the subjectivity into the form of objective rationality. 
(Hegel: 1830/1971: 191) 
 
Elsewhere in ‘The Science of Logic’, Hegel argues that ‘Logic is the 
Science of the Pure Idea’ (Hegel: 1892/2014: 17). And in the 
‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, he maintains that the initial beginnings of 
consciousness are also ‘pure’: 
 
The movement in which the unessential consciousness strives to attain this 
oneness is itself threefold in accordance with the threefold relation this 
consciousness will have with its incarnate beyond: first as pure consciousness; 
second, as a particular individual who approaches the actual world in the forms of 
desire and work; and third, as consciousness that is aware if its own being-for-self. 
(Hegel: 1977: 130) 
 
Hegel’s notion of the ‘pure idea’ seems, therefore, to parallel the Kantian 
idea of the ‘pure concept’ and this idea re-emerges in Peirce’s treatment of 
the icon. What all three thinkers are suggesting, in slightly different ways, is 
that the mind is able to establish an initial identity, or ‘form’. Kant sees it as 
an intuited form of a priori knowledge, Hegel views it as a ‘posited’ identity 
which is full of contradictions, whilst Peirce construes it simply as a sign 
which is an hypothesis. But what all three insist upon is that it enables us to 
begin building a bridge across the dualistic divide that Descartes has 
created for us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
 
6.3.8) Icons: Are They Predicates? 
 
This revision of the Peircean icon changes its status in many ways, but it 
should not be interpreted as narrow account of how objects are created. 
Importantly, ‘objects of thought’ can, for Peirce, be more than the actual 
objects that may (or may not) exist in reality; they also include other entities 
such as ‘qualities’ and ‘predicates’. An ‘object of thought’ could, for 
example, be the ‘redness’ of a traffic light, or the ‘speed’ of a car. As we 
saw earlier, Peirce affirms the view that ‘by an object, I mean anything that 
we can think, i.e. anything we can talk about’ (MS [R] 966). 
 
It is important to emphasise, therefore, that ‘objects of thought’ can be both 
objects and predicates. There is a tendency, however, in some parts of the 
secondary literature, to view icons as predicates only. This is a view 
expressed by Houser (1992: 499), but it is also the case with Stjernfelt who 
states: 
 
Because Icons are the means of representing qualities, they generally constitute 
the predicative side of more complicated signs…..Thus the predicate in logic as 
well as ordinary language is essentially iconic. 
(Stjernfelt: 2007: 76) 
 
And he claims this, even though he quotes Peirce (on his previous page) as 
stating: 
 
Anything whatever, be it a quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, 
in so far as it is like that thing and used as sign of it. 
(EP2: 291) 
 
The problem is that Stjernfelt tends to conflate the notion of ‘likeness’ with 
that of ‘quality’, and to interpret the ‘object’ in a conventional sense. It is 
relatively easy for him, therefore, to fall into the trap of thinking along 
Cartesian lines and to regard indices as equating to objects, and icons as 
equating to predicates (‘likenesses’). This would, however, be a mis-
interpretation of Peirce because predicates are also ‘objects of thought’. 
Additionally, Stjernfelt, as we have noted, also tends to construe iconicity as 
a correspondence between the world and the mind. This, of course, 
encourages the view that correspondences relate to qualities. And this is 
why he emphasises ‘Diagrammatology’ because diagrams capture such 
qualities. 
 
Stjernfelt’s interpretation of iconicity, however, is quite different from the one 
proposed here. It is worth re-stating where these differences reside. Both 
accounts construe the icon as an important mechanism which allows the 
mind to establish empirical knowledge. My interpretation, however, working 
within the framework of Hegelian philosophy, sees the icon as positing a 
mediating ‘object of thought’. In contrast, Stjernfelt’s model construes the 
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icon as establishing correspondences (on the basis of resemblance) 
between objects and signs. This is how, in Stjernfelt’s view, icons create 
meaning and lead to empirical knowledge. But he does not recognise that 
the action of iconicity is quite different from that of the diagram. 
Paradoxically, however, Stjernfelt’s interpretation does lead to the correct 
claim that ‘natural propositions’ (Stjernfelt: 2014) are possible, but he only 
reaches this conclusion through a means that Peirce would hardly 
recognise. 
 
Overall, however, the account of the icon, outlined in this section, marks a 
very significant step away from the received view of this important sign 
type. It should be construed, essentially, as the initial stage in the 
development of a concept. This is achieved by the mind on the basis of 
similarity, but it is not a similarity that exists, dualistically, between a known 
object and an image within the mind. The icon is, instead, an identity that is 
hypothesised as forming a putative class. And this places the icon in the 
appropriate part of Peirce’s sign classification; it is a ‘first’, it is ‘monadic’, 
and it is also a ‘possibility’. And, in this respect, it parallels the Hegelian 
‘Essence’ and the first steps on the road towards synthetic knowledge. 
 
 
6.4) Peirce on Indices 
 
We have now considered the icon, and how it initiates the creation an 
‘object of thought’. A putative identity (or form) is created around which 
further empirical knowledge can subsequently develop. This newly formed 
icon, however, is no more than a ‘possibility’. It is the index, in developing 
the initial icon, which creates the fuller concept and permits the final 
development of the symbol. 
 
It is, however, briefly worth re-visiting the ‘received’ notion of the index that 
we encountered earlier. For there is now considerable distance between 
this account of the second trichotomy (as evidenced, for example, by Fiske) 
and the one that is being proposed here. The ‘received’ view of the index is 
that it (dualistically) involves a contiguous link between a sign (in the mind) 
and an ‘object’ (in the world) (Fiske: 1990; Sternfelt: 2014). For example, a 
perception of smoke is seen as an indexical sign of fire; a high temperature 
is seen as an indexical sign of a fever. The indexical sign thus shows us the 
‘connections’ that exist in reality. 
 
We need, however, to be extremely careful not to conclude that this is 
Peirce’s understanding of the index. The linking of smoke with fire can be 
interpreted (and usually is by commentators) as the establishment of a 
causal link between two known entities (the smoke and the fire). The 
Peircean index can thus appear to be operating like a Humean ‘necessary 
connection’ between two known phenomena. But something must be 
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incorrect in this interpretation because, as we have already noted, such 
causal links can only be established at the level of Peircean ‘thirds’. And, 
with the index, we are still working at the dyadic relationship of secondness. 
 
So, when Peirce gives the example of a weathercock as an index of the 
wind he is not claiming that the index gives us knowledge of a causal 
relation between the wind and the weathercock. What he is making, 
instead, is the much less ambitious claim that the ability to move the 
weathercock is an indexical property of the wind. It enables us to learn 
something about the wind (as an emerging ‘object of thought’): 
 
A weathercock is an indication, or index, of the direction of the wind; because, in 
the first place, it really takes the self-same direction as the wind, so that there is a 
real connection between them, and in the second place, we are so constituted that 
when we see a weathercock pointing in a certain direction it draws our attention to 
that direction, and when we see the weathercock veering with the wind, we are 
forced by the law of the mind to think that direction is connected with the wind. 
(EP2: 14) 
 
The second part of this quotation certainly involves an extension of his 
argument to include the third, or ‘law of the mind’. But it is clear that the 
index simply provides an ‘indication’ of a connection. As such, the index 
serves to develop the ‘object of thought’ and Peirce points out, in 
confirmation of this, that the pure index ‘conveys no information’; it merely 
establishes indexical properties: 
 
A pure index simply forces attention to the object with which it reacts and puts the 
interpreter into mediate reaction with that object, but conveys no information. As an 
example, take an exclamation ‘Oh!’ (my italics). 
(EP2: 306) 
 
This is a clear rejection of any suggestion that an index creates knowledge 
of causal connections in the world. And Peirce states: 
 
Icons and indices assert nothing. If an icon could be interpreted by a sentence, 
that sentence must be in a ‘potential mood’, that is, it would merely say, ‘Suppose 
a figure has three sides’, etc. Were an index so interpreted, the mood must be 
imperative, or exclamatory, as ‘See there!’ or ‘Look Out!’ 
(EP2: 16) 
 
So the index, in itself, does not tell us about causal laws. Indices merely 
force us to notice momentary connections in the world and to include them 
(as potential properties) in our emerging ‘objects of thought’. The ‘received’ 
view of the index, therefore, effectively ‘jumps the gun’ (as it also did with 
legisigns and sinsigns); it assumes that the index establishes a link that 
forms causal knowledge. But the latter is only achieved when concepts are 
formed at the level of ‘thirds’. 
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However, the index does play a critical role in the development of 
knowledge because it enables us to develop our ‘objects of thought’. It does 
this by adding indexical elements to our icons. Peirce describes the role of 
the ‘genuine index’ when it is combined with an icon: 
 
The Genuine Index represents the duality between the representamen and its 
object. As a whole it stands for the object; but a part or element of it represents [it] 
as being the Representamen, by being an Icon or analogue of the object in some 
way; and by virtue of that duality, it conveys information about the object. 
(EP2: 171) 
 
So an index, in combination with an icon, ‘conveys information about the 
object’. It tells us what is included, or not included, within the icon. It does 
this, as it were, by saying ‘Look! this is included!’ and ‘No! this is not 
included!’. All empirical propositions must, therefore, contain an index 
because it relates them to the experiential world (Hilpinen: 192: 479). 
 
Brandom talks of the ‘giving and asking of reasons’ (Brandom: 2000: 189-
196) and McDowell refers to the ‘space of reasons’ (McDowell: 1994: 5). 
Both of these modern philosophers follow Hegel, to some extent, in arguing 
that concepts must have empirical entailments in order to be concepts. We 
can see here that Peirce is adopting a similar approach. For a concept to be 
properly formed it must include empirical entailments – and these are 
provided by the index. It is at this stage in concept development, in Peirce’s 
second trichotomy, that this critical development takes place. And this 
position parallels the Leibnizian concept of ‘distinct ideas’ that we 
encountered earlier. These ideas, as we saw, were defined by our ability to 
‘distinguish their contents’. And it is the index that provides the empirical 
‘contents’ of our concepts and ‘fills out’ the ‘forms’ initiated by icons. 
 
The ‘received’ view of the index, therefore, puts the semiotic cart before the 
horse. It assumes that there are two known phenomena with known 
properties - smoke and fire - and that the index creates a link between 
them. The index, in these accounts, is viewed as informing us about a 
causal connection in the world. This can lead to some very curious results. 
Hookway, in our example earlier, talked about the bark missing on some 
trees as being a ‘sign of deer’, and he stated that ‘it is probably only 
because we know what the deer do to the bark of trees that we take the 
tree as a sign of a deer’ (Hookway: 1985: 123). Here Hookway is trying to 
establish a causal, and indexical, link between the stripped bark and the 
deer. But this amounts to a complete reversal of indexical sign action. He is 
using our prior knowledge of the world (and what deer do) to explain the 
indexical sign – when, in fact, the indexical sign should be helping us 
explain the world. 
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The index, therefore, simply indicates (and only at a provisional level) that 
there is some kind of connection between two phenomena. It is telling us, 
effectively, what sort of thing smoke is (i.e. that we might find a contiguous 
fire somewhere) and helps us build our knowledge of that ‘object of 
thought’. As we have noted, the role of secondness is critical here, because 
it ‘surprises’ us and sometimes forces us to adjust these contents. 
 
There are three possible outcomes of this process. Firstly, a hypothesised 
identity, in an icon, may be simply ‘incorrect’. The index may, for example, 
indicate certain properties of an entity that show us that it is not the sort of 
identity that we initially assumed it to be – in which case we need to revise 
it. Secondly, the index may simply confirm the identity (and its properties) 
that we initially assumed. Or, thirdly, we may find that we have correctly 
‘recognised’ an iconic identity, but now discover (via secondness) that it 
contains some surprising, or new, element. In conjunction with each other, 
and through a process of ‘give and take’, the icon and the index thereby 
develop our concepts. This is a semiotic process that parallels Hegel’s 
dialectics and his interplay of ‘form’ and ‘content’: 
 
It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect of signification, bringing 
its interpreter face to face with the very character signified. For this reason, it is the 
mathematical sign par excellence. But in denotation it is wanting. It gives no 
assurance that any such object as it represents really exists. The index on the 
other hand does this most perfectly, actually bringing to the interpreter the 
experience of the very object denoted. But it is quite wanting in signification unless 
it involves an iconic part. 
(EP2: 307) 
 
This interpretation of the Peircean index also has the useful benefit of 
clarifying some of the insights of Social Semiotics. Earlier, it was argued 
that Social Semiotics does not problematise the identity of the signifier; it 
takes it very much as a given. But Social Semiotics then goes on to 
establish the relationships between the signifier and the elements that 
contextualise it. These include the ways that it is portrayed, such as its 
framing effects, its relationships with other elements in an image and, 
indeed, the viewer themselves. These contextualizing elements effectively 
construct an ‘object of thought’ by utilising semiotic resources to depict it in 
particular manner. These semiotic strategies position the sign in a way that 
suits the sign user. As such, these social constructions effectively establish 
the indexical components of a particular identity. Social Semiotics thus 
operates at the indexical level and it ‘skips’ the iconic stage where the 
identity is first posited. In so doing, Social Semiotics does not question the 
identity of the object that is being constructed and prefers, instead, to talk a 
language of ideology which suggests that the ‘fixed’ identity is being 
‘refracted’ in some way. 
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The Peircean index can also be compared with the philosophy of Kant and 
Hegel. We saw earlier that Peirce’s concept of the icon has its roots in their 
thought. It is not surprising, therefore, to also find equivalents of indexicality 
in their work. However, they consider the manner in which reality impacts 
on our thoughts in slightly different ways to Peirce. 
 
Kant, for example, utilises the notion of his ‘Antimonies’ to explain how 
reality limits the extent of our thought and human reason. The Antimonies 
allow us, through a logical process, to harmonise the ‘conflicting assertions’ 
within our thoughts: 
 
Transcendental assertions, on the contrary, claiming insight into what is far beyond 
the field of possible experience, can never produce their abstract synthesis in any 
a priori intuition, nor can their flaws be discovered by means of any experience. 
Transcendental reason, therefore, admits of no other touchstone than the attempt 
to harmonise its conflicting assertions, and hence to let free and unrestrained 
conflict develop between them beforehand. 
(Kant: 1781/2007: 390) 
 
Hegel acknowledges the ‘Antimonies’ and he develops this intellectual tool: 
 
The Antimonies are not confined to the four special objects taken from Cosmology: 
they appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions and Ideas. To 
be aware of this and to know objects in this property of theirs, makes a vital part in 
a philosophical theory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards 
describe as the Dialectical influence in logic. 
(Hegel: 1992/2014: 63) 
 
Hegel thus agrees that the logical process suggested by Kant is critical to 
the internal coherence of our empirical knowledge. The ‘Essences’ posited 
by the mind in the early stages of dialectical thought contain contradictions. 
These need to be resolved through a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis. Hegel calls this ‘Reflection’: 
 
This word ‘reflection’ is originally applied, when a ray of light in a straight line 
impinging upon a surface of a mirror is thrown back from it. In this phenomenon we 
have two things, - first an immediate fact which is, and secondly the deputed, 
derivated, or transmitted phase of the same. Something of this sort takes place 
when we reflect, or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not 
in its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. 
(ibid: 135) 
 
In this process, the mind identifies the ‘connectedness of things’. In the 
‘Philosophy of Mind’, Hegel, rather confusingly calls this ‘perception’, but he 
clearly differentiates it from the sensuousness of immediate consciousness: 
 
While therefore the merely sensuous consciousness merely shows things, that is 
to say, exhibits them in their immediacy, perception, on the other hand, 
apprehends the connectedness of things, demonstrates that when such and such 
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circumstances are present such and such a thing follows, and thus begins to 
demonstrate the truth of things. 
(Hegel: 1830/1971: 161-2) 
 
Through a reflective process, the mind thus arrives at a better grasp of the 
identity, and properties, of an object. For Hegel this comprises two aspects 
– knowledge of what the object is itself (‘reflection-into-self’) and how it is 
connected with the rest of the world (‘reflection-into-other’): 
 
Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another. It 
follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-
into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light upon one another, - 
which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of 
infinite interconnection between grounds and consequents. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 149) 
 
This dialectical process establishes the connections between our concepts 
and how they relate to each other. This equates to the indexical stage of 
concept development for Peirce. But because they start from different 
positions the two processes appear to be very different from each other. 
Hegel wants to eradicate the contradictions contained within his ‘Essences’, 
whilst Peirce, starting with ‘pure’ forms (icons) wants to add in empirical 
relationships by establishing indexical links. But they are aiming for the 
same outcome – a system of concepts that contain accurate accounts of 
how they relate both to the world and to each other. And this corresponds to 
the Leibnizian system of interrelated monads that we encountered earlier. 
 
In summary, the Peircean index develops the ‘object of thought’ initially 
posited in the icon. As such, it renders the sign a more effective ‘tool’ to 
understand the world – a conclusion that entails a re-framing of the 
indexical sign itself. Conventionally, it is seen as a sign that exists between 
the object and a particular perception. But in this account, it is the way in 
which an ‘object of thought’ develops and is given a relational identity. 
 
Peircean semiotics is not, as Ransdell points out, a question of 
understanding a special class of objects that we call ‘signs’: 
 
But Peirce’s semiotic is not about a class of objects. It is about what it is to be an 
object. 
(Ransdell: 1976: 99) 
 
The indexical stage is vital in the development of ‘what it is to be an object’, 
but the index is still not concerned with the establishment of causal 
relationships. The fact that, at a later stage, we do see objects as being 
causally related to each other is a matter of ‘thirdness’. This higher level of 
human understanding is only achieved at the next stage in the evolution of 
the sign – with the emergence of the symbol. It is at this point that the sign 
both adopts a law-like character and becomes a fully-fledged concept. 
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6.5) Peirce on Symbols and Communication 
 
With the symbol, we come to the part of Peirce’s classification where the 
evolving ‘object of thought’ now meets thirdness. This means that the 
‘object of thought’ can take on the form of a law, a regularity, or a 
relationship that exists in the world. As we have seen, ‘thirds’ also represent 
new identities that are formed from dyadic relationships. This means that 
the symbol provides a mechanism to capture and express this new identity. 
And, moreover, as a symbol, it also offers us a way of sharing this evolving 
‘object of thought’ (with all of its indexical entailments) in our discourse with 
others. 
 
Such an exposition is at some considerable distance from the ‘received’ 
view. This almost always places emphasis on the symbol’s conventional, 
and arbitrary, nature: 
 
In a symbol there is no connection or resemblance between sign and object: a 
symbol communicates only because people agree that it shall stand for what it 
does. 
(Fiske: 1990: 46) 
 
As such, symbol is correlated to its Object by an arbitrary and conventional 
decision. In this sense words are symbols insofar as their lexical content depends 
on a cultural decision. 
(Eco: 1984: 136) 
 
These interpretations, however, ignore the argument that the symbol 
contains an evolving ‘object of thought’. Many commentators claim that the 
boundaries of the symbol are very wide; symbols can have broad meanings 
because we can make them stand for anything that we like. We have 
already noted, however, that this claim is based on a confusion of sign 
types – it is the legisign (and not the symbol) that has this broad remit - 
because the legisign does not yet involve an empirical ‘object of thought’. It 
is the legisign, as a result, that can stand for anything we want it to, and 
Peirce does acknowledge that it involves ‘convention’. Symbols, however, 
are much more than legisigns because they include a developing ‘object of 
thought. As such, reality has played a role in the formation of the symbol 
and it is this characteristic that ensures that they are more than merely 
‘conventional’. 
 
In Peirce’s view, symbols capture evolved, and evolving, ‘objects of 
thought’. In this context, we need to explore how these ‘objects of thought’ 
then turn into symbols. We will look at the Peircean model of this process, 
but we will begin by looking at two alternative accounts. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
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 Firstly, there is the argument that symbols are simply created on an 
arbitrary basis. This is the view which we have just highlighted, and 
rejected, but there is more detail involved here. 
 Secondly, it can be suggested that symbols are created by the tacit 
agreement, convention, or consensus, of a culture. This, as we saw 
in the Introduction, is often allied to the view that meaning is ‘socially 
constructed’. 
Taking the first of these models, there is a strong tradition in semiotics that 
finds it hard not to conflate the idea of the symbol with that of ‘arbitrariness’. 
It is assumed that a symbol is based on convention, that it cannot be 
‘motivated’ by reality, and that it is ‘fixed’ arbitrarily - from individual to 
individual, and from culture to culture. This way of thinking is clearly found 
in Saussure, but it is often mistakenly associated with Peirce. For example, 
Hodge and Kress interpret Peirce as follows:  
 
Peirce had a more helpful classification of signs. He had three major types: icon 
(based on identity or likeness; e.g. road signs), index (based on contiguity or 
causality: e.g., smoke as a sign of fire) and symbol (a merely conventional link, as 
in Saussure’s ‘arbitrary’ sign). 
(Hodge and Kress: 1988: 21-22) 
 
And sometimes Peircean scholars assume that convention and 
arbitrariness can be conflated because they are equivalent to each other: 
 
Icons share features with their referents. Indexes are caused by single objects and 
do not share common iconic features with their referents (unless they also ‘contain’ 
iconic relations). Symbols refer to generals rather than to particulars, and have a 
conventional or arbitrary relation to their referents. 
(Corrington: 1993: 164) 
 
In this context, Peirce is willing to accept that the actual words, or marks on 
a page, that we use in symbols are based on convention, but he rejects the 
suggestion that their underlying ‘objects of thought’ are themselves 
‘arbitrary’. 
 
This has important implications for the status of words. Once they are 
attached to their ‘objects of thought’ they take on a ‘law-like’ quality that is 
derived from their ‘object of thought’. In a quotation that is often overlooked 
by Saussurian interpreters, we find Peirce stating that: 
 
The word itself has no existence, although it has a real being, consisting in the fact 
that existents will conform to it…. A Symbol is a law or a regularity of the indefinite 
future. 
(EP2: 274) 
 
The Peircean idea that ‘existents will conform’ to the word is in stark 
opposition to the Saussurian notion of the arbitrarily formed symbol. 
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Peirce’s rejection of arbitrariness is often misunderstood by scholars - even 
though they sometimes sense the direction he is moving in. Corrington, for 
example, recognising something of Peirce’s position, seems unsure 
whether Peirce means what he appears to be suggesting: 
 
This tension remains unresolved in Peirce although I am increasingly persuaded 
that he was struggling toward a nonconventionalist understanding of how symbols 
function to unveil objective and generic features of nature. 
(Corrington: 1993: 145) 
 
I would argue that Peircean symbols are able to do precisely what 
Corrington is hesitant to accept – ‘to unveil objective and generic features of 
nature’ – and this is because they, in fact, stand for their underlying (or 
‘under-standing’?) ‘objects of thought’. 
 
This re-interpretation of the Peircean symbol is only possible, of course, 
once we have re-evaluated the ‘object’ in the sign as an evolving ‘object of 
thought’ and not as something (outside the sign) that ‘transmits’ it. Peirce’s 
position, however, now has the very significant effect of inverting the 
relationship between words and objects. In the nominalist tradition, words 
name and define objects; the assumption is that this relationship is created 
by ourselves. For Peirce, this is incorrect – ‘existents will conform’ to our 
words. In an unpublished manuscript (MS:1105), quoted by Rosenthal, 
Peirce also argues that: 
 
Meaning enters into language by determining it. 
(Rosenthal: 1994: 147n) 
 
This entirely reverses the nominalist stance that language determines 
meaning. In Peirce’s model of the sign, in contrast, meaning is formed first 
(via the emerging ‘object of thought’) and it is then, subsequently, 
expressed in a symbol. Peirce is, effectively, overturning the very basis of 
nominalism. 
 
As we saw earlier, the ‘object of thought’ captured in a symbol can be an 
actual object, or it can be an ‘object of thought’ (in a third) that we have 
created to understand the world (as in our example of gravity), or it can 
even be something that does not actually exist (e.g. a unicorn). The symbol 
is thus an ‘instrument’ of thought that is formed to facilitate more effective 
thinking about reality. In what is, in many ways, his most insightful 
description of sign action, Peirce thus states that: 
 
It appears to me that the essential function of a sign is to render inefficient relations 
efficient. 
(SS: 31) 
 
What Peirce means here is that we render our understanding of ‘relations’ 
more ‘efficient’ by creating ‘objects of thought’ that capture (in symbols) the 
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relationships, and causal laws, we have encountered in reality. And, in the 
realm of social phenomena, we create ‘objects of thought’ that encapsulate 
social phenomena (such as ‘giving’) which enable us to participate in social 
interactions which we would otherwise construe on a purely dyadic basis. 
 
Deely, borrowing two medieval concepts, similarly distinguishes between 
‘ens rationis’ and ‘ens reale’ (Deely (2010: 391-5; 1982: 23-26). An ‘ens 
rationis’ is an ‘object of thought’ that is not directly perceived (and which is, 
therefore, created by the mind and which is ‘mind dependent’). In contrast, 
an ‘ens reale’ is an ‘object of thought’ that we have simply observed in the 
world and which is ‘mind independent’. This distinction (which seems, on 
the surface, to separate the ‘intramental’ and the ‘extramental’ along 
conventional dualistic lines) does not operate, however, on a Cartesian 
basis. Instead, it reflects the fact that, in Peircean thinking, all ‘objects of 
thought’ are created by the mind. The distinction between them then 
resolves into the secondary question as to whether they also exist, or not as 
directly observable phenomena. Deely, as we saw earlier, makes his own 
distinction here by distinguishing ‘objects’ from what he calls ‘things’. And 
this, as we noted, is the same distinction that we saw in Hegel between the 
two words he uses for ‘object’ – ‘Objekt’ and ‘Gegenstand’. 
 
Of course, as our understanding of reality becomes more ‘efficient’, then the 
‘objects of thought’ that we use to comprehend the reality converge on the 
world as it actually is. This means that our symbols become progressively 
more effective. In the Hegelian model this means that the ‘Objekt’ and the 
‘Gegenstand’ converge, and become more like each other. And, 
incidentally, this tacit assumption may be another reason why Peirce uses 
the term ‘object’, rather than ‘object of thought’, when describing the 
elements of the sign. His nineteenth century audience, brought up on 
Hegel, would have assumed that the two will eventually merge in any case. 
 
Importantly, if we consider Peirce’s classification of signs, it is only with the 
symbol that the ‘object of thought’ becomes a ‘third’. And Peirce believes 
that it is only at this symbolic stage that true concepts are created: 
 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, 
particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of 
likenesses and symbols. We only think in signs. These mental signs are of a mixed 
nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new 
symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new 
symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads 
among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as 
force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they 
bore to our barbarous ancestors. 
(EP2: 10) 
 
Symbols possess two important properties – they are rooted in reality and 
they enter into systems of thought with each other. Because ‘secondness’ 
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has already been involved in their construction, however, they represent 
real facts and real laws; they are not ‘mere symbols’: 
 
Many philosophers say they are ‘mere symbols’. Take away the word mere and 
this is true. They are symbols; and symbols being the only things in the universe 
that have any importance, the word ‘mere’ is a great impertinence. In short, 
wherever there is thought there is Thirdness. 
(EP2: 269) 
 
We can now turn to consider the second version of symbol creation outlined 
above. Would Peirce agree with the view that symbols are formed through 
social convention, or through consensus? The Peircean contention that 
symbols contain underlying ‘objects of thought’ will, of course, conflict with 
this claim, but we should still evaluate whether the social dimension has 
any role for Peirce. Some commentators insist that Peirce pursues a social 
model of meaning (Eco: 1995: 219; Liszka: 1996: 99) and we need to 
identify whether the social dimension does, indeed, play this role. Is it the 
case, for example, that our ‘objects of thought’ are also shaped by social 
interaction? 
 
In relation to this question, it is clear that Peirce still has to explain, in his 
model of symbol formation, the differences which clearly exist between 
individual perspectives. If symbols are created through the evolution of the 
‘object of thought’ in the mind, Peirce must clarify what happens when two 
individuals meet and they find that they possess quite different ‘objects of 
thought’. How do they resolve their differences? This problem introduces 
the issue of communication into Peircean semiotics. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, Peirce was living in a period where meaning 
creation was perceived in quite different terms to our own. The belief that 
meaning is created according to social ‘rules’ was still in its infancy. Peirce 
was writing before the ‘Linguistic Turn’ in philosophy and the corresponding 
view that meaning is created through ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein: 
2009). As a result, Peirce talks relatively little about communication as such 
(Habermas: 1995: 243), although it does form the branch of semiotics he 
calls ‘speculative rhetoric’ – the ‘transmission of meaning by signs from 
mind to mind’ (CP1: 444). 
 
But we should now identify how Peirce construes communication - and the 
role of the symbol in this process. It is important, however, to place his 
treatment within his broader model of sign action. We have already seen (in 
Fig. 6) that, for Peirce, a sign is determined by the ‘object of thought’ and 
that its outcome is a new interpretant, or identity. This happens, primarily, 
within the mind of the individual and it involves the action of ‘secondness’ - 
which constantly forces us to revise our ‘objects of thought’. But, critically, 
for Peirce, this action of ‘limitation’ on any ‘object of thought’ also occurs in 
our acts of communication. 
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What happens in communication is that an ‘object of thought’, present in 
one mind, is expressed in words (symbols) and this, in turn, creates an 
‘object of thought’ in a second mind - but now in the form of an interpretant. 
Peirce’s account of communication thus parallels the activity of 
understanding signs. And the interpretant (produced in the second mind) 
can then be re-expressed as a new ‘object of thought’ in on-going 
‘semiosis’. As Peirce says: 
 
A sign or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of 
that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more develop sign. That sign which it 
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. 
(CP2: 228-9) 
 
The question, of course, is whether the words (symbols) used by the 
speaker will always entail the same ‘object of thought’ for the listener? The 
symbol used by the first speaker is, inherently still a ‘vague’ in the mind of 
the receiver. As such, will the original ‘object of thought’ correspond with the 
resulting interpretant? This is, of course, unlikely to be the case; the initial 
symbol could be broader, or narrower, in scope than the received 
representamen and it could also have different indexical links in the mind of 
the utterer compared with the receiver. As we saw before, Peirce uses the 
example of the two travellers in the coach talking about ‘Charles the 
Second’. There is a possibility that they are referring to different kings 
(Charles the Second of France?) and, even if this is not the case, then it is 
highly likely that the indexical components of their respective ‘objects of 
thought’ will be different from each other. One of the travellers may be a 
scholar of seventeenth century history and the other may not even know 
when ‘Charles the Second’ reigned. As Peirce argues: 
 
When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other sign-
maker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or 
other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a different planet, an 
aeon later; or it may be that very same man as he will be a second after……  
 
The assertion which the deliverer seeks to convey to the mind of the receiver 
relates to some object or objects which have forced themselves upon his attention; 
and he will miss his mark altogether unless he can succeed in forcing those very 
same objects upon the attention of the receiver. 
(CP3: 433-4) 
 
In this scenario there is likely to be a clash of perspectives which parallels 
the epistemological ‘outward clash’ of secondness that we encountered 
earlier. The two travellers need to identify, through their communication, 
what their respective ‘objects of thought’ entail. In otherwords, they need to 
ascertain what is included within them. This procedure will probably involve 
a discussion of indexical relationships – the connections that ‘Charles the 
Second’ had with the world (i.e. his relationships with France, with 
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parliament, or, indeed, with Nell Gwynne). Only if all of these are agreed will 
the two travellers possess the same ‘object of thought’. Full 
correspondence will, doubtless, be impossible, but some level of 
convergence about the Stuart king will always be achievable in practice. 
The travellers will be able to establish ‘adequate’ (cf. Spinoza) similarities 
between their ‘objects of thought’ to make an effective conversation 
possible - and these convergences will continue to evolve as they talk. 
 
We have, as a result, the same epistemological model that we encountered 
earlier in Peirce’s account of perception – a transition from a ‘vague’ to a 
more determined ‘object of thought’. The difference, in communication, is 
that ‘secondness’ is delivered by the language of other individuals. It is 
clear, therefore, that a social aspect of concept formation is important to 
Peirce. Communication help us develop our pre-formed ‘objects of thought’ 
and it allows us to identify where they may be mistaken. As put Peirce 
argues: 
 
We must not begin by talking of pure ideas, - vagabond thoughts that tramp the 
public roads without any human habitation, - but must begin with men and their 
conversation. 
(CP8: 112) 
 
But does this mean that Peirce accepts that our ‘objects of thought’ have a 
social aspect to them? Does he tacitly agree, after all, with a form of 
‘socially constructed’ meaning, or knowledge? On the surface, this appears 
to be the case. But it is clear that Peirce sees the social realm as only 
providing a mechanism to refine our meanings. He is not suggesting, in line 
with Social Constructionism, that meaning itself is created on a social basis. 
 
And another critical feature of Peirce’s model also needs to be noted. It is 
clear that communication, for Peirce, actually involves disagreement 
between individual ‘objects of thought’. The evolution of our ‘objects of 
thought’ is not, therefore, achieved through individuals simply agreeing with 
each other, or sharing meanings; it is established by the ‘outward clash’ 
between their respective ‘objects of thought’. The convergence of two 
‘objects of thought’ in two different minds is thus achieved as they mutually 
limit the scope of what is included in their symbols. Agreement occurs 
through mutual limitation - rather than through consensus. 
 
Some commentators, however, take Peirce to mean that we establish 
knowledge on the basis of consensus. Liszka, for example, interprets 
Peirce in this manner and talks of ‘the achievement of genuine consensus’ 
(Liszka: 1996: 99). Peirce proposes, in contrast, that the role of others is to 
provide multiple different perspectives on a particular ‘object of thought’. 
Agreement between individuals, is not, therefore, what creates a shared 
meaning in a symbol. Rather, the mutually advantageous use of a symbol 
only arises only in the absence of differing opinions. 
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Interestingly, however, Peirce’s framework actually provides those who 
advocate an account of social meaning with a model of how it might be 
constructed. Stjernfelt is quite correct when he claims that we should be 
sceptical about the way in which socially created meanings might be shared 
within a community: 
 
How are we to establish the meaning of a lexeme if it consists in nothing but 
millions of vague, fleeting, instantaneous mental events which we are only able to 
address via the insecure roundabout of trusting people’s own introspective reports 
about their own mental experiences? 
(Stjernfelt: 2014: 15) 
 
But the Peircean account of communication, outlined above, provides us 
with a way of grasping how meanings might, indeed, be spread in a social 
context. Each time a word is used by an individual it creates a putative 
‘object of thought’ in the mind of another. This will, of course, have indexical 
components, which need to be discussed, but the use of a symbol has 
created an ‘object of thought’ in the mind of the listener without any 
recourse to the ‘reporting’ of the speaker’s thoughts. It is in this way that 
meaning may be disseminated across a culture without a requirement for 
some kind of agreement between the individuals within it. 
 
As we shall see, this account of symbol creation also forms the basis of 
Peirce’s account of truth. He talks, on occasions, of the benefits of a 
‘community of inquirers’ (EP1: 54) in scientific discovery. It is this feature of 
Peirce’s thought that leads some commentators, such as Liszka, to assume 
that Peircean truth has a strong social component. But what Peirce is 
proposing is that a broader ‘community of inquirers’ is simply more likely to 
ensure that we achieve a knowledge of what a particular ‘object of thought’ 
entails (Nubiola and Barrena: 2014: 437- 441). This is because a larger 
‘community’ will bring more perspectives to bear in limiting a particular 
symbol’s meaning. True(er) knowledge can, as a result, be established in a 
way which exists despite the ‘vagaries of me and you’ (EP1: 52). Critically, 
however, a large number of inquirers is not beneficial because it creates 
greater consensus, but rather because it ensures more perspectives are 
available and more limitations will be made on an ‘object of thought’. 
 
With this argument it is also possible to discern, once again, the influence of 
Hegel on Peirce. Hegel also takes that view that the individual is unable to 
form a full conception of the truth by themselves. They need the help of 
society to achieve this: 
 
The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion: 
- not of course the correspondence of external things with my conceptions, - for 
these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person (Hegel’s 
italics). 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 229) 
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Hegel goes on to state, invoking the Leibnizian idea of perspective, that: 
 
Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet 
other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-subsistence 
of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is 
realised. The individual by itself does not correspond to its notion. It is this 
limitation of its existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual 
(my italics).  
(ibid) 
 
For both Hegel and Peirce, therefore, the social realm is important in 
meaning creation – but only because it provides a range of perspectives on 
an individual’s emerging ‘object of thought’. 
 
This Peircean account of symbol creation is, of course, open to criticism. 
What happens if particular individuals want to impose their own ‘objects of 
thought’ on other people? Peirce, writing in the nineteenth century, does not 
fully recognise, or indeed debate, the effects of power and ideology. 
However, he does, occasionally, discuss what might happen in such 
situations and (rather optimistically, we might feel), argues that truth will 
triumph in the end. 
 
In the ‘Fixation of Belief’ (EP1: 109-123), he identifies a number of ways in 
which a belief (i.e. the meaning of a symbol) can be imposed on others. The 
‘method of authority’ (ibid: 117) is seen by Peirce as being potentially 
successful in the short term, and able to achieve ‘majestic results’ due to 
the enslavement of the population. But, he argues that, even in ‘the most 
priest-ridden states some individuals will be found who are raised above 
that condition’ (ibid: 118), and this will lead to false beliefs being overturned: 
 
The willful adherence to a belief, and the arbitrary forcing of it upon others, must, 
therefore, both be given up, and a new method of settling opinions must be 
adopted, which shall not only produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide 
what proposition it is which is to be believed. 
(ibid: 118) 
 
The second method is that of ‘tenacity’ and it entails simply ignoring any 
empirical evidence to the contrary. Peirce argues that this ‘will be unable to 
hold its ground in practice’ (ibid: 116). Likewise, the third method, the ‘a 
priori’ method, of fixing belief is rejected by Peirce on similar grounds (ibid: 
119). Peirce concludes that there is only one method of ascertaining the 
truth, and this he calls the ‘method of science’ (ibid: 120). 
 
This fourth method of ‘fixing belief’ limits the social aspect. He points out, 
somewhat paradoxically, that what defines this scientific approach is that it 
leads to beliefs created ‘by nothing human, but by some external 
permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect’ (ibid: 
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120). Far from suggesting, therefore, that we agree between ourselves as 
to what constitutes truth, Peirce argues that what is ‘true’ are the facts upon 
which our opinion ‘has no effect’. Elsewhere, Peirce indeed, defines the 
‘real’ as being that which is ‘as it is regardless of what you or I may think 
about it’ (EP2: 343). This is not the Social Constructionism of the twentieth 
century. 
 
So, to summarise, Peirce does, indeed, accept that there is a social 
dimension in the development of our ‘objects of thought’. This takes place 
when we start to converse with other individuals using our symbols. But 
Peirce neither agrees that these initial ‘objects of thought’ are ‘socially 
constructed’, nor does he assent to the argument that they are arrived at by 
‘consensus’. Symbols find their foundations, and their meanings, in their 
iconic and indexical components and this embeds them in empirical reality. 
The social dimension intervenes, however, when individuals discover that 
they have differing ‘objects of thought’. These differences are resolved 
through our communication which allows us to impose new limits on the 
‘objects of thought’ contained within our symbols. 
 
Another important aspect of the Peircean symbol is the fact that, because it 
is a third, it involves ‘sublation’. In sublation, the iconic and indexical 
elements of the sign are ‘preserved’, but they are also ‘taken up’ to a higher 
level to form a new identity. The Peircean symbol thus parallels the 
Hegelian ‘Notion’: 
 
The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realized. It is a 
systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which 
the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has 
original and complete determinateness … The notion, in short, is what contains all 
the earlier categories of thought merged in it. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 187) 
 
Peirce, therefore, argues that the symbol transforms its underlying iconic 
and indexical properties. We should question, however, whether the idea of 
‘sublation’ should be permitted in any account of the Notion, or symbol. It 
allows Hegel, and Peirce, to maintain that these are more than the sum of 
their parts. This suggests that there might be a ‘gap’ between the iconic and 
indexical qualities of the ‘object of thought’, and the symbol itself. Does this 
create a new form of dualism, masked by the idea of sublation? 
 
This apparent problem, however, is actually fundamental to the symbol-
making process. A sign is, and must always be, something that stands for 
something else. If the ‘sublated’ symbol were no more than the sum of its 
iconic and indexical qualities, then it would not be a symbol (a new identity) 
after all. In otherwords, a genuine symbol cannot exist unless it asserts that 
a newly sublated identity is more than the sum of its parts. 
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The ‘secondary dualist’ might respond, however, that what Hegel and 
Peirce call ‘sublation’ is, in fact, no more than ‘interpretation’ under another 
guise. They could argue that the creation of a new identity is simply our 
interpretation of a set of iconic and indexical experiences. 
 
But this would be to view Hegel and Peirce too simplistically. Firstly, the 
new identity is not an interpretation – it is an identity that exists in the world. 
Secondly, they are using a model of concept development that is very 
different from the Rortian model of the ‘mirror’ which entails ‘subjective’ 
interpretations. Instead, they view concept formation from icon, to index, to 
symbol, as an iterative development which involves reality itself. As such, 
the model has little room for subjective ‘interpretations’ and it also 
possesses an intrinsically logical character. Thirdly, there is a qualitative 
‘leap’ involved in the final creation a symbol, but this always remains an 
active hypothesis for both Hegel and Peirce. There is, as a result, some 
similarity between the notions of ‘sublation’ and ‘interpretation’, but they 
remain categorically different processes. The latter is a subjective act of 
evaluation, whilst the former entails an act of synthesis. 
 
To conclude this section, it is worthwhile summarising the way in which 
Peirce views the formation of a concept (or sign) with an actual example. 
Let us consider how Peirce would account for the development of the 
concept of a ‘table corner’. To begin with the mind has no such concept, 
but, over time, an individual may notice similarities between different 
‘corners of tables’ and start to see them as being discrete entities in their 
own right. This is the iconic stage of sign development – an identity is 
formed on the basis of a similarity. Over time this putative identity may 
accrue certain indexical properties and, as such. an ‘object of thought’ will 
begin to develop. ‘Corners of tables’ will be seen as the kinds of things that 
bump your leg, or which three year olds have a tendency to run into. At this 
stage a more fully-fledged sign is created, but we still do not have a symbol 
that stands for a ‘corner of a table’. This may happen if it becomes useful to 
depict, or talk about, ‘corners of tables’ in a way that is recognised by 
others, or which can be used to represent their identities and the indexical 
properties that they contain. 
 
This final development of the sign may, or may not, ever happen – perhaps 
there are some societies in which a symbol has already been created to 
capture such a concept? Not all signs reach the stage where they become 
fully developed symbols. And, of course, even if they do, they are still open, 
potentially, to further determination. Different symbols could be developed 
to stand for different kinds of ‘corners of tables ’- if were felt that this would 
be useful. 
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However, it has been argued that the symbol is not, it turns out, a 
‘conventional’ sign type. In Peircean hands, it represents the fruition of a 
developmental process that begins with icons and which includes indices. 
The symbol is a ‘third’ and, as such, it creates a new identity, that exists in 
the world, and which also has law-like qualities. 
 
We have noted, however, that whilst the Peircean symbol can be created 
purely in the mind of an individual, there is an important role for the social 
dimension in developing its precise extent (breadth), and its specific 
entailments (depth). Through their character as communication vehicles, 
symbols also have a social aspect and they allow us to encounter the 
‘objects of thought’ of others. Through communication, therefore, symbols 
evolve their meanings, and accommodate other perspectives. The social 
dimension, for Peirce, thus facilitates the growth of human knowledge, but 
this knowledge is always founded upon the initially formed ‘object of 
thought’ that, critically, forms at the level of the individual mind. As such, the 
symbol should not be viewed as involving either conventionality, or 
arbitrariness. 
 
As a coda to this section, it is, perhaps, also worth reflecting on exactly why 
the ‘received’ view is so convinced that symbols are a matter of social 
‘convention’. The answer lies, of course, in the fact that it tacitly assumes 
that only conventional ‘objects’ can exist in the world. As such, the 
‘received’ view must dismiss the reality of our ‘objects of thought’ and 
construe them, instead, in terms of mere convention. It is, therefore, the 
underlying limitation of what is allowed to constitute ‘reality’ that really 
drives the perspective that symbols are matters of convention. Whilst Peirce 
can identify meaning in our ‘objects of thought’, the ‘received’ view has no 
alternative to which it can turn. 
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6.6) Peirce: The ‘Third Trichotomy’ 
 
The third trichotomy of Peirce’s classification will be discussed only briefly. 
The main revisions to Peircean semiotics that are proposed in this thesis 
are largely focused on the second trichotomy that we have just evaluated. 
The purpose of this sub-section is simply to show, therefore, how his 
typology of signs comes to fruition in this column of his classification, and to 
demarcate the critical boundaries between the second and third 
trichotomies. Once we have reached the stage of the symbol, in the second 
trichotomy, we have achieved the establishment of the genuine sign per se 
– the third trichotomy is concerned, less controversially, with how we 
subsequently use it. 
 
As has been argued, the second trichotomy deals with the development of 
the ‘object of thought’ in the sign and the indexical connections that are 
included, or not included, within it. Some of these ‘objects of thought’ are 
directly perceived, some are inferred, and some are social in nature. As a 
result, we no longer experience simple objects, or events, but rather we 
encounter new identities such as ‘tables’, ‘chairs’, ‘giving’, and ‘murder’. We 
know how these ‘objects of thought’ ‘behave’, or will impact upon us, 
because of the indexical properties they contain. When they are sublated 
into ‘thirds’ we use symbols to represent them in our thoughts. 
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that we have only been concerned, 
so far, with how the ‘object of thought’ is formed within the sign and the 
resultant identity that it creates. We have not reached a stage where we 
can affirm, in specific propositional statements, the types of relationships 
that objects enter into in the real world. For example, we may have created 
the ‘object of thought’, or universal, of ‘cat’. We know the sorts of things that 
cats do (what their identity entails), but we are still not able to construct a 
proposition to the effect there is a cat in front of me right now. This is the 
purpose of the third trichotomy – it is concerned with making propositions 
about world and it uses the signs (or concepts) that have been created in 
the second trichotomy. 
 
Taking the first element of the third trichotomy, Peirce defines the ‘rheme’ 
(the ‘first of a third’) as a ‘term’. It is a symbol that has the potential to act 
within a proposition, but it is not yet employed in one. This parallels the 
qualisign which is a quality that has not yet been ‘embodied’ in a sinsign: 
 
A Rheme is a sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of qualitative possibility, that 
is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any 
rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. 
(EP2: 292) 
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Nöth describes the rheme as follows: 
 
Rhemes, being single words in isolation, do not convey any information. It is 
logically impossible for a rhematic sign to be also informative. 
(Nöth: 2014: 16) 
 
And Peirce describes their status as a ‘term’ that can be deployed in 
propositions: 
 
A rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chemical atom or radicle with 
unsaturated bonds. 
(CP3: 421) 
 
At the next stage, the dicisign (or dicent sign), however, does act as a 
proposition. It claims to describe a state of affairs in the world – such as 
there being ‘a cat sitting in front of me’. A proposition is capable, therefore, 
of being true or false. It is important to note here that this possibility is very 
different from the action of indices that we have encountered in the second 
trichotomy. In the latter case, Peirce was merely concerned with the 
empirical actions of secondness that construct an ‘object of thought’, and 
how we learn about a particular identity. This is quite different from the 
empirical question at stake here - where we consider actual relationships 
between two ‘objects of thought’ (cats and mats). 
 
In asserting such a relationship the dicent creates a sign which is a 
proposition. And we may also create further signs that can be used to 
communicate further, and more complex, information: 
 
The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not, is that 
a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its being 
so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to something as 
having a real being independently of the representation of it as such, and further 
that this reference or relation must not be shown as rational, but must appear as a 
blind Secondness. 
(EP2: 275) 
 
The point that Peirce highlights in the middle of this quotation is important – 
the dicisign (because it is ‘just’ a proposition) only ‘professes’ that two signs 
share the same object – it asserts this, but it does not ‘furnish reasons for 
its being so’. It falls to the third element of this trichotomy – the ‘argument’ – 
to provide the reasons for believing in any particular proposition. And the 
‘argument’ achieves this by placing the proposition in a system of other 
truths about the world: 
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An Argument is a sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of a law. We may say 
that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its Object in its characters 
merely; that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its Object in 
respect to actual existence; and that an Argument is a sign which is understood to 
represent its Object in its character as a sign. 
(EP2: 292) 
 
As Liszka points out, for Peirce: 
 
The argument is a sign whose interpretation is directed to the systematic, 
inferential, or law-like connections with other signs; it determines the interpretant 
toward the inferential form or rule like character of the sign. 
(Liszka: 1996: 42) 
 
It is at this stage that knowledge enables us to place a proposition within a 
system of other empirical beliefs. It is also at this point that we are able to 
say why something is true, or why something is false. 
 
The third trichotomy combines different signs, but the identities that it 
utilises have already been created in the second trichotomy. This means 
that both ‘dicisigns’ and ‘arguments’ are empirically rooted. It follows that, 
when a proposition states that ‘all men are mortal’, this cannot be dismissed 
as being a mere (or analytic) result of the terms being used. For the two 
rhemes (terms) involved (‘men’ and ‘mortal’ in this case) have been derived 
from experience and this means that any proposition involving them has 
real empirical content. 
 
This leads to the conclusion, as Stjernfelt correctly suggests, that, for 
Peirce, there are such things as ‘natural propositions’: 
 
A most remarkable implication of a Peircean notion of Dicisigns is the possible 
naturalization of propositions. Propositions are taken to function without the 
intermediary of language or consciousness, and propositions are taken to exist 
before the existence of human beings……. One advantage is that the purely 
functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns from the confinement to 
human language, intention, and consciousness, that is, beyond linguistic-turn 
philosophy as well as philosophy of mind. 
(Stjernfelt: 2014: 105) 
 
This raises the intriguing possibility that we possess empirical knowledge of 
the world as a direct result of the terms that we use in our language. And 
this leads to a discussion of Peirce’s ‘concept of truth’ in the next chapter. 
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7) The Peircean ‘Concept’ and his 
Pragmatism 
 
7.1)  The Pragmatic Maxim 
 
In this, our last chapter on Peirce, we will consider how the Peircean 
‘concept’ links his pragmatism. We will find that the interpretation of the 
concept, put forward in this thesis, has implications for this other important 
facet of Peirce’s philosophy. He is not only known as one of the founders of 
semiotics, but also enjoys a similar status with regard to pragmatism. In this 
chapter we will see how these two aspects of his work are intimately related 
through his account of the concept. 
 
In an essay on Peirce, and his influence on educational theory, Houser 
(1987) quotes Percy: 
 
Charles Peirce was an unlucky man. His most important ideas ran counter to the 
intellectual currents of his day, were embraced by his friends – and turned into 
something else. William James took one idea and turned it into pragmatism which, 
whatever its value, is not the same as Peirce’s pragmaticism. Peirce’s triadic 
theory has been duly saluted by latter-day semioticists – and turned into a trivial 
instance of learning theory….. Freud was lucky. The times were ready for him and 
he had good enemies. It’s our friends we should beware of. 
(Percy: 1972: 160) 
 
We have already noted the ways in which Peirce’s theory of signs has been 
misconstrued in the secondary literature. Percy is correct in claiming, 
however, that a similar fate has also befallen his ‘pragmaticism’. On this 
occasion, however, Peirce was aware of the misinterpretations of his 
position and adopted this, his own distinct term, as a means of distancing 
himself from James’s ‘pragmatism’. 
 
Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ is often viewed as a major theme of his later 
philosophy and as something that was not present in his earlier writings. It 
is of some significance, consequently, that Peirce acknowledges that this 
aspect of his thinking has links with Hegel (CP5: 436). This strongly 
suggests that much of his ‘pragmatic’ thinking is implicitly present in his 
earlier work, but not expressed in overt terms. It is also worth noting that 
neither Peirce, nor James, are the first to use the term ‘pragmatic’. James 
suggests that it was first used by Peirce in 1878 in ‘How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear’ (EP1: 124-141; James: 1908: 46); but it can actually be found, and in 
only a slightly different context, in Hegel (1892/2014: 166). 
 
 
 
 163 
 
Perhaps the clearest formulation of Peirce’s ‘Pragmatic Maxim’ is as 
follows: 
 
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive 
the object of our conception to have: then, our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. 
(EP2: 135) 
 
This is usually interpreted as a statement about ‘effects’. Commentators, as 
a result, infer that the Maxim is about consequences and how future 
anticipated behaviour determines meaning There are numerous examples 
of this interpretation in the secondary literature. Here are several, starting 
with James: 
 
The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its 
respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to 
any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? 
(James: 1908: 45) 
 
Pragmatism, the philosophical doctrine that the meaning of any conception 
consists in how that conception may affect behaviour (with behaviour broadly 
construed to include thinking). 
(Houser: 1987: 255) 
 
The pragmatist doctrine [of truth] depends upon the axiomatic assuming of a 
particular position on what ‘usefulness’ is. 
(Valsiner and Van Der Veer: 2000: 203) 
 
Because, in his view [Peirce], the only function of thought is to establish modes of 
behaviour and action, we merely have to determine what modes of behaviour a 
thought produces in order to develop the meaning of that thought, since what an 
object means consists simply in the modes of behaviour that it involves. 
(Arens: 1994: 6) 
 
We can only know what a word or concept means, Peirce asserted, based on its 
effect upon the conduct of human behaviour. 
(Chiasson: 2002: 11) 
 
The ‘cash value’ of a word or concept was for them [Pragmatists] the difference it 
made in life and action. No difference in life, no difference in meaning. 
(Davis: 1972: 88) 
 
These quotations (and there could be many more) illustrate a widespread 
emphasis on ‘effects’. These are, indeed, an important constituent of the 
Maxim, but we should not conclude that this is all it is about. As Peirce 
points out: 
 
It must be admitted, in the first place, that if pragmaticism really made Doing to be 
the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. 
(EP2: 341) 
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The most critical part of the Pragmatic Maxim can be found in its last line 
where Peirce highlights that he is talking about the ‘whole of the conception 
of the object’. This part of the Maxim is so important to Peirce that in his 
essay ‘What Pragmatism Is’ he writes this part, in obvious frustration, using 
capital letters: 
 
Then your conception of those effects is the WHOLE of your conception of the 
object. 
(EP2: 338) 
 
With the emphasis now placed on the word ‘whole’, the Pragmatic Maxim 
attracts quite a different meaning. Its subject matter is now re-framed; it 
becomes a proposition about what it is for something to constitute a ‘whole 
conception’ (of an ‘object of thought’). This effectively translates the Maxim 
into an assertion about the nature of truth itself, rather than one concerning 
how important particular ‘effects’ may, or may not be, in meaning creation. 
 
James takes Peirce’s ‘Pragmatic Maxim’ and revises it only slightly. But the 
alterations James makes have far reaching consequences. In his lecture, 
‘What Pragmatism Means’, James states the Maxim in his own terms. 
These look, superficially, very similar to Peirce’s, but are entirely different in 
their meaning: 
 
Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to 
develop a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to 
produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance…… To attain perfect clearness 
in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects 
of a practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from 
it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether 
immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so 
far as that conception has positive significance at all (my italics). 
(James: 1908: 46-47) 
 
James’s version clearly covers most of what is included in Peirce’s 
formulation, even mentioning the ‘whole’ conception, but he then limits the 
scope of the Maxim by insisting, twice in this passage, that it only works ‘for 
us’. In making this emphasis he thereby ‘psychologises’ the Maxim. It is no 
longer a proposition about the nature of truth itself; it is now a Maxim about 
how concepts (subjectively) come to mean things ‘for us’. James, of course, 
also believes that his version of the Maxim still remains a ‘doctrine of truth’ 
(Dea: 2014: 478), but, in effect, it is now reduced to a theory of how 
meaning is formed at an individual level. At one point, for example, James 
even claims that the Maxim can be used to justify the religious belief of an 
individual because of the ‘value’ that it creates: 
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Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our experiences work 
out together, she has no a priori prejudices against theology. If theological ideas 
prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the 
sense of being good for so much. 
(James: 1908: 72-3) 
 
As such, the Pragmatic Maxim is no longer a theory about the nature of 
truth, as Peirce intended. It is now a ‘psychological’ theory (Misak: 2013: 
54-57; Otto Apel: 1981: 5) about how we individually create meaning. 
Turrisi makes this distinction clear: 
 
Pragmatism’s usefulness on the level of directing its practitioners to specific 
conclusions is eminently demonstrable. But as Peirce pointed out in his Baldwin’s 
Dictionary article, its general meaning is a different matter. Peirce regarded the 
practical skill of using pragmatic technique as valuable, but not in any great need 
of elucidation. By contrast, readers of William James’s works prior to 1903 were 
treated almost exclusively to descriptions of pragmatic skills and techniques 
implying its value for practical action. Justifications of pragmatism even later in 
James’s works – for example in his 1907 Lowell lectures on pragmatism – are 
made in terms of its usefulness, under the presumption that practical utility is its 
own best defense.… The direction of pragmatic studies typified by James’s work – 
which was not grounded on any greater justification than efficacy – convinced 
Peirce that pragmatism had gone too far without its necessary logical justification.  
(Turrisi: 1997: 29) 
 
The emphasis of James on ‘for us’ also has the effect of relativising the 
Maxim. This interpretation has been passed down to philosophers in the 
twentieth century in a way that subverts Peirce’s original intentions. As a 
result, we find, Rorty, for example, highlighting pragmatism as ‘anti-
essentialist’: 
 
My first characterization of pragmatism is that it is simply anti-essentialism applied 
to notions like ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ language’, ‘morality’, and similar objects of 
philosophical theorizing. 
(Rorty: 1982: 162) 
 
He goes on to criticise such interpretations, but still concludes that 
pragmatism should be described in terms that deny a role for reality: 
 
Let me sum up by offering a third and final characterisation pragmatism: it is the 
doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones – no 
wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of 
language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow 
inquirers. 
(ibid: 165) 
 
Such interpretations are clearly far from Peirce’s original intentions. Peirce 
is concerned with what it is for something to be empirically true - and he 
concludes that this involves knowing the sum of what is contained within a 
‘whole conception’. Such a conception will include all of the ‘effects’ of a 
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thing, but the focus remains, for Peirce, on the conception itself – not on an 
account of how meaning can be framed for an individual. 
 
This way of thinking about a concept is, of course, something that we have 
already encountered in Peirce. He characterises a concept as an identity 
that has indexical elements attached to it. This places an emphasis on the 
role of identity in the Maxim. In ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce 
states, referring to a concept: 
 
To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it 
produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Now the identity 
of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such 
circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no 
matter how improbable they may be. 
(EP1: 131) 
 
It is the sum of the indices (or ‘effects’) that are contained within a concept 
which determine what a concept means. We should note here that Peirce 
specifically mentions that meaning is also determined by the indexical 
connections that ‘might possibly occur’. The meaning of a concept is thus 
defined also by the sum of its possible relationships – not just those which 
we have so far observed. And Peirce goes on to argue that it is these 
relationships that define an identity: 
 
…and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, 
direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the 
sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon. 
(ibid) 
 
Elsewhere, as we saw earlier, Peirce also discusses the hardness of a 
diamond and he comes to the same conclusion. A diamond is ‘hard’ 
because it behaves in a certain way in certain circumstances. This is what 
is entailed in being a diamond. 
 
Because identities are involved, it is important to note that the ‘Pragmatic 
Maxim’ works only at the level of universals. Hookway, for instance, 
correctly points out that it does not apply to questions relating to 
singularities - such as whether Caesar ‘sneezed three times on the morning 
he first crossed to England’ (Hookway: 2004: 147). Peirce makes this point 
himself, insisting that the Maxim can only speak of general kinds (CP5: 
426). He also argues that when we claim that diamonds are ‘hard’ we are 
stating a fact about a class of objects. It may, of course, be the case that 
the next diamond that we encounter is, in fact, ‘soft’ and we may need to 
revise our initial assertion. If this happens we will either conclude that our 
original definition of diamonds is wrong (an unlikely outcome), or we will 
create a new sub-category of ‘soft’ diamonds (a more likely alternative). In 
this interplay of form and content, this would mean that the ‘truth’ that 
ordinary diamonds are ‘hard’ would still be preserved: 
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And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing of single 
experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is conditionally true in 
futuro can hardly be singular), but only speaks of general kinds of experimental 
phenomena. 
(CP5: 426) 
 
The importance of the ‘whole conception’ is often overlooked by 
commentators who then, inevitably, go on to emphasise the importance of 
context in the Pragmatic Maxim. Hookway, for example, sees it as being a 
rule for evaluating the truth content of specific propositions, instead of being 
a theory about meaning itself: 
 
The pragmatist maxim is a methodological rule for clarifying propositions, it is not 
directly part of a systematic semantics or theory of meaning for expressions of a 
natural language. 
(Hookway: 2012: 9) 
 
This shift in focus, however, has the unfortunate effect of inverting the 
operation of the Maxim once more. By ceasing to focus on what it is to be a 
certain concept, it becomes a statement of how particular meanings are 
defined by context. This relativises the ‘Maxim’ again. Hookway goes on to 
argue, for instance, that: 
 
A full understanding of the pragmatist maxim probably requires an understanding 
of our cognitive contexts, of the sorts of information we should take account of in 
reflecting about the consequences of our actions in different possible 
circumstances. 
(ibid: 10) 
 
Context thus becomes all important in determining meaning; it amounts to 
another way of talking about ‘effects’. Such a view would be rejected by 
Peirce who construes the matter the other way around – for him, a context 
is what is included in the ‘whole conception’. When we discussed Social 
Constructionism, at the beginning of this thesis, we noted that the absence 
of an ‘essentialist’ self results in the conclusion that the individual is 
‘fragmented’ and relationally formed. For Peirce, however, the sum of the 
relational characteristics of an ‘object of thought’ are precisely what defines 
an individual – it represents not a rejection of the notion of identity, but 
rather its very definition. 
 
Equally, when we apply this relational framework to Frege, we can see 
where he and Peirce diverge from each other. Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ is 
based on the insight that we often have different ways of talking about the 
same thing – for example the ‘Morning Star’ and the ‘Evening Star’ (Frege: 
1892/1997). Different meanings and ‘senses’ can be formed using the same 
reference. Peirce would have gladly acknowledged this, but would not have 
derived the notion of Fregean ‘sense’ as a result. He would have simply 
pointed out that Frege has correctly identified the relational characteristics 
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of an ‘object of thought’. Frege’s insight, therefore, would be treated by 
Peirce as no more than a reflection of the relational nature of reality. 
 
In summary, the Pragmatic Maxim, is often construed in ways that reverse 
Peirce’s original intentions. It has become, in the hands of some twentieth 
century commentators, a way of thinking how meaning works at an 
individual, and subjective, level. This approach makes it relativistic in 
nature. But what Peirce is actually proposing is an account of how meaning, 
itself, is constituted on a relational basis. Effects are certainly a vital part of 
this – but Peirce’s key point is that it is the summation of all effects that 
creates the meaning of an individual concept. This is quite different from the 
proposition that perceived ‘effects’ establish a particular meaning, for a 
particular individual, and in a particular context. The whole purpose of 
Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim is to demonstrate that the meaning of a concept 
includes all of its potential relational contexts. This, after all, is precisely 
what the ‘dynamic object’ is. 
 
 
7.2)  Peirce’s Concept of Truth 
 
If the Pragmatic Maxim is understood as defining the meaning of a concept 
in terms of the ‘whole’ of its conception, then this also has important 
consequences for Peirce’s concept of truth. And it establishes important 
connections with other themes in this thesis. 
 
When Peirce asserts that the meaning of a concept involves the ‘whole’ of 
its connections with the world, he is adopting a position that is close to the 
Leibnizian model of the Universe as a web of inter-related monads. These, 
as we saw in chapter two, are identities that are defined by the sum of their 
relationships with each other. Leibniz describes their action as follows: 
 
And as, because the world is a plenum, everything is connected and each body 
acts upon every other body, more or less, according to the distance, and by 
reaction is itself affected thereby; it follows that each monad is a living mirror, or 
endowed with an internal activity, representative according to its point of view of 
the universe, and as regulated as the universe itself. 
(Leibniz: 1714/1951: 523) 
 
Peirce is well aware of this Leibnizian argument and his pupil, John Dewey, 
in his book on Leibniz, also reiterates this position. Interestingly, Dewey can 
be found using the notion of a ‘whole content’: 
 
The monad is an individual, but its whole content, its objectivity or reality, is the 
summation of the universe which it represents. 
(Dewey: 1888: 57) 
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Hegel is, of course, aware of this Leibnizian background and it informs his 
own account of the ‘Absolute’. He states, making an overt connection 
between his own ‘object’ and the Leibnizian monad: 
 
The definition, which states that the Absolute is the Object, is most definitely 
implied in the Leibnitzian Monad. The Monads are each an object, but an object 
implicitly ‘representative’, indeed the total representation of the world. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014) 
 
This Leibnizian model means that each monad is related to the rest of the 
Universe in a way that uniquely defines it. It comprises the coming together 
of a specific identity and a set of indexical relations with rest of the world. 
These Leibnizian points foreshadow Hegel’s vision of the ‘Notion’, and 
Peirce’s pragmatic account of the concept. As a result, when we become 
more familiar with a particular identity (or monad), we ascend from ‘clear 
ideas’ (that simply indicate that we have recognised it as an identity), to 
‘distinct ideas’ (where we learn the indexical relations of that identity) and 
we may finally reach ‘perfect ideas’ (which are only known by God). This 
progression, or hierarchy ideas, is also reflected in the way that the human 
mind moves from Leibnizian ‘nominal’ to ‘real definitions’ – a trajectory that 
has Peircean parallels in his ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamic’ objects. 
 
This vision of a relational Universe, that we get to know ‘by degrees’, has 
implications for Leibniz’s concept of truth. Critically, it involves the notion of 
‘containment’. In a letter to Arnauld, Leibniz states:  
 
It is that always, in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or 
contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way 
included in that of the subject. Praedicatum inest subjecto (predicates are 
contained within their subject); otherwise I do not know what truth is. 
(Leibniz: 1686: Loemker: 1989: 337) 
 
This definition of truth, and what it involves, has parallels with Peirce’s 
Pragmatic Maxim. It asserts that what is contained within a concept (e.g. its 
predicates, or ‘effects’) determines what a concept means – its ‘whole 
conception’. This convergence between Peirce and Leibniz is seldom 
noticed in the secondary literature – a considerable oversight given that it 
determines much of Peirce’s thinking. Belluci’s article on Leibniz is a 
notable exception to this. He claims that: 
 
Peirce’s original formulation of the pragmatist principle has its roots in Leibniz’s 
theory of cognition. 
(Belluci: 2013: 339) 
 
And Belluci goes on to point out that Peirce (MS: 649) talks of ‘pragmatic 
adequacy’ – picking up on the notion of ‘adequate ideas’ that we have 
encountered in Spinoza and Leibniz. 
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To the modern mind, however, Leibniz’ account of truth seems to be flawed. 
He appears to suggest that we treat statements about reality as if they were 
analytic. They seem to be true on the basis of the meanings of their terms. 
Our concepts, if they are determined by the predicates they contain, seem 
to reduce all of our propositions about the world to the level of tautologies. 
But Leibniz is writing almost a century before Kant made his distinction 
between synthetic and analytic truths. To the modern reader, what Leibniz 
seems to be proposing is that our statements about the world are analytic – 
but what Leibniz is, in fact, suggesting is a way of thinking about truth than 
transcends this distinction. Leibniz is, in fact, proposing a formulation of 
truth that insists that our empirical truths are (in Kantian terms) 
simultaneously analytic and synthetic. As such, Leibniz combines both 
‘coherence’ and ‘correspondence’ theories of truth. 
 
We can clearly discern, in Peirce’s account of concept formation, and his 
Pragmatic Maxim, a position that equates to this radical Leibnizian stance. 
We have seen that Peircean concepts are initiated as putative identities 
(icons), that they accrue connections with the world (via indices), and that 
they are eventually captured in the form of symbols. At this symbolic level 
they are then incorporated into systems of other symbols that form 
structures which are internally coherent. Here we have the requisite 
elements for a formulation of truth that combines both empirical foundations 
(correspondence) and internal consistency (coherence). This is possible 
because the meanings of our terms are not nominalistically ‘plucked from 
the air’, but are developed on the basis of our previous empirical experience 
- the determining actions of secondness. Peirce, as we highlighted, 
maintains that meanings determine the words we use – not the other way 
around. 
 
And Almeder confirms this view of Peircean truth. He identifies no less than 
thirteen ways of interpreting Peirce concept of truth, but concludes that the 
most effective ones are those that involve a combination of ‘coherence’ and 
‘correspondence’ theories (Almeder: 1985: 89). 
 
This Peircean view of truth – as involving a combination of the empirical 
and the logical - is, of course, further evidence of his Hegelian approach to 
knowledge. For both philosophers, our concepts have an internal 
coherence with each other and they are also rooted in our experience. This 
is what leads Hegel to claim that ‘what is reasonable is actual; and what is 
actual is reasonable’ (Hegel: 1892/2014: 5), whilst Peirce argues that we 
experience ‘concrete reasonableness’ (CP5:3). And, in this, he possibly 
echoes the concept of ‘petrified intelligence’ first employed by Schelling 
(Hegel: 1970: 15; Stone: 2005; Otto-Apel: 1981: 34). 
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Hegelian dialectics, as we have seen, enables the mind to achieve, through 
the interplay of form and content, a position where our Notions correspond 
with our experience. We find that our Notions and reality converge on each 
other: 
 
But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is 
the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge 
finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion. 
(Hegel: 1977: 51) 
 
This parallels the position that we have just encountered in Peirce - where 
we possess a form of knowledge that is both synthetic and analytic. 
Winfield, discussing Hegel’s stance, argues that: 
 
This enables the ensuing movement [dialecticism] to be analytic and synthetic at 
once. As in logic’s self-thinking of thought, here each advance is synthetic by 
presenting something not already contained in what precedes it, yet analytic 
insofar as it provides nothing that is not contained within the whole that is in the 
process of determining itself. 
(Winfield: 2006: 30) 
 
And Houlgate concurs with Winfield’s account by viewing Hegel’s dialectical 
process as combining the analytic and the synthetic: 
 
Hegelian logic is ‘analytic’ to the extent to that it merely renders explicit what is 
implicit or unthought in an initial category. However, by explicating the 
indeterminate category of being, we do not merely restate in different words what 
is obviously ‘contained’ in it, we watch a new category emerge. It is this 
transformation of categories into new categories which prevents the development 
of Hegel’s logic being straightforwardly analytic. 
(Houlgate: 2005: 38) 
 
These arguments result in a philosophical position being established where 
our concepts of meaning and truth are able to converge on each other. In 
the nominalist view, truth can only relate to the correspondence of our 
perceptions with some ‘noumenal’ reality ‘behind’ them, whilst meaning is 
created by the mind itself. In the position developed by Peirce, and also by 
Hegel, these distinctions are dissolved. Each identity, captured in a 
synthetic concept, is defined by its relationships with the world and these 
also define, pragmatically, what its meaning is. We have overcome the 
dualisms of nominalism and brought the concepts of truth and meaning 
back together again. 
 
This argument, however, can be developed further. If we take Hegel’s and 
Peirce’s position and frame it in more ‘Kantian’ terms, we find that they are 
both espousing a form of truth that we could possibly describe as ‘a 
posteriori analytic’. By this, I mean that our statements about the world 
enjoy an ‘analytical’ quality (because of the meanings they contain), but, at 
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the same time, they are not true in a tautological sense. This is because the 
terms that these statements utilise have been framed, and determined, by 
our experience - and so they contain synthetic content. 
 
When Kant divided truth into four types – ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’, 
‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’, he concluded that it is possible to achieve ‘a priori 
synthetic’ truth. Leaving aside the question of whether such a claim was 
justified, the more important question is one that asks why he did not adopt 
the other alternative – that of ‘a posteriori analytic’ truth. He was too great a 
philosopher not to have considered this option, but it would not have 
appealed to him. As a self-proclaimed flag-bearer of the Enlightenment it 
would have entailed an unacceptable consequence - a return to Leibniz. 
 
It is possible to argue, however, that both Hegel and Peirce are proposing 
this alternative vision of truth. The mechanism that, of course, enables them 
to maintain such a position is the concept itself. The way in which they both 
construe the concept’s development is what enables them to arrive at this 
view. If we accept their claim that our concepts are formed by combining 
the empirical and the rational, then it is possible to envisage a form of truth 
that is simultaneously analytical in structure and which is also rooted in our 
experience. 
 
The argument that is being put forward here also has some parallels with 
Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (Quine: 1951). In this paper he argues 
that it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between analytic and 
synthetic statements and he describes this division as ‘an unempirical 
dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith’ (ibid: 34). He believes 
that the distinction is based on the empiricist belief that we can verify our 
beliefs through our experience and that it is on this basis that we can 
impose a ‘cleavage between the analytic and the synthetic’ (ibid: 38). 
Arguing that this is not possible, he concludes that our statements about the 
world ‘face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a 
corporate body’. 
 
The view of truth being proposed here does not mean, of course, that our 
statements about the world are always true. We utilise concepts fashioned 
by our experience, but this does not mean that they are always fool-proof. 
The fallibility of our concepts, however, marks the relevance of Peirce’s 
concept of secondness. It is this category of experience that continually 
throws up ‘surprises’ and which means that our concepts always remain 
contingent. Peirce, on one occasion, describes the progress of human 
knowledge as like ‘walking on a bog’. This metaphor emphasises its 
contingent nature: 
 
It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must then find 
confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find confirmations, they are 
only partial. It is still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, 
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and can only say, this ground seems to hold fast for the present. Here I will stay till 
it begins to give way. 
(CP5: 589) 
 
It is also of interest to conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of how 
Peirce’s concept of truth parallels some of the arguments put forward by 
Kripke. The latter famously suggests that we are able to know ‘necessary’ 
truths about the world. Using the notion of ‘rigid designation’, Kripke asks, in 
‘Naming and Necessity’ (Kripke: 1980), whether the proposition that ‘gold is 
a yellow metal is necessary’ (ibid: 123) and ‘is it a necessary or a 
contingent property of gold that it has the atomic number 79?’. Kripke 
answers, affirmatively, that it is necessary for gold to have these properties 
simply because this is just what ‘being gold’ amounts to: 
 
Given that gold is this element, any other substance, even though it looks like gold 
and is found in the very places where we in fact find gold, would not be gold. It 
would be some other substance which was a counterfeit for gold. In any 
counterfactual situation where the same geographical areas were filled with such a 
substance, they would not have been filled with gold. They would have been filled 
with something else. 
 
So if this consideration is right, it tends to show that such statements representing 
scientific discoveries about what this stuff is are not contingent truths, but 
necessary truths in the strictest possible sense. 
(ibid: 125) 
 
Kripke concludes, as a result, that ‘necessary truths’ are founded upon our 
knowledge of identities (rather than ‘things’). These properties, he claims, 
are not contingent because they are intrinsically included in these identities. 
 
Kripke’s approach is very close to that of Peirce. The latter begins with the 
icon, or an identity, acting as a ‘placeholder’ (footnote twenty) (stripped of 
any empirical baggage) around which indexical qualities then coalesce. 
Kripke starts from much the same standpoint – gold is assumed to be a 
certain kind of ‘stuff’ (e.g. at first it is an empty ‘placeholder’) which we 
subsequently ‘fill in’ with the empirical components (or properties) of what 
this ‘stuff’ might be like. This way of forming the identity of gold renders the 
properties of gold ‘necessary’, rather than contingent, and it does so in a 
manner that is a posteriori. And it will be noted that Peirce’s account of wine 
(see section 7.1) corresponds with Kripke’s account of how the identity of 
gold is formed. 
 
Unfortunately, Kripke, in contrast to Peirce, then proceeds to argue that the 
identity of gold must have been fixed, nominalistically, in a naming process 
and that it is, as a result, a socially constructed definition: 
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In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but on other 
people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, and things like 
that. It is by following such a history that one gets to a reference. 
(ibid: 95) 
 
Kripke, therefore, concludes that identities are ‘fixed’ by the community. But 
Peirce does not need to adopt this approach. For him, it is the combinatory 
actions of the icon and the index that enable us to ‘fix’ the contents of an 
‘object of thought’, and to give it meaning. 
 
Leaving this Kripkean byway aside, however, it seems clear that the 
‘positing’ of an identity (i.e. the creation of a ‘placeholder’ without initial 
empirical qualities) represents the critical epistemological step that allows 
us to bridge the ‘gap’ between the experiential and the conceptual. This is 
the fundamental strategy of both Hegel and Peirce. Hegel performs this 
task by invoking ‘Essences’, whilst Peirce achieves the same result with the 
icon. This leads them both to establish an account of human knowledge 
founded on concepts that are universal, and yet contingent. 
 
To conclude this chapter, it is clear that Peirce’s account of truth is closely 
linked to his pragmatism, his understanding of the concept, and, in turn, his 
description of sign action. It is thus possible to grasp the deeper 
connections between his pragmaticism and his semiotics. As suggested 
above, I would argue that these linkages can be traced back to the 
influence of Leibniz, and Hegel, on Peirce. By focusing on the development 
of concepts and construing them as emerging identities, Hegel and Peirce 
are able to circumvent the problems of dualism. They are both, as a result, 
able to develop an account of truth that is synthetic, but which also displays 
‘analytic’ qualities. 
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8) Vygotsky: the ‘Higher Psychological 
Processes’ 
 
Having analysed the ways in which Peircean thought is informed by Hegel, 
we can now turn to Vygotsky and his account of concept formation. The 
parallels with Hegel are easier to discern here because Vygotsky openly 
acknowledges his debt to Hegel and because he is also clear that his main 
focus is the activity concept formation. Vygotsky does sometimes talk in 
terms of signs, but his approach to concept formation is more clearly 
framed within the Hegelian template. 
 
 
8.1) Dialecticism in Vygotsky 
 
It is acknowledged that Vygotsky borrows the dialecticism of Hegel in his 
treatment of concept formation. However, his dialectics are often 
misunderstood by commentators who interpret it in ways that misconstrue 
Vygotsky’s intended meaning. In particular, there is a tendency in the 
secondary literature to shift the workings of dialecticism away from a 
cognitive perspective (that is more Hegelian in character), and towards a 
form of dialecticism that describes the relationship between the individual 
and society. In this perspective, it ceases to be an account of what happens 
within the mind of an individual and becomes, instead, an account of 
relationships between individuals within the social dimension. 
 
With Hegel and Peirce, we have already seen that their accounts of concept 
formation involve mediating entities. With Hegel, the mind posits an 
‘Essence’ which evolves, dialectically, to create the ‘Absolute’. Peirce, 
whilst rejecting the notion of dialecticism itself, still argues that an ‘object of 
thought’, formed in the icon, evolves into a symbol. In both cases, a process 
of concept formation involves a mediating entity which synthesises the 
empirical and the mental. 
 
Vygotsky also adopts this Hegelian template in his account of concept 
formation. Within this, a ‘third system’ is created that is different to the 
purely empirical inputs of ‘natural perception’ and the reactions of the mind 
to these - as espoused in conventional ‘stimulus and response’ models: 
 
The system of activity of the child is determined at each given step by both the 
degree of his organic development and the degree of his mastery of tools. The two 
different systems develop jointly, forming, in essence, a third system, a new 
system of a unique type. 
(Vygotsky: 1997b: 21) 
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In suggesting this approach, Vygotsky proposes that we adopt a new 
discipline that avoids the ‘animalization of child psychology’ (Vygotsky and 
Luria: 1994: 101) and he calls this ‘dialectical psychology’: 
 
Dialectical psychology’s whole uniqueness precisely resides in the attempt to 
define the subject matter of its study in a completely novel way. This subject matter 
is the integral process of behaviour which is characterised by the fact that it has its 
mental and physiological side. [Dialectical] psychology studies it as a unitary and 
integral process and only in this tries to find a way out of the blind alley that was 
created. 
(Vygotsky: 1997a: 114) 
 
And, moreover, this approach explicitly involves a rejection of dualism: 
 
Dialectical psychology proceeds first of all from the unity of mental and 
physiological processes. Because for dialectical psychology mind is not, in the 
words of Spinoza, something that is situated outside nature or as a kingdom within 
a kingdom, it is part of nature itself, directly linked to the functions of the higher 
organised matter of our brain. 
(ibid: 112) 
 
Vygotsky’s own account of dialecticism can be contrasted with the 
interpretations of some commentators. These often fail to recognise that the 
idea of ‘dialecticism’ in Vygotsky involves this mediating ‘third system’. 
Instead, they assume that Vygotsky means by ‘dialecticism’ a mediating 
(but quite different) form of social interaction between individuals. Ma, for 
example,  talks of ‘how mind and culture shape each other dialectically’ 
(Ma: 2014: 377). And C. Lee sees dialecticism as simply being a matter of 
‘give and take’ between interlocutors: 
 
The use of language as both a socially communicative act and a medium for 
internal organisation of experience requires a give and take, a dialectical 
interaction among interlocutors. Wertsch calls this dialectical dialogue semiotic 
mediation. 
(C. Lee: 2005: 254) 
 
Equally, Bidell, compares Vygotsky with Piaget, and views the former’s 
dialecticism in social, and participatory, terms: 
 
Vygotsky presents a dialectical conception of relations between the personal and 
the social…. 
(Bidell: 1992: 308) 
 
Vygotskian scholars over the years have successfully introduced alternatives to 
individualism and interactionism by rebuilding developmental constructs and 
methods around the dialectical metaphor of participation (my italics). 
(ibid) 
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Equally, there are other commentators who conflate Hegelian dialectics with 
the dialectical materialism of Marx. The latter involves the effects of the 
social on the consciousness of the individual and these can look very 
similar to Vygotsky’s account of how the social informs our concepts. B. Lee 
argues, for example, discussing Vygotsky: 
 
As new levels of the organisation of productive forces and relations develop, new 
forms of consensus emerge. Particular economic social structures exist as 
moments in the dialectical interplay between productive forces and relations. 
(B. Lee: 1985: 71) 
 
These interpretations suggest a dialectical interplay of thesis and antithesis 
between the social, and the individual, and that this enables us to form 
synthesised concepts. 
 
In fact, when we read Vygotsky, we find he is very keen to distance himself 
from ‘dialectical materialism’, and he views it as being different from the 
dialecticism of Hegel. The latter is concerned primarily with cognition and 
how we move from ‘indeterminacy’ towards ‘determinacy’. This issue is not 
one that arises in ‘dialectical materialism’ and, equally, Vygotsky is not 
concerned, as Marx is, with the way in which a society progresses (footnote 
twenty one). At one point, in fact, Vygotsky goes out of his way to state: 
 
The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism to the problems of the 
natural science and in particular to the group of biological sciences or psychology 
is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it directly to history and sociology. 
(Vygotsky: 1997a: 330) 
 
And he continues, specifically highlighting a number of Hegelian dialectical 
terms as being more relevant to his work than the concepts employed by 
Marx: 
 
It suffices to imagine Marx operating with the general principles and categories of 
dialectics, like quantity-quality, the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of 
contradictions], leap etc – without the abstract and historical categories of value, 
class, commodity, capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. 
(ibid) 
 
Vygotsky, in contrast, conceives dialecticism, as Hegel and Peirce do, as 
operating within the individual mind. There are ‘two lines of development’ 
involved in this; ‘the elementary processes which are biological in origin’ 
and the ‘higher psychological functions, of socio-cultural origin’ (Vygotsky: 
1978: 46). The interaction of these two planes forms a type of dialecticism 
which determines our synthesised concepts. These two lines of 
development broadly parallel the intersection of Peirce’s three categories of 
existence with his three elements of the sign. Critically, although there is 
clearly a social input involved, for Vygotsky, this dialectical activity takes 
place within the mind, and results in mediating entities being formed there. 
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Vygotsky’s more ‘internal’ focus for dialecticism also becomes more evident 
when we consider Vygotsky’s differentiation of what he calls ‘formal logic’ 
from ‘dialectical logic’. The former is something we have already 
encountered in our discussion of ‘secondary dualism’. It involves the notion 
that we perceive ‘atomised’ perceptions and then abstract common qualities 
from them. For Vygotsky, ‘formal logic’ works as follows: 
 
The path to generalization is thus a path which leads away from the riches of 
concrete reality toward the world of concepts, the kingdom of empty abstractions, 
far from living life and from living knowledge. 
(Vygotsky: 1993: 204-5) 
 
Whilst Vygotsky views ‘dialectical logic’ in contrasting terms: 
 
In dialectical logic, it is quite the opposite. A concept seems richer in content than it 
does in a presentation. Thus the path to generalization is not a path formally 
divided into separate indications. Rather, it is an uncovering of the links of the 
relationship of a given matter with another. If the subject becomes truly intelligible, 
not through immediate experience, but in all the many links and relationships 
which define its place in the world and its connection to the rest of reality, then 
one’s understanding is a deeper, more real, truer, and more complete reflection 
than the envisaged one. 
(ibid) 
 
And: 
The internal connection of things is disclosed with the help of thinking in concepts, 
for to develop a concept of some object means to disclose a series of connections 
and relations of that object with all the rest of reality, to include it in the complex 
system of phenomena. 
(Vygotsky: 1998: 54) 
 
This last quotation could almost have been written by Peirce himself - when 
describing the effect of indexical signs on an emerging ‘object of thought’. 
The Peircean sign evolves as it becomes indexically connected with the 
world, as does the Vygotskian concept. With this Vygotskian focus on 
dialectical logic, it is clear that Vygotsky is talking about much more than a 
social ‘give and take’ between interlocutors. 
 
At a deeper level, we also find that Vygotsky inherits another, and related, 
aspect of Hegel’s dialecticism. This is a shared emphasis on the issue of 
‘form’ and ‘content’, and how these relate to each other. Hegel rejects both 
the view that form and content are conjoined through an interpretative 
process and also the notion that content is ‘fixed’ in perception. Hegel 
argues that dialecticism enables us to adjust the content of our perceptions 
to any given form and that this, in turn, permits form to adjust to the content 
of our perceptions: 
 
 
 179 
 
The essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and Content is 
that content is not formless, but has the form in its own self, quite as much as the 
form is external to it. There is thus a doubling of form. At one time it is reflected 
into itself; and then is identical with the content. At another time it is not reflected 
into itself, and then is the external existence, which does not at all affect the 
content. We are here in presence, implicitly, of the absolute correlation of content 
and form: viz. their reciprocal revulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion 
of form into content, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form. This 
mutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 157). 
 
This dialectical way of thinking refutes the argument that identities are 
‘given’ in perception (the ‘Myth of the Given’); it is always possible to 
transform one identity into another or, as Vygotsky puts it, ‘quantity into 
quality’: 
 
The overcoming of the errors of mechanistic natural science lies in the 
acknowledgement of this dialectical principle of the transition of quantity into 
quality. 
(Vygotsky: 1997a: 188) 
 
In a dialectical system, therefore, new identities are always capable of 
being formed. This is precisely the activity that we encountered with 
Peirce’s ‘thirds’. The human mind does not need to accept the identities that 
are given to us in ‘natural perception’. 
 
Dialecticism is closely related to another concept in Vygotsky’s thought that 
is also widely misunderstood; this is the notion of ‘mediation’. 
Commentators, if they assume that dialecticism is concerned with the social 
interaction of individuals, often extend this particular way of thinking to 
include Vygotskian ‘mediation’. We will now evaluate how Vygotsky 
envisages mediation in the light of his dialecticism. 
 
 
8.2) ‘Mediation’ in Vygotsky 
 
We have already encountered the idea of ‘mediation’ in Hegel and in 
Peirce. We will now consider how it also forms one of the cornerstones of 
Vygotsky’s thinking. As Wertsch notes (Wertsch: 1991), the concept of 
mediation runs through Vygotsky and it is central to his account of concept 
formation. But the key questions that we need to address are these: in 
Vygotsky’s view, what, precisely, is being mediated; and, secondly, where 
is this mediation taking place? 
 
Before we analyse Vygotsky’s views on mediation we should, again, 
consider the secondary literature on this subject. These approaches have 
sometimes, however, been framed by needs which are quite extraneous to 
Vygotsky’s work. Firstly, Vygotsky has been used by academics to highlight 
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the social nature of the learning process. They have been eager to play 
down Piagetian interpretations of this activity which are more individualist 
(Bidell: 1992; Daniels: 2016). As a result, they seek to emphasise the social 
dimension in meaning making and they borrow Vygotsky’s work in their 
support. Secondly, Vygotsky is also invoked by commentators who reject 
the ‘transmission’ model of the child learning. This construes the learning 
process as a matter of simply conveying information into the child’s mind. 
This is rightly criticised as a flawed approach, but the educational literature 
has, as a result, emphasised the interactive nature of the learning process 
in Vygotsky. And this easily slips, as we will find, into an account of the 
learning process that is primarily social in character. 
 
Thirdly, and quite separately, interpretations of Vygotsky in the USSR, after 
his death, also resulted in an emphasis on meaning creation as a social 
activity. In the Kharkov school (including Leontiev), there was a need to 
create distance from Vygotsky and to render his thought more acceptable in 
the political climate of the time. This, again, resulted in a focus on the 
existence of a social dimension in between ‘stimulus and response’ (S-R): 
 
Objects of human experience – and therefore objects in psychological experiments 
– are socially and culturally meaningful things and not just abstract stimuli. Activity 
then takes the place of the dash in the formulation ‘S-R’, turning it into a formula 
‘object-activity-subject’, where both the object and subject are historically and 
culturally specific. 
(Kozulin: 1996: 103) 
 
‘Activity’ was thus positioned by the Kharkov school as being in a mediating 
role. It follows that meaning was viewed as formed through social 
mediation: 
 
As a general conclusion, the Kharkovites came to believe that the structure of 
cognitive processes more or less repeats the structure of external operations. 
(Kozulin: 1996: 111) 
 
This, of course, still seemed faithful to the Vygotskian view that the ‘social’ 
plays a role in meaning creation – but ‘meaning’ was now construed as 
something created externally, and then latterly transferred to the mind. 
 
There has thus been a significant tendency, in parts of the secondary 
literature, to highlight the social aspects of Vygotsky’s account of concept 
formation. These interpretations do seem to be thoroughly supported, 
however, in Vygotsky’s writings. He states, for example, that: 
 
Human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which 
children grow into the intellectual life of those around them. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 88) 
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The most important and basic of genetic laws, to which the study of higher 
psychological functions leads us, reads that every symbolic activity of the child was 
once a social form of co-operation and preserves throughout its development, to its 
highest point, the social method of its functioning. 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 138) 
 
The history of higher mental functions is disclosed here as the history of converting 
means of social behaviour into means of individual-psychological organisation. 
(Vygotsky: 1999: 41) 
 
But we need to be careful to specify exactly how the social dimension 
operates in Vygotsky’s analysis – and how the social relates to his notion of 
‘mediation’. 
 
We will now look at a number of interpretations of Vygotskian ‘mediation’ in 
the secondary literature. At the end of this section, I will then put forward an 
alternative account which suggests that the real locus of Vygotskian 
mediation remains (as it is for Peirce) within the mind of the individual. This 
account, I will argue, better reflects the influence of Hegel, and it also draws 
Vygotsky much closer to Peirce. 
 
In the secondary literature there are a range of interpretations of Vygotskian 
‘mediation’. These often overlap with each other, but they variously include: 
 
 Mediation as language, or communication 
 Mediation as semiotics, or sign action 
 Mediation as activity – including construction and negotiation 
 Mediation as participation, or as a shared medium of ‘culture’ 
One of the most common interpretations of Vygotsky is that, by ‘mediation’, 
he means the action of words, or of speech. And there seem to be plenty of 
examples where Vygotsky confirms this view. After all, Vygotsky places the 
‘word’ at the centre of his account of concept formation. As a result, we find 
commentators asserting that language is critical to Vygotskian mediation: 
 
He understood the development of higher functions in terms of mediated social, 
collaborative activity. Language is the most crucial of these ‘mediational means’. 
(Daniels: 2016: 48)  
 
Vygotsky focused on language as the instrument which would transfer social 
experiences to the individual. 
(Popkewitz: 1998: 538) 
 
Language is particularly emphasised by Vygotsky, as it is vital in mediating 
between individuals and between the interpsychological and intrapsychological 
processes of the individual. 
(Ma: 2014: 379) 
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This emphasis on language also extends to an assertion that it is through 
signs that the child gains a deeper understanding of the world. Again, there 
seems to be much evidence in the work of Vygotsky to support this view - 
as he insists that the use of signs is a part of the development of the ‘higher 
psychological processes’. C. Lee argues, for example: 
 
Through an on-going process of semiotic mediation occurring in specific cultural, 
social and historical contexts, the young learn the skills, values and knowledge of 
the community of which they are a part. 
(C. Lee: 2005: 254) 
 
This suggests that ‘mediation’ should be construed a semiotic medium 
where signs help the child develop their concepts – as they become more 
familiar with cultural signs. When discussing ‘mediation’, Daniels also 
expresses the same view: 
 
Activity theory posits psychological development and thus psychological analysis 
as grounded in practical cultural activities. The symbolic approach understands 
psychology in terms of collective symbols and concepts. 
(Daniels: 2016: 76) 
 
The notion of ‘activity’, mentioned above, is also important. It has been 
frequently used by commentators (and not just Soviet ones) to interpret 
mediation. In this approach, it is the activity of individuals, interacting with 
each other, that allows meanings to form in the mind of a child. As 
Stetsenko observes, this leads to various interpretations: 
 
It is no accident that many of the different units of analysis that have been chosen 
by scholars working in the Vygotskian tradition relate to acting and activity – 
mediated action (Wertsch), activity or event (Rogoff) activity system (Cole and 
Engestrom) and activity setting (Tharp and Gallimore). 
(Stetsenko: 2017: 148) 
 
Daniels goes further, and summarises these ‘activities’ under their 
respective titles as ‘Situated Learning’ (Daniels: 2016: 70), and ‘Distributed 
Cognition’ (ibid: 70), ‘Activity Theory’ (ibid: 83) and ‘Cultural Historical 
Activity Theory (CHAT)’ (ibid: 78). What is common to all of these 
approaches is the belief, often attributed to Vygotsky himself, that meaning 
is created exclusively in the social sphere through some social activity and 
interaction. These models assume that meaning can only be created in a 
social context and, as a result, it must then be transferred to the mind of the 
child. This happens through an individual’s participation in the social 
domain. Such an interpretation of ‘mediation’ assumes that it must be a 
social phenomenon, whilst Vygotsky, in fact, as we shall see, views it as an 
activity taking place within the mind of the child. 
 
The assertion that meaning is created socially, and then transferred to the 
mind of the child, also brings its own problems. Advocates of this model 
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then have to explain how this apparent ‘transfer’ takes place. This is called 
the problem of ‘interiorization’. Bruner, an advocate of a ‘cultural’ approach, 
can be found questioning whether Vygotsky provides an adequate account 
of how this requisite ‘transfer’ takes place: 
 
Let me turn to another approach to mind and culture, one whose popularity rests, I 
sometimes despair, on obscuring many of the issues we have been discussing. It 
is the ‘interiorization’ position associated with Vygotsky and his followers. 
(Bruner: 2001: 202) 
 
And Bruner goes on to explain: 
 
Indeed, interiorization theory obscures the vexing question of the commensurability 
of culture and mind by simply asserting that the latter ‘interiorizes’ the former. 
Vygotsky and Vygotskians have provided rich accounts of how the child’s mind 
grows and how it uses ‘external’ forms, but they have had little to say about how 
this is accomplished. 
(ibid: 203) 
 
Later, however, we will see that Vygotsky does not require a theory of 
‘interiorisation’ as proposed by Bruner. And this is because meaning is 
created as a mediating system within the mind of the child. 
 
Elsewhere, Cole takes Vygotsky’s concept of mediation and translates it 
into a slightly different claim that meanings can only exist in the ‘medium’ of 
culture. He proposes, in an article ominously entitled ‘Putting Culture in the 
Middle’: 
 
Culture as a system of artifacts and mind as the process of mediating behaviour 
through artifacts in relation to a supra-individual ‘envelope’ with respect to which 
object/environment, text/context are defined. This approach allows me to make 
use of the notion of culture as medium and of context as both that which surrounds 
and that weaves together. 
(Cole: 2005: 220) 
 
As a proponent of the ‘cultural-historical’ approach, Cole also claims that 
meaning exists in a culture as ‘artifact-mediated’ objects: 
 
The initial premise of the cultural-historical school is that human psychological 
processes emerged simultaneously with a new form of behaviour in which humans 
modified material objects as a means of regulating their interactions with the world 
and one another. 
(Cole: 1996: 108) 
 
But Miller is critical of Cole on this point: 
 
It appears that in Cole’s account of the Russian cultural-historical school, 
Vygotsky’s most distinctive and definitive ideas, such as the crucial role of signs as 
psychological tools and their functional difference from material tools, are simply 
ignored. Although he adopts the term mediation from Vygotsky, Cole does not 
explicitly point out that his concept of artefact-mediated action differs 
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fundamentally from that of Vygotsky’s sign mediation; that artefact-mediated 
actions refer to actions carried out by people in the world using artefacts to better 
achieve their purposes whereas sign mediation refers to operations that are 
carried out internally on psychological functions such as attention and memory. 
(Miller: 2011: 206) 
 
Miller also criticises another interpretation of Vygotskian thinking on 
mediation – that proposed by Wertsch. The latter espouses what he calls a 
‘sociocultural approach’ (Wertsch: 1991), and he argues that Vygotsky 
suggests a form of ‘semiotic mediation’. In doing so, Wertsch argues that 
Vygotsky is guilty of a form of ‘decontextualised rationality’. Ironically, 
Wertsch reaches this conclusion largely because he sees signs (assumed 
to be symbols?) as being necessarily detached from reality: 
 
By taking maximal advantage of the semiotic potential of decontextualization, it is 
possible to operate strictly within an abstract system, with all the attributes of 
mastery, conscious awareness, intellectualisation, and volition that Vygotsky 
associated with scientific concepts (my italics). 
(Wertsch: 1996: 30) 
 
Such a view of ‘semiotic mediation’ is clearly, and evidently, contrary to 
Peirce. But, as a result of his perspective, Wertsch places ‘mediation’ in a 
social realm of culturally determined signs and not in the mind of the child. 
Miller goes on to criticise this and insists, rightly, that Vygotskian mediation 
must focus on ‘word meanings’: 
 
As we have seen, associating Vygotsky with the term ‘mediated action’ is like 
associating Freud with consciousness. It is a convenient half-truth that serves to 
obscure the fact that Vygotsky’s central concern is word meaning and the 
mediation of mental functions…… Wertsch discusses Vygotsky’s emphasis on 
verbal mediation without even mentioning his emphatic point that sign mediation 
results in internal changes in the person using signs as opposed to external 
changes in the world brought about by mediated actions involving the use of tools. 
(Miller: 2011: 233) 
 
Highlighting other attempts to ‘socialise’ mediation, Daniels also quotes 
Lave (1993) who views cognition, itself, as being social formed. It is, as a 
result, ‘stretched over, not divided among – mind, body, activity and 
culturally organised settings (which include other actors)’ (Daniels: 2016: 
72). This renders meaning, itself, as a social phenomenon. Likewise, 
Daniels also mentions Hutchins (1995) who argues that ‘doing without a 
social organisation of distributed cognition is not an option’ (Daniels: 2016: 
70). And this position can easily slip into Social Constructionist accounts of 
Vygotsky that suggest meaning can only be constructed socially: 
 
We can say that such a vision implies the idea that reality is the product of social, 
conversational, or discursive constructions and that our constructions of reality are 
always social and historical, not individual. 
(E. Moura da Costa and S. Calvo Tuleski: 2017: 1192) 
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The belief that reality, and therefore meaning, are socially constructed also 
surfaces in the work of Lave and Wenger who suggest that meaning is 
mediated because it is negotiated:  
 
A theory of social practice emphasises the relational interdependency of agent and 
world, activity, meaning cognition, learning, and knowing. It emphasises the 
inherently socially negotiated character of meaning and the interested, concerned 
character of thought and actions of persons-in-activity. This view also claims that 
learning, thinking, and knowing are relations among people in activity in, with, and 
arising from the socially and culturally structured world. 
(Lave and Wenger: 2005: 151) 
 
Finally, the cultural aspects of mediation also emerge in the work of Cole. 
He references Bruner, and states that mediation is a matter of ‘cultural 
psychology’: 
 
Jerome Bruner’s vision of cultural psychology also emphasises the premise that 
human experience and action are shaped by our intentional states. It locates the 
emergence and functioning of psychological processes within the social-
symbolically mediated everyday encounters of people in the lived events of their 
everyday lives. 
(Cole: 1996: 103) 
 
An important facet of this interpretation of Vygotsky is, of course, that it also 
seems to address one of Vygotsky’s other concerns – that we overcome the 
problems of dualism. By making the individual part of a participatory whole, 
the problems of dualism seem to be resolved; the individual is now defined 
as being part of a social structure. However, this is not, as we shall see, the 
solution that Vygotsky himself pursues. 
 
To summarise the position adopted by much of the secondary literature in 
relation to Vygotskian ‘mediation’, we find that it construes this notion in 
largely social terms. Meaning, it seems, is created between individuals 
(using an array of social verbs such as ‘participating’, ‘negotiating’, 
‘constructing’ etc) and it is then transferred to the mind. The question, 
however, is this: is this actually what Vygotsky proposes when he discusses 
‘mediation’? Certainly, Vygotsky has a role for the social in his account of 
meaning creation. But would he agree with claims that meaning is created 
within a mediating, or participatory, realm? And what light is shed on 
Vygotsky’s position if we take into account an Hegelian vision of mediation? 
 
Vygotsky describes ‘mediation’ as follows: 
 
Let us now compare the natural and cultural mnemonics of a child. The relation 
between the two forms can be graphically expressed by means of the schematic 
triangle in figure 5.1: in case of natural memorisation a direct associative or 
conditional reflexive connection is set up between two points, A and B. In case of 
mnemotechnical memorisation, utilising some sign, instead of one associative 
connection AB, the others are set up AX and BX, which bring us to the same 
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result, but in a roundabout way. Each of these connections AX and BX is the same 
kind of conditional-reflexive process of connection as AB. 
 
Figure 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.…. The inclusion of any process of a sign remodels the whole structure of 
psychological operations, just as the inclusion of tools remodels the whole 
structure of a labour operation. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 60-1) 
 
There are a number of observations on this passage. Firstly, Vygotsky 
rejects the ‘associationist’ view which states that links between perceptions 
are established by identifying the ‘connections’ between them. Secondly, he 
claims that these mediated entities ‘remodel’ the ‘whole structure of 
psychological operations’. Thirdly, Vygotsky alludes to the fact that these 
mediating entities have similarities to human ‘tools’. The reader will 
recognise that this Vygotskian account is very similar to Peirce’s description 
of ‘thirds’. 
 
Mention of ‘tools’, however, can, once again, be misleading because it 
suggests that Vygotsky means external objects, or external signs, as forms 
of mediation – e.g. words and symbols (or knots in string/notches on wood) 
And, indeed, these types of mediation are sometimes mentioned by 
Vygotsky himself (Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 143). But it is also clear that 
this is not all that Vygotsky means. He also insists that mediating entities 
are internal to the mind – because they remodel the ‘whole structure of 
psychological operations’. This claim regarding the location of meaning-
making is critical to understanding Vygotsky: 
 
The transfer of social methods of behaviour to the interior of the systems of 
individual forms of adapting is not at all a purely mechanical transfer; it is not done 
automatically, but is connected with a change in structure and function of the 
whole operation and is a special stage in the development of higher forms of 
behaviour. 
(Vygotsky: 1999: 53) 
 
Vygotsky highlights the change in the ‘structure and function of the whole 
operation’. This is an internal change in the mind of the individual – not an 
external one. 
 
Because the location of meaning creation is in the mind of the child, it 
follows that the mediating entities that it produces are to be found there too. 
X 
A B 
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These mediating entities evolve (in Hegelian manner) into concepts, and 
Vygotsky sometimes calls them ‘signs’: 
 
Investigations, which we are not going to discuss here, have shown that all higher 
psychological functions are united by one common characteristic, namely that they 
are mediated processes, i.e. that they incorporate in their structure, as the central 
and basic part of the process in general, the use of the sign as a basic means for 
directing and mastering the psychological processes. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 207) 
 
Importantly, in ‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky: 2012), Vygotsky starts to 
call these mediating entities ‘word meanings’. Valsiner and Van der Veer 
highlight that, later in his career, Vygotsky began to use the notion of ‘word 
meanings’ more frequently and that he often emphasised their importance 
(Valsiner and Van der Veer: 2000: 375; 383). 
 
‘Word meanings’ are critical to an understanding of both Vygotsky’s account 
of dialecticism and his concept of ‘mediation’. ‘Word meanings’ are what is 
formed in the dialectical process and they evolve into concepts. In this 
respect they are similar to Hegel’s ‘Essences’ and Peirce’s ‘objects of 
thought’. And Vygotsky also considers ‘word meanings’ as being the most 
appropriate units of analysis for the psychologist to study. He argues that it 
is at this level that a child’s knowledge and development should be 
understood. 
 
These units of analysis are synthetic, because they are formed dialectically, 
and, as such, they should not be broken down into their composite 
elements. Using the analogy of water, Vygotsky points out that water 
behaves in quite different ways to oxygen and hydrogen, in isolation, and 
that we cannot gain an accurate understanding of water, and its properties, 
by focusing on its components. Likewise, we cannot understand how 
humans think, or how they use concepts, if we fail to recognise the 
importance of our synthetic ‘word meanings’: 
 
Psychology, which aims at a study of complex holistic systems, must replace the 
method of analysis into elements with the method of analysis into units. What is 
the unit of verbal thought that is further unanalyzable and yet retains the properties 
of the whole? We believe that such a unit can be found in the internal aspect of the 
word, in word meaning. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 5) 
 
We also encountered ‘units of thought’ in Peirce’s account of the sign. In his 
description of ‘thirds’, he saw these as being ‘irreducible’ to their parts. 
‘Thirds’ are formed in a way that means that they have properties that are 
more than the sum of their ‘dyadic’ parts. ‘Giving’, for example, is much 
more than the passing of object ‘A’ from ‘B’ to ‘C’. Interestingly, Peirce also 
uses a chemical analogy to explain ‘thirds’ - using the compounds of carbon 
as an example (EP2: 363) – to make exactly the same point as Vygotsky 
makes here. And it is with a certain inevitability that we find that both are 
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actually following Hegel in this respect. In ‘The Science of Logic’ Hegel 
describes the difference between ‘flesh’ and the ‘nitrogen, carbon, 
hydrogen’ that constitute it. Hegel, as a result, criticises the: 
 
…reasoning of an empirical psychologist when he analyses an action into the 
various aspects which it presents, and then sticks to these aspects in their 
separation. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 237) 
 
This position, shared by all three thinkers, reflects Peirce’s insistence that 
we should resist individuating everything we experience into atomised 
elements. How we understand the world often involves ‘thirds’ which are 
mediated, and mind dependent, entities. In Vygotskian terms these units 
are ‘word meanings’; they create a synthesis between thought and word: 
 
Meaning is the path from the thought to the word. Meaning is not the sum of all 
the psychological operations which stand behind the word. Meaning is something 
more specific – it is the internal structure of the sign operation. It is what is lying 
between the thought and the word. Meaning is not equal to the word, not equal to 
the thought (my italics). 
(Vygotsky: 1997a: 133) 
 
Here, Vygotsky is rejecting the view (in ‘secondary dualism’) that meaning 
relates to something ‘behind the word’. Instead, he suggests that meaning 
stands, in mediation, ‘between the thought and the word’ – and it is 
meaning itself which fuses the two together. As such, Vygotsky’s ‘word 
meanings’ operate in the same way as ‘objects of thought’ do in the 
Peircean sign – in between the representamen and the interpretant. In this 
mediating role they form ‘the internal structure of the sign generation’. 
 
As a result, it is clear that ‘word meanings’ are more than external ‘tools’ 
that provide a ‘short cut’ to understand the relationship between two 
separate entities. Rather, ‘word meanings’ have a role between thought 
(inner experience) and word/speech (outer experience), and they also form 
discrete ‘units of analysis’. Vygotsky even describes them as an ‘alloy’ 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 30), or as an ‘amalgam’ (Vygotsky: 2012: 225) - thus 
highlighting their synthetic structure. 
 
In the secondary literature, it is surprising how little emphasis is placed on 
Vygotsky’s notion of ‘word meaning’. To take just one or two examples, Moll 
does not mention ‘word meaning’ at all in ‘L.S. Vygotsky and Education’ 
(Moll: 2014), and Daniels, in ‘Vygotsky and Pedagogy’ (Daniels: 2016), 
makes just one mention of the term (ibid: 31). This is surprising given 
Vygotsky’s insistence that word meaning forms the most critical unit of 
psychological analysis. 
 
Other commentators take more notice of the concept, but then tend to 
misconstrue it. For example, Blunden states: 
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….His [Vygotsky’s] chosen unit is word meaning – a unity of speech and thinking, 
of sound and meaning. A word is a unity of sound and meaning because a sound 
without a meaning is not a word and a meaning without sound is not a word – word 
has to be both. Word meaning is equally a unity of generalisation and social 
interaction, of thinking and communication. 
(Blunden: 2017: 137) 
 
In this passage, Blunden correctly identifies that ‘word meaning’ is a unity of 
speech and thinking, but then concludes that it is a unity of ‘social 
interaction’ and ‘communication’. Indeed, he goes on to state that ‘word 
meaning’ is an ‘action’ (ibid: 138) - so we are back to ‘activity’ again. 
Blunden seems to be reluctant to view ‘word meaning’ as a synthetic unity 
in the mind. 
 
If we look at Vygotsky’s broader discussion of ‘word meaning’, and the 
‘higher psychological processes’, we find more evidence that ‘word 
meaning’ is a mediating entity in the mind. Vygotsky, for instance, insists 
that a child’s understanding exists in these internal mediating entities 
because the activity of teaching words, without their underlying concepts, is 
a ‘fruitless’ cause: 
 
Practical experience also shows that direct teaching of concepts is impossible and 
fruitless. A teacher who tries to do this usually accomplishes nothing but empty 
verbalism, a parrot-like repetition of words by the child, simulating knowledge of 
the corresponding concepts but actually covering up a vacuum. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 159) 
 
Vygotsky maintains that concepts are founded upon, and develop from, 
‘word meanings’. It is their underlying evolution that allows a child’s 
understanding to flourish. And without these ‘word meanings’, the ‘direct 
teaching’ of concepts (through words) would be impossible. Incidentally, if 
we did assume that a strictly social account of mediation is correct, this 
argument of Vygotsky’s would lack validity. It could be argued that the 
meaning of words could be grasped within a social medium in activities 
such as ‘participation’ and ‘negotiation’ etc. This further suggests that 
Vygotskian ‘mediation’ is something that is more than mere social 
interaction. 
 
Elsewhere, Vygotsky maintains that the synthetic ‘amalgam’ between 
thought and speech acts as a ‘bond’, but it is a bond that has a high degree 
of flexibility. Thought and speech are not linked together in a way that is 
inherently necessary and the ‘amalgams’ that are created in ‘word 
meanings’ are always individual to the child. In addition, these ‘bonds’ are 
constantly evolving (in a dialectical fashion) over time: 
 
Thought and word are not connected by a primary bond. A connection originates, 
changes, and grows in the course of the evolution of thinking and speech. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 223-4) 
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This means that the development of ‘word meaning’ is always dynamic. 
When the synthetic unity of a ‘word meaning’ is first established, it is just 
setting out on its evolutionary path. This, again, corresponds to the 
‘Essence’ in Hegel and the Peircean ‘object of thought’. Vygotsky, 
therefore, makes it very clear (and in contrast to Saussure’s synchronic 
model) that ‘word meanings’ are diachronic. Vygotsky, in asserting this, 
argues that ‘this insight must replace the postulate of the immutability of 
word meanings’ (ibid: 225). And, elsewhere, Vygotsky states: 
 
However, the meanings of words develop. At the time when a child first acquires a 
new word connected with a definite meaning, the development of this word does 
not stop, but is only beginning. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 356) 
 
In adopting this approach, Vygotsky avoids the difficulties that are inevitable 
if ‘word meaning’ is established through an ‘associative’ bond. In this, the 
perspective of ‘associationism’, the criterion for establishing the meaning of 
a word becomes, inevitably, the consistency of a word’s usage. This will 
lead, ineluctably, to a view of meaning that is immutable – if for no other 
reason than that the mechanism of Humean ‘constant conjunction’ is being 
used to establish how meaning is established in the first place. In contrast, 
in Vygotsky’s dialectical model of meaning, this mistake is entirely avoided. 
Riegel, putting forward a case for ‘dialectical psychology’, agrees with this 
perspective: 
 
I reject the preference for stable traits, abilities or competences deeply rooted in 
western psychological thinking. 
(Riegel: 1976: 689) 
 
One other important characteristic of Vygotsky’s ‘word meanings’ is that 
they are generalisations (or universals). Indeed, he insists that their very 
meaning derives from this feature: 
 
 
Closer study of the development of understanding and communication in 
childhood, however, has led to the conclusion that real communication requires 
meaning – that is, generalization – as much as signs. In order to convey one’s 
experience or thought, it is imperative to refer them to some known class or group 
of phenomena. Such reference, however, already requires generalization. 
Therefore, communication presupposes generalization and the development of 
word meaning: generalization, thus, becomes possible in the course of 
communication. The higher, specifically human forms of psychological 
communication are possible because man’s reflection of reality is carried out in 
generalized concepts. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 8) 
 
The identification of ‘word meaning’ with generalisation is important 
because it shows how meaning is created. Meaning derives from construing 
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a particular experience as an instance of a ‘class or group of phenomena’. 
Later, Vygotsky argues: 
 
But perception in terms of meaning always implies a degree of generalization. 
(ibid: 180) 
 
So ‘word meanings’ are created as the child makes distinctions between 
his, or her, ‘inchoate’ perceptions, and classifies them as universals: 
 
All the psychological schools and trends overlook the cardinal point that every 
thought is a generalisation; and they all study word and meaning without any 
reference to development. 
(ibid: 230) 
and: 
 
One will then discover that the connections between concepts are neither 
associative nor structural, but are based on the principle of the relations of 
generality. 
(ibid: 216) 
 
This view that concepts are, in fact, generalisations both echoes Peirce’s 
description of the ‘object’ in the sign, and his underlying account of 
‘perceptual judgments’. Vygotsky adopts the same approach in his analysis 
of ‘word meanings’. 
 
And in relation to the concept of meaning, itself, we find that Vygotsky 
shares the same perspective as Peirce. We have seen that for Peirce 
meaning is created within the sign as the ‘object of thought’ is formed. This 
is then captured in a symbol, or in a word. This is reflected in Vygotsky’s 
treatment of the process of naming – this takes place after a mediating 
‘word meaning’ has developed and the child knows how to use it: 
 
Further experiments show that the ‘function of naming’ is not the creation of a 
single discovery, but has its own natural history, and that probably at the beginning 
of speech formation the child does not discover that every object has its own 
name, but rather learns new ways of dealing with them – and that is what gives 
them names. 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 152) 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the concept of ‘word meaning’ is also 
distinguished, by Vygotsky, from ‘ordinary’ meaning. The latter lacks the 
critical feature of being a generalisation. Vygotsky makes this distinction 
because ‘word meanings’ have this key characteristic, whilst a ‘word sense’ 
depends on the context in which a word is uttered. Kozulin explains: 
 
He [Vygotsky] made a distinction between word meaning (znachenie), which 
reflects a generalized concept, and word sense (smysl), which depends on the 
context of speech. 
(Kozulin: 1996: 109) 
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This is yet more evidence that Vygotsky rejects the argument that ‘word 
meanings’ are created within a social context. If they were created socially, 
then they would surely be formed as ‘word sense’ (smysl) (and then 
transferred into the mind) and not as ‘word meanings’ (znachenie) (footnote 
twenty-two). 
 
Another account of the distinction between ‘word meaning’ and ‘word 
sense’ can also be found in Wertsch’s article ‘Vygotsky’s Two Minds on the 
Nature of Meaning’ (2000). Here, he maintains that the two terms are used 
by Vygotsky in fundamentally dualistic ways – ‘znachenie’ is defined by 
Wertsch as pertaining to the ‘external’ and to ‘language’ (ibid: 23), whilst 
‘smysl’ is seen as relating to the ‘internal’ and to ‘thought’ (ibid). This 
explication is, of course, the almost the opposite of Kozulin’s account. 
Wertsch goes on to analyse Vygotsky’s use of the two terms in an explicit 
framework of Cartesian Dualism, and it is no surprise that Wertsch 
concludes that Vygotsky found himself in a ‘quandary’ (ibid: 29). Wertsch, 
however, overlooks the possibility that ‘word meaning’, as a mediating 
entity, is Vygotsky’s route out of the problems of dualism. 
 
This particular issue becomes more interesting, however, if one explores a 
number of Russian dictionaries. The word ‘znachenie’ is variously 
translated as ‘meaning’, ‘value’, ‘significance’, or ‘signification’ (e.g. Oxford 
Russian Dictionary: 1984: 162). The word also derives from the Russian 
verb ‘to mean’, or ‘to signify’. These suggest alternative interpretations of 
‘znachenie’, and they place Vygotsky’s account of concept formation in a 
potentially more semiotic framework. More importantly, they also tend to 
shift the focus away from language per se, and the explicit reference to the 
social dimension that this may involve. There is no mention, for example, of 
the term ‘word’ in the dictionaries. Indeed, we could question whether this 
particular interpretation is designed to nudge Vygotsky in a direction that is 
more overtly social in orientation. It is also of note that Yasnitsky and Van 
der Veer (2016) discuss the translation issues around the word ‘smysl’, but 
they do not look at the issue of the meaning of ‘znachenie’. For the sake of 
consistency, however, I will continue to use the term ‘word meaning’ in the 
rest of this thesis; but we should note that it could also be translated as 
‘signification’.  
 
In summary, ‘word meaning’ is a critical aspect of Vygotsky’s thought. It is 
at the heart of his account of both dialecticism and mediation. Given our 
previous discussions, we can also see that it exhibits features which echo 
the synthetic unities of the Hegelian ‘Essence’. Critically, ‘word meanings’ 
are formed internally, and they evolve within the mind of the child. As such, 
they are not simply the creations of the social dimension. 
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From our discussions above, we can also see how Vygotskian ‘word 
meaning’ parallels the ‘object of thought’ in Peirce. Both are formed in a 
manner which combines the empirical and the mental and they both permit 
a dynamic account of meaning development. Paradoxically, both concepts 
– the ‘object’ (in Peirce) and ‘word meaning’ (in Vygotsky) seem to have 
experienced the same exegetical ‘fate’ in the secondary literature. They 
have both been ‘externalized’ by secondary commentators – Peirce’s 
‘object’ as the initiating force in the sign, and Vygotsky’s ‘mediation’ as a 
social ‘activity’. This is because commentators have either been reluctant to 
abandon their own dualist tendencies, or because they have neglected the 
Hegelian heritage of these two thinkers. 
 
 
8.3) The ‘Natural History’ of the Sign 
 
In this section we will analyse the process of concept formation in Vygotsky 
and consider the influence of Hegel upon it. This will involve identification of 
how the social dimension becomes implicated in this process and we will 
also discuss how close Vygotsky’s account is to the Peircean model. This 
will, in turn, create a platform for an account of the ZPD that has some 
interesting similarities with Peirce. 
 
In ‘Mind in Society’, Vygotsky describes the process of concept formation 
as ‘the natural history of the sign’ (Vygotsky: 1978: 46). As we have seen, in 
previous sections, it is an activity that involves the dialectical creation of 
mediated entities: 
 
Moreover, with the formation of concepts, the adolescent enters the path of 
development that sooner or later will bring him to mastering dialectical thinking. 
(Vygotsky: 1998: 46) 
 
In terms of the underlying processes that are involved, in transforming 
experience into thought, Vygotsky describes two ‘lines of development’ 
combining with each other to form the ‘higher psychological processes’: 
 
Within a general process of development, two qualitatively different lines of 
development, differing in origin, can be distinguished: the elementary processes, 
which are of biological origin, on the one hand, and higher psychological functions, 
of sociological origin, on the other. The history of child behaviour is born from the 
interweaving of these two lines. The history of the development of the higher 
psychological functions is impossible without a study of their prehistory, their 
biological roots, and their organic disposition. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 46) 
 
Vygotsky argues, therefore, that there are basic biological inputs from 
‘natural perception’ in child development, but that the ‘higher psychological 
functions’ emerge when these intersect with inputs which are more 
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‘sociological’ in origin. These inputs are encountered in the form of received 
speech - as words provide the child with underlying structures for their 
emerging concepts. In contrast to this, Vygotsky criticises other writers who 
reduce speech to being a simple external expression of internal thought. If it 
is seen in this manner, he argues, we cannot uncover its true role in child 
development: 
 
As we know, some authors consider speech and reasoning as entirely different 
processes, one of which serves as the expression and the outer clothing of the 
other. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 68) 
 
Piaget is included by Vygotsky in his criticism on this point. Vygotsky 
describes the thoughts that emerge at the biological level as ‘spontaneous’ 
concepts, whilst defining those that speech engenders as ‘non-
spontaneous’ concepts. In this underlying distinction he agrees with Piaget, 
but Vygotsky argues that Piaget then makes the mistake of believing these 
two sets of concepts remain apart: 
 
Piaget is only able to differentiate between the spontaneous and the non-
spontaneous concepts, but he is unable to see the facts which unite them into a 
single system of concepts formed during the course of the child’s mental 
development. He only sees the gap, not the connection. 
(ibid: 361) 
 
In arguing that our concepts are informed by words, Vygotsky also criticises 
the Piagetian contention that thought ‘comes first’, and that speech is an 
‘outer’ manifestation of it. Vygotsky reverses this process and maintains 
that speech informs thought. At one level, this seems to be non-
controversial – of course, the speech of others influences us. But Vygotsky 
is making a much stronger point – that our concepts themselves are formed 
through the inputs of others – and that the outcomes determine how we 
view reality: 
 
Just as a mold gives shape to a substance, words can shape an activity into a 
structure. 
(Vygotsky:1978: 28) 
 
Vygotsky claims he is able to identify the action of words through his 
experiments with ‘double stimulation’ (Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 159). The 
introduction of a second level of stimulation (via adult words, or signs) 
enables the child to form concepts more effectively in a problem-solving 
situation. 
 
In adopting this position, Vygotsky is making a claim that neither parallels 
the nominalist view that ‘words determine meanings’, nor the Peircean 
position that ‘meanings determine words’. He is suggesting, instead, that 
words (in the form of the speech of others) have a partial role in determining 
our meaning structures. Additionally, whilst Peirce suggests that words (as 
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symbols) emerge at the final stages of sign formation and as the outcome 
of sublated ‘objects of thought’, Vygotsky is suggesting that words intervene 
at an earlier stage in the process. Indeed, he argues that words are 
instrumental in the process of forming meanings themselves – rather than 
being the mechanisms that we subsequently employ to capture meanings. 
This, as we shall see, positions the Vygotskian ‘word’ in a way that has 
parallels with the Peircean icon. Words, for Vygotsky, aid the formation of 
meaning by providing an underlying framework for it: 
 
The system of symbols reconstructs the whole psychological process, and the 
speaking child masters its movement on a totally new foundation…. Movement 
detaches itself from direct perception and submits itself to symbolic functions 
included in the reactive act, thus breaking with the natural history of behaviour and 
turning a new page: that of the higher intellectual activity of man. 
 (Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 130-1) 
 
Vygotsky is also keen to point out that the word meanings, developed in this 
process of concept formation, do not entirely replace natural ‘spontaneous 
concepts’. This corresponds with the concept of ‘sublation’ that we have 
previously discussed in Hegel. Spontaneous concepts remain with the child, 
together with those that belong to the ‘higher psychological processes’. 
Indeed, they can form the basis for subsequent acts of synthesis. As such, 
the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ psychological processes live alongside each other: 
 
Further, we believe that psychological analysis, penetrating beyond the external 
manifestation of phenomena and revealing the inner structure of psychological 
processes and, particularly, the analysis of the development of higher forms, 
compels us to acknowledge the unity, but not the identity, of higher and lower 
psychological functions. (Vygotsky’s emphasis) 
(ibid: 163) 
 
We will now consider, in detail, how Vygotsky perceives the process of 
concept formation. We will look at how ‘word meanings’ emerge from 
spontaneous concepts and consider the role of words, and ‘outer speech’, 
in this process. 
 
In a clear parallel with Hegelian thought, Vygotsky divides the process of 
concept formation into ‘three basic phases’ (Vygotsky: 2012: 117), but he 
also claims that there are also smaller stages within these. These stages 
are described as: 
 ‘Unorganised congeries’, or ‘heaps’ 
 Complexes (of which there are many kinds) 
 Concepts 
 
In Vygotsky’s account of concept formation, these phases are described as 
a dialectical synthesis of two sets of separated inputs – spontaneous (or 
everyday) concepts from ‘below’ and speech, or words, from ‘above’. The 
latter are derived from the social dimension in the form of received speech. 
In his additional accounts of how children learn ‘scientific’ concepts, the 
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same processes are also at work –‘scientific’ concepts merge with the 
‘everyday’ experiences of the child. He insists that both dimensions are 
required for this process to work effectively – pointing out (as we have 
already noted) that it is impossible to teach concepts to children if they are 
merely ‘words’. Vygotsky outlines the process of concept formation in 
several of his writings. In this analysis, I will focus mainly on the account in 
‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky: 2012). 
 
In the initial phase of concept formation, the child identifies basic groups of 
objects: 
 
The young child takes the first step toward concept formation when he puts 
together a number of objects in an unorganised congeries, or ‘heap’, in order to 
solve a problem that we adults would normally solve by forming a new concept. 
The heap, consisting of disparate objects grouped together without any basis, 
reveals a diffuse, undirected extension of the meaning of the sign (artificial word) 
to inherently unrelated objects linked by chance in the child’s perception. At that 
stage, word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a vague syncretic 
conglomeration of individual objects that have somehow or other coalesced into an 
image in his mind. Because of its syncretic origin, that image is highly unstable. 
(ibid: 117-8) 
 
This starting point broadly equates to the Hegelian description of 
undifferentiated ‘Being’. There is no rational organisation in the way that the 
child groups objects, even though there is ‘natural perception’. These 
‘heaps’ are what Peirce would call ‘vagues’ – indeed Peirce even uses the 
concept of ‘non-relative congeries’ (CP5: 493) – paralleling Vygotsky’s 
terminology here. It could be argued that the business of making ‘heaps’ is 
qualitatively different from the perceptual process itself, but both thinkers 
view this process as one that intrinsically involves classification. This first 
stage takes place on the border of perception. These ‘syncretic 
conglomerations’ of objects also have parallels, as noted before, with 
Spinoza and Leibniz, in relation to ‘confused ideas’. 
 
The second stage of concept formation is more complicated and involves 
what Vygotsky calls ‘complexes’. There are a number of sub-divisions 
within these which reflect the different ways in which a specific ‘complex’ 
may correlate with reality: 
 
In a complex, individual objects are united in the child’s mind not only by his 
subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing between these objects. 
This is a new achievement, an ascent to a much higher level. 
(ibid: 120) 
 
These bonds involve the establishment of potential empirical connections 
between objects, and this corresponds to the next stage in concept 
formation. However, in a ‘complex’ the links that are hypothesised by the 
child have not reached the point at which they have been ‘abstracted’ – 
they remain firmly rooted in the factual domain: 
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In a complex, the bonds between its components are concrete and factual rather 
than abstract and logical, just as we do not classify a person as belonging to the 
Petrov family because of any logical relation between him and other bearers of the 
name. The question is settled for us by facts. 
(ibid: 120-1) 
 
Because of the various dimensions which can be used to do this, there are 
a number of ways (Vygotsky enumerates five) in which a ‘complex’ can be 
formed. Although only one of these types is described as ‘associative’, 
Vygotsky sees them as all having associative (and often contiguous) 
features (Vygotsky: 1994: 219). It should be noted that this stage also 
suggests that some degree of ‘atomism’ has crept into Vygotsky’s account. 
The objects are being treated by him as separate entities – Vygotsky is not 
treating them as experiences that need further ‘determination’. He is 
building up from the bottom, as it were, rather than determining a 
‘continuum’: 
 
Associative Complexes – based on the weakest of links being established – 
‘any bond the child notices between the sample object and some other 
blocks’ (Vygotsky: 2012: 121). 
 
Collection Complexes – based upon functional links of what goes with what, 
‘Experience teaches the child certain forms of functional grouping: cup, 
saucer, and spoon; a place setting of knife, fork, spoon and plate; the set of 
clothes he wears’ (ibid: 123) 
 
Chain Complexes – ‘a dynamic, consecutive joining together of individual 
links into a single chain, with meaning carried over from one link to the next’ 
(ibid: 123). This complex type demonstrates a key attribute of complexes – 
that the objects in them enter ‘the complex not just as the carrier of that one 
trait but as an individual with all its attributes’ (ibid: 124). This as we shall 
see is one of the defining differences between complexes and concepts. 
 
Diffuse Complexes – these are created by the child because he or she 
thinks that ‘attributes are sometimes considered similar, not because a 
genuine likeness, but because of a dim impression that they have 
something in common…. The diffuse complex is marked by the fluidity of 
the very attribute that unites its single elements’ (ibid: 125). 
 
The key point about these complexes is that they are formed on the basis of 
what Peirce would call ‘dyadic’, or ‘indexical’, relationships. They are linked 
by association and have not yet reached the stage where abstraction (or 
Peircean ‘thirds’) are involved. It is also relevant, in this respect, that 
Vygotsky emphasises the factual nature of the criteria used at this stage. 
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Another important feature of Vygotsky’s model should be highlighted, at this 
stage, through its absence. There appears to be no equivalent of the 
Peircean ‘icon’ at this stage in Vygotsky’s description of concept formation. 
There is nothing that equates to an initiating ‘form’. There is, however, an 
equivalent of the Peircean icon within Vygotsky’s model - but it intervenes, 
in the form of speech, at the next stage of the process. 
 
The fifth, and last, form of ‘complex’ that Vygotsky mentions is the 
‘pseudoconcept’. It is the final ‘complex’ type before the concept itself is 
formed. The ‘pseudoconcept’, Vygotsky argues, looks, from the outside, just 
like a concept: 
 
We call this type of complex the pseudoconcept because the generalisation 
formed in the child’s mind, although phenotypically resembling the adult concept, is 
psychologically very different from the concept proper; in its essence it is still a 
complex. 
(ibid: 127) 
 
What makes the ‘pseudoconcept’ appear to be like a concept is the fact that 
it has been borrowed from adults or peers. The child is using a word at this 
point that someone else has given to them. It is here that speech, therefore, 
plays a critical role in the dialectical process. The child is moving beyond a 
simplistic system of associative classifications. Vygotsky outlines what 
makes the ‘pseudoconcept’ different from other ‘complexes’: 
 
Adults, through their verbal communication with the child, are able to predetermine 
the path of the development of generalisations and its final point – a fully formed 
concept. But the adult cannot pass on to the child his mode of thinking. He merely 
supplies the ready-made meanings of the words, around which the child builds 
complexes. Such complexes are nothing but pseudoconcepts. 
(ibid: 129) 
 
With the emergence of the ‘pseudoconcept’, the development of the 
concept begins to have characteristics that now correspond to Peirce’s 
icon. It is of note, in this context, that Vygotsky talks, above, of the adult 
‘word’ being able to ‘predetermine the path of the development’. Another of 
the characteristics of the ‘pseudoconcept’ is that abstraction also begins at 
this point. A single, or a few, aspects of the ‘complex’ are now chosen by 
the child to stand for all of the properties of the incipient concept.  This 
exactly the process we encountered in Peirce, when the ‘object of thought’ 
is first formed from the representamen: 
 
Complex thinking begins the unification of scattered impressions; by organising 
discrete elements of experience into groups, it creates a basis for later 
generalisations. 
But the advanced concept presupposes more than unification. To form such a 
concept, it is necessary to abstract, to single out elements, and to view the 
abstracted elements apart from the totality of the concrete experience in which 
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they are embedded. In genuine concept formation, it is equally important to unite 
and to separate: synthesis and analysis presuppose each other as inhalation 
presupposes exhalation. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 144) 
 
And this corresponds with Hegel’s insistence that: 
 
Abstraction is the imposition of this Identity of form, the transformation of 
something inherently concrete into this form of elementary simplicity. And this may 
be done in two ways. Either we may neglect a part of the multiple features which 
are found in the concrete thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of 
them; or neglecting their variety, we may concentrate the multiple features into 
one. 
(Hegel: 1892/2014: 138) 
 
However, this activity of abstraction (an ‘imposition of this Identity of form’) 
is fraught with potential difficulties – for it is not always the case that the 
correct ‘choices’ are made by the child when deciding which features 
should be adopted. This means that the ‘pseudoconcept’ is still relatively 
unstable and may contain contradictions (as we saw in the Hegelian 
‘Essence’): 
 
So, our analysis led us to the conclusion that an internal contradiction is present in 
the pseudoconcept, the most widespread concrete form of thinking in complexes in 
children, which is imprinted on its very name and which, on the one hand, is the 
greatest problem and obstacle we face in our attempts to investigate it from the 
scientific point of view, and on the other, underlines its enormous functional and 
genetic significance as the most important determining factor in the process of 
development of thinking in children. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 229) 
 
This explains why Vygotsky views ‘pseudoconcepts’ as a step towards 
‘potential concepts’: 
 
But as long as complex thinking predominates, the abstracted trait is unstable, has 
no privileged position, and easily yields its temporary dominance over other traits. 
In potential concepts proper, a trait once abstracted is not easily lost again among 
other traits. The concrete totality of traits has been destroyed through its 
abstraction, and the possibility of unifying the traits on a different basis opens up. 
Only the mastery of abstraction, combined with advanced complex thinking 
enables the child to progress to the formation of genuine concepts. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 148) 
 
However, what is most critical, in the case of the pseudoconcept, is that the 
child has now been influenced by an adult or peer. And this is because the 
words, received from outer speech, have become involved in concept 
formation. As such, the ‘pseudoconcept’ represents a crucial bridge 
between the ‘complex’ and the concept. It effectively marks the point at 
which the ‘word meaning’, like the Peircean ‘object of thought’, is first being 
formed. 
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Vygotsky is recognised, by all commentators, as insisting on the role of the 
social dimension in concept formation. As noted earlier, some interpret this 
as suggesting that meanings are socially constructed. But we can now see 
that an alternative role for the social dimension is suggested by him. The 
speech of others provides the child (when confronted with a ‘complex’) with 
a suggested ‘path’ along which a concept may be formed. As Vygotsky 
states: 
 
Speech lies at the very beginning of the child’s development and becomes its most 
decisive factor. 
(Vygotsky and Luria: 1994: 116) 
 
The precise role of the social dimension can now be clearly identified. It 
plays the role of ‘positing’ the pathway for the new concept. In Hegel and 
Peirce, the mind does this by itself - via an Essence, or an icon. In 
Vygotsky’s dialectics, in contrast, it is the social dimension that provides a 
pathway that enables the child to hypothesise a new identity. It is clear, 
therefore, that whilst the social input provides a vital ingredient in concept 
formation, it does not provide concepts, in toto, which need to be 
‘interiorized’. As we noted, it was the potential problem of ‘interiorization’ 
that Bruner questioned – and we have now found a solution to it. 
 
The Vygotskian ‘word’ thus provides the equivalent of a ‘form’ around which 
the developing concept coalesces. Commentators are, therefore, mistaken 
in assuming that the ‘word’ provides evidence for a form of Vygotskian 
‘Social Constructionism’. In fact, it is evidence of a much older tradition in 
his thought - his Hegelian inheritance. 
 
It could be argued that this interpretation amounts to ‘hair-splitting’. If the 
key element that is required for the concept to be formed comes from the 
social dimension, doesn’t this entail that concepts are ‘social’, after all? But 
the fact that an element of the concept derives from the ‘word’ of others 
does not mean that the resultant concept is socially created. However, we 
still find commentators, such as Bakhurst, concluding that: 
 
It is an enduring theme of Vygotsky’s writings that the higher mental functions are 
social in origin. Their development cannot be portrayed as the outcome of 
biological maturation, but essentially involves the child’s appropriation of culture. 
(Bakhurst: 2011: 153) 
 
It is precisely the idea of ‘the child’s appropriation of culture’ that is 
mistaken here. Just because the social dimension provides a resource of 
potential ‘pathways’ for concept development, it does not follow that the 
child ‘appropriates culture’. The child will often produce concepts that are 
slightly different from those of others. There is little suggestion that the child 
is ‘learning’ culture, or that they are adopting ‘ready-made’ solutions that 
pre-exist. All that Vygotsky is suggesting is that culture provides a 
 201 
repository of potential conceptual pathways. Invocations of social ‘activity’, 
‘negotiation’, or ‘participation’ are not required in his model. 
 
Vygotsky goes on to argue, in an Hegelian manner, that concept 
development must involve a dialectically determined qualitative change: 
 
About its quality, we can say, in the words of Hegel, that something is what it is 
because of its quality, and losing its quality, it ceases being what it is, for the 
development of behaviour from animal to man resulted in the appearance of a new 
quality. This is our main idea. This development is not exhausted by a simple 
increased complexity of those relations between stimuli and responses which were 
already presented to us in animal psychology. Neither does it proceed along the 
path of quantitative increase and branching of these relations. At its centre is a 
dialectical leap that leads to a qualitative change in the relation between the 
stimulus and the response. 
(Vygotsky: 1997b: 39) 
 
This ‘dialectical leap’ references the Hegelian notion of ‘sublation’, and the 
resulting change of identity that this involves. We have already encountered 
this important step with Peirce’s ‘interpretant’. And it is this change in 
identity, achieved through sublation, that marks the moment when a true 
concept is formed. When it has been formed, it stands for something that is 
more than just a representation of what has been directly perceived by the 
senses. It is through such dialectical thinking that the concept emerges and 
becomes the equivalent of Hegel’s ‘Notion’, or the Peircean ‘third’. Vygotsky 
overtly references ‘sublation’ when he states: 
 
But in this highest form of behaviour the habits which participate in an intellectual 
operation and form part of the structure have already become a ‘superseded 
category’ 
(Vygotsky: 1997a: 188) 
 
The fully-fledged Vygotskian concept, when it has emerged, also has a 
number of important characteristics. In ‘abstraction’, the concept forms 
around specific elements that have been singled out by the mind and this 
has the effect of raising the importance, of some, and lowering the 
importance of others. This, as we saw, parallels the action of the Peircean 
mind in abstracting the ‘object of thought’ from the representamen. It can 
also be contrasted with the ‘complex’ - where all attributes are treated 
equally. This means that the child has now moved beyond ‘natural 
perception’, and is creating something new: 
 
Still, the global character of the child’s perception has been breached. An object’s 
attributes have been divided into two parts unequally attended to – a beginning of 
positive and negative abstraction. An object no longer enters a complex in toto, 
with all of its attributes – some are denied admission; if the object is impoverished 
thereby, the attributes that caused its inclusion in the complex acquire a sharper 
relief in the child’s thinking. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 145) 
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However, we should be careful to identify exactly what sort of ‘abstraction’ 
Vygotsky is emphasising here. Vygotsky is not talking about the Lockean 
form of abstraction where the individual identifies similarities between 
qualities and then forms increasingly general terms. Instead, for Vygotsky, 
the concept is formed through the interaction of the two planes that we 
highlighted earlier. In the translation of ‘Thought and Language’ in ‘The 
Collected Works of Vygotsky’, he describes abstraction as follows; 
 
On the contrary, the child uses the most general concepts from the very beginning. 
He reaches the middle level concept not though abstraction, not by moving from 
below to above, but through definitions, by moving from higher to lower. The child’s 
representations move from the undifferentiated, from genus to species and variety. 
(Vygotsky: 1987: 162) 
 
This account of abstraction is missing from the Kozulin translation of 
‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky: 2012) and it is an important omission 
because Vygotsky makes it clear here that he is adopting the same 
progressive determination of identities that is espoused by Peirce. In the 
same translation, Vygotsky goes on to state: 
 
Rather than involving a simple isolation of similar features from a series of 
concrete objects, the process of concept formation came to be understood as a 
complex process involving the movement of thinking through the pyramid of 
concepts, a process involving constant movement from the general to the 
particular and from the particular to the general. 
(ibid) 
 
Within these ‘pyramids of concepts’, the child slowly identifies what is 
contained (and also not contained) within a particular concept and, 
additionally, how an individual concept fits within a wider system of other 
concepts. The child, in identifying what is contained within a concept, also 
establishes which are more general, and which form subsets of others. 
 
One other feature of the concept, which Vygotsky highlights, is its 
‘functional’ or ‘instrumental’ role. As Vygotsky puts it, the newly formed 
concept becomes ‘the main instrument of thought’ (ibid: 148). As such, it 
begins to operate in similar ways to the Peircean symbol. Vygotsky argues 
that: 
 
On the contrary, the very difference between the complex and the concept lies in 
the different functional uses of the word. The word is a sign, and as such it may be 
used in different ways depending on what kind of intellectual operation it is 
involved in. 
(ibid: 149)  
 
This reflects Vygotsky’s previous argument that signs are ‘tools’. But, in this 
instance, no physical manifestation of the tool is involved – the concept, 
itself, has become ‘instrumental’ because it permits us to understand the 
world more effectively. This parallels the Peircean treatment of the symbol 
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in that the Vygotskian ‘instrument of thought’ makes our thinking more 
‘efficient’ (Peirce: SS 31). 
 
With the Peircean sign, we saw that symbols always contain indexical 
components. The question must be asked: does Vygotsky have an 
equivalent of the ‘indexical’ sign in his account of the concept – even 
though he does not use the term? 
 
In Vygotsky, it is clear that the indexical sign does not exist as such, but it 
can be found in Vygotsky’s psychological, rather than his semiotic 
language. In this respect, Vygotsky is actually following Hegel more 
faithfully than Peirce. Hegel, lacking Peirce’s concept of ‘secondness’, 
focusses on memory (Hegel: 1830/1971: 219-223) as the mechanism 
enabling the human mind to link ‘indexical’ properties to concepts. Similarly, 
in ‘Mind in Society’, Vygotsky argues: 
 
The possibility of combining elements of the past and present visual fields (for 
instance tool and goal) in one field of attention leads in turn to a basic 
reconstruction of another vital function, memory. Through verbal formulations of 
past situations and activities, the child frees himself from the limitations of direct 
recall; he succeeds in synthesizing the past and the present to suit his purposes. 
The changes that occur in memory are similar to those that occur in the child’s 
perceptual field where centres of gravity are shifted and figure and ground 
relationship are altered. The child’s memory not only makes fragments of the past 
more available, but also results in a new method of uniting the elements of past 
experience with the present. Created with the help of speech, the time field for 
action extends both forward and backward. Future activity that can be included in 
an ongoing activity is represented by signs. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 36) 
 
In the emerging concept, therefore, memorized experiences are included in 
the ‘word meaning’, and these relationships with the world stretch forwards, 
and backwards, in time. They form the ‘contents’ of the concept, and also 
connect each concept with other concepts. It is this feature of the concept 
that both gives it the functional role that we noted earlier and also 
determines how it is embedded in a system of other concepts. As Vygotsky 
states: 
 
A real concept is an image of an objective thing in all its complexity. Only when we 
recognise the thing in all its connections and relations, only when this diversity is 
synthesised in a word, in an integral image through a multitude of determinations, 
do we develop a concept. 
(Vygotsky: 1998: 53) 
 
The fact that the concept represents an object ‘in all its complexity’ is 
important. It stands in contrast to the view of ‘secondary dualism’ that 
concepts are formed arbitrarily and are detached from reality: 
 
In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a concept is filled 
with definitions of an object; it is the result of rational processing of our experience, 
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and it is a mediated knowledge of the object. To think of some object with the help 
of a concept means to include the given object in a complex system of mediating 
connections and relations developed in determinations of the concept. 
(Vygotsky: 1998: 53) 
 
Another important aspect of the Vygotskian concept is the fact that a child’s 
newly formed concept will always be different, in some respect or other, 
from the adult ‘word’ that plays a role in its formation. It is clear that there 
will always be a certain ‘gap’ between a new concept of the child, and the 
speech of adults. This ‘gap’ is transcended by the Hegelian ‘leap’ that is 
involved in the final, sublated, stage of concept formation, but significant 
consequences do arise from it. 
 
For it will always be the case that the individual spontaneous experiences 
that the child utilises in concept formation will be different, in some way or 
other, from those that the adult has experienced in their own lives. Vygotsky 
states, for example, when talking about ‘paths’: 
 
The speech of the people surrounding the child, with its established, constant 
meanings, predetermines the path which the development of the child’s 
generalisations can take. It limits the child’s individual actions and directs them 
down specific, strictly defined channels…. By engaging the child in verbal 
communication, an adult can influence the further progress of this generalisation 
process, as well as the end and outcome of that journey which will be the result of 
the child’s generalisations. But adults cannot pass on their method of thinking to 
children. A child assimilates ready-made meanings of words from adults, but he 
does not have to select actual themes for the complexes himself. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 228) 
 
This means that a child’s concept will always develop in ways that are 
slightly different from the previous adult concept. Received speech provides 
‘strictly defined channels’, but it cannot ‘pass down’ ready constructed 
meanings: 
 
This means that sign-using activity in children is neither simply invented nor 
passed down by adults; rather it arises from something that is originally not a sign 
operation and becomes one only after a series of qualitative transformations. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 46) 
 
The process of concept formation does not, therefore, involve the child 
simply ‘copying’ an adult concept, as Bruner might suggest. Vygotsky is 
keen to emphasise that speech only provides an indicative ‘pathway’ for the 
child’s concept to develop. And this means that concept formation within a 
particular culture is intrinsically dynamic. Concepts are not synchronic; they 
evolve as circumstances, and each child’s resources of ‘spontaneous 
concepts’ change. A child will not inherit exactly the same concept - even 
though they may use the same ‘word’. This is important when we come to 
Vygotsky’s discussion of ‘imitation’ in the Zone of Proximal Development. 
He frequently uses this term, but it is clear that Vygotsky does not believe 
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that concepts are mechanically ‘copied’ from one mind to another. And this 
is more evidence that Vygotsky sees the social realm as simply providing 
‘pathways’ around which a concept can form – rather than a social medium 
in which they are formed, and then ‘interiorized’. 
 
In this section we have followed the ‘natural history’ of the Vygotskian 
concept from the initial ‘indeterminacy’ of a child’s perceptions to the level 
where an evolving concept is formed. We have seen that there are 
parallels, and also some key differences, between Vygotsky and Peirce. 
The most notable of these is that Vygotsky lacks an equivalent of the icon 
at the initial stage of a concept’s development. However, we have also 
identified that the Vygotskian ‘word’ plays a similar role to the Peircean icon 
at a later stage. When the ‘pseudoconcept’ is formed the ‘word’ does 
provide a ‘form’ (or ‘pathway’) around which a developing complex may 
coalesce. It is also, at this point, that abstraction begins to takes place and 
hierarchies are formed. The ‘word’, it turns out, is an indication, therefore, of 
Vygotsky’s Hegelian inheritance – not evidence of his incipient Social 
Constructionism. 
 
 
8.4) The Zone of Proximal Development 
 
Vygotsky’s notion of a Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) has attracted 
much attention in the secondary literature. However, interpretations of it 
have been very wide ranging and it has been applied to child psychology in 
a considerable number of ways. In an educational context, the main focus 
of commentators has been placed, not surprisingly, on its potential usage in 
the classroom – both as a means of thinking about child attainment, and as 
a way for thinking about the learning process. In this section, however, the 
ZPD will be considered in a new way; we will explore the extent to which 
the ZPD exhibits potential parallels with Peircean thought. 
 
 
8.4.1) Interpretations of the ZPD 
 
Many commentators view the Zone of Proximal Development as a 
metaphorical ‘space’, or ‘gap’, which exists between the child’s learning 
ability, in a ‘solus’ context, and their enhanced ability with the help of 
another person (usually a teacher, but this can be another adult, or ‘more 
capable peer’). This position seems to be supported by Vygotsky himself; 
he defines the ZPD as: 
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This difference between twelve and eight, or between nine and eight, is what we 
call the zone of proximal development. It is the distance between the actual 
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level 
of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult 
guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 86) 
 
On this basis, the ZPD seems to offer an opportunity to explore how a 
child’s potential can be brought to the surface. It has resulted in the concept 
of ‘scaffolding’ (Wood, Bruner, and Ross: 1976), and it has spawned 
numerous projects looking at how the ZPD may enhance the learning 
process (an example would be Moll’s use of the ZPD in teaching 
bilingualism: Moll: 2014: 49). Equally, there has been a tendency to see 
Vygotsky’s mention of ‘distance’ as suggesting that this concept can even 
be used to measure development - as if there were two objective attainment 
levels. 
 
But the most important aspect of the ZPD, in most interpretations, has been 
the emphasis that has been placed, once again, on the social aspects of 
the concept. In some cases, the Zone of Proximal Development has been 
interpreted almost as a zone in a ‘physical’ sense and, therefore, strictly 
related to the activities that are conducted, or the environment that is 
established, within the classroom. The ZPD: 
 
Has to do with the manner in which we arrange the environment such that a child 
can reach higher or more abstract ground from which to reflect, ground on which 
he is enabled to be more conscious. 
(Moll: 2014: 24) 
And Bruner argues that: 
 
The tutor, in effect, performs the critical function of ‘scaffolding’ the learning task to 
make it possible for the child, in Vygotsky’s word, to internalize external knowledge 
and convert it into a tool for conscious control. 
(Bruner: 1985: 25) 
 
Newman and Holzman, likewise, suggest: 
 
We stated that the ZPD is not a technique or an experiment, but a reorganizing of 
environmental scenes to create new meaning and a learning that leads 
development. 
(Newman and Holzman: 1993: 147) 
 
And the latter even propose innovations such as a ‘ZPD factory’ (ibid: 148) 
in order to stimulate the learning process. Other writers have also taken 
Vygotsky’s emphasis on the ‘social’ quite literally - and suggested the need 
for learning ‘partners’: 
 
According to Vygotsky, higher mental functions have their origins in human social 
life as children interact with more experienced members of their community. This 
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process involves a child as an active participant working with a more competent 
partner to solve a problem. To facilitate children’s participation and learning, more 
experienced partners target their assistance to a child’s zone of proximal 
development or potential development…. 
(Gauvin: 2001: 35) 
 
This has led commentators, such as Daniels, however, to correctly point out 
that Vygotsky does not regard interpersonal activity as being required in the 
ZPD (Daniels: 2016: 64). Daniels argues, quite rightly, that the ZPD can 
operate in the absence of adults, or of peers. However, many then counter 
that, even if the actual proximity of the teacher or peer is not important at 
the time, then it has been present at some stage in the past (e.g. in the 
classroom). In these scenarios, the child is still thought to develop concepts 
‘in’ the ZPD, when working alone, but they are using ‘help’ previously 
received. 
 
In these interpretations, the social aspects of the ZPD are, of course, 
placed centre stage and interpretations of Vygotsky follow familiar patterns 
that we have already encountered. Daniels, for example, despite his 
observations above, still talks of the importance of social interaction: 
 
The adult creates a social setting in which reading takes place as a collaborative 
act. The setting is designed to facilitate the gradual development of individual 
unsupported reading. 
(ibid: 34) 
 
Indeed, some commentators see the ZPD almost as a ‘zone of 
communication’. As Miller wryly observes, this transforms the ZPD into ‘a 
kind of magical learning-teaching capsule’ (Miller: 2011: 122). And, once 
the ZPD has been subsumed within this over-arching communication 
model, then other problems arise. It becomes inevitable that the ZPD starts 
to look dualist in its structure. And this leads to the questions that we 
encountered before - which relate to how concepts might traverse this 
divide. It is worth revisiting this issue because it highlights some underlying 
misconceptions concerning the ZPD. 
 
When discussing how new concepts emerge in the child’s mind, most 
commentators highlight Vygotsky’s mention of ‘imitation’ and suggest this 
must be the mechanism that allows the child to create concepts in the ZPD. 
This view seems, on occasions, to be supported by Vygotsky himself: 
 
In the child’s development, on the contrary, imitation and instruction play a major 
role. They bring out the specifically human qualities of the mind and lead the child 
to new developmental levels. In learning to speak, as in learning school subjects, 
imitation is indispensable. What the child can do in cooperation today he can do 
alone tomorrow. 
(Vygotsky: 2012: 199) 
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But there is a problem if we take this passage at face value. Elsewhere, 
Vygotsky himself points out that ‘imitation’ is not the same as ‘copying’. 
Miller notes that: 
 
He [Vygotsky] identifies imitation as the underlying process, but points out that a 
particular kind of imitation is involved that is not based on a blind mechanical kind 
of copying. 
(Miller: 2011: 120) 
 
The question is this: what kind of ‘imitation’ occurs in the ZPD? Miller 
himself maintains that Vygotsky does not resolve this question satisfactorily. 
Miller suggests, at one point, that ‘meaningful imitation’ is ‘distinguished by 
sudden or what has been termed insight learning and does not require 
repetition’ (ibid 121). But it is clear that such a solution (e.g. ‘insight 
learning’) simply begs the question. Miller concludes, criticising Vygotsky, 
that: 
 
But how the human instructional kind of imitation differs from the mechanical 
copying kind of imitation and what it consists of or what additional processes are 
involved in its operation, as distinct from the outcomes produced, are matters that 
are not directly addressed. This is not a mere oversight, but represents a 
significant theoretical gap at the heart of his account of instruction and 
development. 
(ibid: 153) 
 
But, as we have already seen, such analysis ignores Vygotsky’s adherence 
to dialecticism and its Hegelian notion of ‘positing’. The latter offers a 
potential way of answering these criticisms of Vygotsky. If we construe the 
social dimension as being an external force which simply ‘posits’ 
suggestions for potential concept formation, then the problem of ‘imitation’ 
is resolved. Despite his criticisms of other commentators, Miller still 
overlooks the fact that the child, when forming its ‘pseudoconcepts’, is 
essentially making hypotheses - using words posited by the speech of 
others. Concept formation does not, therefore, involve the ‘copying’ of 
concepts. Instead, it involves adopting pathways suggested by the ‘word’ of 
others. 
 
Such Hegelian influence clearly renders concept formation a much more 
intricate affair than a straightforward process of ‘imitation’. The child never 
‘copies’ the adult or peer, but always creates something that is individual to 
themselves. Newman and Holzman come very close to this view when they 
state that: 
 
Imitation in the ZPD is the activity of making meaning, where the predetermining 
tools of the adult language, and the resulting predetermined tools of the mind are 
used by the child – the toolmaker – to create something that is not determined by 
them (my italics). 
(Newman and Holzman: 1993: 87) 
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This revised interpretation may also explain why Vygotsky calls the ZPD 
‘proximal’ (as opposed to ‘direct’). Arguably, Vygotsky may not be 
describing an interpersonal ‘closeness’ when using this term. Instead, he 
may be describing the ‘proximal’ characteristics of the developing concepts 
themselves when compared with those of the initiating adult, or peer. 
 
In summary, we have seen that concepts are formed in the mind of the child 
as the ‘posited’ speech of others, and the child’s own spontaneous 
concepts, interweave with each other on a dialectical basis. This is the very 
activity that takes place in the Zone of Proximal Development; it is a 
metaphorical ‘space’ where synthetic ‘amalgams’ are created. The ZPD 
should be construed, therefore, as an active interface which exists within 
the child’s mind. It should not be interpreted in overtly social terms that 
inevitably create problems about ‘copying’ and ‘interiorisation’. 
 
But this revision can go still further – for the ZPD possesses other parallels 
with Peircean thought. 
 
 
8.4.2)  The ZPD: Fusing the Iconic and the Indexical 
 
If it is accepted that the ZPD is where a child’s spontaneous concepts 
interface with the ‘posited’ input from outer speech, then other key 
characteristics emerge. In this sub-section, it will be argued that Vygotsky’s 
ZPD exhibits features that we have already encountered in Peirce’s account 
of the interplay between iconicity and indexicality. These parallels exist 
because both thinkers are trying to explain how new identities are formed, 
and then develop, within the mind. 
 
There are a number of comments that Vygotsky makes about the ZPD 
which suggest that it has applications beyond the a formal learning 
environment. Interestingly, for example, Vygotsky considers the ZPD in 
relation to ‘play’: 
 
This strict subordination to rules is quite impossible in life, but in play it does 
become possible: thus, play creates a zone of proximal development of the child. 
In play a child always behaves beyond his average age, above his daily behaviour; 
in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself. As in the focus of a 
magnifying glass, play contains all developmental tendencies in a condensed form 
and is itself a major source of development. 
(Vygotsky: 1978: 102) 
 
This aspect of the ZPD deserves attention because it reveals much more 
about Vygotsky’s interpretation. Why should ‘play’ create a Zone of 
Proximal Development; and what has the ZPD to do with a ‘subordination to 
rules’? 
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In ‘Mind in Society’, Vygotsky distinguishes between a world of illusion and 
a world of reality. Illusion, he suggests, is invented by the child when he, or 
she, ‘begins to experience unrealizable tendencies’ (Vygotsky: 1978: 93). 
He states that: 
 
To resolve this tension, the pre-school child enters an imaginary, illusory world in 
which the unrealisable desires can be realised, and this world is what we call play. 
Imagination is a new psychological process for the child; it is not present in the 
consciousness of the very young child, is totally absent in animals, and represents 
a specifically human form of conscious activity. 
(ibid: 93) 
 
This use of play by the child is also described by Vygotsky in terms of 
‘rules’: 
 
One could go even further and propose that there is no such thing as play without 
rules. The imaginary situation of any form of play already contains rules of 
behaviour, although it may not be a game with formulated rules laid down in 
advance. The child imagines himself to be the mother and the doll to be the child, 
so he must obey the rules of maternal behaviour. Sully early noted that, 
remarkably, young children could make the play situation and reality coincide. He 
described a case where two sisters, aged five and seven, said to each other, ‘Let’s 
play sisters’. They were playing at reality. 
(ibid: 94) 
 
In ‘playing at reality’, Vygotsky claims that a child ‘operates with meanings 
detached from their usual objects and actions’ (ibid: 98). Sticks can, for 
example, become ‘horses’. In these scenarios the normal relationships 
between objects and meanings are inverted – meanings now define the role 
of objects: 
 
What was said about detaching meaning from objects applies equally well to the 
child’s own actions. A child who stamps on the ground and imagines herself riding 
a horse has thereby inverted the action/meaning ratio to meaning/action. 
(ibid: 100) 
 
This is why play is ‘rule bound’ – the meanings of words now define how an 
object ought to ‘behave’ in a game. For Vygotsky, this activity is how a child 
discovers what is included (and also not included) in a particular concept. It 
is where ‘form’ and ‘content’ work out their dialectical relationships with 
each other. This results in the seemingly paradoxical claim that: 
 
A child’s greatest self-control occurs in play. 
(ibid: 99) 
And Vygotsky concludes that: 
 
This strict subordination to rules is quite impossible in life, but in play it does 
become possible: thus, play creates a zone of proximal development of the child. 
(ibid: 102) 
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So a ZPD exists when a child plays within a set of ‘rules’ determined by the 
evolving meanings of their concepts. When they are ‘being a horse’ or 
‘being a mother’ they are submitting themselves to the ‘rules’ of this game – 
and submitting themselves to meanings. In doing so they are coming to 
terms with what specific identities mean and what their entailments might 
also be. It is important that a child can carry out this activity alone and there 
is no formal teaching involved. Vygotsky observes that the notions of ‘horse’ 
and ‘mother’ have come, ultimately, from the speech of adults, or peers, but 
the child can still play alone in the ZPD. 
 
This inversion of meaning and words is something that we have previously 
encountered. We noted that, for Peirce, meaning determines words and not 
the other way round (see section 6.5). Here we have Vygotsky exploring the 
same idea – meanings are actually determining the actions of the child as 
they explore what is contained, and what is not contained, within a 
particular concept. 
 
This has important consequences for the ZPD. In Peirce, the indexical 
entailments of concepts are developed after the icon has been ‘posited’ and 
they evolve through the action of secondness. Vygotsky differs from Peirce 
in not possessing either of these concepts. The ‘word’ of adults, or peers, 
negate any need for icons at an initiating stage, and the indexical 
components of a concept seem to be provided by memory. But Vygotsky 
still needs to show how the child brings all of these elements together in 
manner that creates new identities. In Vygotsky’s model, this task is 
accomplished in the ZPD. As the child learns (or plays), they are working 
out what particular identities mean – and this involves establishing sets of 
indexical entailments under the headings of specific identities (or 
‘pathways’). 
 
In the ZPD, the child is, therefore, creating a new concept that synthetically 
brings together their experience (‘spontaneous concepts’) and the ‘word’ of 
others. This activity seems to cross the dualistic divide and it is why 
Vygotsky states, in paradoxical terms, that the child is ‘playing at reality’. 
With an emerging word meaning, the child is attempting to fuse together 
empirical and mental aspects. In Peirce, this is accomplished by the icon as 
it accrues indexical components. In Vygotsky it is achieved when word 
meaning is created, as an ‘amalgam’, within the ZPD. 
 
For Vygotsky, the ZPD, therefore, is where a child’s developing ‘complexes’ 
are sublated into new identities. However, because the child has already 
formed these ‘complexes’ from associative groupings, the question is not 
how signs are initiated ex nihilo (the role of the Peircean icon), but rather 
how existing ‘complexes’ are finally transformed into the concepts of the 
‘higher psychological processes’. This takes place at the stage of the 
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unstable ‘pseudoconcept’. Whilst the icon, therefore, is construed by Peirce 
as an initiating semiotic mechanism that allows new entities to be created 
by the mind, the ZPD has a different role – that of enabling concepts to be 
formed towards the end of the developmental process. Vygotsky references 
Tolstoy to support the view and argues that the concept is only formed by 
the ‘word’ when the emergent (and underlying) ‘concept is ready’: 
 
The truth of this theory, according to Tolstoy’s own words, lies in the fact that 
almost always it is not the word itself which is unintelligible, but that the pupil lacks 
the concept which would be capable of expressing this word. The word is almost 
always available when the concept is ready. 
(Vygotsky: 1994: 357) 
 
The different characteristics of the ZPD and the icon are thus determined by 
the different starting points of the two thinkers. Peirce adopts the idea of a 
structuring ‘form’ at the beginning of the process of concept formation. In 
contrast, Vygotsky sees the ZPD as being where complexes are finally 
sublated, in a dialectical fusion, into concepts. 
 
Incidentally, it is of some interest here that Vygotsky goes out of his way to 
reject the idea that the child’s play is ‘symbolic’ (and thus detached from 
reality). He points out that, if this were the case, play would become ‘akin to 
algebra’ (ibid: 94). In making this point, Vygotsky effectively pre-empts 
Wertsch’s claim regarding his adherence to ‘decontextualised’ rationality 
(Wertsch: 1996). The whole purpose of play, from Vygotsky’s point of view 
is to permit the dialectical fusion of the mental and the empirical - and this 
could not be achieved if play were symbolic. 
 
There are, however, additional similarities between the Peircean icon and 
the ZPD. In our discussion of the Peircean icon, we noted that it involves 
the work of the imagination. In Vygotsky’s account, something equivalent, 
and equally creative, takes place in the ZPD. Because the ‘pathway’ of the 
concept comes from the speech of others, the child must explore what 
meanings are entailed in it. This means that the child wants to play 
(imaginatively) at ‘being’ a mother, or at ‘riding’ a horse. The child thus 
creatively explores what is contained within a given conceptual identity. The 
Vygotskian equivalent of the icon is not, itself, formed imaginatively 
(because it comes from the speech of others), but it is still through the 
action of the imagination (in play) that the child finds out what a given 
concept entails. 
 
This revised account also confirms the view that the ZPD is relevant to a 
child’s learning processes when no other person is present. The urge, 
however, for commentators to believe that social mediation is required in 
the ZPD leads some to ignore the ‘play’ aspect of the ZPD, or, alternatively, 
to insist (unsurprisingly) that ‘play’ must, itself, have a social dimension. 
Moll, for example, states that: 
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Vygotsky proposed, in fact, that the zone of proximal development in play is 
unique, because it involves the creation of imaginary situations, with their own 
particular social rules, through which children advance themselves to higher levels 
of psychological functioning. Notice that the focus on the individual does not 
negate the social dynamics of development (my italics). 
(Moll: 2014: 36-37) 
 
Aware that play may not involve social interaction, Moll inserts the word 
‘social’ into the definition of ‘rules’ (in the second line) and claims that 
Vygotsky’s focus on the individual retains a ‘social’ character because 
development must possess ‘social dynamics’. But to insist that the ZPD 
itself is a social construct narrows the concept too far. And it reflects a 
deeper reluctance to recognise ‘word meaning’ as the true mediating 
element in Vygotsky’s thought. 
 
The fact that the ZPD involves creative ‘exploration’ is also encountered in 
Vygotsky’s discussion of ‘egocentric speech’. This is another area where 
the ZPD appears in Vygotsky’s work. As Kozulin points out in the foreword 
to ‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky: 2012), the amount of egocentric 
speech that a child uses tends to increase in the ZPD, but it is lower ‘when 
the task is too easy or too difficult for the child’ (ibid: xvii). It is clear, 
therefore, that egocentric speech is most important to a child’s 
understanding just at the critical point where new concepts are being 
formed (in the ZPD). The child finds it helpful to vocalise these emerging 
concepts as they try to solve a problem that is just within the range of their 
ability: 
 
Our findings indicate that egocentric speech does not long remain a mere 
accompaniment to the child’s activity. Besides being a means of expression and of 
release of tension, it soon becomes an instrument of thought in the proper sense – 
in seeking and planning the solution of a problem. 
(ibid: 32) 
 
And, interestingly, Vygotsky insists that egocentric speech entails ‘realistic 
thinking’: 
 
This is the factual evidence that the child’s egocentric speech does not reflect 
egocentric thinking, but rather carries out an opposite function, that of realistic 
thinking. 
(ibid: 35) 
 
It is easy to conclude with this comment, and if we think dualistically, that 
Vygotsky is, in fact, separating egocentric speech from the work of the 
imagination. This is because he describes egocentric speech as ‘realistic 
thinking’. But we must not conclude that the imagination is absent from 
egocentric speech; rather the child is simply using their imagination to build 
synthetic concepts in the ZPD. 
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Further references to the imagination in the ZPD are also found in 
Vygotsky’s work on the role of creativity in the adolescent (Vygotsky: 1998: 
151-167). Here we find ‘fantasy’ discussed in ways similar to ‘play’ with 
younger children. Vygotsky points out that other commentators make the 
mistake of assuming that imagination and thinking are separated from each 
other (again by dualistic desires to separate creativity from logic) whilst, for 
Vygotsky (as with Peirce), the role of the imagination is central to the 
creation of new concepts and the ‘liberation from the concrete situation’: 
 
This can be understood as follows: thinking that is purely concrete, completely 
devoid of concepts, is also without fantasy. The formation of concepts brings with 
it, first of all, liberation from the concrete situation and the possibility of creativity 
reprocessing and changing its elements. 
(ibid: 163) 
 
In summary, it is possible to make a number of revisions to our 
understanding of the Vygotskian ZPD within a framework which is more 
Hegelian, and more Peircean, in character. If we abandon interpretations of 
Vygotsky which are predominantly social in orientation, we find that the 
ZPD can be construed as a metaphorical ‘space’ where concepts are 
created in a synthetic ‘amalgam’ - utilising the ‘posited’ input from outer 
speech. As such, the ZPD is fundamental to a child’s concept formation 
because it is where the child fuses ‘word meanings’ along ‘pathways’ 
suggested by the speech of others. 
 
In this interpretation, although Vygotsky does not overtly possess the 
concept of the icon, this key Peircean term is reflected in key aspects of the 
ZPD. Vygotsky believes the imagination plays a key role in concept 
development and he views the ZPD as offering the child an opportunity to 
explore potential new meanings. Moreover, whilst the social realm always 
provides the vital input in concept formation, it is in the ZPD that the child 
explores the critical relationships between putative identities and their 
indexical entailments. 
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9)  Peirce, Vygotsky, and the Learning 
Process 
 
By any measure, a successful account of concept formation has a strong 
claim to be the focus in any theory of learning. How a child forms their 
concepts, and develops their ‘tools’ for understanding of the world, should 
be the cornerstone of any educational theory – a theory of concept 
formation will always be intimately connected with how the child develops 
his or her knowledge. As Bakhurst notes, referring to McDowell and his 
‘space of reasons’: 
 
We need a sophisticated appreciation of the child’s initial state and a nuanced 
conception of the influences upon her as she becomes an inhabitant of the space 
of reasons. At this point, we may turn for inspiration to Vygotsky, a thinker with 
whom the term ‘socio-cultural’ has long been associated, and whose work contains 
a blueprint of the kind of framework for which we are looking. 
(Bakhurst: 2011: 152) 
 
Vygotsky’s ability to provide such an account of concept formation is the 
reason for his current, and justified, status in relation to the learning 
process. It has been the purpose of this thesis, however, to show that 
Peirce can also make such a claim – and that Peircean semiotics can 
provide an equally ‘nuanced’ account of how our concepts are formed. 
 
Vygotsky’s thought clearly offers an overarching framework for concept 
formation. As our discussions have shown, however, his thinking has often 
been employed to provide support for arguments that meaning is socially 
created. Such positions have been, quite correctly, motivated by the desire 
to counter the received view that learning is a matter of ‘transmitting’ 
knowledge (Stables: 2010: 21), or that children are ‘passive’ in the learning 
process (Cunningham: 1987: 202). In this thesis, it has been suggested, 
however, that whilst Vygotsky does give a role to the social dimension in 
concept formation, it unlikely that he would agree to a more fully-fledged 
social account of meaning creation. He is too much of an Hegelian to do 
this. From his point of view, the social dimension simply provides the child 
with ‘hypotheses’ (in the form of words) that facilitate the formation of 
mediated concepts. Meaning is thus created within the mind of the child as 
a dialectical process that forms ‘word meanings’. One of the purposes of 
this thesis has been, therefore, to draw interpretations of Vygotsky back 
from overt Social Constructionism. 
 
In recent decades there have been concerted efforts to bring semiotics into 
the mainstream of educational thinking. Social Semiotics has shown how 
signs can be used, as ‘resources’, in the classroom to deliver more effective 
learning environments and teaching methods. But, as a discipline, it has 
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been constrained by the fact that it focusses on the processes of meaning 
(re-)construction, and communication, rather than on the activity of meaning 
creation ab initio. As such, it does not attempt to establish an account of 
how children form valid empirical knowledge and it labours under the 
implicit assumption that any such knowledge is, in any case, distorted 
because of its social foundations. 
 
Elsewhere, Edusemiotics has also introduced a number of new 
perspectives on educational theory and these have reflected a more 
Peircean approach to sign action. It emphasises, as this thesis has, an anti-
dualistic orientation in educational thinking (Stables: 2010: 21-37; Stables 
and Semetsky: 2015: 31). It has construed learning as a process, the pupil 
as an active learner (Stables: 2008b: 149; Stables: 2010: 26), and learning 
as ‘semiotic engagement’ (Stables and Semetsky: 2015: 36). This line of 
argument has also emphasised the role of abduction in the development of 
a child’s thinking (ibid: 19-22). Edusemiotics has also sought to place the 
student in a semiotic world that has no boundaries (because the world is 
relational). This has undermined the view that academic subjects can be 
‘compartmentalized’ into discrete subject categories (Noth: 2010: 4). As a 
result, semiotics challenges the divisions between the ‘sciences’ and the 
‘arts’. Deely and Semetsky, for example, have argued that signs ‘must be 
recognised as a pervasive fact of both nature and culture’ (Deely and 
Semetsky: 2016: 208). 
 
Noth has also highlighted how Peirce’s concept of ‘secondness’ shows that 
the experience of ‘surprise’ is key to learning, whilst Stables views 
education, on the same footing, as an intrinsically ‘disruptive’ activity 
(Stables: 2010). Olteanu has also written on the role of ‘secondness’ in 
Peircean semiotics (Olteanu, Kambouri and Stables: 2016: 636) and, 
elsewhere, he has outlined a potential role for the icon in knowledge 
formation. Despite all of these developments, however, Stables has still 
suggested that there may be difficulties ‘in taking Peirce as the basis of a 
fully semiotic theory of education’ (Stables: 2014: 598). 
 
What semiotics, seemingly, has not been able to provide is a credible 
account of concept formation, and one that parallels Vygotsky. It is this 
underlying potential in Peircean semiotics which this thesis has sought to 
explicate. And, as we have seen, this potential can be discovered, 
significantly, in the precisely the same Hegelian framework that Vygotsky 
utilised. 
 
The reasons why contemporary semiotics, as a discipline, has found it 
difficult to establish a credible account of concept formation have been 
touched upon at several points in this thesis. The first obstacle is the highly 
influential view that meaning is created by the mind, and by culture, and 
that this process occurs on an arbitrary basis. This assumption will, prima 
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facie, always separate meaning from reality. Secondly, and strongly 
associated with this, has been the deep implicit acceptance of what has 
been described here as ‘secondary dualism’. This way of framing the 
activity of the mind results in a template of meaning construction that 
construes it as, firstly, perceiving and then, secondly, interpreting its sense 
data. This model results, inevitably, in a dislocation taking place between 
our experience of reality and our understanding of it. And, thirdly, this same 
model is associated with a common belief that signs are, quintessentially, a 
form of experience that demands ‘interpretation’. This view is widespread in 
much of contemporary semiotics (Ransdell: 1976: 98), and it renders any 
account of valid empirical concept formation along semiotic lines virtually 
impossible. Signs, if they are construed as the products of ‘interpretation’, 
cannot possibly form the basis of true empirical knowledge. 
 
Once Peirce is understood in his Hegelian colours, however, it becomes 
possible to discern a clear account of concept formation on the basis of 
signs. As we have seen, Peirce rejects all three of the assumptions, 
summarised above, and he models his semiotics, instead, on the ‘objective 
logic’ of Hegel. This provides a triadic account of concept formation - 
creating mediating entities that enable us to understand the world. In his 
model, Peirce rejects the dialectical logic of Hegel, but he still retains a 
strong adherence to its underlying logical spirit. The gradual evolution of 
concepts, from iconic ‘hypotheses’, to symbols, is achieved as the effects of 
‘secondness’ limit, and determine, the meaning of signs. The indexical links 
that are established under these icons also mean that they become 
incorporated within a system of other concepts which, together, establish 
the wider body of human knowledge. 
 
As Chiasson highlights (Chiasson: 2001: 205), Peirce seldom overtly 
discusses education; but on one occasion, Peirce ventures that: 
 
When new paths have to be struck out, a spinal cord is not enough; a brain is 
needed, and that brain an organ of mind, and that mind perfected by a liberal 
education. And a liberal education – so far as its relation to the understanding goes 
– means logic. 
(EP1: 212) 
 
As surprising as this statement might seem, Peirce is simply highlighting 
that, if our concepts are created through the semiotic processes described 
above, then it follows that they will be formed on a logical basis. Peirce 
sees semiotics as being intimately connected with logic, and he states: 
 
All thought being performed by means of signs, Logic may be regarded as the 
science of the general laws of signs. 
(EP2: 260) 
 
And he goes on, in this same passage, to state that the first branch of his 
‘Logic’ is: 
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Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, 
whether they be icons, indices or symbols. 
(ibid) 
 
This emphasis on logic, and Peirce’s conviction that the mind understands 
its experiences in a way that involves synthetic mediation, leads to his 
conclusion that our concepts represent a form of ‘concrete reasonableness’. 
This also has profound implications, as we saw, for his accounts of 
meaning and truth; the meanings of our concepts are determined by the 
actions of the world upon us. It follows from this that meanings are derived 
from the fusion of iconic identities with their indexical components. A 
specific meaning, encapsulated in the Pragmatic Maxim, is thus defined as 
the sum of the relationships that a particular identity has with the world. In 
Peirce’s hands, this account of meaning creation also parallels his 
treatment of truth. He is thus able to bring together these two philosophical 
concepts in a way that always proves impossible for nominalism. 
 
The philosophical insight that facilitates this Peircean fusion of meaning and 
truth is the recognition that a concept (as an ‘object of thought’) represents 
a form of mediated knowledge embedded within a web of other concepts. 
As such, concepts are not mental entities that simply have meaning 
attached to them; instead, they exist, synthetically, as meanings (or as 
‘objects of thought’). The traditional philosophical problem of explaining how 
our meanings become ‘attached’ to ‘things’ (in the outside world) is 
dissolved, because we recognise that such a demand is, in fact, 
dualistically inspired. Peircean concepts, envisaged in this way, therefore, 
mirror the characteristics of Leibnizian monads. They do not have 
relationships with the world (across a putative Cartesian divide). Instead, 
they exist, as synthetic, mediated, ‘objects of thought’, which are also the 
sum of their relationships with the world. 
 
This Peircean concept of truth has been described in this thesis as ‘a 
posteriori analytic’. The evolving ‘object of thought’ in a sign is determined 
by our previous experience of the world. This results in a theory of meaning 
based on a template of identities and their indexical inclusions - rather than 
one that advocates meaning based on the idea of reference, or, indeed, the 
conventional semiotic view that terms are placed within a system of other 
terms. From this it follows that when we use particular concepts, the 
propositions that we form with them already possess the latent structures of 
‘analytic’ truths. Simultaneously, however, they also retain a vital sense of 
contingency – because our meanings (formed in this semiotic manner) are 
always open to revision (through the action of secondness). Such a claim 
represents a considerable challenge to the ‘received’ view that knowledge 
is ‘constructed’ by the interpretative mind, and that it is formed in a manner 
that must render it ‘relative’ to some objective reality that we cannot 
observe. 
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Some may argue that Peirce’s evocation of ‘logic’ will have a stultifying 
effect on the imagination, and creativity, of a child in an educational 
environment. But we have also seen that the imagination is at the very 
heart of Peirce’s model of concept development. It is the imagination itself 
that forms the initial icon upon which all concept development is founded. 
Equally, we have noted, with Vygotsky, that the imagination is vital to the 
activity of concept formation, both in a child’s play, and in the ZPD. 
Creativity only appears opposed to ‘logic’ in accounts of knowledge that are 
dualist in nature. As Vygotsky highlights, ‘a child’s greatest self-control 
occurs in play’ (Vygotsky: 1978: 99). 
 
What are the benefits of this analysis of Peirce for educationalists and for 
any philosophy of the learning process? There several aspects to this. 
 
Firstly, it becomes clear that, in this Peircean account, education is not a 
matter of transmitting knowledge. This is already a view held within 
Edusemiotics; Pesce, for example, attacks this conventional view of the 
learning process as follows: 
 
Knowledge is viewed as a set of verbal statements that are to be transmitted (in 
writing or orally), from one mind to another, according to a telegraphic metaphor. In 
other words, a student is learning as soon as he or she is offered information. 
Semiotic theories of learning call into question.... these types of ‘fundamental 
assumptions’. 
(Pesce: 2018: 159) 
 
In the place of this ‘transmission’ model – which is formed on an implicit 
assumption of dualism, we uncover a model of the learning process that 
involves the learner being encouraged to develop his or her concepts along 
the pathways outlined in this thesis. These begin with the initial formation of 
icons, and they conclude with the creation of, and the ability to use, 
systems of symbols that possess extensive indexical properties. 
 
Secondly, if educationalists assume, along conventional dualistic lines, that 
there is an ‘objective’ world, then it is very easy to slip into one of two 
interrelated problems. On the one hand, there are implications for the 
perceived role of the teacher. They become, for example, not only the 
‘transmitters’ of knowledge, but also guardians of objective truth. As Stables 
highlights, this results in the tendency: 
 
...to regard the process of teaching as one of conveying objective truth, via 
language, into the subjective world of the learner: a view of teaching matter as 
objective and fixed, of learners as subjective and unreliable, of teachers as 
deliverers, and of language as a vehicle. 
(Stables: 2018: 34) 
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However, as Derry highlights, the effects of dualism can also work in the 
other direction – and just as damagingly. In this particular scenario 
educationalists can give too much emphasis to subjectivity in education. 
She argues: 
 
..for the importance of going beyond purely psychological and individualist 
constructivism in order to view maths at least in part as enculturation into an 
intellectual community. 
(Derry: 2013: 57) 
 
The arguments of this thesis have made it clear that both of these errors 
are ultimately founded in ‘secondary dualism’. On the one hand, we have a 
misplaced conviction in the certainty of our sensory knowledge and, on the 
other, the assumption that all knowledge is subjective and relative to it. 
Neither, I would argue, is the basis of an adequate philosophy of education. 
Instead, the synthetic approaches of Peirce and Vygotsky offer a way of 
looking at knowledge acquisition which avoid both of these problems. 
 
In contrast, in the approach outlined in this thesis, we have rejected the 
dualist view that knowledge is either ‘subjective’, or ‘objective’ and we have, 
instead, proposed a model that construes knowledge as progressing, by 
degrees, from the ‘vague’ to the more ‘determinate’. As such, particular 
views of the world are not ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ – they 
are simply partial in nature. To use the language of Leibniz, particular 
opinions in the classroom may be very poor ‘nominal definitions’, or good 
‘real definitions’. The purpose of education is to take the child from the 
former to the latter in as many areas as possible. In doing so the learner will 
evolve more developed concepts that will enable them to achieve synthetic 
knowledge of their experience. The purpose of Peirce’s, and Vygotsky’s, 
arguments is to show that ‘reality’ is, in an important sense, constructed, but 
not that it is wholly ‘subjective’ as a result. This claim has significant 
implications for much of contemporary educational theory. 
 
Thirdly, if we conclude, alongside Peirce, that our concepts are logically 
formed, then there are a number of important benefits for our understanding 
of the learning process itself. Paradoxically, in the accounts of concept 
formation that are framed by the idea of ‘secondary dualism’ there is 
scarcely any focus on the actual activity of concept creation. It is assumed 
that concepts are simply ‘made’ (and fairly spontaneously at that) on the 
basis of individual ‘interpretation’. From our foregoing discussions, however, 
it is clear that the activity of concept formation is much more complicated 
than the ‘secondary dualist’ would suggest. 
 
As we have discussed, the process of concept formation involves the 
combinatory actions of icons, indices, and the formation of symbols. But the 
fact that Peirce has highlighted in detail, in his classification of signs, how 
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the concept develops means that educationalists can identify how (and 
indeed why) particular concepts are being formed in a child’s mind. The fact 
that these various stages of concept formation are outlined by Peirce 
provides an opportunity for educationalists to understand the learning 
process in more detail. And because these stages are more specific, and 
more accessible, than Hegelian dialectics, it is possible to identify the key 
stages that are central to this activity. 
 
When we considered the approach of Social Semiotics, we saw that it takes 
an identity and then considers how a user of a sign may decide to construct 
that specific identity. A user may want to construct a particular meaning of, 
say, the concept of ‘the family’ using specific imagery (or ‘resources’). It 
may be constructed, for example, in a manner that is rooted in European 
culture and the imagery used would derived from that cultural resource. As 
such, the outcome would be very different from the notion of the ‘family’ that 
might be constructed in Africa, or in Asia. But because the notion of ‘family’ 
is already a given identity in such Social Semiotic analysis, then it follows 
that any construction of the ‘family’, so formed. will be treated by it as 
culturally relative and, perhaps, even ideological in nature. 
 
The Peircean account of the sign, would, however, step back from the 
assumption that we have a ‘given’ concept of the ‘family’ and would, 
instead, assume that each of these notions of ‘family’ is, in fact, a unique 
‘object of thought’ which has been determined in its own way. Peirce would 
reject the notion that different cultures have the very same concept, and 
that these must, as a result, be relative to each other. Instead, he would 
argue that different cultures have, in fact, different ‘objects of thought’ when 
they are using the term ‘family’ and that conversation (as with our two 
travellers in the carriage) would establish what is, and what is not, 
contained in each concept. 
 
What emerges from such an analysis is highly relevant in educational 
terms. It suggests that we should question the assumed relativity of 
knowledge – a commonly accepted notion in contemporary education – 
and, instead, encourage the child to probe much deeper, and more 
analytically, into the meanings of his, or her, concepts. Peirce would not be 
concerned with how we ‘construct’ a particular entity; rather he would seek 
to establish ‘what sort of thing’ the many different kinds of ‘family’ are at a 
deeper level. This would, in turn, resolve into identifying what is contained, 
or not contained, within a range of different ‘objects of thought’ which might 
all be using the same term (or name) ‘family’ to describe them. This 
approach in education serves to minimise the call to relativity in education 
and it also highlights the benefits of deeper analysis and discussion in the 
classroom. Every concept is a ‘vague’ awaiting further determination. 
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Such an analysis also provides a useful template for understanding the way 
in which learners create new concepts. Using our example of the concept of 
the ‘family’, we can explore a number of issues: 
 
 Given that all signs (and concepts) begin as icons, what exists in the 
notion of the ‘family’ at an iconic level? 
 If the icon, itself, is formed on the basis of similarity, what kinds of 
similarity have been identified by the learner when first constructing 
the concept of ‘the family’ and how have these informed his, or her, 
idea of a ‘family’? 
 This, in turn, encourages us to understand how a child makes 
distinctions. What elements has the learner identified as constituting 
‘similarity’, at the iconic level, and which elements are construed as 
constituting ‘difference’ within this underlying framework of similarity? 
 This would allow educationalists to identify what kind of family is 
distinguished by a learner and how the latter see their own family as 
being similar to (or different from) other families. Instead of resulting 
in a relativistic account of the concept, this analysis would uncover 
different types of family (as ‘objects of thought’) with different 
indexical properties and associations. Importantly, as noted earlier, 
many of these would not have names ascribed to them. It is our 
decision to use the term ‘family’ to describe these heterogeneous 
‘objects of thought’ that seems to render the concept susceptible to 
cultural relativism. 
These kinds of approaches could be used to identify how a particular 
concept has developed in the mind of a learner and to identify the reasons 
for this. The Peircean account of how the sign is formed provides the basis 
for analysing the steps through which a concept is developed. 
 
Finally, it is also possible to take the learning of this thesis and approach 
concept formation from another angle. This would involve developing an 
account of how Peircean semiotics could be used, in the classroom, as a 
tool to actively encourage the development of new concepts. This is often 
achieved by making new distinctions within the learner’s emerging ‘objects 
of thought’. It is likely that a learner who is able to discern more subtle 
distinctions in ‘reality’ will be better adapted to the demands of the world 
and more able to deal with the challenges of life. 
 
Nöth highlights how Peirce describes the need for the learner to be able to 
make discriminations: 
 
To educate means, among other things, to develop the ability of making perceptual 
judgments. In the domain of Firstness, the young person “has to learn to 
discriminate certain special things” (MS: 693a 4-5) 
(Nöth: 2018: 88-89)  
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This ability is one that teachers should encourage in the classroom – it is at 
the heart of the learner’s development of an effective system of concepts. 
 
On this basis of these arguments, the learning process of the child could 
also be enhanced if educationalists encourage the child to: 
 
 Creatively form new icons – as hypothetical identities that a learner 
may believe exist in their environment. And this includes hypotheses 
based on abduction. 
 Develop richer indexical links for these potential icons – these should 
include connections which an emerging sign may have with the 
empirical world, but also those indices that are not connected with it. 
Using the terminology of Leibniz, the learner needs to ascertain what 
makes an emerging concept ‘distinct’ – and this means the 
identification of both what it ‘contains’, and what it does not ‘contain’. 
 Develop a rich vocabulary of words which capture (as symbols) 
potential new identities, and which enable distinctions to be made 
between concepts. Vygotsky correctly argues that words help the 
development of new concepts. The underlying ‘complexes’ still need 
to be present – but access to a wide range of vocabulary in an 
educational environment will enable more, and more subtle, 
concepts to be formed. 
 
Such techniques could prove very effective for educationalists, and for 
teachers in the classroom. For what Peirce’s account of the sign provides is 
a template for both the initiation, and development, of concepts. Rather 
than assuming that education is a matter of learning facts, or even personal 
skills, the educational process becomes reframed as one in which the child 
is encouraged to develop icons, new ‘objects of thought’, and, ultimately, 
better ‘tools’ (or ‘instruments’) for dealing with the world. The educational 
experience should, in these circumstances, encourage the learner, using 
their imagination, to hypothesise new ‘objects of thought’. Although this 
would certainly involve a shift away from the teaching ‘facts’, they would still 
retain an important position in the educational process – and for two 
reasons. Firstly, facts are an intrinsic part of what constitutes a sign – 
because signs possess indexical components. Secondly, as we have seen 
with Peirce, it is facts that make us rethink the character, and extent, of our 
concepts. The learning process, as we have seen outlined by both Peirce 
and Vygotsky, involves the synthesis of the intellectual and the empirical, 
and both elements are required for successful concept formation. 
 
The revisionary analysis of the icon, undertaken in this thesis, has been one 
of its central themes. It has the notable effect of placing the idea of identity 
at the heart of the learning process. It is through the ‘positing’ of a 
hypothetical identity that the icon is formed and it has been argued that, in 
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the Vygotskian ZPD, the entailments of particular identities are established 
by the child when they are at play. We have also seen that the notion of 
identity is critical to resolving the problems created by dualism – it is 
through the hypothesising of an icon (or ‘placeholder’) that we are able to 
establish mediating identities which then accrue indexical components. 
 
Of course, the notion of ‘identity’ forming any part of the learning process is 
wholly anathema to nominalism - which assumes that we create identities 
and that the world has no say in this matter. It is a contention of this thesis, 
however, that the ‘positing’ of new identities forms a fundamental part of the 
learning process. A learner should be encouraged to adopt a creative 
approach to concept formation and to form new icons, and identities. This 
activity involves two approaches – looking for the resemblances between 
things, and also recognising that some identities may need revision. The 
learner should, as a result, be encouraged to make distinctions and to 
consider the possibility of splitting, or qualifying, existing concepts. This 
entails an active invocation of Peircean ‘determination’ in the learning 
environment 
 
Determination of our perceptual ‘vagues’ also occurs when reality itself 
(through secondness) ‘surprises’ us, or when it makes us aware of the 
limitations of our existing concepts. The ability of reality to do this should be 
harnessed, and learning approaches adopted, which allow the child to 
discover such effects. Environments and practices should be encouraged 
that permit secondness to perform its critical activities. This involves the 
role of experimental activities and play. It also means that children should 
be exposed to the views of others – secondness, as we saw, plays a critical 
role when we are exposed to the concepts, and symbols, of others. This is 
how we discover that our own concepts may be lacking in some way – 
enabling us to limit, qualify, or split them, and also to include new 
predicates within them. 
 
Overall, the more numerous and more subtle the ‘objects of thought’ that a 
learner possesses, the richer their experience will be of reality and the more 
capable they will be of participating in society. The emergence of more 
numerous, and more differentiated, concepts will allow them to more 
effectively understand experiences and to establish relationships that may 
exist between them. 
 
The concept of ‘construction’ is also one that we have encountered 
throughout this thesis. As we have seen, both Peirce and Vygotsky view 
knowledge as being ‘constructed’, but they are not Social Constructionists. 
Concepts are constructed by the mind, but they give only a partial role to 
the social dimension. 
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In the case of Peirce, the activity of concept formation itself takes place at 
an individual level and the social dimension only comes into play once an 
individual’s initial concepts are formed. At this point, the actions of the 
social dimension mean that our concepts are further determined, and new 
distinctions made. These result in new (and more complex) concepts being 
developed, but the social dimension is simply refining what has already 
been formed. For example, the concept of ‘giving’ may evolve in an 
individual’s mind, but different types of ‘giving’ may demand input from the 
social dimension as an individual becomes more sensitive to specific social 
distinctions. Where one draws the line between the individual and the social 
input is a matter of debate, but what Peirce is very clear about is that 
meaning can be created at an individual level. 
 
In the case of Vygotsky, the social dimension has a more critical role to play 
in concept formation – as a resource of the potential ‘forms’, or ‘pathways’, 
that the child can utilise to create concepts. Some may argue that this 
amounts to a form of Social Constructionism, but the social dimension still 
has, in fact, only a partial role to play in this process. Vygotsky is always 
clear that our ‘spontaneous concepts’ continue to exist alongside our 
‘higher’ concepts. As Bakhurst remarks, the view that all of our concepts 
are determined by the social is not one that Vygotsky holds: 
 
Although he argues that the elementary functions are fundamentally transformed 
with the emergence of the higher, nothing prevents Vygotsky from holding that 
aspects of elementary mental functioning have an enduring influence. 
(Bakhurst: 2011: 154) 
 
It can be concluded, however, that the greater role of the social dimension 
has the effect of diminishing the emphasis that Vygotsky places on the 
logical aspects of concept formation. If an input into the emerging concept 
is the ‘word’ of others, then it is less likely that concepts will be determined 
on a purely logical basis. 
 
The greater emphasis on the role of ‘logic’, in Hegel and Peirce, also 
explains some of their other conclusions. They both take the view, in a 
nineteenth century manner, that human knowledge will tend to evolve. 
Hegel conceives this process as resulting in the ‘Idea’, or the ‘Absolute’, 
and Peirce also believes that human knowledge (and truth) are ‘teleological’ 
in nature (Short: 2007: 330-333). This position stems from their view that 
concepts are formed on a logical basis. It means that human knowledge will 
tend to converge on itself. 
 
Against this view it can suggested that such convergence largely relies, for 
Peirce, on the existence of human conversation. As we have seen, the 
symbols used by individuals should still be construed as ‘vagues’ – they do 
not necessarily convey the same ‘objects of thought’ as their users intend. 
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As such, only the maintenance of effective conversations in society will 
ensure that a convergence in usage does, in fact, occur – without it 
divergence could easily ensue, instead, as symbols might attract new, and 
individualistic, meanings. 
 
In contrast to Peirce, Vygotsky construes concept formation as being more 
dependent on the social dimension. Although some (‘everyday’) concepts 
can be formed without social input, more sophisticated concepts (e.g. 
‘scientific concepts’) do rely on social input – often in a formal classroom 
setting. This means that the outcomes of concept formation are more likely 
to be dependent on the social environment. Some of these will be more 
beneficial for concept formation than others; and this is evident in the 
emphasis that Vygotsky places on the ZPD. Additionally, the existence of 
different social environments may also result in divergence taking place in 
concept formation. As soon as a social element is allowed into an account 
of concept formation, then some element of relativism is likely to emerge. 
 
Is Peirce, or Vygotsky, right in this respect? Peirce can, in repost, argue 
that any variation in the social environment will always be picked up in the 
way that the mind forms its concepts. More concepts will be formed that 
reflect these diverging social environments - even without the social input 
that Vygotsky proposes. For Peirce, therefore, this scenario will mean either 
that we develop more ‘objects of thought’, or that we achieve a greater 
number of perspectives on a particular ‘object of thought’. This will promote 
more variety in our symbols (because more differentiation will take place), 
and this might lead to greater conceptual sensitivity in the long run. 
 
One of the fundamental differences between Peirce and Vygotsky lies, 
however, in the way in which they construe the overall context of concept 
formation. As we saw, Peirce begins with the assumption that we encounter 
continuity in the form of the Phaneron, and that we subsequently ‘pick out’ 
identities from this. It follows from this that an underlying unity of experience 
is already assumed in Peirce’s synechistic model of experience. The 
subsequent unities that emerge (as our concepts form links with each other) 
are, therefore, essentially new ways of re-constructing a unity that already 
exists. Hegel’s claim that everything that we experience is initially perceived 
as indeterminate ‘Being’ also reflects this same premise. It follows that 
everything in Peirce’s and Hegel’s system is connected at a deeper level 
and that the mind is identifying potential, and actual, relationships that exist 
within a closed system. 
 
In contrast, Vygotsky’s starting point is slightly different. Although he largely 
agrees with Peirce and Hegel that our initial perceptions are ‘confused’, he 
does not go so far as to insist that reality, itself, forms a ‘synechistic’ whole 
which requires ‘determination’. Indeed, his account of concept formation 
begins, in fact, with the child making groups of disparate objects on an 
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‘associative’ basis. As the child forms concepts, it is only in the ‘higher 
psychological processes’ that we encounter more interrelated systems. 
Unity is created, for Vygotsky, as a result, in these later stages and it is not 
assumed to exist from the very beginning of the process. 
 
Hegel and Peirce are, therefore, working within largely closed systems – 
defined as ‘Being’, or the ‘Phaneron’. This encourages them to conclude 
that human knowledge is likely, in the long run, to converge. And this is also 
why they place more emphasis on the notions of ‘determination’ and ‘logic’ 
– they assume an implicit unity and seek to determine the relational 
identities of different concepts within this. Vygotsky, in contrast, is working 
within a more open system that allows the social dimension to innovate new 
and more divergent concepts. 
 
The other difference between Hegel, Peirce and Vygotsky is that reality 
itself plays a far greater role in concept formation for Hegel and Peirce. 
Vygotsky does not seem to possess a concept ‘secondness’ in his system, 
and this also serves to differentiate his position. Because of this, the social 
dimension plays a much greater role in his account of concept formation. 
This may be another reason why his account of concept formation appears 
more ‘open’ – reality itself drives the convergent effect in the philosophy of 
Hegel and Peirce. 
 
Contrary to this view, however, one could also hypothesise that, for 
Vygotsky, the social realm, itself, provides an equivalent of ‘secondness’ in 
Peirce. To support such an interpretation, Vygotsky does not entirely reject 
the role of logic in his thought and he contrasts his ‘dialectical logic’ with 
‘formal logic’ (Vygotsky: 1998: 53). And it is also clear that he views the 
speech of others in dialectical, and Hegelian, terms. However, the inputs 
received from the social dimension are, for Vygotsky, nothing like as 
forceful as ‘secondness’ is for Peirce. The social offers potential solutions in 
concept formation – it does not force itself upon us. As such the Vygotskian 
account, whilst retaining a Hegelian character, is much less prescriptive in 
its approach. 
 
Interestingly, however, Vygotsky does view his own position as different 
from Piaget on the basis that he, himself, allows external impacts on a 
child’s thinking. Vygotsky argues, for example, that ‘Piaget sees thinking as 
entirely divorced from reality and activity’ (Vygotsky: 1987: 88). So Vygotsky 
himself may, in fact, see the role of the social dimension in more 
prescriptive terms, and in a manner that partially mirrors Peirce’s 
‘secondness’. 
 
The question of whether we are working within an open, or closed, system 
also has implications for how the learning process itself is construed. If the 
system is felt to be ‘open’ then it is likely that the learning process will be 
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viewed as a creative activity; if the system is deemed to be ‘closed’ then the 
educational process tends to be framed as an ‘unfolding’, or as ‘discovery’. 
This parallels Phillips’s distinction between knowledge as being ‘made or 
discovered’ (Phillips: 1995: 7). The concept of ‘unfolding’ is encountered in 
various accounts of educational development and it also finds its roots in 
Leibniz (indeed, Deleuze’s book on Leibniz is entitled ‘The Fold’ (Deleuze: 
1993)). Semetsky and Bogue also discuss educational development as an 
‘unfolding’ (Bogue and Semetsky: 2010: 118) and they reference Deleuze: 
 
What Deleuze details in his accounts of learning and teaching is that dimension of 
education that inspires all true students and teachers, that is, the dimension of 
discovery and creation within the ever-unfolding domain of the new. It is also the 
dimension of freedom, in which thought escapes its preconceptions and explores 
new possibilities for life. 
(ibid: 128) 
 
The idea of ‘unfolding’ is also reflected in McDowell’s concept of ‘second 
nature’ (McDowell: 1994: 84) and this, in turn, parallels Vygotsky’s notion of 
the ‘higher psychological processes’. McDowell argues that our ‘second 
nature’ enables us to think in terms of ‘reasons’, rather than ‘causes’, and 
this mirrors the distinction that we made earlier between ‘objects of thought’ 
and ‘things’. McDowell’s concept is, itself, a development of the concept of 
Bildung. As Bakhurst explains, this concept, originating in German Idealism, 
is central to McDowell’s vision of education: 
 
In the present context, the crucial aspect of McDowell’s position is that human 
beings are not born into the space of reasons but are initiated into it by education, 
or Bildung, as he puts it, adopting the evocative German term. The child is born a 
mere animal, as it were, but acquires a ‘second nature’ as she develops 
conceptual capacities that put her in touch with reality in experience. She thereby 
becomes a conscious rational being – a person. 
(Bakhurst: 2011: 7) 
 
The idea of ‘Bildung’ maintains that the unfolding of the empirical world also 
parallels the development of human consciousness (footnote twenty three). 
Associated with this is the claim that, as we develop our understanding, we 
become more free; the signs that we create allow us to escape the 
deterministic restrictions of ‘stimulus and response’. This is the position that 
we encountered in Vygotsky - and Peirce agrees that the growth of 
knowledge and freedom are linked to each other (Olteanu: 2015: 205-225). 
 
As argued in this thesis, fundamental to our ability to develop this ‘space of 
reasons’ is our capacity to form synthetic mediations from our experience. 
The creation of the ‘tools’ of our understanding should be, as a result, a 
central aim of the learning process. As Dewey suggests, any ‘philosophy of 
education’ must be based on a philosophy of experience, and that: 
 
The philosophy in question is, to paraphrase the saying of Lincoln about 
democracy, one of education of, by and for experience. No one of these words, of, 
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by, or for, names anything which is self-evident. Each of them is a challenge to 
discover and put into operation a principle of order and organization which follows 
from understanding what educative experience signifies. 
(Dewey: 1938/2015: 29) 
 
It is hoped that this thesis has outlined the potential ways in which semiotics 
can live up to Dewey’s challenge. It does so because semiotics, at least in 
Peircean hands, provides a detailed account of synthetic concept formation. 
The way in which we learn of our experience, by our experience, and in a 
manner which is also for our experience, is determined by the ‘natural 
history of the sign’ that both Peirce and Vygotsky, in their own, but 
remarkably similar ways, expound. 
  
 230 
 
Bibliography 
 
The Writings of C.S. Peirce 
 
The majority of references from Peirce’s writings come from The Essential 
Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Volumes 1-2, with various editors 
at the Peirce Edition Project. Indiana UP (1992/8). These are referenced as 
‘EP’ with volume number and page number. 
 
Other references come from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Vols 1-6, Hartshorne and Weiss, eds, Vols 7-8, Burks ed. Harvard 
UP, 1931-5 and 1958. These are referenced as ‘CP’ with volume and 
section number. 
 
I have occasionally referenced the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A 
Chronological Edition. Vols 1-6, various editors at the Peirce Edition 
Project, Indiana, 1982-2000. These are referenced with a ‘W’, volume 
number, and page number. And also Semiotics and Significs: The 
Correspondence between Charles S Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Ed 
Charles S. Hardwick (1977) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. These 
are referenced as ‘SS’ with the page number. 
 
There are some references to unpublished manuscripts of Peirce in the 
Houghton Library. These are denoted by ‘MS’ and a manuscript number 
along with the secondary source of the reference. 
 
 
The Writings of L.S. Vygotsky 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher 
Psychological Processes. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1987) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 1: Problems 
of General Psychology, eds. R.W. Rieber and A.S. Carton. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1993) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 2: The 
Fundamentals of Defectology, eds. R.W. Rieber and A.S. Carton. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1994) The Vygotsky Reader, eds. R. Van der Veer and J. 
Valsiner. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
 
 
 231 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1997a) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 3: The 
Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, eds. R.W. Rieber and J. 
Wollock. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1997b) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 4: The 
History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, ed. R.W. Rieber. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1998) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 5: Child 
Psychology, ed. R.W. Rieber. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (1999) The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol 6: Scientific 
Legacy, ed. R.W. Rieber. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Vygotsky, L. (2012) Thought and Language. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press 
 
Vygotsky (L) and Luria (A) (1994) Tool and Symbol in Child Development. 
In: The Vygotsky Reader, eds. R. Van der Veer and J. Valsiner. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
 
 
The Writings of G.W. Hegel 
 
The 1892 Wallace translation of ‘The Science of Logic’ has been used in 
this thesis as it is contemporaneous with Peirce. 
 
Hegel, G. (1830/1971) Philosophy of Mind. Trans: W Wallace. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Hegel, G. (1830/1991) The Encyclopaedia Logic (Part One). Trans: T. 
Geraets, W. Suchting and H. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
 
Hegel, G. (1892/2014) The Science of Logic. Trans: W. Wallace. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Hegel, G. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans: A.V. Miller. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Hegel, G. (1995) History of Philosophy, Vol.3. London: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
 
Hegel, G. (1998) The Philosophy of Right. In The Hegel Reader. ed. 
Houlgate (S). Oxford. Blackwell Publishers. 
 
 232 
 
Other Sources 
 
Almeder, R. (1980) The Philosophy of Charles S Peirce. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Almeder, R. (1985) Peirce’s Thirteen Theories of Truth. Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.21: Number 1. 
 
Andacht, F. (2013) The Lure of the Powerful, Freewheeling Icon: On 
Ransdell’s Analysis of Iconicity. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society: Vol.49, Number 4. 
 
Apel, K-O. (1981) Charles Sanders Peirce: From Pragmatism to 
Pragmaticism. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
 
Apel, K-O. (1995) Transcendental Semiotics and Hypothetical Metaphysics 
of Evolution: A Peircean or Quasi-Peircean Answer to a Recurrent Problem 
of Post-Kantian Philosophy. In: Peirce and Contemporary Thought: 
Philosophical Inquiries, ed K. Ketner. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Arens, E. (1994) The Logic of Pragmatic Thinking: From Peirce to 
Habermas. New Jersey: Humanities Press.  
 
Aristotle (1998) The Metaphysics. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Ayer, A. (1968) The Origins of Pragmatism. London: Macmillan. 
 
Baert, P (2005) Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bakhurst, D (2007) Vygotsky’s Demons. In M. Cole, H. Daniels and J 
Wertsch (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bakhurst, D (2011) The Formation of Reason. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Barnes, J. (2003) Porphyry. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Barnham, C (2009) Essence: The Structure and Dynamics of the Brand. 
International Journal of Market Research, 51: 5, pp 593-610. 
 
Barnham, C (2015) Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Perceptual 
Foundations. International Journal of Market Research, 57:6, pp 837-854. 
 
 
 
 233 
 
Barthes, R. (1990) The Fashion System. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Barthes, R. (2009) Mythologies. London: Vintage Books 
 
Belluci, F. (2013) Peirce, Leibniz, and the Threshold of Pragmatism. 
Semiotica: Volume 2013: Issue 195. 
 
Bennett, J. (1971) Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Berger (P) and Luckmann (T) (1967) The Social Construction of Reality. 
London: Penguin Books. 
 
Bergman, S. (1967) The Philosophy of Salomon Maimon. Jerusalem: The 
Hebrew University Press. 
 
Bernstein, R. (1964) Peirce’s Theory of Perception. In Studies in the 
Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds. E.C. Moore and R. Robin. 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
 
Bernstein, R. (2013) Hegel and Pragmatism. In The Cambridge Companion 
to Pragmatism, ed. A. Malachowski. Cambridge. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Bidell, T. (1992) Beyond Interactionism in Contextualist Models of 
Development. Human Development, 35, 306 -15. 
 
Blunden, A. (2017) The Germ Cell of Vygotsky’s Science. In Vygotsky and 
Marx, eds. Ratner (C) and Silva (D). London: Routledge. 
 
Bogue (R) and Semetsky (I) (2010) Reading Signs/Learning from 
Experience: Deleuze’s Pedagogy as Becoming-Other. In: Semiotics, 
Education, Experience, ed, I. Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 
Boler, J. (1963) Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce’s 
Relation to John Duns Scotus. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P (1977) Outline of a Theory Of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Brandom, R. (2000) Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 
 234 
 
Breazeale (D) (2013) Thinking through the Wissenschaftslehre: Themes 
from Fichte’s Early Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 
from Oxfordscholarship.com. 
 
Bruner, J. (1985) Vygotsky: A Historical and Conceptual Perspective. In J. 
Wertsch (ed) Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian 
Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bruner, J. (2001) In Response. In: D. Bakhurst and S. Shanker: Jerome 
Bruner: Language, Culture, Self. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Burr, V. (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Carlson, D. (2007) A Commentary to Hegel’s Science of Logic. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Chandler, D. (2002) Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge. 
 
Chiasson, P. (2001) The Design for Thinking. Amsterdam: Rodolphi Press. 
 
Chiasson, P. (2002) Peirce and Educational Philosophy. Retrieved from 
www.digitalpeirce.org/text. 
 
Cole, M. (1996) Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Cole, M (2005) Putting Culture in the Middle. In: An Introduction to 
Vygotsky. H. Daniels (ed). London: Routledge. 
 
Corrington, R. (1993) An Introduction to C.S. Peirce. Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Cunningham, D. (1987) Outline of an Education Semiotic. American Journal 
of Semiotics: 5, 201-216. 
 
Daniels, H. (2016) Vygotsky and Pedagogy. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Davidson, D. (1973) On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In: 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Society, Vol 47, 
pp 5-20. 
 
Davis, W. (1972) Peirce’s Epistemology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
 
 235 
 
Dea, S. (2014) The River of Pragmatism. In: T. Thellefsen and B. Sorensen 
(eds) Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
De Waal, C. (2013) Peirce. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Deely, J. (1982) Introducing Semiotic: Its History and Doctrine. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Deely, J. (1994) The Grand Vision. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society: Vol. 30, Number 2. 
 
Deely, J. (2002) What Distinguishes Human Understanding? Indiana: St 
Augustine’s Press. 
 
Deely, J. (2008) Descartes and Poinsot: The Crossroad of Signs and Ideas. 
Scranton: University of Scranton Press. 
 
Deely, J. (2009) Realism for the 21st Century: A John Deely Reader. ed. P. 
Cobley. Scranton: Scranton University Press. 
 
Deely, J. (2010) Medieval Philosophy Redefined. Scranton: University of 
Scranton Press. 
 
Deely/Poinsot, J. (2013) Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot. 
Indiana: St Augustine’s Press. 
 
Deely (J) and Semetsky (I) (2016) Semiotics, Edusemiotics and the Culture 
of Education. In Educational Philosophy and Theory: 49:3, pp 207-19. 
 
Deledalle, G. (1992) Peirce’s ‘Sign’: Its Concept and its Use. Transactions 
of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.28: Number 2. 
 
Delaney, C (1993) Science, Knowledge and Mind: A Study in the 
Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Deledalle, G. (2000) Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Deleuze, G. (1993) The Fold. London: The Athlone Press. 
 
Derry, J. (2013) Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education. Chichester: Wiley 
Blackwell. 
 
Descartes, R. (1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol.1. 
(Cottingham Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 236 
 
Dewey, J. (1888) Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning Human Understanding: 
A Critical Exposition. Chicago: S.C. Griggs and Company. 
 
Dewey, J. (1938/2015) Experience and Education. New York: Free Press. 
 
Duns Scotus, J. (1987) Philosophical Writings: A Selection, trans. A Wolter. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
 
Eco, U. (1976) A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
 
Eco, U. (1984) Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Eco, U (1995) Unlimited Semiosis and Drift: Pragmaticism vs. ‘Pragmatism’. 
In: Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, ed. K. 
Ketner. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Eco, U. (1999) Kant and the Platypus. London: Secker and Warburg. 
 
Edwards, A. (2007) An Interesting Resemblance: Vygotsky, Mead, and 
American Pragmatism. In The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky, eds H. 
Daniels, M. Cole and J. Wertsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Engel-Tiercelin, C. (1992) Vagueness and the Unity of C.S. Peirce’s 
Realism. Transcriptions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol. 28: 1. 
 
Fabbrichesi, R (2011) Iconic thought and diagrammatical scripture: Peirce 
and the Leibnizian tradition. Semiotica: Volume 2011: Issue 186.  
 
Feibleman, J. (1970) An Introduction to Peirce’s Philosophy. Cambridge 
(MA): MIT Press. 
 
Fisch, M. (1986a) Peirce and Leibniz. In: Peirce, Semeiotic and 
Pragmatism. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
 
Fisch, M. (1986b) Hegel and Peirce. In: Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Fiske, J. (1990) Introduction to Communication Studies. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Fitzgerald, J (1966) Peirce’s Theory of Signs as Foundation for 
Pragmatism. The Hague: Mouton and Co. 
 
 237 
 
Forster, P. (2011) Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Frege, G (1892/1997) On Sense and Reference. In: The Frege Reader, ed. 
M Beaney, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Freydberg, B. (2005) Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Gallie, W. (1952) Peirce and Pragmatism. Middlesex: Pelican. 
 
Gauvin, M. (2001) The Social Context of Cognitive Development. New 
York: Guildford Press. 
 
Geertz, C (1973) The Interpretation of Culture. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gergen, K. (1999) An Invitation to Social Construction. London: Sage. 
 
Greenlee, D (1973) Peirce’s Concept of the Sign. The Hague: Mouton. 
 
Habermas, J. (1995) Peirce and Communication. In: Peirce and 
Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, ed. K. Ketner. New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
 
Hacking, I (1999) The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hausman, C. (2012) Peirce’s Dynamical Object: Realism as Process 
Philosophy. In Conversations on Peirce, eds, D. Anderson and C. 
Hausman. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Hilpinen, R. (1992) On Peirce’s Philosophical Logic: Propositions and Their 
Objects. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.28: Number 3. 
 
Hodge (R) and Kress (G) (1988) Social Semiotics. London: Polity Press. 
 
Hood Holzman, L. (1996) Pragmatism and Dialectical Materialism in 
Language Development. In An Introduction to Vygotsky ed. H. Daniels. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Hookway, C. (1985) Peirce. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Hookway, C. (2004) Truth, Reality and Convergence. In The Cambridge 
Companion to Peirce, ed, C Misak. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 238 
 
Hookway, C. (2012) The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and 
Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Houlgate, S. (2005) An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Houser, N. (1987) Towards a Peircean Semiotic Theory of Learning. 
American Journal of Semiotics, 5, 251-274. 
 
Houser, N. (1992) On Peirce’s Theory of Propositions: A Response to 
Hilpinen.  
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.28: Number 3. 
 
Hume, D. (1985) Treatise on Human Nature. London: Penguin Classics. 
 
Hutchins, E. (1995) Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
 
Inwood, M. (1983) Hegel. Abingdon, Routledge. 
 
Inwood, M. (1992) A Hegel Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
James, W. (1908) Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
 
Jappy, T. (2013) Introduction to Peircean Visual Semiotics. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
 
Kaag, J (2011) Hegel, Peirce and Royce on the Concept of Essence. 
Dialogue, Vol 50, 3, 557-575. 
 
Kant, I. (1781/2007) Critique of Pure Reason. London: Penguin Classics. 
 
Kozulin, A (1990) Vygotsky’s Psychology: A Biography of Ideas. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Kozulin, A. (1996) The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology: Vygotsky, 
his Disciples and Critics. In An Introduction to Vygotsky, ed. H. Daniels. 
Hove, Routledge. 
 
Kress (G) and Van Leeuwen (T) (1996) Reading Images; The Grammar of 
Visual Design. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
 
 239 
 
Lagerlund, H. (2007) Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval 
Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
 
Lave, J. (1993) The Practice of Learning, in S Chaiklin and J Lave (eds) 
Understanding Practice: Perspectives of Activity in Context. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lave (J) and Wenger (E) (2005) Practice, Person, Social World. In: An 
Introduction to Vygotsky. H. Daniels (ed). London: Routledge. 
 
Lee, B (1985) Intellectual Origins of Vygotsky’s Semiotic Analysis. In: 
Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives. J. 
Wertsch (ed) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Lee, C (2005) Signifying in the ZPD. In: An Introduction to Vygotsky. H. 
Daniels (ed). London: Routledge. 
 
Leibniz, G. (1714/1951) The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on 
Reason. In: P Weiner (ed) Leibniz Selections. New York: Charles Scribner. 
 
Leibniz, G. (1996) New Essays on Human Understanding. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Liszka, J. (1996) A General Introduction to the Semiotic of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Locke, J. (1690/1981) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Collins: Glasgow. 
 
Loemker, L. (1989) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and 
Letters (Vol 2). Dordrecht:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Ma, J. (2014) The synergy of Peirce and Vygotsky as an analytical 
approach to the multimodality of semiotic mediation. Mind, Culture and 
Activity (21(4), 374-389) 
 
Maritain, J. (1995) The Degrees of Knowledge. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Marx (K) and Engels (F) (1996) Collected Works, Volume 35. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart Publishers. 
 
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 240 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012) Phenomenology of Perception. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Meyers, R (1992) Peirce’s New Way of Signs. Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society: Vol.28: Number 3. 
 
Miller, R. (2011) Vygotsky in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Misak, C (1994) Pragmatism and the Transcendental Turn in Truth and 
Ethics.  
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.30: Number 4. 
 
Misak, C (2013) The American Pragmatists. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Moll, L. (2014) LS Vygotsky and Education. New York: Routledge 
 
Morris, C. (1946) Signs, Language and Behaviour. New York: George 
Braziller Inc. 
 
Moura da Costa (E) and Tuleski (S) (2017) Constructionist Interpretations of 
Vygotsky. In: Vygotsky and Marx. In: Ratner (C) and Silva (D) (eds). 
London: Routledge. 
 
Muller, R (1994) On the Principles of Construction and the Order of 
Peirce's Trichotomies of Signs. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society: Vol.30: Number 1. 
 
Murphey, M. (1993) The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company. 
 
Nagl, L. (2014) Peirce on Hegel, Pragmaticism and the Triadic Class of 
Philosophical Doctrines’. In: T. Thellefsen and B. Sorensen (eds) Charles 
Sanders Peirce in His Own Words. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Newman (F) and Holzman (L) (1993) Lev Vygotsky: Revolutionary Scientist. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Nöth, W. (1995) Handbook of Semiotics. Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press. 
 
Nöth, W (2010) The Semiotics of Teaching and the Teaching of Semiotics. 
In: Semiotics, Education, Experience, ed. I. Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers. 
 241 
 
Nöth, W. (2014) Signs as Educators: Peircean Insights. In: Pedagogy and 
Edusemiotics, eds. Semetsky (I) and Stables (A). Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers. 
 
Noth, W (2018) Education in the Domain of Firstness. In: Semiotic Theory 
of Learning: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Education. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Nubiola (J) and Barrena (S) (2014) Science as a Communicative Mode of 
Life. In T. Thellefsen and B. Sorensen (eds) Charles Sanders Peirce in His 
Own Words. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Ogden (C) and Richards (I) (1989) The Meaning of Meaning. London: 
Harvest. 
 
Olteanu, A. (2015) Philosophy of Education in the Semiotics of Charles 
Peirce: A Cosmology of Learning and Loving. Oxford: Peter Lang. 
 
Olteanu, (A), Kambouri (M), Stables (A) (2016) Predicating from an Early 
Age: Edusemiotics and the Potential of Children’s Preconceptions. Studies 
in Philosophy and Education: 35 (6) pp 621-40. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary (1989) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Oxford Russian Dictionary (1984) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pasnau, R. (2003) Cognition. In: The Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Percy, W (1972) Towards a Triadic Theory of Meaning. Psychiatry: 35. 
 
Pesce, S (2010) From Semiotics of Teaching to Educational Semiotics: The 
Case of French-Speaking Research in Education. In: Semiotics, Education, 
Experience, ed, I. Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 
Pesce, S (2018) Signs, Significance and Semioses in the Classroom. In: 
Semiotic Theory of Learning: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of 
Education. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Petrilli, S. (2010) Icon. In The Routledge Companion to Semiotics, Edited 
by Paul Cobley. London: Routledge. 
 
Petrilli, S (2010b) Image and Primary Iconism: Peirce and Husserl. 
Semiotica: Volume 2010: Issue: 181. 
 
 242 
 
Phillips, D (1995) The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of 
Constructivism. In: Educational Researcher: Vol. 24, No 7: pp 5-12. 
 
Pikkarainen, E (2016) Signs as Functions: Edusemiotics and Ontological 
Foundations for a Semiotic Concept of a Sign. In Semiotica: 212: pp 27-44. 
 
Pinkard, T. (1990) How Kantian was Hegel? The Review of Metaphysics, 
Vol 34, 4: pp 831-838. 
 
Popkewitz, T. (1998) Dewey, Vygotsky and the Social Administration of the 
Individual: Constructivist Pedagogy as Systems of Ideas in Historical 
Spaces. American Educational Research Journal: 35: 4: pp 535-70. 
 
Popper, K. (1945) The Open Society and its Enemies: London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
 
Proni, G. (2015) Umberto Eco and Charles Peirce: A Slow and 
Respectful Convergence. Semiotica: Volume 2015: Issue: 206. 
 
Quine, W. (1951) Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism. In: The Philosophical Review, Vol 60, No.1: pp 20-43. 
 
Ransdell, J. (1976) Another Interpretation of Peirce’s Semiotic. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.12: No. 2. 
 
Ransdell, J. (2013) Kinds of Determinants of Semiosis. Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.49: No. 4. 
 
Raposa, M. (1984) Habits and Essences. Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society: Vol.20: No. 2. 
 
Riegel, K. (1976) The Dialectics of Human Development. American 
Psychologist, October, pp 689-700. 
 
Rockmore, T. (1999) Hegel, Peirce and Knowledge. The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, Vol 13: 3: pp 166-184. 
 
Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Rorty, R. (1982) Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Rosenthal, S. (1994) Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Pluralism. Albany: State 
University of New York. 
 243 
 
Rosenthal, S. (2004) Peirce’s Pragmatic Account of Perception: Issues and 
Implications. In: The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, ed. C. Misak. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Saussure, F. de (2012) Course in General Linguistics. Forgotten Books. 
 
Savan, D. (1994) C.S. Peirce and American Semiotics. In: The Peirce 
Seminar Papers, Vol 2, ed. M. Shapiro. Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
 
Savan, D. (1995) Peirce and Idealism. In: Peirce and Contemporary 
Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, ed. K. Ketner. New York: Fordham 
University Press. 
 
Sebeok, T. (1976) Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Sebeok, T. (1994) An Introduction to Semiotics. London: Pinter Publishers. 
 
Sellars, W. (1956) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In H. Feigl and 
M. Scriven, eds, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol 1. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Semetsky, I. (2010) Moral Stumbling: When Ethics Recapitulates Ontology. 
In: Semiotics, Education, Experience, ed, I. Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers. 
 
Semetsky (I) and Stables (A) (2014) Pedagogy and Edusemiotics. 
Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 
Shapiro, G. (1981) Peirce’s Critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology and 
Dialectic. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: Vol.17: Number 3. 
 
Sheriff, J. (1994) Charles Peirce’s Guess at The Riddle. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Short, T. L. (1986) Life among the Legisigns. In Frontiers in Semiotics, eds: 
J Deely, B Williams and F Kruse. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Short, T. L. (2007) Peirce’s Theory of Signs. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Smith, H. (2010) Peircean Theory, Psychosemiotics, and Education. In: 
Semiotics, Education, Experience, ed, I. Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers. 
 
 244 
 
Spinoza, B. (1955) On the Improvement of the Understanding. New York: 
Dover Publications. 
 
Spinoza, B. (1677/1996) Ethics. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Stables, A (2005) Living and Learning as Semiotic Engagement: A New 
Theory of Education. Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press Ltd. 
 
Stables, A. (2008a) Childhood and the Philosophy of Education: An Anti-
Aristotelian Perspective. London: Continuum. 
 
Stables, A. (2008b) Semiosis, Dewey and Difference: Implications for 
Pragmatic Philosophy of Education. Contemporary Pragmatism: Vol 5: 1, 
pp 147-162. 
 
Stables, A. (2010) Semiosis and the Collapse of Mind-Body Dualism: 
Implications for Education. In: Semiotics, Education, Experience, ed, I. 
Semetsky. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 
Stables, A. (2014) Peirce and Rationalism: Is Peirce a Fully Semiotic 
Philosopher? Journal of Philosophy of Education: Vol 48: 4, pp 591-603. 
 
Stables (A ) and Semetsky (I) (2015) Edusemiotics: Semiotic Philosophy as 
Educational Foundation, eds, A. Stables and I. Semetsky. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Stables, A. (2016) Edusemiotics as Process Semiotics: Towards a New 
Model of Semiosis for Teaching and Learning. In: Semiotica: 212: pp 45-57. 
 
Stables, A. (2018) The Semiotic Encounter. In: Semiotic Theory of 
Learning: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Education. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Stearns, I. (1952) Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. In: P Weiner and 
F Young (eds) Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
Stern, R. (2007) Peirce, Hegel and the Category of Secondness. Inquiry, 
Vol 50: 2, pp 123-155. 
 
Stern, R. (2009) Hegelian Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stetsenko, A. (2017) The Transformative Mind: Expanding Vygotsky’s 
Approach to Development and Education. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 245 
 
Stjernfelt, F. (2007) Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines 
of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics. London: Springer Dordrecht. 
 
Stjernfelt, F. (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine 
of Dicisigns. Boston: Docent Press. 
 
Stone, A. (2005) Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Sturrock, J. (1993) Structuralism. London: Fontana. 
 
Tarde, G. (1893) Monadologie et Sociologie: Classiques.uqac.ca/tarde _ 
gabriel/monadologie. 
 
Turrisi, P. (1997) Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: 
The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
 
Tweedale, M. (2007) Representation in Scholastic Epistemology. In 
Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, ed. H. 
Lagerlund. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
 
Van Leeuwen, T. (2005) Introducing Social Semiotics. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Van der Veer, R. (1984) Early Periods in the Work of L.S. Vygotsky: The 
Influence of Spinoza. In: M. Hedegaard, P. Hakkarainen and Y. Engestrom 
(eds)  
Learning and Teaching on a Scientific Basis: Methodological and 
Epistemological Aspects of the Activity Theory of Learning and Teaching. 
Aarhus: Aarhus University. 
 
Valsiner (J) and Van der Veer (R) (2000) The Social Mind: Construction of 
the Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Van der Veer (R) and Valsiner, J (1991) Understanding Vygotsky: A Quest 
for Synthesis. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Volosinov, V. (1973) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press. 
 
Wertsch, J. (1991) Voices in the Mind: A Sociological Approach to Mediated 
Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 246 
 
Wertsch, J. (1996) The Role of Abstract Rationality in Vygotsky’s Image of 
Mind. In: A. Tryphon and J. Voneche (eds) Piaget-Vygotsky: The Social 
Genesis of Thought. Hove: Psychology Press. 
 
Wertsch, J (2000) Vygotsky’s Two Minds on the Nature of Meaning. In: C. 
Lee and P. Smagorinsky (eds) Vygotskian Perspectives on Literacy 
Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Winfield, R. (2006) From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s 
Subjective Logic. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (2009) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
 
Wood (D), Bruner (J) and Ross (G) (1976) The Role of Tutoring in Problem 
Solving. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17: pp 89-100. 
 
Yasnitsky (A) and Van der Veer (R) (2016) Revisionist Revolution in 
Vygotsky Studies. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
 
Chapter Footnotes 
 
 
1)  The idea that the conceptual comprises a mixture of the empirical and the mental has 
been revived recently by two philosophers who openly acknowledge their debt to Hegel. 
McDowell, for example, suggests we think about perception in a new way – as combining 
sensibility and the conceptual: 
 
I have been urging that, in judgments of experience, conceptual capacities are not 
exercised on non-conceptual deliverance of sensibility. Conceptual capacities are 
already operative in the deliverance of sensibility themselves. 
(McDowell: 1994: 39) 
 
2)  McDowell also argues that ‘representational content cannot be dualistically set over 
against the conceptual’ (ibid: 3) and that, in perception, ‘conceptual capacities have 
already been brought into play, in content’s being available to one, before one has any 
choice in the matter’ (ibid: 10). This parallels the Peircean concept of perceptual 
judgements. Brandom, however, adopts a different approach. Advocating a position that he 
calls ‘inferentialism’, he claims that a concept must involve inferences about the world. This 
means that it cannot be a concept unless it involves ‘the giving and asking of reasons’: 
 
The master idea that animates and orients this enterprise is that what distinguishes 
specifically discursive practices from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is 
their inferential articulation. To talk about concepts is to talk about roles in 
reasoning…It is a rationalist pragmatism, in giving pride of place to practices of 
giving and asking for reasons, understanding them as conferring conceptual 
content on performances, expressions, and states suitably caught up in those 
practices…. Saying or thinking that things are thus-and-so is undertaking a 
distinctive kind of inferentially articulated commitment. 
(Brandom: 2000: 10-11) 
 
Brandom, however, departs from Peirce in his insistence that this ‘giving and asking of 
reasons’ is a linguistic, and social, affair: 
 
The thesis to be elaborated here is that the representational dimension of 
discourse reflects the fact that conceptual content is not only inferentially 
articulated but also socially articulated. The game of giving and asking for reasons 
is an essentially social practice. 
(ibid: 163) 
 
Likewise, Brandom talks of ‘linguistic rationalism’ (ibid: 189).  What Brandom is effectively 
doing is taking the Hegelian understanding of what it is to be a concept, but then framing it 
within a social and linguistic context. It is noticeable, for instance, that although Brandom 
mentions his Hegelian debt he does not mention his dialecticism. Brandom is, as a result, 
only adopting part of Hegel’s thinking and is not concerned with how anything equating to 
an Hegelian ‘Essence’, or a Peircean ‘object of thought’ is formed. 
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3)  As an aside, there does seem to be a certain weakness in Wittgenstein’s argument. He 
rejects the idea that reference can act as a basis for creating meaning and concludes, as a 
result, that meaning must reside in the social domain. But he seems not to consider any 
other possibilities. By setting the bar so high for meaning to be created by non-social 
means, he thus creates the philosophical space for a social account of meaning. For 
example, in his discussion of an imaginary dictionary, he claims that any justification for a 
particular definition could only ‘consist in appealing to an independent authority’ 
(Wittgenstein: 2009: 265). This suggests an underlying assumption that reference is the 
only way in which meaning could be validly created on an empirical basis. As such, 
Wittgenstein reaches the conclusion that an imaginary dictionary would be useless 
(‘looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the 
result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment’ (ibid)). However, because 
Wittgenstein claims that empirical meaning can only be justified through a valid act of 
reference, then he reaches the conclusion that meaning is socially created. He seems to 
have given himself no other alternative. One of these would be, however, the approach 
advocated by Hegel and Peirce – that meaning is created through synthetic ‘mediations’ 
(e.g. ‘objects of thought’) - but this is not an option that Wittgenstein appears willing to 
entertain. 
 
 
Chapter Two: Hegel’s Influence on Peirce and Vygotsky 
 
4)  Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s interpretations of ‘clear and distinct’ ideas are usually 
overlooked in the semiotic literature. In the early modern period, they form a sophisticated 
means of understanding how our concepts develop. In the secondary literature, if ‘clear 
and distinct’ ideas are mentioned at all (e.g. Semetsky: 2015: 16), they tend to be 
interpreted along Cartesian lines. And even Brandom does this (Brandom: 2000: 80). 
Descartes’ interpretation, however, is very different from the views of Leibniz and Spinoza. 
Descartes wants to show how the ‘cogito’ permits true knowledge and it is, as a result, 
invoked as a guarantee of the validity of ‘clear and distinct’ ideas. In this formulation ‘clear 
and distinct’ ideas begin to look very much like a form of ‘intuitionism’, or the ‘Myth of the 
Given’ when, in fact, in the hands of Spinoza and Leibniz, they represent almost the 
reverse of this. ‘Clear and distinct’ ideas should be interpreted, by their lights, as the very 
mechanisms that allow us to develop concepts - as explained in the main text. 
 
 
Chapter Three: Perception and Indeterminacy 
 
5)  Humean scepticism is also rejected by Merleau-Ponty who argues that nominalism’s 
account of ‘sensation’ leads to errors: ‘The notion of sensation precludes every philosophy 
other than nominalism, that is, the reduction of sense to either the error of confused 
resemblance or the non-sense of association through contiguity’.(Merleau-Ponty: 2012: 16) 
 
6)  Confusingly, Peirce sometimes categorizes Hegel (and even Leibniz) as ‘nominalists’ 
(EP2: 157). Given that these philosophers are among the most ‘metaphysical’ in Western 
philosophy, this may come as some surprise to the reader. Peirce justifies this claim, 
however, on the basis that they both appear to lack his category of ‘secondness’. Later in 
his career (CP5: 392) Peirce seems to repudiate his earlier claim that Leibniz was a 
nominalist (Belluci: 2013). 
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7)  It is of note that Peirce even borrows an Hegelian term here. On occasions, Hegel talks 
of a ‘prius’ (e.g. Hegel: (1830/1971: 183). This also places the ‘first’ at the beginning of a 
logical process in Hegel’s dialectical approach. 
 
8)  There is a potential parallel between Peirce’s concept of secondness and Merleau-
Ponty’s account of the body. The latter describes the body in the following terms: ‘The 
body is the vehicle of being in the world and, for a living being, having a body means being 
united with a definite milieu, merging with certain projects, and being perpetually engaged 
with therein’. (Merleau-Ponty: 2012: 84). As such, our own body is ‘no longer an object of 
the world, but rather our means of communication with it’ (ibid: 95). It is how we encounter 
the world. 
 
 
Chapter Five: The Structure of the Peircean Sign 
 
9)  Deledalle (1992: 294) records Peirce’s use of the term ‘representamen’ as follows: it is 
used by Peirce until 1873, then dropped in his writings from 1873 until 1895, and then re-
adopted from 1895 until 1903 - when it is abandoned once again. This inconsistent usage 
clearly does not help our understanding Peirce, but Deledalle’s discussion of the term in 
this paper does not mention the central characteristic of the representamen as a ‘vague’. 
 
10)  The use of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ have almost entirely the opposite 
meaning in medieval philosophy compared with modern usage. The Oxford English 
Dictionary, for example, states that ‘The scholastic philosophy made the distinction 
between what belongs to things subjectively, or as they are ‘in themselves’, and what 
belongs to them objectively, as they are presented to the consciousness. In later times the 
custom of considering the perceiving or thinking consciousness as pre-eminently ‘the 
subject’ brought about a different use of these words, which now prevails in philosophical 
language. According to this, what is considered as belonging to the perceiving or thinking 
self is called subjective and what is considered as independent of the perceiving or thinking 
self is called, in contrast, objective. (Oxford English Dictionary: 1989: Vol X: 643) 
 
11)  Maimon’s ‘Principle of Determinability’ distinguishes real from accidental 
subject/predicate relationships: ‘Real thinking is governed the Law or Principle of 
Determinability, according to which the subject of a judgment can be thought ‘on its own’ 
(as something capable of further determination) whereas the predicate can be thought only 
with reference to the subject, which thereby ‘determines’ the predicate. This principle is 
thus a transcendental principle for the ‘a priori’ determination of the objects of ‘real 
thinking’. (Breazeale: 2013). 
 
12)  In Apel, signs are very much on the periphery of his treatment of Peirce. Instead, he 
sees Peircean knowledge being largely established on the basis of the ‘hypothetical 
inference of things in the outside world’ (Apel: 1981: 22). Apel places a great deal of 
emphasis on abduction, deduction, and induction and generally views ‘secondness’ as 
affirming, or refuting, abductive hypotheses. He argues, for example, that ‘abduction is 
therefore the first stage of all inquiry’ (ibid: 109). He also sees a key role for the ‘community 
of inquirers’ and the ‘ultimate opinion’ (ibid: 28). He sees such knowledge as being 
established in a way that is ‘mediated’ (ibid: 22). He also interprets Peirce phenomenology 
as being much the same as Husserl’s and as a result gives ‘intuition’ a place in Peircean 
thought that is not supported by Peirce’s writings. He describes, for example, Peirce’s 
‘Phaneroscopy’ as follows: ‘Its way of knowing is intuitive; that is, it is pure, qualitative 
vision which describes what is immediately before our eyes, free of all interpretative 
presuppositions’. (ibid: 111). This, of course, takes no account of Peirce’s account of 
perception. 
 
 250 
13)  Stjernfelt picks up on the way in which knowledge grows, but instead of viewing this 
through the growth of the ‘object’ he sees it as something that the icon performs: 
 
…any icon fails to portray its object with final precision; this possibility is only 
asymptotically open for the community of researchers. This, of course, is Peirce’s 
answer by means of continuity to Kant’s Ding-an-Sich, it may be reached, but only 
in an indefinite future. This implies that given any present icon, it is always in 
principle possible to find an even better icon which will yield more evidence that 
the former. 
(Stjernfelt: 2007: 88) 
 
This is another reflection of Stjernfelt’s interpretation of Peirce (discussed in sub-section 
6.3.5) that views the icon as being central to Peircean semiotics. It is significant, in this 
regard, that Stjernfelt spends very little time, in his ‘Diagrammatology’, discussing the 
actual structure of the Peircean sign itself. He barely mentions the representamen, the 
object, and the interpretant, or the possible relationship between them. 
 
Chapter Six: Icons, Indices, Symbols and Concept Formation 
 
14)  The ten possible sign combinations that Peirce identifies are outlined below. They 
involve the elements of the sign that we have described. At CP2: 236-7, Peirce explains 
how they work in terms of ‘possibility’, ‘existence’, and ‘law’. In the second column, I have 
italicised the way in which the sign, itself, is experienced: 
 
Sign 
Combination 
Peircean Categories 
Combined 
Explained? 
Rhematic, 
Iconic Qualisign 
Possibility/Possibility/Possibility A term signifying the 
possibility of a quality 
Rhematic, 
Iconic Sinsign 
Possibility/Possibility/Existent A term signifying the 
likeness of an 
embodied quality 
Rhematic, 
Indexical 
Sinsign 
Possibility/Existent/Existent A term signifying the 
property of an 
embodied quality 
Rhematic, 
Iconic Legisign 
Possibility/Possibility/Law A term signifying the 
likeness of a law 
Rhematic, 
Indexical 
Legisign 
Possibility/Existent/Law A term signifying a law 
of a property 
Rhematic 
Symbolic 
Legisign 
Possibility/Law/Law A term signifying a 
symbol in a system 
If the Second is an Existent, then also: 
Dicent Indexical 
Sinsign 
Existent/Existent/Existent A proposition asserting 
the property of 
something 
Dicent Indexical 
Legisign 
Existent/Existent/Law A proposition asserting 
the law-like property of 
something 
If the First is an Existent, then also: 
Dicent 
Symbolic 
Legisign 
Existent/Law/Law A proposition asserting 
law-like facts 
Argument 
Symbolic 
Legisign 
Law/Law/Law An argument explained 
in a system of symbolic 
laws 
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15)  Peirce identifies three branches of semiotics. The first of these is ‘speculative 
grammar’, as discussed, which considers the ‘general formal conditions of signs’ (Liszka: 
1996: 18). The other two are; ‘critical logic’ which is ‘concerned with the necessary 
conditions by which signs can tell us something truthful about the object they represent’ 
(ibid: 10) and ‘speculative rhetoric’ which is ‘the study of the formal conditions under which 
signs can be communicated, developed, understood, and accepted’ (ibid: 11). 
Communication, therefore, is the subject of the third branch of semiotics. It is of some 
significance that the triad of the three branches of semiotics also parallels Peirce’s triad of 
the icon, index and symbol. As discussed in this chapter, the icon has ‘formal’ qualities and 
is ‘speculative’ in nature. Indices tell us something about the ‘object they represent’, whilst 
symbols enable signs to be ‘communicated’ to others (rhetoric). Short misunderstands this 
structure and argues that Logic ‘divides into three parts, of which semeiotic in our sense of 
the term is the first, logic more narrowly construed as the theory of inference is the second, 
and methodology is the third.’ (Short: 2007: 63). This means that Short fails to grasp the 
way in which Peirce views the sign developing within his Logic. 
 
16)  Abduction is often viewed by commentators as a simple matter of Peirce highlighting 
the importance of ‘hypothesis’ in human inquiry. Hypotheses provide potential answers to 
observed phenomena – and, in particular, cause and effect. Liszka, for example, describes 
a range of potential examples of abduction. These include Copernicus’s hypothesis about 
a heliocentric solar system, continental drift theory and the diagnosing of patients (Liszka: 
1996: 64-68). Olteanu, likewise, talks of abduction as being ‘the logical operation of 
advancing hypotheses by qualified guessing’ (Olteanu: 2015: 190). Peirce certainly talks 
about abduction in all of these ways, but it is also essential to view abduction as part of his 
wider philosophy, and also in relation to his notion of the icon. 
 
We have already seen that the idea of ‘hypothesis’ enters Peircean thought at a number of 
levels. Perceptual judgments, themselves, are ‘hypotheses’, and they form the very 
beginnings of empirical knowledge (CP5: 182; Murphey:1993: 375). With icons, also, 
Peirce is proposing that they are formed on the basis of putative similarity. This suggests 
that abduction works at the level of identities. Critically, for Peirce, identity allows us to 
make inferences. This is something that is not possible in nominalism because identities 
are our deemed to be our own creations. One of Peirce’s examples of abduction is the 
‘white beans’ in the bag: 
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white 
Result: These beans are white  
Case: These beans are from this bag 
(EP1: 188) 
 
The beans in the second line share a predicate (‘being white’) with the beans that have 
been taken from the bag. This gives them a potential shared identity that places them in 
the same class as the other beans. On this basis, Peirce argues that we can hypothesise 
that the beans are ‘from this bag’. This conclusion is possible because we notice the 
resemblance between the two sets of beans and infer a connection on the basis of their 
identity. Peirce, working within a framework of knowledge that is founded on iconic identity, 
cannot know that the beans are from the bag, but the fact that they are ‘white’ suggests 
that they share this aspect of their identity - and that this might be meaningful. Elsewhere, 
Peirce argues: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 252 
 
Hypothesis is where we find some very curious circumstance, which would be 
explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain general rule, and 
thereupon adopt that supposition. Or, where we find that in certain respects two 
objects have a strong resemblance, and we infer that they resemble one another 
strongly in other respects. 
(EP1: 189) 
 
As such, abduction is more than the simple conjecturing of hypotheses in terms of cause 
and effect. Davis distinguishes abduction from induction arguing that: 
 
‘Induction yields a rule or a habit while abduction yields a mental unity with an 
accompanying sense of relief…’ 
(Davis: 1972: 23) 
 
It is precisely this - abduction’s ability to create new a ‘mental unity’ that marks out its 
importance to Peirce. It is a form of mental inference founded on Peirce’s treatment of the 
icon and identity. 
 
17)  Deely also suggests that in Poinsot’s ‘Tractatus de Signis’, the icon is present in the 
guise of the ‘idolum’. He states that ‘The closest English word to Poinsot’s use of idolum is 
the term ‘icon’ as semiotically defined by C.S. Peirce’ (Deely/Poinsot: 2013: 241). 
 
18)  The notion of ‘form’ is an important one to Peirce and it is critical to his view of the 
icon. However, Peirce seems curiously reluctant to move from the notion of ‘form’ to that of 
‘formal cause’. Peirce is known for advocating the Aristotelian concept of ‘final cause’ in his 
teleological account of human knowledge (Short: 2007: 91-144), but the idea of ‘formal 
cause’ is seldom touched upon by Peirce himself. Indeed, at EP2: 120, he only identifies 
two types of causation – ‘efficient’ and ‘final’ cause. This seems to be a potentially 
important omission. Joseph Ransdell is one of the few commentators who also views this 
as puzzling and he attempts to involve the notion of formal cause into Peircean thought in 
a posthumous article in the TCSPS (Ransdell: 2013: 541-552). The idea of formal cause, 
however, is anathema to nominalists. It asserts that things behave as they do because of 
what they are (i.e. they behave according to their identity). This idea seems implicit, 
however, in Peirce’s theory of knowledge because it suggests that objects, in fact, behave 
according to the identities formed by their indexical properties which are captured in 
symbols. When objects, therefore, behave according to their ‘habits’ they seem to be 
operating according to their identities - which have, in turn, been established on the basis 
of past experience. Indeed, Peirce also describes ‘substances’ as ‘bundles of habits’ (CP1: 
414). Peirce may have decided that invoking ‘formal cause’, as a mechanism in the world, 
was too radical a step to take. He took the alternative path of talking about things having 
‘habits’, but this, in itself, amounts to an acceptance of a form of formal cause. Incidentally, 
the Aristotelian approach on this issue reflects much of Peirce’s thinking. Aristotle argues 
that ‘knowledge of some particular thing is constituted by knowledge of what-it-was-to-be-
that-thing’ (Aristotle: 1998: 187). As such, he agrees with Peirce that knowledge is based 
on a fundamental understanding of identities. 
 
19)  The idea that the icon ‘structures the knowing power’ is one that we will return to later. 
If the icon creates the initial starting point of an ‘object of thought’, it defines the trajectory 
of its further development. This is an argument that we will encounter, again, when we 
discuss the role of the ‘word’ in creating ‘pathways’ along which concepts develop for 
Vygotsky. 
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Chapter Seven: The Peircean ‘Concept’ and his Pragmatism 
 
20)  The notion of ‘placeholders’ is one that Short (2007: 268) also highlights. He argues 
that Peirce’s account of ‘Hypostatic Abstraction’ allows him to introduce a new object into 
an analysis. Hypostatic abstraction takes a predicate and turns it into an object (of thought) 
(e.g. ‘honey is sweet’ (predicate) is turned into ‘honey has sweetness’ (and sweetness 
becomes the ‘object of thought’). Peirce’s favourite example is in Moliere’s play where the 
doctor says that opium has a ‘dormitive virtue’. In this case, the cause of sleepiness is not, 
itself, identified, but it is still recognised as existing as ‘placeholder’. Peirce states that ‘the 
operation of hypostatic abstraction is not quite utterly futile. For it does say that there is 
some peculiarity in the opium to which sleep must be due’ (CP5: 534). It is thus possible to 
view hypostatic abstraction as another way in which Peirce accounts for the creation of 
new ‘objects of thought’ in a manner that parallels iconicity. Short, however, does not make 
this connection, and still sees icons in conventional terms (‘We may therefore speak of 
likenesses, examples, and samples as icons’ (Short: 2007: 218). 
 
 
Chapter Eight: Vygotsky: the ‘Higher Psychological Processes’ 
 
21)  Interestingly, Marx is also of the same opinion when he compares himself with Hegel. 
He contrasts what he sees as the ‘idealism’ of Hegel with his more materialist focus. In the 
preface to the second German edition of Das Capital (Marx and Engels: 1996: 19) he 
writes ‘My dialectic is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To 
Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which under the 
name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the 
real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me, 
on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human 
mind, and translated into forms of thought’. 
 
22)  The various translations of Vygotsky are discussed by Daniels, where he highlights 
that the words, in Russian, that are translated as ‘personality’ and ‘instruction’ have quite 
different meanings in the original language of Vygotsky (Daniels: 2016: 9-13). As 
highlighted, there may also be a case for re-assessing the translations of ‘word meaning’ in 
his texts. 
 
 
Chapter Nine: Peirce, Vygotsky, and the Learning Process 
 
23)  The nature of consciousness is not an issue that I have tried to address in this thesis. 
However, it is clear from the foregoing discussion, that we should reject the nominalist view 
that the human consciousness a ‘container’ into which sense data enter through 
perception. Neither should human consciousness be viewed as the ‘sum of the contents’ of 
our mind - as it sometimes appears to be in the hands of Social Constructionists. Instead, I 
would argue that human consciousness amounts to our ability to determine our 
experiences and to classify them as being one thing, and not another. This position 
construes the consciousness as a dynamic entity. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer also see 
this as being very largely Vygotsky’s understanding of consciousness: ‘Consciousness for 
Vygotsky, is best understood as a dynamic phenomenon, an action rather than a state or 
an entity’ (Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: 2016: 235). This account of consciousness is one 
that is also close to that of Leibniz. He sees the human soul as an active, striving, monad 
that determines its own position in the web of other monads in the Universe. This account 
also has parallels with Bourdieu’s view of ‘habitus’ as a ‘structuring structure’ (Bourdieu: 
1977: 72). 
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